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As the following pages are about to be given to the public I am reminded of the
story told of a professor in one of the German universities. He had announced for the
semester a course of lectures on the political institutions of the Middle Ages; when
the end of the semester was reached he had only just finished his introductory
remarks. A few years ago I projected a study of the modern “corporation question,”
and intended to clear the ground for the subject by a short introductory chapter on the
history of corporations. I am now congratulating myself that the introduction has
consumed no more than three years and has demanded no more than thirteen
chapters. The present volumes are intended to serve as an introduction to a volume
on the subject of modern corporations, especially those in the United States, to be
written during the next five or ten years. Chapter XIV is not intended to be
exhaustive, but to show briefly the connection between the old and modern
corporations.
In the early history of the United States and Canada many corporations are found
that would have to be classified with the corporations described in the present
volume; but few references have, however, been made to these, because I have
conceived it more convenient to consider them in connection with modern
corporations. To have made place for their consideration in connection with the
classes of English corporations to which they belonged might have distracted the
attention of the student and have interfered with the effectiveness of the main
narrative.
It need hardly be suggested that the present volumes are to be considered not as a
work of historical research, but as an interpretation of existing and accessible
historical material. When particular classes of corporations have been adequately
considered by scholars, I have been glad to accept the results of their labors, while
I have frequently taken the liberty to disagree with these scholars in their
interpretation of the facts. My indebtedness to others I have aimed to acknowledge
fully in footnotes and references. It is unfortunate that so few classes of corporations
have been critically studied by scholars. With the exception of certain kinds of gildsJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 5
and of the mediaeval universities, they have been greatly neglected. Why have
authoritative histories never been written of the English municipalities, the monastic
associations, of the Merchants of the Staple, the Merchant Adventurers, the Russia
Company, the Turkey Company, the Eastland Company, the East India Company, the
South Sea Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company and the American Colonial
Companies? An abundance of material is in existence, but only a small part of it is
accessible to those who must confine their work to American libraries. As it has been
my task to correlate and systematize the existing body of facts, taken for the most
part from secondary sources, rather than to discover new facts, I have not often
yielded to the temptation to indulge in research and investigation of original material.
A prerequisite to a study of corporations is a sound conception of their nature, itself
derived from an extended study of their history. The technical legal conception of
them is so clearly unscientific that it must sooner or later be greatly modified or
entirely dispensed with. If I should find that I had contributed even in a small degree
to the formation of a new and better conception of corporations, I should feel that my
labor had at least in that respect borne good fruit.
I indulge the hope that my efforts to make a scientific study of corporations may
stimulate others to investigate special classes of corporations or special features of






Mr Davis’s manuscript on corporations was completed April 8, 1897, and the
preface written not later than six weeks after that date. Ill-health contracted during
the period that he was engaged in the preparation of this work prevented him from
writing the contemplated treatise on modern corporations. Leaving the East in 1897
in search of a climate where he might regain his health, he took up his residence at
Nampa, Idaho, which place he claimed as his home until his death in December,
1903, at Asheville, N.J.
It must be regarded as a distinct loss to the literature of political science that aJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 6
writer so well equipped to deal with the modern corporation problem and so keenly
alive to the significance of the present-day tendency toward the corporate form of
organization did not live to complete the work which he had planned.




University of Washington.I.  Introduction.
The most important and conspicuous feature of the development of society in
Europe and America on its formal or institutional side during the past century
1 (and
particularly during the second half of it) has been the growth of corporations. The
movement has been most noticeable in the domain of industry,
2 but has by no means
been confined to it; only less influential has it been in religion, in the promotion of
science, the arts and literature, in amusements, and in the satisfaction of the
social-fraternal impulses of mankind. So rapidly have the industrial corporations
increased in numbers and wealth in the United States that they are counted by the
thousands
3 in the several States and are estimated to own from one fourth
4 to four
fifths
5 of all the property, in the nation. Hardly a supreme court in the land does not
vain that more of its time and attention is devoted cares involving corporations than
to cases of any other kind.
6 The mass of laws, rules and decisions evolved from the
creation of corporations and from the interpretation and enforcement of their rights
and duties, both by legislatures and courts, has become so great and so confusing in
its details, and at the same time the dependence of society on the activity of
corporations has become so close and vital,
7 that special governmental bodies have
been formed for the purpose of both restraining and protecting them, while the
“corporation lawyer” has been clearly differentiated in the legal profession, and the
corporation journal among publications. So extensively have the people become
organized in corporations for almost every social purpose that, it is feared, the
integrity of the individual as the unit of society within the state has been seriously
impaired.
8 The anarchist views with, delight the growth of corporations because he
considers them the framework for the aggregation and consolidation of wealth that
will eventually end in the destruction of all institutions. The socialist, not averse to
the submersion of the individual in the social group, is willing to believe that the
flourishing of corporations is preparing society for the acceptance of a future
socialistic regime.
The older “individualists” are apparently maintaining a hopeless struggle againstJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 8
the social tendencies that make it impossible for them to gain a footing in society
except through the medium of corporate organizations or in subordination to them.
Even the apologists for corporations deplore the elimination from trade and industry
of the individual as an efficient unit.
9 Notwithstanding their vital importance to
modern society by reason of their great number and increasing resources, and of the
universality of their presence in the several branches of social life, corporations have
shared so fully in the complexity of the growth of society during the past century that
a clear comprehension of their true relations to it has not been attained. Those who
have given them critical consideration have usually begun and ended with an
indistinct conception of their nature, even if it be conceded that they have made
efforts to provide such a conception as the basis of their study or to attain one as the
result of it.
10 Like most other criticism of immature social movements, the criticism
of corporations has gone to one or the other of two extremes: it has been largely
negative and destructive from a failure to recognize their permanent and enduring
elements and to give them due weight, or it has credited to them social elements
contributed by other social factors;
11 the result has been unqualified denunciation by
one group of critics and unlimited approbation by another. An effort must be made
to avoid the two extremes; to attain a conception of corporations that will include all
their essential and permanent attributes and exclude such as are not essential or are
merely temporary.
Possibly the failure to appreciate the true relations of corporations to society and
social progress, that has caused unscientific criticism of them, is also accountable for
the condition of the body of law intended for the interpretation and enforcement of
their rights and duties.
The principles of the law of corporations, derived chiefly from the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and formulated by Blackstone in 1758, are in the main the
principles still applied, subject to modification by legislatures and courts. Both the
modifying agencies have proceeded somewhat blindly but not entirely without
wisdom. Legislative bodies, it hardly need be suggested, do not always act
consistently; they do not always have policies founded on broad principles; they see
a social need and see it distinctly, but they do not always supply it with due regard
to the ultimate consequences of the remedy. In dealing with questions relating to
corporations they have, in general, had in mind rather the needs of society than theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 9
nature of the corporation, the means through which the needs were supplied. The
result is a heterogeneous mass of laws from which it would be difficult to say what
the legislative conception of a corporation is. The courts, on the other hand, seek a
fundamental principle on which to base every decision; they aim at system and
consistency. The fault of judicial interpretation of rights and obligations is
inflexibility. The anxiety to conform to established principles carries the courts not
infrequently beyond the point at which the principles cease to be wholesome.
Principles are gradually abandoned, however, and new ones substituted for them,
though, unfortunately for system and consistency, interdependent principles relating
to the same subject-matter are not changed at the same time. As far as corporation
law is concerned, the courts have succeeded in fairly administering justice, but only
at the expense of injecting into the system represented by Coke and Blackstone a
body of new principles, one at a time, until it has become necessary for the text
writers to divide the law of corporations into separate bodies according to the
varieties of corporations. It has been virtually conceded by the courts that the older
principles of the law of corporations have become inadequate for the interpretation
and regulation of their relations to present society, but they have been unable to do
more than amend them or partially substitute others for them. The difficulty seems
to be fundamental. The conception of a corporation badly needed by critical students
of social institutions, is only a little worse needed by the legislatures and courts. Such
a conception can hardly be attained otherwise than by a careful historical and
statistical study of the past development and present condition of corporations in their
relations to the society of which they have heretofore formed and now form a part.
The new conception attained, the legislator and judge have a centre about which to
group a system of laws and rules for their creation, control and protection.
The condition of the literary material for a study of corporations is unfortunately
such as to impose on the student and investigator an unusual degree of self-reliance.
The historical and statistical
12 material is scanty and unreliable, while the work of
interpretation already done is of little service. Less enlightenment on the nature and
history of corporations than one would be inclined to expect is given by jurists, either
in legal treatises, opinions or judicial decisions, though they alone, with the exception
of recent sociologists, have essayed to present a systematic treatment of the subject
13
When new social forces make their appearance and begin to be expressed in newJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 10
social relations, the jurist endeavors to explain and control them by the application
of legal principles already established in analogous social relations rather than by the
application of principles that might be discovered through scientific study in the
workings of the new forces.
14 For most practical purposes, the lawyer must assume
that society is not subject to historical development, though such an attitude, while
it conduces to the stability and conservation of social institutions, requires for a study
of institutions the necessity of exercising extreme caution in the use of technical legal
material. Yet, without pretending to discard the established legal principles,
legislatures and courts, as already suggested, have made so many modifications of
the law of corporations that the principles formulated by Coke and Blackstone have
become quite inadequate as a foundation for the modern law of corporations;
15
consequently the later legal writers that have undertaken to expound the law of
private corporations have struck at the very root of the older law of corporations by
discarding, in whole or in part, the cardinal theory of “artificial personality,”
16 though
for very good reasons they have not been followed by the expounders of the law of
public corporations.
17
Writers of political history, it must be admitted, cast little light on the subject of
corporations. Constitutional history, as written, may be relied on for a knowledge of
the form or framework of the state, and popular history for a knowledge of national
activity. Corporations, however, have constituted, for the most part, the framework
of society subordinate to that of the state and have been largely overlooked or ignored
by both classes of historians.
18 The results achieved by recent sociologists are more
serviceable. In recognizing that all men and all combinations of men have their
peculiar and appropriate social functions exercised in relations and sets of relations
subject to constant change and development, they have been led to a comprehensive
view of the formal or institutional side of society and have avoided the narrowness
of both jurists and historians. But in their efforts to classify and systematize social
forms and functions, it is feared that they have not infrequently chosen objectionable
bases of classification and have somewhat arbitrarily exaggerated or disparaged
particular attributes of institutions to make them fit into their system — tendencies
for which more extended historical and statistical study of particular institutions must
act as a corrective.
A study of corporations has primarily for its subject-matter a particular class ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 11
subordinate social forms.
19 Like all other social forms, corporations are subject to
modification: (1) internally, by the influence of their content, the social activity
exercised within them, and (2) externally, by the influence of other social forms and
other social activity. (1) Social forms and social functions are intimately
interdependent. Lack of adaptation of either to the other must result in modifications
in one or the other or in both. (a) If the form, whether originally or as the result of
subsequent more or less arbitrary modification, is unsuitable for a particular function,
it must be altered to conform to the character of the function, or perish, — unless it
be adapted or adaptable to some other social function to which it may be readily
transferred. (b) If a particular function may not be exercised, within a form provided
for it, it must be either wholly unexercised, only partly exercised or fitted into another
form. (2) Social forms have also a close relation to their environment, made even
more intimate by the concurrent close relation of their functions to the same
environment. (a) One social form may be superseded by another, may absorb it or
may anticipate either result by internal modification; even when entirely efficient for
its function, a form may be swept away by a public opinion that finds in it a want of
harmony with some accepted type of social forms. (b) A form in being expanded to
include new social functions, either in addition to or in place of those already
included in it, is likely to undergo modification in the process. (c) A form may be
indirectly influenced through changes in its own function caused by changes in other
forms and functions with which its own comes in contact. Corporations must be
studied, then, not merely in their own internal structure, — though their peculiarity
of form is their distinguishing feature, — but in the relations of their structures to the
functions exercised within them and in their relations to their formal and functional
environment. Corporate forms and functions and the environment by which they are
influenced are all products of time. They are all meaningless except as they register
past experience or predict future social growth, stagnation or decay. They must
therefore be subjected to historical treatment.
The purpose of the present work, then, is to trace the historical development of
corporate forms, and, concurrently, of the social functions that have successively
been performed within them. An effort will be made to lay a foundation for
determining the character of the social functions that have seemed by the test of
experience to be best fitted for exercise by corporations. The various relationsJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 12
sustained by them to other social forms in which entire societies have been
organized, the state and church, will be considered. As far as possible, the effects on
corporate forms of the relations of corporate activity to the general activity of society
will be observed.
For convenience of treatment, the subject of corporations will be divided into two
parts on the basis of their relations to modern social life; those that have been of
service to mankind under conditions prevalent in the past, but now obsolete or only
exceptional, will be treated in the present volume; those that are part of our present
social order will be left for future treatment (except as to the topic of ecclesiastical
corporations). The study will be restricted to English and American corporations,
because they have been more important than others, and the development of
corporate life in England and the United States has been more orderly and complete;
almost all that is worth knowing about corporations may be learned from English and
American experience. The chief importance of Roman corporations lies in the body
of Roman law amassed in their interpretation and regulation and afterwards
incorporated almost bodily into the English system of law. However, for purposes of
illustration, the history of corporations of other countries will be occasionally
resorted to.II. The Nature of Corporations.
All human activity has its social as well as its individual aspect. Man is so
essentially a “social animal” that his every act, however insignificant, has its effect,
directly or indirectly, on his fellows. All men sustain social relations to all other men.
The effect of the social relations — social growth, stagnation, or decay — is a
product of two factors, the content (function) of the human activity and the
organization (form) within which it is exerted. The existence of each factor implies
the existence of the other. Social functions are exercised only through the machinery
of social forms; yet social forms, though indispensable to the exercise of social
functions, are continually suffering modification to meet the demands of new or
altered social functions. In general, function and form — each depends upon and
reacts on the other; progress and retrogression in each are reflected in some degree
in the condition of the other. The corporation is a group of natural persons embodied
in a certain class of the many forms of organization within or through which certain
classes of social functions are exercised. The delimitations of form and function will
appear in the following review of the several generic attributes of the corporation:
1. Associate Activity. — The corporate form is one within whose limits associate,
as distinguished from individual, activity
20 is exercised, and comprehends both the
interrelations of the associated members and their relations with other organs of
society. The early distinction of corporations as aggregate or sole is manifestly
illogical and has been almost entirely abandoned in practice.
21 There are probably no
corporations sole in the United States; with the possible exception of church parsons
in Massachusetts.
22 If there are any, their powers and duties may be fully interpreted
by the laws of trust and trusteeship. It is significant that the later text-books on
corporations give no space to the subject of the corporation sole. The inclusion of
certain individuals in a classification of corporations was undoubtedly considered
necessary on account of the presence in some public officers (or offices) of attributes
common to them and to corporations, such as the legal limitation of activity (found
in all public offices) or of limited control over property held for public purposes.John P. Davis, Corporations, 14
From another point of view, the extended use of the term is explained by a particular
application of the theory of artificial personality — a legal exaltation of the purpose
for which property is held or powers exercised above the natural personality of the
person or persons holding the one or exercising the others.
23
Again, while the functions of corporations aggregate and corporations sole may be
the same, the latter lack the continuity of existence that is so prominent a
characteristic of the former. When it is said that the king never dies and that he thus
resembles a corporation, the actual continuous group life of the latter is confused
with the continuity of existence of the public office not possessed by its successive
incumbents.
24 Groups may, but individuals may not, have continuous existence;
social functions of both groups and individuals may endure continuously. Holding
property for particular public purposes with incapacity to use it for other purposes or
to alienate it does not alone constitute the holder a corporation, though it is one of the
attributes of a corporation that its use of its property is limited by the terms of the
charter to which it owes its creation and in accordance with whose terms it must
exercise its activity. So-called corporations sole differ from true corporations, not in
function but in form; the former lack the internal social structure of the latter.
2. Creation by the State. — The corporate form or sum of peculiar relations
subsisting between the members of the corporate group and between them and other
members of society is created by the state, or, after spontaneous origin and
maintenance by the force of custom, is approved with the same legal effect as if
originally created by it. Neither the group nor its functions, but only the internal and
external personal and group relations under or within which the group exercises its
functions are created by the state. The progress of civilization demands an increasing
exercise of associate activity, but not necessarily in the corporate form. As compared
with the state, a primary, sovereign group, the corporation is a secondary, derivative,
subordinate group.
Likewise ecclesiastical corporations, under the earlier conception of the church as
society primarily organized on its religious side (whether or not coextensive with the
state) were sub-groups of the church, deriving from it their internal and external
social relations. To be sure, all social activity, whether of individuals or groups, is
limited and conditioned by the system of law under which it is exercised, for the state
is itself, like the corporation, a group (though superior to all others), acting throughJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 15
or within certain self-imposed forms; but the corporate form brings to the members
of the group in possession of it internal and external relations different from the usual
and regular social relations imposed on individuals by the existing system of law and
artificial and exceptional as compared with them.
25 Not only is the corporate form
artificial and exceptional, but the field of group functional activity is narrowed or
widened, or otherwise artificially and exceptionally created or modified, by the act
of the state. Nor need the corporate relations owe their existence to a direct and
special creative act of the state; they may be created through any subordinate agency
of the state that the state may see fit to select, or by virtue of general incorporation”
laws, which have the effect of causing the erection of the peculiar legal relations on
the performance of certain preliminary acts by incorporators.
26 Some fields of social
activity, such as the construction and operation of railways
27 and the formation and
management of banks, may by modern law be occupied only by groups of persons
organized in the corporate form. Whatever may be the purpose of granting special
group forms or of contracting or expanding the field of group-activity, the act is
always that of the supreme social group organized as the state or church. This
attribute of corporations has always been fully recognized by courts of law, and the
enforcement of the rule of strict construction of corporate powers and acts has been
consistent with the recognition of it.
28
3. Voluntary Inception — Compulsory Endurance. — The assumption by a group
of the corporate form and the acceptance by individuals of membership in the group
are voluntary, as distinguished from the compulsory political status of citizens in the
state and its subdivisions.
29 But this is not equivalent to saying that persons not
members of the group may be voluntarily exempt from the external effects of the
organization and activity of corporate groups. One must be a citizen of some state,
though not necessarily a member of any corporation; in either case, however, his
conduct must conform to the conditions imposed by the organized activity of the
state, its subordinate institutions and the autonomous corporations created by it.
There is a particular sense in which even the state organization may be described as
voluntary; even if imposed by external force, it may be said to depend for its
continued existence on the consent of the subjects upon whom it is imposed; but a
society must have a political organization of some kind, — the “right of the state to
be” has been placed beyond question. Once organized, the state may coercivelyJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 16
organize sub-groups of its citizens for the exercise in detail of the functions of
government, but such coercively organized groups are not true corporations, though
the name is often applied to them; legal writers have well described them as
quasi-corporations, because they have many of the attributes of corporations, though
lacking in the essential elements of voluntary inception and autonomy. After the
corporate form has been assumed by a group, it is compulsory, from the side of the
state, upon all its members until forfeited for misuser or non-user or regularly put
aside in the manner provided by the state at the time of its creation or afterwards;
from the side of the corporation, however, the corporate form may not be assumed
or retained against the sovereign will of the state. The doctrine that”a charter is a
contract” is vicious; the conception of a bargain between a state and a group of its
citizens is illogical; the only final guaranty of the protection of rights and of the
performance of duties is a sound social sentiment. The prevalence of corporations is
therefore characteristic of a state of society in which individual (and not state)
initiative is relied on and individual responsibility is expected to serve as a regulating
force. In rapidly developing communities the individual initiative has often been
unduly encouraged by making the maintenance of corporate relations (once assumed)
less compulsory. Perpetual-lived corporations are usually born in epochs of social
expansion; under settled social conditions, corporations having a definite and shorter
term of life are usually created.
4. Autonomy, Self-Sufficiency, Self-Renovation. — The group of members within
the corporation is (a) autonomous, (b) self-sufficient and (c) self-renewing.
(a) Within the limits of the particular corporate form and function imposed or
granted by the state, the corporate group controls the conditions (of both form and
function) of its own activity without direction, interference or revision by other
persons or groups of persons, including the state itself.
30 In this respect the true
corporation is distinguished from purely administrative or sub-governmental bodies,
which possess and exercise only enough discretion to execute properly duties for the
most part directed, controlled or revised by superior social groups. Thus the
autonomy (and thereby the corporate character) of American municipalities is greatly
decreased by the interference of state governments in their local affairs, by frequent
modifications of their charters, the creation of state commissions for local purposes,
and the almost excessive use of the writs of injunction and mandamus by the courts.John P. Davis, Corporations, 17
Though the courts theoretically recognize the element of autonomy by refusing to
compel by mandamus the performance of other than purely ministerial acts or to
prevent by injunction a reasonable exercise of a corporation’s powers within the
terms of its charter, the present tendency of legislation and judicial interpretation is
to lengthen the category of ministerial acts and to interpret the”reasonable” more
strictly. The limits of municipal activity are being narrowed, though the actual
volume of activity within the narrower limits may be increasing. From the standpoint
of historical social development, this characteristic of corporate relations has been
most important; it is a proposition not difficult to establish that the early stages of
nearly all the movements in the direction of what is comprehended in “personal
liberty” have been organized in the corporate form.
31
(b) During the period of existence granted to a corporation by the terms of its
charter, its general powers must be sufficient to assure it existence and maintenance,
and the ability to effectively exercise the particular powers granted it and the duties
imposed upon it, independently of external social agents, except in so far as all
members of society are dependent upon their social environment. Such powers, if not
expressly granted, are uniformly held by the courts to have been granted by
implication, some being considered as of the essence of the corporate organization
itself and others as incidentally necessary to the exercise of the particular activity of
the corporation described by its charter. For example, if a corporation should be
permitted to elect officers necessary to perform its functions only when directed by
some external agent so to do, it would not be self-sufficient; it might actually cease
to exercise its functions for want of the necessary official organs through which to
act; such a body would be merely an abortive, not a true corporation. In 1684,
Charles II, by the threatened use of the writ of quo warranto, compelled the London
Livery Companies to surrender their charters and accept in place of them new
charters in which it was provided by a special clause that the wardens’ and clerks’
names were first to be presented to the King for his approval, and if rejected, that the
courts of assistants were to elect others, and so on, from time to time, until his
Majesty should be satisfied, any election contrary to such provisions to be void; the
King also reserved the power of removing any warden, assistant or clerk; the wardens
and commonalty were to be subject to the lord mayor and court of aldermen of the
City of London (themselves to be appointed by the Crown), who were to approve ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 18
all persons admitted to the clothing or livery.
32 The exaction of these concessions by
Charles II and the attempt to enforce them by James II were readily recognized as
tyranny, and had  much to do with the expulsion of the Stuarts and the Revolution of
1688.
(c) A corporate group without power to renew its membership during the term of
existence granted to it in its charter might cease to exist and thus fail of its purposes
for want of members. The existence of a group at all implies a necessity (real or
assumed) of plurality of persons for the due performance of some social function; if
there were no such necessity, there would be no group. If by the grace of the state the
group become a corporation by the assumption of a peculiar form, its character as a
group does not cease to be necessary for the exercise of its social functions. The
diminution of a very large number by th& loss of even a single member might, in an
extreme case, so impair the group (as such) as to make it inefficient for its work. The
purpose of conferring the corporate form, however, is not to destroy the character of
the group as such, but to make it more efficient by providing it with a form
appropriate for its peculiar activity. Failure to provide adequate means for the
renewal of a corporation’s membership, therefore, would be inconsistent with the
original purpose of conferring the corporate form. If at the same time the necessity
of autonomy and self-sufficiency be given due weight, the means of renewal must be
within the group itself,
33 — it must be self-renewal. Thus it is an established principle
that the loss by a corporation of an “integral part,” in the absence of power to supply
it, works its dissolution. It has also been held that when no provision is made in a
charter for the filling of future vacancies, the power to do so by cooperation is
conferred by implication. The three attributes here considered under one head
(because each involves and implies the other) are in some cases very difficult to
identify. They are all, however, found developed in some degree in every corporation,
as well as in many bodies not usually regarded as corporations. When they are not
highly developed, the corporation proper is not easily distinguished from the purely
administrative body; indeed, it must be admitted that a critical analysis of most
so-called quasi-corporations would reveal in them the presence of the three attributes.
The question is one of degree of development; the corporation is in distinct, effective
and clearly perceptible possession of them; the purely administrative body has them
indistinct, rudimentary and almost imperceptible, and ordinarily depends on the stateJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 19
for complementary activity to enable it to exercise its functions. The necessity of
autonomy and self-sufficiency is the basis of the doctrine enforced by the courts (as
an exception to the general rule of strict construction of corporate grants and powers)
that such a construction, if possible, shall be applied in the interpretation of corporate
powers and duties as shall permit the accomplishment by the corporation of the
original purpose of its creation.
34
5. Compulsory Unity. — The creation of a corporation contemplates that in all its
relations with other organs of society it shall act and be acted upon as a unit.
Accordingly it is provided by its charter (supplemented by its by-laws) with a means
of determining the group-will of its members, with agencies through which the
group-will shall be executed, and with agencies through which other social organs
shall maintain their relations with it. In the element of compulsory unity, corporations
are distinguished from most other associate bodies, and resemble most nearly the
state itself. Blackstone very aptly called them “little republics,” though he would
have been more faithful to history if he had called republics “big corporations.” This
is one of the sources of the theory of “artificial personality”; the corporation is said
to have a common name, and to be, “for certain purposes, considered as a natural
person,”
35 “vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several
respects as an individual.”
36 There is nothing harmful in the recognition by the state
in its system of law that a sub-group of it has distinct characteristics like men, if the
fact that it is still a group be not lost to view. Though unified in action, the
corporation is none the less a group; on the contrary, its unity of action preserves it
as a group; if each member persisted in following his own will in preference to
finding a common ground on which a group-will might stand, the group would not
act as such, but would be inactive, and lawyers would readily determine it liable to
forfeit its charter for non-user. The fact that the common group-will may not coincide
completely with the will of any one member ought not to exempt the members from
responsibility for the effects of its execution. It is purely a legal fiction that a
corporation is an “artificial person,” — “a conception, which, if it amounts to
anything. is but a stumbling-block in the advance of corporation law towards the
discrimination of the real rights of actual men and women.”
37 The other source of the
theory is formed in the nature of the functional activity of the corporation, which will
be considered below.John P. Davis, Corporations, 20
It must be admitted, however, that the theory has been discredited in practice, in the
rejection or modification of so many of the principles founded on it that it is quite
unnecessary to refer to them in detail. One such principle has been the source of an
unusual amount of confusion; it is a logical deduction from it that the members of a
corporation have no right in debts due to it and are not liable for debts owing by it,
— “si quid ultiversitati deltitur, singulis non debetur; nec, quod debit universitas,
singuli debent.” The principle has been so extensively applied that the corporate form
has come to be used for the advantage of the limited liability afforded by it more than
for any other purpose.
38 Yet there is nothing in the corporate form itself that affords
a justification for the presence of this predominant element; though some social
functions may be regarded as to such an extent public in character as to justify the
setting a limit to the pecuniary risk of those who perform them, regardless of the
social form (whether corporate or not) in which they are organized. The pernicious
movement has decreased the personal responsibility on which the integrity of
democratic institutions depends, and has introduced into both investments and social
services a dangerous element of insecurity. Limited liability of members was not a
feature of early corporate life in England, and its undue prevalence in this century has
been due to an overestimation of the importance of national internal development.
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More settled economic conditions have already resulted in some improvement, and
the element of personal responsibility is gradually pushing its way back into the
management of corporations so far that limited liability, instead of being an
advantage, is often regarded by promoters and investors as a positive detriment.
6. Motive in Private Interest. — A corporation is composed of persons having a
private or particular (or local), not merely public or general, interest in the subject
matter of the group-activity, whether it be political, social (in the narrower sense),
religious or economic. This is partly deducible from the voluntary inception of
corporate relations, for if such relations are voluntary in their inception, only those
will desire to assume them who have the satisfaction of a private interest as their
motive. A county is not regarded as a corporation proper, but only as a
quasi-corporation; what the citizens of a county do as such, they do as members of
the inclusive society of the state, and their acts are limited (theoretically, at least) to
such as it is necessary for them to do as members of the general society of the state,
and do not include such as they have merely a particular, private or local interest inJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 21
doing. While the same may be said of the citizens of a municipality, there is a field
of activity in which they are considered to be actuated by a particular, private or local
interest not shared by society in general. Lower in the scale, members of a so-called
private corporation, such as one for purposes of trade, are actuated almost entirely by
private interest. In some cases, however, associations upon which a compulsory
organization has been imposed by the state have become corporations by such a
perverted use of the machinery of the imposed organization as to make it a fit form
for the exercise of activity dictated by the private interests of the associated persons;
such was the origin of the old English corporation of the Merchants of the Staple or
Staplers. But “public” and “ private” are relative terms. What is a public and what a
private interest is determined only by the stage of development that has been attained
by a particular society. In a rapidly growing community, a body of citizens so
influenced by patriotic sentiment as to establish a business enterprise largely for the
purpose of “booming” their country may be said to be actuated by something more
than mere private interest; while a similar venture, under mature and settled social
conditions, would have little of the public element in it. Public and private, social and
individual, interests are always found in combination, and sometimes so blended and
confused that it is extremely difficult to determine which is predominant.
Legislatures and courts of law, in the application of the principle, have often been
driven to assume apparently inconsistent attitudes towards very similar states of facts,
though the correctness of the principle has not been denied. The principle must be
adhered to, even if in many cases so hard to apply. In the corporation proper, then,
private and particular interest is permitted to seek its own satisfaction, and public and
general interest, if at all, will be consulted from the side of the corporation, only
incidentally, collaterally or secondarily, as set forth in the paragraph following.
7. Functions Public and Appropriate for Associate Activity. — The social functions
performed by corporations have had two enduring qualities: They have been (a) such
as were considered under succeeding sets of social conditions conducive to the
welfare of the public and of society in general rather than to the particular welfare of
the persons performing them, and (b) such as were more advantageously performed
by associate than by individual activity. The first has reference to the relations of the
activity of the corporate group to the society of which it is a part; the second, to the
relations of the group to the conditions under which its activity must be exercised.John P. Davis, Corporations, 22
The standpoint of the first is society in general; of the second, the corporate group.
(a) What now appears at first blush to be a too restricted view of corporate f ons
would probably have been accepted as sufficiently comprehensive before the
beginning of the nineteenth century. The unprecedented growth of private
corporations since 1830 seems to discredit the statement made, but it is believed that
even private corporations find justification for their existence in the general opinion
that public welfare is materially promoted by the more facile exercise in corporate
form of social functions whose exercise is prompted by the pursuit of private
interest.
40 Nor is the limitation inconsistent with the statement made in paragraph six
above. The corporate form has always been intended and used to promote public
welfare through private interest by affording to private interest a social mechanism
through which adequately and effectually to express itself in social activity. The
almost insuperable difficulty in the use of the corporate form has been to reconcile
the private motive and public purpose of the activity exercised within it. But the
difficulty is due not so much to the corporate form itself as to the character of the
activity; indeed, it is urged with much force that the use of the corporate form has a
tendency to ameliorate the unfortunate social conditions incidental to some kinds of
social activity.
41 The class of social evils usually included in discussions of the
“railway problem” are evils due more to modern methods of transportation under
modern social conditions than to the peculiar legal form in which the men engaged
in transportation are organized. Ownership and operation of railways by individuals
would entail greater evils than their ownership and operation by corporations.
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This attribute of corporate functions is another source of the pernicious legal theory
of “artificial personality.” The function performed by a person is personified, and the
sum of rights and duties involved in the performance of the function is separated in
abstract thought and law from the succession of natural persons or groups of persons
in whom they are reposed. Then the persons or groups are known to the law as
corporations to the extent of their connection with the social functions in view.
Hence the division of corporations into aggregate and sole. The early English parson
was the persona ecclesiae; the church was personified in him; the land, of which he
had a limited use, was in reality the property of the church, or the property of society
devoted to particular religious services performed by the parson.
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The private corporation pure and simple is a product of social, political andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 23
industrial conditions largely peculiar to the nineteenth century, of which democracy
and individualism are the foundations. Repugnance to class distinctions and the
belief in the equality of men combined with the tendency to restrict the area of state
activity at the end of the eighteenth century opposed the creation of corporations
because they involved class privileges, inequality and the limitation of individual
activity; powers that could not be safely (as a matter of theory) left to the exercise of
the state could with no greater degree of safety be reposed in corporations. But if
certain functions were dangerous to the liberty of the individual when exercised by
the state, they were none the less necessary to be exercised, and the nearer they were
to the individual, the less dangerous they seemed to be; accordingly corporations
became more numerous in the early part of the present century. But again,
inconsistently enough, class distinctions must not be maintained and the assumption
of the corporate form and the exercise of corporate powers must be free to all;
general incorporation laws were accordingly justified by social theories. The
distinction between public and private functions is never easy to determine and it is
not made easier by democratic theories of society and the state; all functions have
tended to reach the same level, and “incorporation for any lawful purpose” has been
freely permitted to all. A false definition of public and private functions has been the
cause of the confusion. The ‘private corporation” is a contradiction in terms, and has
no place in a sound organization of society. The present tendency in the business
world (as well as in the courts) is to distinguish more clearly between the various
purposes for which corporations are organized and to estimate the responsibility of
the organized persons accordingly.
(b) The importance of the second attribute of corporate functions has been only
gradually developed and appreciated in the progress of society. Before the present
century, even partnerships were unusual and, when they existed, were usually
composed of members of the same family. The object of medieval corporations was
primarily to provide and limit the conditions of individual activity and only
secondarily to afford a means of expression for unified associate activity. It is only
in the nineteenth century that the latter object has been magnified (concurrently with
a depreciation of the former) to such a degree as seriously to menace the stability and
permanence of the individual as a social unit.
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The principle of association may make itself manifest in two degrees: (a) in theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 24
imposition by a group of the conditions of activity on its individual members and (b)
in the absorption by the group as a unit of the activity of its members. (a) The activity
in the first case is so closely appropriate for associated persons that it will not be
discussed. (b) Whether absorption by a group of the activity represented by its
membership is advantageous is a question to be determined by the ratio of the unit
of greatest efficiency of the activity itself (corresponding to the unit of production in
economics) to the unit of means of exercising the activity; in general, when the
former exceeds the latter, association will be necessary. The ratio of the two factors
varies in successive stages of society and the necessity of association varies
accordingly.
In some cases both degrees of association have been manifested in the activity of
the same corporation; in the fifteenth century, fishing vessels were frequently owned
by a borough and used by the burgesses in common, each conducting his business for
himself, but according to the ordinances of the corporation, and using the corporation
vessels in common with his fellows. The principle of joint-stock management of the
entire activity of the corporation was first fully applied in the East India Company,
and in that case it was a gradual evolution; originally an “open” regulated company
with several groups of investors, it later by degrees came to be a complete joint stock
company with one body of investors under unified management.
The corporate function has both attributes. However fully developed either attribute
may be, the function is not truly corporate if the other be wanting.
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After the foregoing somewhat extended discussion of the nature of the corporation,
the following is offered as a definition: A corporation is a body of persons Upon
whom the state has conferred such voluntarily accepted but compulsorily maintained
relations to one another and to all others that as an autonomous, self-sufficient and
self-renewing body they may determine and enforce their common will, and in the
pursuit of their private interest may exercise more efficiently social functions both
specially conducive to public welfare and most appropriately exercised by associated
persons.III. Ecclesiastical Corporations.
I — Organic Christianity.
Christianity has contributed to the progress of civilization in two ways: directly
through its qualities as a form of religion and indirectly through the system of social
organization incidentally involved in its exercise. The expression of religious thought
and feeling must be sought in a more or less elaborate social organization of some
kind, whether patriarchal, democratic or other; undoubtedly, tool for each historical
form of religion there has been theoretically a particular social structure more suitable
than any other for its maintenance and exercise, however remotely it may have been
separated from it in practice. The early organization of society for Christian worship
however,  — the Christian Church before the Reformation, — the more important on
account of its great extent and complexity, was molded less in conformity to its
inherent religious qualities than in imitation of the structure of the social environment
with which it came in contact; for that reason it was possible to use the Church, to
the great relief of mankind, for purposes other than those strictly pertaining to the
worship of Christianity. Especially during the Dark Ages, after the fall of the Roman
Empire and the decay of its institutions, when Europe was threatened with the
anarchy of barbarism, the Church was more promotive of civilization as a system of
government than as an embodiment of religious belief and worship. In every century
of the Christian era the Church has performed social functions not necessarily
devolving on it as an organization of believers in Christianity, largely because it
alone has had a social structure adequate for them. During long periods the structure
of Christianity has even been so extensively devoted to temporal uses that many
spiritual functions have been either neglected or given over to newly devised social
organs.”
Christianity as a religion before the Reformation was such that Christian society
had to be more widely and highly organized than has since been necessary. It
emphasized to an extent approached by no form of paganism the human element in
religion. It was not satisfied with being a mere body of doctrine — it had to beJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 26
translated into the social life of its believers. Its entertainment and propagation
involved the enforcement of a social code and the erection of such social machinery
as should be incidentally necessary. The faithful were seldom persecuted in Rome for
believing in Christianity, — they suffered oftenest for acting it. Moreover, it was
exclusive. No other religion might exist side by side with it as with the various forms
of paganism in Rome; it was to be the religion of all men, a world-religion in a
world-church. The wider the area of church government and the more numerous its
subjects, the stronger and more complex it had to be; the greater the danger of dissent
and heresy with the widening area, the abler the Church had to be to check
disintegration and preserve unity.
It was the great extent and complexity of the structure of Christian society, and its
adaptability to other than religious purposes, that caused the growth within it of
ecclesiastical corporations. They had not existed in the early Church because the
conditions that would give rise to them had not come into existence; but the
developing Church became familiar with their use long before analogous institutions
were more than fragmentary or rudimentary in the political society of Europe. The
secular corporations that had developed under the Roman Empire perished in the
general ruin of Roman institutions, or survived here and there as mere fragments
during the centuries of feudal domination; the Church, however, suffered less
interruption in the course of its development from the Tuetonic invasions, and
ecclesiastical corporations had not to wait for their rise until a feudal organization of
society should enter on its decline. The significance of corporations, whether in
church or state, must always be determined by comparing them with the superior
social structure under which they flourish; accordingly an examination of the
constitution of the Church at the time of the fall of the Western Roman Empire must
be preliminary to a detailed consideration of ecclesiastical corporations.
II — The Primitive Christian Church.
Christ left no imposing social structure for his adherents when he bequeathed his
mission to the apostles. The faithful exercised their freedom to organize themselves
by adapting to their conditions the forms of the older Jewish Church or of paganism,
the existing political institutions of the Roman Empire, and the fragmentary remains
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and his apostles and disciples, — in general, by resorting freely to all the suitable
material so abundantly at hand. The body of Christians, though in scattered groups,
was very plastic and susceptible of being molded into almost any form, if only
substantial equality and fraternity should be preserved in the mass of its members;
moreover, it had a remarkable power of absorption and was capable of rapidly
extracting from its environment a complete system of institutions. The apostles and
such of their disciples as they commissioned to do so, passed from city to city over
the Roman Empire, establishing in each of them a church of Christians. Each church
was to be governed in all things spiritual and temporal by a limited number of its
members, at first indifferently called presbyters (elders or priests) or bishops
(overseers), chosen by the congregation and ordained by an apostle or his disciple;
they were the teachers, priests and rulers of the apostolic church. Unity of faith and
discipline among the scattered churches was to be preserved by frequent visitation
and close supervision of them on the part of the apostles and their disciples, and by
the intercommunication of the several churches. The apostles, gifted with greater
purity of faith from their earlier personal association with Christ himself, aimed to
preserve it in greater harmony and unity by mutual consultations and correspondence.
The bond of unity in the apostolic church was purely one of Christian love and
charity.
In each college of presbyters one of the number, either by presiding over the body
or by acting as the appointed or chosen medium of communication between his
church and the other churches and the apostles, or by serving in both capacities, came
to be, by the middle of the second century, the leader of his church; the name of
bishop was now restricted to him, and the college of elders or priests acted as his
advisers; as his official assistants, deacons were appointed by the bishop, to execute
his will in temporal matters, to aid in the oblation of the holy sacrifice, to collect the
offerings of the faithful and to distribute alms among the dependent. The bishops
were the successors of the apostles in their relations to the churches, except that their
oversight was confined to the particular churches over which they presided.
The element of Christian unity contributed by the visitation and supervision of the
churches by the apostles having been eliminated by their death, the remaining
element, that of the intercommunication of the churches, had to be strengthened; and
the bishop being the medium of their intercommunication, the episcopal office wasJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 28
greatly magnified in consequence. The moral unity of the apostolic church became
the constitutional unity of the later church in the establishment of provincial synods
periodically attended by the bishops of the several churches in each province of the
Roman Empire. In each province one church, because originally founded by one of
the apostles and situated in the principal city of the province, was accorded
precedence over the other churches; its bishop presided over the provincial synods,
and as metropolitan sustained to his fellow-bishops a relation quite similar to that of
each bishop to his college of presbyters.
The ecclesiastical hierarchy was to be built even higher and the council as the
foundation of Christian unity was to be further extended and strengthened. Some
councils held in the East had been attended by bishops from more than one province,
when the Emperor Constantine caused the summoning at Nicaea, in 325, of the first
of the ecumenical councils, a general council attended by bishops or other
representatives of all the churches in Christendom. In that council the metropolitans
of Rome, Antioch and Alexandria were recognized to be entitled “by ancient custom”
to supervisory powers as patriarchs over the other metropolitans in their several
districts of the Empire,
46 and metropolitans were not henceforth to take any action
affecting any matter of more than provincial importance without the consent of their
patriarch. Patriarchal synods or councils were to act as courts of appeal from the
provincial synods. The final step was not taken. A contest between the bishops of
Constantinople and Rome for the headship of the universal church was not to be
decided in favor of either, but was to result finally in the division of Christianity into
two great bodies. Latin Christianity in the Western Church and Greek Christianity in
the Eastern Church.
Proscribed and forbidden in the Roman Empire for three centuries, the Christian
religion and worship had been permitted by the edict of Constantine and Licinius in
312 on an equality with paganism. Later it had been made the legal religion of the
Empire by Theodosius in the East and Gratian in the West, though paganism was still
tolerated. The crowning victory was won with the destruction of the pagan temples
or their transformation into Christian churches before the end of the fourth century.
Such was the constitution and dominion of Christianity, when the fall of the Western
Roman Empire and the Teutonic migrations cast upon its Western branch the burden
of preserving Europe from anarchy. The burden had hardly been assumed whenJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 29
associations in the nature of corporations made their appearance as part of the
structure of the Western Church. The corporations that emerged in the history of the
Roman Catholic Church and its successor, the Church of England, were of there
classes: (1) Convents, (2) Catholic Chapters, and (3) Colleges of Collegiate
Churches.
III — Convents.
Every body of adherents of a form of belief — whether religious or other — has
contained a smaller number more devoted than the others to its tenets and unduly
zealous and rigid in putting them into practice. And especially every religion
(Christianity no less than others) has had its class of ascetics (	, from

, to exercise) — persons over-zealous in the practical application of its
principles. Asceticism involves distinction of its votaries from the rest of the mass
of the believers of which they are a part, and the distinction has usually found
expression in the following a separate life. So close has been the relation between
exceptionally rigid application of religious tenets and leading a separate life that
asceticism and monasticism (

 to be alone, to live in solitude, from 	,
alone) have been justly considered nearly synonymous. During the centuries of their
persecution in the Roman Empire, all Christians may rightly be said to have been
ascetics in comparison with the rest of society; there was no middle ground between
unbelief and fanaticism.
47 In the literature of the Church, the monks are often called
the successors of the martyrs. The distinction was so marked that the solitary life was
also involved, to some extent, in the relations of the early Christians to the rest of
society, in the differences of belief, peculiar manners of living and persecutions. The
solitary life was in such complete harmony with the conditions surrounding the early
Christians that the apologists of monasticism have sought for it, with some degree
of success, a positive basis in the teachings of Christ. Referring to the advice given
by him to the rich man,
48 Montalembert says: “Governed by these words of the
Gospel, the most illustrious fathers, doctors and councils have declared religious
(monastic) life to be founded by Jesus Christ himself and first practiced by his
apostles. The highest authorities have agreed to recognize that it was born w th the
Church and that it has never ceased to coexist with her.”
49 Yet it cannot be admitted
that Christian doctrine favored the solitary life as an end in itself; it consistentlyJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 30
regarded it only in its effects on general social life and urged it only so far as it aided
the Christian to attain more fully his ideal relations to his fellow-men. In general, the
orthodox teaching contemplated only temporary periods of solitary life in preparation
for more useful participation in the general life of society.
IV — Early Monesticism.
Christian monasticism first became an appreciable movement in Egypt, where its
adherents were of two classes, hermits (
	, from 
	, solitary) or anchorites
(
, to retire), and cenobites (, common, and 	, life). Many
primitive Christians, impelled by the fear of persecution, or the desire to find
increased religious zeal in a simple and self-denying life of meditation and worship,
retired from the cities to live in waste and solitary places as hermits or anchorites.
One of the earliest and most noted of them was Paul, who passed many years in the
desert in the second half of the third century. The strictly solitary life was soon
modified, however, by the introduction of a social element into it. 
St. Anthony, the greatest of the Fathers of the Desert, had inherited wealth, but
when he heard read in a church the advice given by Christ to the rich young man, he
sold his lands, distributed the proceeds among the poor, and retired into the desert to
take up the life of a hermit. Attracted by the fame of his exceeding piety and austerity
of life, many other hermits gathered about him to profit by his companionship and
teaching, with the result that a common mode of living and thinking came to prevail
among them under St. Anthony’s direction and control. His instruction was oral and
the form of his community consequently lacked stability, though when he died in 356
at the age of one hundred and five years, he left behind him a discourse for the future
guidance of his disciples.
Pachomius, however, who lived from age to 348, in early life a pagan and a soldier
in Constantine’s army, provided an organic system for the monastic life of Egypt.
Instead of the oral teachings of St. Anthony, he introduced a written rule (which he
said had been brought to him by an angel from heaven) for the government and
direction of the monks, among whom, after his conversion to Christianity, he had cast
his lot. At Tabenne, on the Nile, in the upper Thebaid, he founded a congregation of
eight monasteries, each divided into families, and each family subdivided into cells
of three monks each. The entire congregation was under one superior, eachJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 31
monastery under an abbot, and each family under a prior. The monks of each
monastery, though in separate cells, lived within one enclosure. So much of their
time as was not devoted to religious meditation and worship was passed in fishing,
tilling the soil, gathering dates and, most of all, in weaving baskets and mats. They
held their goods in common and distributed much in charity to the poor and in
hospitality to the stranger and traveller. Both men and women were organized in such
communities, though in separate enclosures. The element of unity in monastic life
was strengthened by the quite general adoption of Pachomius’s rule, and by
reciprocal visits and general assemblies. Such were the cenobites, between whom and
the hermits the disciples of St. Anthony formed a middle class. In members they
increased so rapidly that in the fifth century they were said to equal all the other
inhabitants of the province, and entire cities were occupied by them. But the stage of
organization attained by monasticism under Pachomius was the highest that it
attained in Egypt.
From Egypt, after spreading into Arabia, Syria and Palestine,
50 monasticism
reached Asia Minor. Among the hermits and monks of Syria and Asia Minor there
had been no generally accepted standard of life until St. Basil (who lived from 379
to 379) provided the rule that has ever since been known by his name and is even
now followed by Eastern monks. Born in Cappadocia and educated in Caesarea,
Athens and Constantinople, he left the schools to visit the saints among the hermits
and monks and lived among them in Egypt, Syria and Palestine. He then adopted
their form of life and retired to his estates in Pontus to follow it. Afterwards he was
called from his solitary life to become a priest, and he in later years he became
Bishop of Caesarea. Then he travelled over his province, uniting the scattered hermits
in monasteries and founding nunneries, and giving to all of them his uniform rule. St.
Basil was the first monk to become a bishop and the first bishop to introduce monks
into his cathedral church as priests. What he added to the organization of
monasticism consisted in making it not only contemplative but active, and in
strengthening the clergy and Christian church by bringing them into direct contact
with the greater piety of the monks, — in fine, in making monasticism not an end in
itself, but a means to an end, the betterment of the universal church. His rule (which
was in the form of answers to two hundred and three questions) emphasized the
superiority of the monastic (or cenobitic) to the strictly solitary life, as inculcatingJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 32
greater charity and humility; it also enjoined chastity, implicit obedience, and
self-abnegation, and a life of industry and labor.
During the time of St. Basil, monasteries multiplied rapidly in the East, and after
his death no Eastern province of the Empire was without them. St. Basil was the
father of Eastern monasticism, and his rule was its constitution. But in the East the
monasteries never attained an organic connection with the whole church. St. Basil
dealt with the monks rather as individuals than as corporate groups or members of
them, and his rule was rather assumed by the monks than conferred by the church;
they were neither created nor recognized by the church as corporate groups. The
Roman Church, with its greater genius for organization, was to fill out the outline of
corporate monastic life by bestowing on the convents of the West the definite and
organic relations to the church that were wanting in those of the East.
V — The Roman Church in the Fifth Century.
In the fifth century the Roman Catholic Church, as the organization of western
Christianity, had cast upon it, by the course of events, burdens greater than had ever
been borne by any other organization of society. The triumph of Christianity in its
recognition as the religion of the Roman Empire in the preceding century, the
consequent exemption of its property from taxation and its priesthood from military
service, and the succeeding grants of Imperial subsidies and other favors brought into
the Church a large membership of former pagans and half-hearted Christians whose
adherence to its doctrines was formal rather than real. An inevitable impetus was
given to the growing distinction between clergy and laity, between sincere Christians
and conventional Christians. The attempted absorption of the Roman population
involved the introduction of pagan elements into the rites of the Church in the
worship of saints and images. The tendency to pure formalism, always prominent in
a state church, was increased in no slight degree. Moreover, Roman society, aside
from its lack of sympathy for the (Christian religion, was hopelessly corrupt, and the
task of bringing it into conformity with Christian doctrines was almost more than the
Church could accomplish, —  the Church as an institution of government had to be
strengthened at the expense of Christianity as a religion, and at a greater expense,
because it is the essence of Christianity as a religion that its doctrines be translated
into the activity of every-day social life. It was inevitable that a considerable part ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 33
the more zealous Christians should be crowded out of the Church, as organized and
administered under the influence of its environment and equally as inevitable that
such Christians should sooner or later adopt a separate organization. The rise of
monasteries as part of the organization of Christianity was due, in general, to the
inability of the current government of the Church to comprehend and regulate the life
of the most vigorous part of Christianity. 
Perhaps the Church might have elevated the mass of its membership nearer to the
plane of its priesthood and more zealous laity, might have resisted the introduction
of pagan elements into its worship, or, once introduced, might have gradually
eliminated them, or perhaps it might have eventually molded Roman social life into
substantial conformity with its rules of conduct, if its internal affairs had been its
only charge; but the decadence of the Imperial government, the irruptions of the
barbarians and the assertion of pretended rights by the Eastern Empire and the
Eastern Church demanded such an extended use of the governmental machinery of
the Church for external purposes that it was fortunate in preserving any considerable
part of the older Christianity. Social stability, the protection of person and property
and the maintenance of 1a\v and order had to be assured. The inroads of the
barbarians had to be withstood. Armies had to be maintained and towns and prisoners
ransomed The conversion of some of the barbarians to Christianity and the
reclamation of others from the heresy of Arianism had to be accomplished and their
results made steadfast until a new Roman Empire and an extended structure of the
Church itself might provide organic stability. The destruction of the earlier literature,
art and science of Greece and Rome was imminent. In the impotence of the temporal
government and the corruption of individual life, the Roman Church had the whole
burden to bear. Nor was the burden made lighter by the attitude of the Eastern Empire
and Eastern Church, both powerless to assist, but eager to reap the advantages of the
struggles of the Roman Church. The ecclesiastical structure, strained as it was, would
probably have succumbed if some of the weight imposed on it had not been shifted
to subordinate social organizations — the monastic corporations.
On the basis of their relations to the Roman Church, as well as of their internal
organization, the history of Western monasteries may be divided into six periods,
each of which is characterized by the origin and development of a peculiar class of
monastic bodies:John P. Davis, Corporations, 34
1. 340–529. The Pre-Benedictine Period. From the origin of Western monasticism
to the adoption of the rule of St. Benedict.
2. 529–910. The Benedictine Period. The “Heroic Age” of monasticism. From the
adoption of the Benedictine rule to the grouping of the Benedictine monasteries in
“congregations,” as those of Clugny and Citeaux.
3. 910–1210. The Congregational Period. The “Knighthood of Monasticism.” From
the origin of the congregations of reformed Benedictine monasteries to the rise of the
Mendicant Orders.
4. 1210–1534. The Period of the Mendicant Orders. From the organization of the
Mendicant Orders to the Protestant Reformation.
5. 1534–1773. The Period of the Jesuits. From the Protestant Reformation to the
suppression of the Jesuits.
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6. 1773 — The Modern Period. From the suppression of the Jesuits to the present
time.
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VI — The Pre-Benedictine Period, 340–529.
It was not merely accidental that the beginning of monasticism in Italy, usually
placed at 340, was almost coincidental with the triumph of Christianity in the
Empire, the peace of the Church dating from 312. The often-repeated statement that
the monks were the successors of the martyrs contains much truth; when the State
Church widened enough to make room for the mass of the Roman people, it did not
remain deep enough to include a large part of the zealous Christians to whom the
introduction of foreign elements into the Church was offensive — and left them to
become hermits and monks. The Roman Church was at first opposed to the new
asceticism, just as the Romans had earlier opposed Christianity, when all its believers
were more or less ascetic. Persecution without the state had given place to
persecution within the state; the same classes were persecuted and the same classes
were their persecutors. Early monasticism in the west was an effort to practice
orthodox Christianity for its own sake by its zealous adherents. As a movement of
importance, it got its chief impulse from the teachings of the Fathers of the Church.
St. Athanasius, the opponent of Arianism, in one of his exiles, spent a season in
Rome and there advocated the ascetic life, with which he had become familiar in
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a “Life of St. Anthony,” even it he added to the known facts such imaginary elements
as would make it rather a description of the ideal ascetic life than a faithful
biography. St. Jerome did more by persuading some of the wealthy Christian women
of Rome, descendants of old patrician families, to devote their lives to self-denial and
their wealth to founding monasteries (though mostly in the East); he himself gave to
the world the Vulgate as a monument of the industry of his solitary life. St. Ambrose,
from his cathedral chair at Milan, preached asceticism so eloquently that Milanese
matrons restrained their daughters from hearing him, lest they should be induced to
make vows of chastity and assume the rigorous ascetic life; moreover, he permitted
the settlement of a body of monks at the very gates of the enclosure of his church. St.
Augustine, in imitation of St. Basil and in anticipation of a general movement of later
centuries, introduced the vita communis of the monks among the priests of his
cathedral church at Hippo.
But before the time of St. Benedict monastic and ascetic life was unorganized and
formless; the Pre-Benedictine period might almost be called the Pre-Corporate
period. Many inhabitants of the Italian cities made vows of chastity or poverty, and
contrived to live under them in the midst of society, while others became hermits
living under the rule of St. Basil, some newly devised rule or no rule at all. From the
fifth century date the gyrovagi, — dissolute vagabond monks.
During this period no organized efforts appear to have been made by monks to
reclaim Roman life from its corruption; the monastic life was lived for its own sake.
Some of the earliest monks, however, devoted their energies to missionary work
among the barbarians. About 380, St. Martin of Tours introduced monks into
Northern Gaul through his monastery at Poitiers. In 410, Honoratus founded the
monastery of Lesinium, afterwards so prolific of priests and bishops. About 415,
John Cassianus placed a body of monks at Massilia (modern Marseilles) and
anticipated St. Benedict’s later work by writing for them his De Institutis
Caenobiorum.
During the latter half of the fifth century, however, monasticism made no progress,
even if it held the ground it had gained. St. Augustine, the last of its great promoters,
had died in 430; and no other great name replaces his before that of St. Benedict of
Nursia in the beginning of the next century. It lacked unity of organization and
purpose, an element to be supplied in the next period.John P. Davis, Corporations, 36
VII — The Benedictine Period, 529–910.
Born in Umbria in 480 and sent to Rome for education, St. Benedict of Nursia
deserted the corrupt life of the city in 494 and retired to live for three years the life
of a hermit in a cave in Sublacum (or Subiaco). The fame of his piety and wisdom
drew other hermits about him, and wealthy Romans placed their children in his
charge for spiritual and intellectual training. He was then placed at the head of a
monastery in the vicinity, but withdrew from it when he found the monks unwilling
to live the life he desired. After founding others, he finally, in 528, founded the
celebrated monastery of Monte Cassino; in the following year he gave to the monks
under him for their government the rule that was to serve as a constitutional basis of
the interior monastic life for more than a thousand years.
The Benedictine rule consists of seventy-three chapters. After a novitiate of one
year
53 (afterwards increased to two years) the monk entered into the full fellowship
of the monastery upon taking the three vows of stabilitas loci (fixity of residence),
conversto mortem (implying poverty and chastity) and obedientia (obedience). At the
head of the monastery and elected for life by all the monks was to be the abbot,
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whose will should be supreme, but who should in all important matters reach a
decision only after having taken the advice of the whole body, though in less
important matters the advice of the elder monks alone should be sufficient. If the
body of monks should be numerous, it was to be divided into groups of ten, each
under a dean appointed and removable by the abbot. If, indeed, the body should
become too large for one monastery, it might be divided and its parts placed under
priors or superiors appointed by the abbot and subject to him.
55 If a monk should be
rebellions, disobedient, proud or complaining, he might by steps be secretly
admonished, publicly reprehended, excommunicated, corporally chastised or finally
expelled. After expulsion, a monk might be readmitted only three times. No monks
from other monasteries might be admitted without the consent of their abbots.
No property should be private, but all should be held in common and distributed
to each for his use according to his needs. As to clothing, each should have such as
the nature of his labor and the season of the year should require; “concerning the
color and size of which things the monks shall not talk; but they shall be such as can
be found in the province where they are or as can be bough. the most cheaply.” Each
should have a cowl and gown and a working garment, as well as boots and shoes. IfJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 37
a monk should be about to go upon a journey, he should have the use of a cowl and
gown a little better than the ordinary, but he should return them after his journey to
the vestiary of the monastery. Worn-out were not to be discarded, but to be replaced
in the vestiary for distribution among the poor. Each one should have for his bed a
mat and a woollen covering — which were to be frequently searched lest private
property should be concealed in them! To remove any excuse for acquiring private
property, the abbot should provide each monk with a cowl, a gown, boots, shoes, a
binder for the loins a knife, a pen, a needle, a handkerchief and tablets. If possible all
should sleep in separate beds in a common dormitory.
Two meals should be served each day in a common hall; each to consist of two
cooked dishes, unless it should be possible to add a third of apples or vegetables; but
“eating of the flesh of quadrupeds shall be abstained from altogether by every one,
excepting alone the weak and sick”; and each monk should be allowed only one
pound of bread and a petunia (half a pint) of wine each day; though all the regulations
should be subject to modification by the abbot according to the season of the year,
the labor of the monk and other such circumstances. The cellarer (or steward) should
hold his position permanently, subject only to the abbot, but the work of the kitchen
should be performed by the monks in weekly turns. No monk should partake of food
outside of the monastery without the consent of the abbot.
The monks should not be idle, but should work in the fields or wherever else
directed by the abbot. If any monk should be an artifices, he might work at his craft
within the monastery, though the goods he should produce would be the property of
the community. Silence and humility should be cultivated at all times. Certain hours
of the day should be reserved for meditation, prayer and worship, including the
exercises of the “seven canonical hours.” Monks selected by the abbots for ordination
as priests, or priests who should be admitted into the fraternity as monks, should
receive the same treatment and be subject to the same regulations as other monks.
Special care should be taken of the young, the sick and the infirm; and hospitality
should be extended by the abbot to the stranger and traveller. If possible the monastic
enclosure should have within it water, a mill, a garden, a bakery and facilities for the
different arts, to the end that the contact of the monks with the outside world might
be as slight as possible.
56
Such was the internal structure and life of the Benedictine monasteries. What wasJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 38
their external relation to the Church? In the course of the historical development of
any class of corporations, the question of their relation to the general organization of
society in comparison with which they are in a sense exceptional, is sure to arise at
some time, and whenever it arises it is important. Groups of monks were not true
corporations until their interrelations and their relations with other members of
society were determined and enforced.
The Council of Chalcedon (451) had first recognized the bodies of monks that had
multiplied without order or regulation within the pale of the Church, and had
subjected them, like any other body of laymen, to the control and protection of the
bishop of the province in which they lived.
57 The rule of St. Benedict had been
sanctioned by Pope Gregory I in the Council of Rome of 595; and in the Council of
Rome of 601, all monasteries were relieved by him of the control of bishops (except
with the consent of abbots) in a decree in which he said: “The charge which we
formerly filled as head of a monastery has taught us how necessary it is to provide
for the tranquillity and security of the monks; and as we know that most of them had
to suffer much oppression and injustice at the hands of the bishops, it concerns our
fraternal feeling to provide for their future repose.” St. Gregory the Great, the first
Pope of that name, himself formerly an abbot and founder of monasteries, and the
first monk to become pope, was the first to foresee the future importance of
monasteries to the Church and to the papacy. That by independence of activity they
might become more efficient, he granted them numerous “exceptions.” He essayed
to make their constitution more nearly perfect by supplementary provisions: —
abbots of irregular life should be deposed, discipline in the monasteries should be
enforced, monks should not wander about or be harbored by others in their
wanderings, the novitiate should be two years instead of one year, monks and nuns
should reside in separate monasteries, bishops as well as secular persons should not
diminish the property or revenues of monasteries, abbots should be chosen from
among the monks by their free and unanimous election and should hold their office
until death or the commission of crimes recognized in the canons; no monk should
perform secular services, and no bishop should hold a service in a monastery. The
Council of Rome of 601 released the monks from another form of dependence upon
the bishops that had been imposed by the Council of Chalcedon by bestowing upon
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priesthood.
The Benedictine rule became the general rule for Roman Catholic monasteries,
though there was, for the most part, no organic connection between the monasteries
in which it was enforced. Benedictine monasteries increased in number very rapidly.
Southern Italy and Sicily were covered with them. In 543 St. Mavrus carried the rule
into France, and at the end of the century St. Augustine was commissioned by Pope
Gregory to plant it in England. In the seventh century it made its way into Spain. In
the eighth century Boniface transplanted it from England into Germany. The great
work of converting the barbarians to Christianity was performed by monks. As soon
as a foothold had been gained by a body of monks in a new land, monasteries were
established, and as soon as the work of conversion had been well begun, the
monasteries became cathedrals, with their abbots for bishops and their monks for
priests. The monasteries became the training schools of popes, cardinals, bishops and
priests. Before the sixth century, monks were only laymen, though distinguished from
ordinary laymen, (seculares), as religiosi, and spiritual worship was performed for
them by priests assigned to their monasteries by the bishops. In the tenth century, at
the end of the Benedictine period, the monks were regarded as a special ecclesiastical
order (ordo religiosorum) and their secular affairs were administered by lay brethren
(conversi). It is hardly too much to say that the Church was monasticized during the
period. As often happens in the development of corporate life, the superior
organization of society proved unable to absorb into its own structure the inferior
corporate life that it had called into being; it had to be content with annexing the
subordinate structure; the Church was unable to comprehend the results of monastic
activity within the hierarchy of pope, bishops and priests, and had to make
monasteries a part of its own structure.
58 The monastic life, though slightly modified,
was very generally introduced into cathedral chapters and the colleges of collegiate
churches in the ninth century.
The Church had its civilizing work to do, not only in Italy but in the Celtic
provinces, when the devastating pagan life came in contact with them. To some
extent performed through the medium of its regular ecclesiastical organization, the
greater service was rendered by the Benedictine monasteries, where the conquered
found at least a temporary refuge. Through their industry and frugality, aided by the
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economic wealth that was devoted very largely to humane purposes,  — the
entertainment of the stranger, refugee or traveller, the relief of the sick and poor and
the preservation of the remnants of the odder literature, art and science. If in no other
place, there was peace, arms were silent within the monastic walls. The harshness of
feudal relations was mitigated by the humility of the monks and the influence lent by
them to the enfranchisement of slaves. As the property of monasteries was the
property of God, the theory of the divine right of their property must have had a
tendency to lend stability and security to all property. With all its faults, monasticism
was the great reserve force of civilization in the Middle Ages.
Though the Papacy did not attain the height of its powers until the next period,
even in the present period the relation of monasticism to its growth is plainly evident.
Gregory the Great had enforced the policy of emancipating the monks from the
control of the bishops, and his successors followed his example. The popes and the
monks each needed the help of the others in their contests with independent and
aggressive bishops. The Papacy was the source from which the monasteries obtained
exemptions and privileges: the monks in return became the standing army of the
Papacy.
At the end of the eighth century the Benedictine monasteries became corrupt, and
the strong hand of Charlemagne was needed to restore discipline in them. After the
Diet of Aix-la-Chapelle in 817, however, a systematic effort was made by Louis the
Pious to effect comprehensive reformation and reorganization of them. He appointed
Benedict of Aniane superior-general of all the monasteries in his realm, and caused
him, after having investigated them at the head of a commission, to impose upon
them a stricter observance of the older Benedictine rule (though slightly modified).
Many of the abbacies and much of the property of the monasteries had fallen under
the control of laymen — an abuse corrected to some extent by the restoration to the
monks of the rights of free election of abbots and of full administration of their
property. What was needed, however, was closer organic connection between the
separated Benedictine monasteries, and that was an element added only through the
formation of new orders. After the tenth century the unreformed Benedictine
monasteries sank into impotence as social factors.John P. Davis, Corporations, 41
III — The Congregational Period, 910–1210.
This period was characterized by the grouping of most of the Benedictine and
other monasteries in”congregations” and by a consequent revival of monastic life.
Such a movement had been inaugurated under St. Benedict of Aniane, but had been
a failure. The interior life of the monasteries was still based generally on the
Benedictine rule,
59 but though they are sometimes called Benedictine monasteries,
as distinguished from the later Mendicant Orders, the important point is that the older
unit of the single Benedictine monastery had been superseded in this period by the
new unit of the congregation of monasteries. Clugniacs, Cistercians, Camaldolites,
Celestines and Carthusians have now taken the place of Benedictines.
The monastery of Clugny, founded and liberally endowed by Duke William of
Aquitaine in 910, was the pioneer in the reformatory movement. Its first abbot,
Berno, and his immediate successors enforced the Benedictine rule with such
strictness that many other monasteries were influenced to submit themselves to it by
granting the selection of their abbots to the abbot of Clugny; many other monasteries
simply profited by the example of Clugny by using its life as a standard for the
reformation of their own. The submission of monasteries to Clugny became so
general that in the twelfth century its congregation numbered two thousand
monasteries in France alone; the abbots of Clugny were known as archiabbates, as
compared with their subordinate abbots. When the congregation became extended,
it was divided into ten provinces, and annual general chapters were attended by all
abbots; two visitors and other supervisory officers were elected for each province.
In the congregation of Clugny so much depended on the personal character of the
abbot of Clugny that the work of Berno, Odo and Peter the Venerable was almost
destroyed during the administrations of a few less capable abbots. The Congregation
of Citeaux (the Cistercians) profited by the experience of the Clugniacs by inserting
suitable provisions in their Charta Charitatis, the constitution of their order, in 1119:
The abbot of Citeaux should be master over all the monasteries in the congregation,
and should visit each of them at least once a year; he should be under the supervision
of the abbots of the four monasteries of La Ferte, Pontigny, Clairvaux and
Morimond, the chief subordinate monasteries; if he should be remiss or vicious, the
supervisory abbots should admonish him four times, and then, in default of
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other hand, if any abbot should be lukewarm in his enforcement of the monastic rule,
he might be accused before the annual general chapter, and if found culpable might
be compelled to ask for pardon and undergo penance, or be deposed. This was a step
in advance of the constitution of the congregation of Clugny.
Nor was the congregational constitution peculiar to the Clugniac and Cistercian
orders. It is also found in the orders of Fontevraux (1006), Grammont (1073),
Chartreuse (1084) Camaldoli (1018), and other monastic orders of the period, as well
as in the military orders founded during the Crusades. When many orders fell into
decay after the Reformation, an attempt was often made to renew them by uniting
them to some more flourishing congregation;
60 founding new orders was discouraged,
and prospective founders were advised to unite their foundations with whatever
congregation should be most in harmony with them.
61 The future constitutional
development of monasticism was to consist largely in perfecting the congregational
principle.
The monastic orders were in this period, as in the preceding, the main support of
the papacy, while their strength had grown with increasing wealth and numbers and
more efficient organization. If in the struggle with the Empire the papacy had to
suffer many defections among the bishops, those among the abbots and monks were
few. Three of the Popes were Clugniacs. The monk Hildebrand, as Clement VII,
asserted the greatest claims to which the papacy could aspire. Peter the Hermit
preached the first, and St. Bernard the second crusade. On the other hand, the popes
granted to the monastic orders greater powers than ever before. The earlier
Benedictines had lived the monastic life largely for its own sake; the privileges
bestowed on them were largely in the nature of exemptions, from ecclesiastical
authority: the reformed orders regarded the monastic life more as a means to an end
within the Church; their privileges were not passive exemptions but active powers.
The abbot of Clugny, more influential than any bishop, exercised the power of a
bishop in a territory about his monastery. In the councils of the Church, side by side
with bishops abbots enjoyed equal rights. If before the tenth century the popes had
delegated the missionary work of the Church to the Benedictines, Innocent III now
delegated to the Cistercians the reclamation of the AIbigensians from their heresy,
and, upon their failure, directed Arnold, the head of the order, to proclaim a crusade
against them. The ecclesiastical hierarchy was more corrupt than the monastic orders;John P. Davis, Corporations, 43
the bishops had few followers, while every monk had taken the vow of obedience to
his abbot; the bishops and clergy were complaining of the invasions of their rightful
fields of authority by the pope; the abbots and monks were dependent upon an
independent papacy for all the rights they had and were to have; plainly the interests
of the monastic orders and those of the pope were identical; each depended on the
other and neither was disappointed.
In this period the monks still monopolized the literature, science and art of their
time, though at its end the growth of the universities and the increase of general
enlightenment were to threaten them with competition.
62 Scholasticism (the
philosophy of the monastic and cathedral schools) became a system during the tenth,
eleventh and twelfth centuries, and found its greatest names among the monks.
This period has been well called the “Knighthood of asceticism” A change had
come over the spirit of monasticism; the passive humility of St. Benedict had given
way to the aggressive pride of St. Bernard. The one extolled the virtues of the solitary
life; the other preached a crusade. The one regretted that he had to be a monk; the
other was proud to be one. Monasticism became rather. positive than negative, a form
of life with something to accomplish in society instead of a life complete in itself.
The new temper appears most clearly in the military orders of the crusades, a class
of corporations midway between the congregational orders and the later mendicant
orders and Jesuits. The Knights Hospitallers of St. John had originally been a body
organized to maintain a hospice in Jerusalem for the reception of pilgrims to the Holy
Sepulchre, and living under the monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.
Later they added the vow of resistance to the Infidels and defence of the Holy
Sepulchre — in distinct recognition of an active social purpose in monasticism. They
comprised three classes: (a) knights, who (of noble birth) bore arms and performed
military services in war; (b) clergy or chaplains, who conducted the services in the
churches of the order, visited the sick in hospitals, and tended the wounded on the
battle-field; and (c) serving brethren, who acted as squires to the knights and assisted
in the care of hospitals. The government of the order was vested in a Council over
which the master of the order presided, — a step beyond the feature of congregational
orders that one monastery should be above the others. All the great military orders,
passing beyond their strictly military and religious field, later obtained political
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was a greater differentiation of classes of members than in the purely monastic
congregations — a feature to be even further expanded by the Jesuits.
In the congregational orders there was an element of nationalism (if the term may
be used for want of a better one), though few of the orders were confined to any one
nation. The Clugniacs and Cistercians had their greatest strength in France; the orders
closely corresponding to them in Italy were those of Camaldoli and Vallombrosi. The
order of Guilbertinus in England was parallel with that of Fontevraux in France. The
general chapters were held at the parent monastery and not in Rome as in later
centuries. The orders were not universalized or identified in their administrative
centres with the Church, as was later the case with the mendicant orders and Jesuits.
In the fourteenth century, the pontificate of Boniface VIII being the turning-point,
this class of corporations sank into impotence and resisted all the efforts of the
papacy to revive them; in England they were suppressed at the Reformation; in
France they lasted until the French Revolution; in all Europe they were superseded
in the active life of society by the Mendicant Orders and Jesuits.
IX — The Period of the Mendicant Orders, 1210–1534.
The four great mendicant orders were the Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians,
and Carmelites. Though not strictly monastic, they were the legitimate historical
outgrowth of monasticism and the most important bodies in the Roman Catholic
Church from the beginning of the thirteenth century to the Reformation.
At the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, Innocent III forbade the formation of new
monastic orders, that the entire monastic body might not be weakened by excessive
subdivision; yet the mendicant orders were so different from the older monastic
orders and promised so much that he favored the formation of the Franciscans and
Dominicans.
The Franciscan rule, sometimes called the Magna Charta Pauperitatis,
63 consisting
of only twelve short chapters,
64 contained the following chief provisions: — At the
head of the whole fraternity was to be a general minister whose orders were to be
implicitly obeyed. Over each province a provincial minister was to preside; over each
house or monastery a guardian. Upon the death of the general minister,
65 his
successor should be elected by the provincial ministers and guardians in a chapter
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general. If it should become apparent to the body of provincial ministers and
guardians that the general minister was not fit for the service and common utility of
the brothers, they might elect another in his place. Brothers should obey all their
superiors, should be frequently visited by those set over them, and should have
recourse to the general or provincial ministers, if they should find themselves unable
to “spiritually observe the rule.”
The Franciscan brothers were to live in obedience, without personal possessions,
and in chastity. Francis promised obedience and reverence to the pope, and to the
Roman Church, and the other brothers were to obey Francis and his successors.
Brothers were to be admitted to the order only by provincial ministers after a strict
examination and a year of probation. They were to be disciplined by elaborate
fasting. The clerical brothers were to perform the divine service according to the
order of the Roman Catholic Church. Entertainment and hospitality might be
accepted by the brothers, but they were always to walk, and avoid riding if possible.
No money was to be received or handled by any of the order, and even clothing was
to be provided for the brothers by the general or provincial ministers through spiritual
friends.
“Those brothers to whom God has given the ability to labor, shall
labor faithfully and devoutly; in such way that idleness, the enemy of
the soul, being excluded, they may not extinguish the spirit of holy
prayer and devotion, to which other temporal things should be
subservient. As a reward for their labor, they may receive for
themselves and their brothers the necessaries of life, but not coin or
money, — and this humbly, as becomes the servants of God and the
followers of most holy poverty.” “The brothers shall appropriate
nothing to themselves, neither a house nor a place, nor anything else;
but as pilgrims and strangers in this world, in poverty and humility
serving God, they shall confidently go seeking for alms;... and
wherever the brothers are and shall meet, they shall show themselves
as of one household;... and if any of them fall into sickness, the other
brothers ought to serve him, as they would wish themselves to be
served.”John P. Davis, Corporations, 46
The sins and shortcomings of brothers were to be referred to the provincial
ministers, who might enjoin penance upon them or give them over to some priest of
the order for that purpose.
Brothers might not preach in any bishopric if forbidden by the bishop. And no
brother might preach at all, except after examination and approval by the minister
general as to his fitness. Suspicious intercourse with women should be avoided, and
nunneries might not be entered without the special permission of the Apostolic Chair.
Brothers might go among the Saracens or other infidels upon securing permission so
to do from the provincial ministers.
The pope conferred upon the mendicant orders the right of preaching and the cure
of souls in any district or country, and ordered that each should have a cardinal for
its governor, protector and corrector. Each order eventually made Rome its
administrative centre and the residence of its general. They multiplied so rapidly in
numbers, that before the Reformation they wielded a greater force than the
ecclesiastical hierarchy. In some cities they were so numerous that the cities had to
be divided into districts, each of which was exclusively assigned to the brothers of
one order. The Church was threatened with absorption by the mendicant orders and
the older monastic orders. Among both the Franciscans and Dominicans there was
added to the two classes of priests and lay brothers a third known as “Tertiaries,”
persons who lived in the world and adopted a semimonastic rule provided by the
order. Almost contemporaneously with the founding of the order of St. Francis, Clara
of Assisi founded a parallel female order — the Sisterhood of St. Clara — under a
slightly modified form of the Franciscan rule.
The orders became so extended that disagreements arose within them. In 1517 Pope
Leo X. had to give recognition to a division of the Franciscans into Observantes and
Conventualists. In such cases the order was usually not absolutely divided, but the
dissenting body, if so considerable as to demand recognition, was given a separate
vicar-general. Among the Carmelites, the congregation of Mantua, and the
“Barefoot” Carmelites of Spain and Italy were granted separate vicar-generals. The
reformed order of Augustinians, to which Martin Luther belonged, was one under its
own vicar-general. The well-known Capuchins were a reformed order of the
Franciscans organized by Matthew de Bassi and accorded the privilege of choosing
their own vicar-general in 1525. Thus, at least, the semblance of a unifiedJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 47
organization was maintained.
As a matter of organization, the mendicant orders differed from the earlier monastic
orders in being more highly centralized, in maintaining closer relations with the
popes by having their systems radiating from Rome, in having larger and more nearly
universal fields of activity, and in their desertion of the monastery (or restricted
locality) as their unit. The Benedictine of the sixth century had been a member of a
monastery; the Franciscan of the fourteenth century was a member of an order as
wide as the Church. The development was parallel (though earlier in time) with that
of monarchy and national administration out of feudalism.
Their social functions were far in advance of those of their predecessors. Their
work was to give new life to the Christian religion and uproot heresy by practicing
humility and preaching, the Franciscans rather by the former, the Dominicans rather
by the latter. The degeneracy of the clergy and the proud indolence of the monastic
orders left the masses of the people, after the first five crusades, disheartened and
spiritually miserable. The crusades had been a manifestation of the chivalry of
Christianity; they had all but failed. The thirteenth century called for humanity in
place of chivalry. The Church, as organized, was powerless to fill the need of the
time. The mendicant orders were the organized forms of the new social force. They
were churches within the Church. The granting of corporate powers to the mendicant
orders is only evidence of the tendency of all organized societies to rely, in their
extremities, rather on corporations than on their own organization.
It had been suggested that with the Benedictines the monastic life was largely an
end in itself, and that with the congregational orders it was less an end in itself, and
more a means to an end. With the mendicants the life of the order (while it remained
uncorrupt) was almost entirely for the purpose of affecting society in general; those
who desired to practice it for its own sake were organized as “Tertiaries.” For this
reason fixity of residence had not been contemplated by St. Francis, though St.
Benedict had imposed on his monk the vow of stabilitas loci. The mendicants were
an itinerant priesthood to seek men wherever they might be found. and to benefit
society spiritually by autos-da-fé as well as masses. 
During this period the Franciscans and Dominicans sustained the monastic
reputation for learning by producing many of the most learned men and greatest
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through the universities than through the machinery of their own orders — a presage
of the future differentiation of educational from ecclesiastical corporations.
The Reformation found the mendicant orders in decay; wealth accumulated in spite
of vows of poverty had engendered indolence and self-seeking; and envy and
jealousy between the orders and between factions within them had displaced zeal for
the spiritual welfare of men. In England they were suppressed along with the
monastic orders. On the Continent the Church made heroic efforts to reform them,
but with only moderately substantial results. Ecclesiastical corporations, like others,
have seemed incapable of reformation without such organic changes as to make them
virtually different organizations. It has seemed impossible to infuse vitality into a
corporate structure when once it has been pervaded by corruption. Instead of a
genuine revival of the corporations that had declined by the end of the period, a new
class of corporations made their appearance. differing from their predecessors less
in form than in the degree to which the same general form was developed.
X — The Period of the Jesuits, 1534–1773.
Ignatius de Loyola founded the Society of Jesus in 1534, but it received the formal
approval of the Church only in 1540. In the latter year Pope Paul III, in the bull
Regimini Militantis Ecclesiae, gave the organization his sanction:
“Whereas, we have lately learned that our beloved son, Ignatius de
Loyola [and ten others) have met together and become associates; and
renouncing the seductions of this world, have dedicated their lives to
the perpetual service of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of us, and of other
our successors, Roman Pontiffs; and expressly for the instruction of
boys and other ignorant people in Christianity; and above all, for the
spirit and consolation of the faithful in Christ, by hearing confessions
[etc.] we receive the associates under our protection and that of the
Apostolic See; conceding to them, moreover, that some among them
may freely and lawfully draw up such constitutions as they shall judge
to be conformable [etc.].... We will, moreover, that into this society
there be admitted to the number of sixty persons only, desirous of
embracing this rule of living, and no more, and to be incorporatedJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 49
into the society aforesaid.”
The limitation of membership to sixty was removed by a second bull of the same
pope in 1543.
The constitution provided for in the bull of approval appears to have been
completed in 1552. At the head of the order was to bee general with his residence at
Rome and possessing almost absolute authority over the members of the order. He
was to be elected by a general chapter or congregation consisting of two professi
living at Rome, all the provincial generals, and two professi chosen in each province
by a provincial congregation or chapter. Four assistants should also be elected by the
general congregation to reside near the general at Rome and aid him in the
administration of the affairs of the order, each with particular reference to one of the
four original provinces. The general congregation should also appoint one
“admonitor” who should be in continual attendance on the general for the purpose,
“should he perceive him swerving from the right path, with all possible humility to
advise him, after earnest and devout prayer to God, what he considers to be the best
course to follower.”
Extreme discrimination was to be exercised in the admission to membership in the
order. Members were to be drawn from the best social material. Candidates had to
possess a comedy presence, youth, health, strength, facility of speech, and steadiness
of purpose. No heretics or schismatics, homicides or other criminals, married men,
or persons of weak or unsound mind, were eligible to membership. The governable
passions, habits of sinning, unsteadiness and fickleness of mind, lukewarm devotion,
want of learning and of ability to acquire it, a dull memory, bodily defects, debility
and disease, and advanced age were some of the impediments to candidacy. Any
member might be expelled by the general or the general congregation.
The members were divided into four general classes: (a) professi, (b) coadjutors,
(c) scholars, and (d) novices,  — to which ought perhaps to be added a fifth class, (e)
of laymen living in society and maintaining secret relations to the order and
corresponding to the Tertiaries of the Franciscans and Dominicans. (a) The professi
were the class from which the highest officers of the order were chosen. (b) The
coadjutors were both temporal and spiritual, the former as agents and stewards in
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periods as (c) scholars and (d) novices. The colleges of the order were presided over
by rectors, houses of first and second probation by superiors, and provinces by
provincial generals, all appointed by the general for limited terms from the class of
professi.
No property should be owned by the members. Private property should be disposed
of at the bidding of the general within a year after the admission of its owner into the
order; “and he will accomplish a work of greater perfection if he dispose of it in
benefit of the order.” Endowments should not be received by the order save for the
support of its colleges, scholars, and instructors. No ecclesiastical dignity or benefice,
or payment for services, as that of hearing confessions, should be accepted by
members. Absolute obedience should be the bond that bound together the several
parts of the order in their intricate relations.
“As for holy obedience, this virtue must be perfect in every point, —
in execution, in will, in intellect; doing what is enjoined with all
celerity, spiritual joy, and perseverance; persuading ourselves that
everything is just; suppressing every repugnant thought and judgment
of one’s own, in a certain obedience;... and let every one persuade
himself that he who lives under obedience should be moved and
directed, under Divine Providence, by his superior, just as if he were
a corpse, which allows itself to be moved and led in every direction.”
Members were to have no communication with other men within or without the
order, except with the permission of their superiors. An elaborate system of reports
kept the actions of every member and every part of the machinery of the order under
the eyes of the higher officers. To the old monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and
obedience imposed on all members, a special vow of obedience to the pope was
exacted of the profess), the highest class of the order.
The general aims of the Jesuits were, positively, the promotion of the interests of
the Roman Catholic Church, and, negatively, the undoing of the work of the
Reformation by suppressing Protestantism, as indicated from their point of view by
their motto, Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam. The means employed had close reference to
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reason against authority, they aimed to suppress it by maintaining colleges of their
own and working their way into other institutions of learning. As the result had taken
place under the protection of temporal rulers they sought to attain control over
European princes by every conceivable avenue, from acting as their confessors and
tutors to enrolling them in their membership; if control of hostile governments could
not be compassed, their work was hampered to the greatest possible extent by the
employment of all the arts of diplomacy and intrigue. Incidentally they planted
Roman Catholic missions in the East Indies, Japan and China, and in North and
South America, aiming always rather at the attainment of control through the
machinery of their order than at the dissemination of doctrines. The first thing
needful for the Roman Catholic Church was the reassertion of its authority, of its
control of the framework of society; afterwards the enlightened tendencies of the time
might be accommodated within it. With its large membership of carefully chosen
men,
66 its highly concentrated and unified organization, and its wide ramifications,
touching society at every point and in every country, it was the strongest factor in the
counter-Reformation in the second half of the sixteenth century.
But corporations have seldom been confined to their legitimate field of activity.
Always appearing at times when the superior contemporary structure of society is
unequal to the tasks by which it is confronted, and when the efforts of individuals in
the accomplishment of public purposes are in need of combination and correlation,
their powers are likely to be far in excess of their legitimate needs, and their pursuit
of public welfare to be subordinated to that of their own interests. The Jesuits
accumulated too much power and used it too little for the benefit of the Church and
too much for their own aggrandizement. Pope Paul III seems to have had fears for the
future in insisting at the outset upon a special vow of obedience to the papacy. The
general verdict of history has been in justification of the expulsion of the order from
nearly all European countries during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and
of its final suppression by Pope Clement XIV in 1773 by the bull Dominus et
Redemptor.
It must not be understood that the Jesuits occupied the whole field of corporate life
of the Roman Catholic Church; the sixteenth century (after the Reformation) and the
first half of the seventeenth century witnessed a considerable revival of the older
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was, however, nothing new in their organization. The Jesuits represent the highest
point of development reached by corporations in the Roman Catholic Church, a point
at which they maintained themselves even against the opposition of the monastic
orders, the Church itself and the temporal princes. They filled such a large part in the
activity of the Church and the Church became so dependent upon them, unable as it
was to do even the legitimate work delegated to them, that their suppression was
followed by a restoration in 1814, though under circumstances that cannot be
considered here.
XI — Cathedral Chapters.
It has been suggested that corporations may have their origin not only in the
assumption of a form of organization by newly created groups, but by such changes
in the supreme organization of society as to leave some of its groups, retaining their
old organization, in an exceptional relation to it. Cathedral chapters are
exemplifications of this principle. The course of their development is in some
respects the reverse of that of the monastic bodies. The conversion of bodies of
cathedral clergy into corporations is due no more to changes within them than to
concurrent changes without them in the ecclesiastical organization.
The Church was largely monasticized during the seventh, eighth, and ninth
centuries. The later national churches in France, England, and Germany were
established by missionary monks. When the conversion of a considerable part of the
barbarians had been accomplished, the abbots became bishops and their monks
became their clergy. Thus St. Martin was taken from his monastery at Poitiers to be
made Bishop of Tours; St. Augustine became the first archbishop of England, and the
first of thirty-eight monks to hold that position in succession; and Boniface became
archbishop of Germany. Likewise in Italy, the superior reputation of the monks for
piety and learning and their close connection with the papacy made many of them
popes and even more of them bishops. But while a large part of the bishops were
monks, others were not, and the clergy, taken to some extent from the native
inhabitants, and in all cases subject to be influenced by their closer contact with the
natives, became farther removed from the moral plane of the bishops; by the middle
of the eighth century, the degenerate clergy were plainly in need of reformation. The
impulse to the Reformation had been given by the monks, both by example of livingJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 53
and by preaching.
67 The monks had been rising, since the sixth century, from the
position of laymen to that of an order of clergy in the Church, and their example must
have had increasing influence in the direction of a reformation. The demand for
reformation was answered by almost transforming the cathedral churches into
monasteries.
It is stated on good authority
68 that the first trace of the “canonical rule” or vita
comas is found in a decree of the Council of Vernon in 755, in which it was enacted
that “clerks should live either in a monastery under monastic order, or under the
control of the bishop under ‘canonical’ order.” Later in the century, bishops in
Lombardy “were required to compel their clergy to live under ‘canonical’ order”;
otherwise they would be liable to military service, like ordinary laymen. In 802,
Charlemagne enacted at Aix-la-Chapelle:
“Let [the clergy] not be permitted to wander out of doors, but let them
live under complete ward, not given to filthy lucre, not unchaste, not
thieves, not murderers, not ravishers, not litigious, not passionate, not
puffed up, not drunkards, but chaste in heart and body, humble,
modest, sober, kind, peaceful, sons of God worthy of being promoted
to holy orders, not living lives of luxury or unchastity or other kinds
of iniquity in the villages or homesteads adjoining a church without
control or discipline.” “The theory was that in cities the bishop and
his clergy, and in country places the chief presbyter and the younger
clergy, should live together under the same roof. When the bishop’s
house was not large enough, another building was to be provided; but
whether it were the bishop’s house or another building, it was a
‘clustrum’ or ‘cloister,’ a building kept under lock and key, with a
common refectory and, above all, a common dormitory.”
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The final step was the imposition of a common rule on the body of priests living
together.
Louis the Pious, at the same time when he essayed to introduce the reforms of
Benedict of Aniane into the monasteries in 817 also made obligatory upon priests the
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the rule was based on the Benedictine monastic rule, but slightly modified, chiefly
in the elimination of the vow of poverty. Louis the Pious also altered Chrodigang’s
rule so as to make it more widely applicable to bodies of clergy.
“In both forms of the rule, the clergy-house was to have only one door
for entrance and for exit; it was to contain a dormitory, a refectory, a
storeroom, and other offices necessary for brethren living together in
a single society; the clergy were to receive food and drink in
prescribed portions; those who had no means of their own were to
receive clothing as well.”
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The seven “canonical hours” were to be observed, definite parts of each day were
to be set apart for prayer, meditation, discipline and instruction. Each day the whole
body should come together to celebrate mass and hear the reading of psalms, canons,
the canonical rule, or “treatises and homilies which should edify the hearers.” Indeed
the name”chapter” is said to be derived from the daily meeting for the hearing of the
“chapter” (ad capitulum). Later in the same century it was enacted that bishops
should provide cloisters; if their own houses were not large enough, they were
empowered to acquire neighboring land, by compulsion if necessary; if funds were
wanting with which to build, forced levies were to be made on the holders of church
lands. “The rule became as general in Italy and England as it had become in the
Frankish domain, and by the beginning of the tenth century the canonical life
embraced almost all the clergy in Western Christendom.”
71 Concurrent with and even
preceding the introduction of the canonical rule into cathedral chapters, the
episcopacy was passing through an important change. The bishop was coming to be
less the head of a predominant church with country churches dependent upon it, and
more the supervisor of all the churches in a district; in other words, the diocese and
parish were emerging in their modern form. Then separation of the clergy from the
bishop became wider and the dean came to be the virtual head of the chapter. Church
revenues, originally divided into three parts (for the clergy, church structure and
poor), came to be divided into four parts (for the bishop, clergy, church structure and
poor). The election of the dean had already been vested in the chapter; election of its
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distinct from the residence of the bishop. At first temporarily, from the twelfth
century permanently, the members of the chapter employed vicars to perform their
ecclesiastical services, and some of them were laymen or, if in holy orders, had no
actual connection whatever with the cathedral. The sole remaining bond between the
cathedral chapter and the hierarchy of the Church was the power of electing the
bishops, which has always been retained.
As usual, classes within the chapter were formed and its powers reposed in one
class to the exclusion of the other, just as in monasteries the membership was divided
into monks and lay brethren, and in the Society of Jesus into professi and lower
classes. The members of the chapter were distinguished as capitular and
non-capitular, according as they participated or not in the exercise of the powers of
the chapter.
An instructive process of partial dissolution took place. The revenue and property
of the chapter were first separated from those of the bishop. then they were gradually
divided among the members of the chapter, the right to live in the chapter-house
being commuted for a fixed payment of money; then the members lived in separate
houses, and the other features of the common life vanished, except as the shadow of
it remained in periodical meetings or banquets. The word “prebend” (prebends,
fodder) originally stood for the right to live at the common table, but was applied to
the estate for which it was commuted; and those who had still only the right to live
in the chapter-house were distinguished as mere canons in contrast with the
prebendaries.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when reforms were attempted in the cathedral
chapters, especially by the restoration of the common life (vita communis) under the
rule of St. Augustine those who assumed it were known as “regular canons” (canons
living under a rule or regula) as distinguished from “secular canons.” Some of the
canons who were dissatisfied with the life of the cathedral chapters left the cathedrals
and organized monastic orders; such was the origin of the influential
Premonstratensian order, founded by St. Norbert in Germany in the twelfth century.
In England, when the monasteries were suppressed, some of them were transformed
into cathedrals, the monks becoming secular canons, to wit, the cathedrals of
Westminster, Chester, Gloucester, Peterborough, Oxford, and Bristol.John P. Davis, Corporations, 56
XII — Chapters of Collegiate Churches.
When the common life and canonical rule were introduced into churches in the
eighth and ninth centuries, the change was intended to apply to bodies of clergy not
only in cathedral churches, but also in country churches. Churches that were not
cathedrals, and in which there was such an organized body of clergy, became
collegiate churches and their bodies of clergy became colleges or chapters.
The chief difference between them and cathedral chapters was in their relation to
the bishop and through him to the ecclesiastical organization. They had no voice in
the election of the bishop, and their sources of revenue were more easily
distinguished from his; not being situated so as to be clearly subject to the episcopal
influence, they came to occupy a position of greater independence.
Their internal organization and development was quite identical with those of the
cathedral chapters. After the Reformation in England, the addition of a bishop was
all that was necessary to convert some of their churches into cathedrals, the cathedral
chapter being already at hand in the collegiate chapter. Some of the monasteries or
priories, and especially the latter, were also transformed into collegiate churches, as
those of Canterbury, Rochester, Winchester, Worcester,.Durham, Norwich, Ely, and
Carlisle.
There was no such tendency to affiliation in the cathedral and collegiate chapters
as became such an important element in the growth of monasticism; their activity was
rather negative than positive; without great aims or purposes of their own, they are
examples of ecclesiastical organs forced into a monastic mold. They are also
evidences of the efforts of the Church to absorb into its own structure the monastic
life; the futility of the efforts appears in the fact that the ecclesiastical bodies into
which the monastic life was injected became corporations after a time.
XIII — General Observations.
After the foregoing historical review of the growth of corporations in the Church,
it may be of advantage to bring together some of the tendencies observable in their
relation to the general ecclesiastical organization, in their internal structure, and in
their interrelations. Some such tendencies have already been noticed, others may now
be added.
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the ecclesiastical organization to comprehend all the life of Christianity and to
provide it machinery for the expansion of its full activity. The Church as an
organization of all society — as a spiritual government — had to be so general in its
nature that it was unfitted for certain classes of Christians; consequently they had of
necessity either to remain entirely outside the Church or be allowed to assume
autonomous organizations only nominally within it. The situation was appreciated
by the Church, the excluded classes were permitted to adopt their own organization,
and the complex of all relations set up by them within their own groups and between
their own members and the other members of society were confirmed and sanctioned
by the Church.
2. The element of personal interest in the membership of ecclesiastical corporations
was so much more vigorous than the merely general interest (approaching to apathy)
of the membership of the Church that they rapidly absorbed the vitality of
Christianity, — and the monastic life came to be known as the “religious” as
distinguished from the “secular” life. The Church was weakened by the loss of the
strength of Christian thought, feeling and action abstracted by its corporations. Nor
was the loss compensated by the emulation of the monastic life by the membership
of the Church (outside of the hierarchy of the priesthood); the tendency was quite the
contrary, —  to depress the moral level of the membership of the Church.
3. The Church was never able to reabsorb the structure of the monasteries, so strong
was their tendency to independent life. The only way open to the Church to gain
advantage from the existence of the corporations was to accept their fruits (religious
zeal and purity) by recruiting the ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy from the
“religious” orders. The Church thus became so dependent on its corporations that it
was virtually unable to exist without them, while it was unable to make them a part
of itself. When it attempted to attain the results of monastic life within its own
organization by imposing a rule on its bodies of priests in cathedrals and collegiate
churches, it soon found that the bodies of priests had become corporations, almost
as independent of the Church as the monastic orders themselves, and hardly a part of
the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
4. The initiative in the formation of monastic corporations was never taken by the
Church. The acts by which their internal and external powers, duties and organization
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arrangements made by the groups on their own initiative.
“[The Church of Rome] understands, what no other Church has ever
understood, how to deal with enthusiasts The Catholic Church neither
submits to enthusiasm nor proscribes it, but uses it. She considers it
as a great moving force which in itself... is neither good nor evil, but
which may be so directed as to produce great good or evil; and she
assumes the direction to herself,... she knows that when religious
feelings have obtained the complete empire of the mind, they impart
a strange energy, that may raise men above the dominion of pain and
pleasure, that obloquy becomes glory, that death itself is
contemplated only as the beginning of a higher and happier life. He
may be vulgar, ignorant, visionary, extravagant; but he will do and
suffer things which it is for her interest that somebody should do and
suffer, yet from which calm and sober-minded men would shrink. She
accordingly enlists him in her service, assigns to him some forlorn
hope, in which intrepidity and impetuosity are more wanted than
judgment and self-command, and sends him forth with her
benediction and her approval.”
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The popes understood that the activity of the monks would be of benefit to
Christianity as a religion, but that they could not be organized within the Church, as
it was; they accordingly confirmed the organization assumed by them, making it
subject to the control of the Church only in an extremity, and not immediately. 
In the cathedral and collegiate chapters, however, the initiative was not in the
bodies of priests, but in their Church. The intention was not to create corporations,
but to prescribe a mode of life for certain bodies within the Church; their ultimate
corporate character was the outcome of their prescribed mode of life and their
changing relations to the other parts of the government of the Church.
5. Every revival in the Roman Catholic Church was characterized by and largely
dependent upon an increase in the membership, power and activity of its
corporations. In every great struggle, internal and external, from the descent of the
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century, the Church found its greatest strength in its corporations. And it was
unfortunately so, because no reformation that was not effected in the general
organization of the Church could be lasting. The gain was at the expense, to a great
extent, of the substitution of an outside and semi-independent Church for the regular
Church; and corporate life had such a degree of persistence that it could not be
absorbed.
6. The ecclesiastical corporations were the support of the monarchical principle in
its application in the Church. They were the standing army of the Pope, his bulwark
against the independence of archbishops and bishops and national churches, —
against heresy within the pale of the Church, and the increased activity of universities
and schools without it. But the day of reckoning with the religious orders was to
come. The papacy anticipated the evil day by making them its Pretorian Guard, by
accepting its nominees or occupants of the Apostolic see, and thus providing a bond
of unity between them. Pope Clement XIV had to abolish the order of Jesuits, — the
quintessence of ecclesiastical corporations. There had come to be two popes in Rome
in popular phrase, — the “White Pope” and the “Black Pope” (the superior general
of the Jesuits). If the revivals of purity in Christianity and the expanding activity of
Christian society had found expression through the machinery of the Church instead
of ecclesiastical corporations, the power of the papacy would have been seriously
threatened. As it was, the Church itself became so corrupt as to suffer  contempt in
the eyes of the religious orders, and an Augustinian friar setting at naught his
allegiance to the Pope, started the Reformation.
7. In the earliest stages, the attitude of the Church towards its corporations was
passive; in its latest stages, active. The Benedictines were tolerated by the Church
— merely permitted to live a peculiar life; the Church used the Mendicant Orders as
its instruments in destroying heresy, and the Jesuits to regain its control over social
organization. The canonical chapters were the result of a positive compulsory action
of the Church in an effort to accomplish within it what the monks had accomplished
without it. But the change from passivity to activity was not merely a voluntary
change of attitude on the part of the governing body of the Church; it is rather
evidence that concurrently the vital forces of Christianity had been gradually
transferred from the Church to its corporations, — the change of attitude was
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maintained.
8. One marked tendency of the ecclesiastical corporations was to make themselves
self-sufficient, to fill the entire zone of activity in which they moved. The monks
might well have been served by priests assigned to them by the bishops, but they
were not satisfied until they were priests themselves. The Mendicant Orders might
have restricted their activity to districts in which the bishops might suffer them to
work, but they soon acquired the right to work in all districts without the consent of
bishops. The canonical chapters might have lived their common life under the
supervision of a bishop’s appointee, but they nevertheless soon acquired the right to
elect their own deans. When once the body of powers bestowed on the corporations
passed beyond the point at which corporate maintenance was assured, they exhibited
a striking ability to attract and absorb additional powers until they filled the entire
field of activity in which the corporations were placed; they were able to escape
reliance on other organizations of society for any part of their activity. Each
succeeding group of corporations had greater powers and a wider organization than
its predecessors.
9. As the corporations developed there appeared a tendency to internal
differentiation and disintegration, approaching in some respects a final resolution of
the bodies into their original individual elements. Instead of living in common with
the monks, the abbot came to live apart and enjoy separate and distinct revenues, his
place as actual head of the monastery being relinquished to the prior or superior,
especially when the abbot came to be rather the head of a system of monasteries than
the head of a particular one. As the distance between the head and body of the orders
increased, more checks were devised to control the head, and even the service for life
was reduced in some cases to short terms of service. Most of the duties of the
monastery were early performed in rotation by the monks; but later they acquired
some degree of fixity, and many of them were supported by separate revenues; even
the positions of those who performed the duties came to be regarded as pieces of
property that might be transferred from person to person; in the most degenerate
days, many monks ceased to live in common and lived on separate pieces of the
monastery lands distributed among them, with little regard for the original purposes
of monasticism. In the canonical chapters, the relations of the canons to the chapters
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10. The membership in the corporations became more select. Longer novitiates and
periods of probation were required, until the one year’s novitiate of St. Benedict
became about fifteen years of passing from one grade to another to final admission
into the body of professi of the Jesuits. While almost any member of society might
be a Benedictine, rigid examinations determined the fitness of Mendicants and
Jesuits for admission to their orders, and a formidable array of impediments restricted
eligibility to fewer persons.
11. The tendency to filiation was so strong that the local unit of the monastery,
greatly impaired in the congregation, was finally displaced by the larger unit of the
order. The monastic congregations were the earliest “trusts,” the Mendicant Orders
and Society of Jesus were their logical results — organized churches within the
Church, rivalling it in extent and power and threatening to displace it as the
government of Catholic Christianity.
12. The most instructive feature of the growth of ecclesiastical corporations was
their tendency to become an organization of the priesthood of Christianity instead of
being a total organization of a part of Christian society. The early Benedictine
convents were merely groups of laymen differing from ordinary laymen only in living
a stricter mode of life, enforced and regulated by a written constitution and organized
government, but receiving spiritual ministration from the same body of clergy as the
ordinary membership of the Church. The “congregational” convents were an order
of the clergy though including a class (now distinct) of laymen devoted to the
temporal concerns of the body. The Mendicant Orders were bodies of priests, the
only lay element being a class of “Tertiaries” not included in their organization, but
identified with them only remotely by practicing in their own lives some of the
precepts of the friars. The Jesuits were priests, politicians, and teachers, even more
distinct from the rank and file of Christianity. The result of this movement was a
corporate despotism so strongly intrenched that the Church alone could not dislodge
it —  perhaps did not dare to attack it because so dependent upon it — and had to
accept the assistance of temporal states.
13. The corruption of monasticism and the consequent injury of the Church have
been most frequently accounted for by charging the monks with having intentionally
subordinated the original purpose of monasticism, the advancement of Christianity,
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but the influence of the organic system of relations between the monastic orders and
the Church is overlooked. The Church deliberately sought the promotion of its own
welfare by encouraging the growth of organizations of Christians virtually
independent of it; it was the penalty of trying to absorb a large number of members
whose participation in its life must have been lacking in zeal and sincerity. The
secondary result was to widen a chasm between the papacy and the great body of
Christians within the Church which must have been narrowed in time if the papacy
had not been placed in a position of dangerous independence through the support of
the monastic orders. The weakness of the Church itself, due in large measure to the
abstraction from it of the body of Christians organized in monastic orders, was the
most potent factor in producing the Reformation. If the Christians who became
monks had been so organized as to be kept in close contact with the rest of the world
of Christians of which they formed a part, the public purposes of their organization
could not have been so easily forgotten and their private interests could not have been
so easily magnified. The criticism, however, might justly be made more widely
applicable. The experience of the Roman Catholic Church in the use of corporations
was not dissimilar to that of other organizations of society in their use.IV. Feudalism and Corporations.
The point in history at which a study of English corporations (except those of the
Church) must be begun is that of the dominance of feudalism. In the structure of an
ideal feudal system there could have been no place for corporate forms; they would
have been out of harmony with it. While in England, as in the other countries of
Europe, feudalism did not attain the typical form that it approximated, it was so fully
developed under William the Conqueror that only the most rudimentary corporate
forms existed in some of the old English towns at the end of the eleventh century.
When corporations began their development, it was at the expense of the feudal
system, outside of it and largely in opposition to it, certainly not as an integral part
of it or in conformity with it.
The peculiarity of feudalism was that when it was more nearly perfect it appeared
to be the least necessary. Its rise and development were demanded by the need of
security, — for the most part, purely physical security, safety of life and limb. After
the destruction of the Roman Empire and the infusion into European society of the
unorganized Germanic elements, civilization declined until it was checked in its
downward course by the interposition of the feudal system. But feudalism as a social
structure was inflexible; it could permit within it only a slight degree of social
expansion. When the chief work of feudalism had been accomplished in the
establishing of a tolerable degree of order and security, and society had resumed its
progress, the feudal bonds were found to be as irksome in restriction as they had been
agreeable in protection. Society in its expansion out of feudalism accordingly
demanded new forms of organization for its various lines of activity. The want was
supplied, for the most part, by corporations, though to some extent also by more
extended and more efficient administrative organs of the central government.
As a general principle, it may be said that periods of social growth and expansion
in both state and Church have been characterized by an extended prevalence of
corporations, while organic periods of social life have witnessed the extension of the
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periods of transition in the framework of corporations as a kind of scaffolding or
provisional structure, to be destroyed during organic periods, when the state and
Church have been able to absorb partially or wholly the new activities and
incorporate them within their own structure. In many cases the provisional structure
has proved to be so appropriate for the activity exercised within it during its
expansion that larger organizations of society, in absorbing it, have made the
provisional structure permanent and have had to modify their own structures to
conform to it. There is more truth, from the standpoint of history, in describing the
state as a great corporation than in describing corporations as little states. 
The growth of corporations depends much on the social unit, on the relations of the
state to the individual. From the dominance of feudalism to the time when it was
superseded by national organizations there was a gradual change from local units to
national units — from feudal manors to nations. The growth of England outside of
feudalism was in new local units (until the period of nationality was reached) and the
extra-feudal local units were generally organized as corporations. When nationality
was attained, the autonomy, and independence of the localities disappeared and they
were largely replaced by sub-governmental administrative bodies enforcing national
laws instead of locally enacted laws. So long as the national unit had been
impossible, and local units had been necessary, there had been an appropriate field
for corporations, which was occupied by them as far as feudal forms were unable to
occupy it. Again when nationality had been attained, English society began an
extra-national expansion by the conquest, settlement and economic exploitation of
new lands; this movement was organized largely in the forms of corporations until
it was complete, when its results were slowly absorbed by the state and the
corporations, after a period of obsolescence, passed out of existence. The nation was
the largest unit that the state (as organized) could control; when a larger unit was to
be comprehended, the state resorted to the use of corporations for the purpose.
Before feudalism was dominant in England, the Church (considered as society
organized on its religious side) had anticipated the decentralizing experience of
secular society under feudalism and had recuperated its strength through the
assistance of monasticism. Monasticism, however, had been made effective through
the medium of corporations, which continued in existence and formed a part of the
corporate life of post-feudal England.John P. Davis, Corporations, 65
Post-feudal society in England, then, except so far as its expanding activities were
able to be organized either within the decaying structure of feudalism or within the
extended machinery of the state or church, was organized in the forms of (I)
Local-Internal Corporations, differentiated into (1) Ecclesiastical Corporations, (2)
Municipalities, (3) Gilds and (4) Educational and other Eleemosynary Corporations.
England in its national expansion was organized in the forms of (II)
National-External Corporations, differentiated into (1) Regulated Companies, (2)
Regulated-Exclusive Companies, (3) Joint-Stock Companies, and (4) Colonial
Companies. Broadly speaking, none of the corporations comprised in these classes
plays a direct part in the life of nineteenth-century society. A few of them still exist
as obsolete survivals of a past social order; a few others are even of recent origin and
occupy a legitimate field of activity, but the circumstances under which they have
been created and are acting are clearly exceptional in the present order. The
examination of the several sub-classes in detail will be the work of succeeding
chapters of the present volume. 
Under the influence of manifold new social movements that have developed,
chiefly since the end of the seventeenth century and have been reflected in social
institutions in the nineteenth century, has arisen another class Of corporations
sufficiently distinguished from all their predecessors if they be called simply (III)
Modern Corporations. So great has been the break between the life of this century
and the older life, and so numerous are the social factors to be taken into
consideration in the interpretation of this last class of corporations that extended
treatment of them must be reserved for a separate volume.V. Municipalities.
I — Towns before 1100.
What degree of growth was attained by cities and towns in Britain under the
Romans is unknown, though the scant historical and archeological evidence indicates
that they must have acquired considerable size and importance. And perhaps it is just
to assume — it is barely more than an assumption — with Kemble
73 that the
organization of Utica, colonial, and military stations in other Roman provinces was
simply duplicated in Britain. It is, however, a question of hardly more than
antiquarian interest, as no substantial features of their civilization and government
survived the departure of the Romans except among the incompletely Romanized
British during the interval preceding the advent of the Saxons and other Teutonic
tribes. The benefits of the adoption of Roman institutions by the native British had
been more than counterbalanced by the degeneration due to the contact with Roman
social life. Their towns, with their mere shadows of Roman municipal institutions,
fell a comparatively easy prey to the Picts and Scots on one hand and the Germanic
invaders on the other. But after the British were expelled, their cities and towns were
not occupied and inhabited by the invaders. The Germans were not builders of cities
or dwellers in them; they were primarily agriculturists. It is a mistake to assume a
continuity of English municipal institutions from the Roman days; there was a
complete break at the time of the Anglo-Saxon invasion; the institutions of the later
boroughs, towns and cities had their roots in the tribal organizations of the invaders.
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Thus it came that the settlements about fortified places, at the fords of rivers on
convenient harbors, or around cathedral churches and monasteries, though somewhat
larger than the agricultural villages, were organized on the same model as townships
or groups of townships. Thus, too, when feudal institutions developed in England,
they covered the cities, towns and boroughs, whose inhabitants were largely engaged
in commerce, as well as the purely agricultural villages and manors, though certainly
the feudal ties were not so strict in the former as in the latter. Most of the inhabitants
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king — the towns were said to be “in royal demesne”; a larger proportion of the
villages were subject to secular or ecclesiastical barons. The confiscated lands
distributed by William the Conqueror among his followers were largely agricultural
lands and their villages,  — the towns he preferred to reserve to himself.
In the growth of English society out of feudalism there were at first two movements
— a main movement in the upbuilding of a central power and an elaborated
administrative machinery through which it could act, and an ancillary movement in
the creation of corporations that represented, to a great degree, the inability of the
expanding central power to comprehend all the new activity of society. It was the
fortunate peculiarity of feudalism in England that it was conditioned by the existence,
side by side with its chain of relations from the land-holder to the sovereign, of an
immediate relation of every English man to the king as his subject, — a survival of
the principles of the older English kingship. The main movement referred to was in
the direction of extending and perfecting the immediate relations of king and subject,
while the intermediate feudal relations gradually decayed. For a time, even the
growth of town-life was retained within the regular administrative system of the
central power, but eventually it secured organizations of a high degree of
independence and autonomy. An understanding of the growth of town-life in its
organic independence and autonomy demands a consideration of the relations of the
townsmen to the monarch as rex Anglorum and his administrative system on the one
hand and of their relations to the monarch and baronage as feudal seigneurs on the
other hand — the former to discover the actual progress towards a future condition,
the latter to observe the departure from a past condition. Yet the study is far from
being so simple as it may appear. The monarch did not always distinguish in his
dealings with his subjects whether he was acting as English king or feudal overlord;
many of the relations, particularly those involved in taxation, were expressed in
feudal terms long after the essence of feudalism had departed from them. In the
county (the unit of administration) the office of sheriff long betrayed a tendency to
become hereditary and in that respect to approximate a feudal type; indeed, the
administrative system was tinctured throughout with the color of feudalism. Again,
there was such a marked unevenness in the progress of the several local communities,
and the set of social relations that constitute a corporation were acquired so much in
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be wholly without system. For that reason the growth of towns and town institutions
from the Conquest to the middle of the sixteenth century must be considered as a
whole; as no town can fairly be taken as a type, the general features of the
development must be described, and the experience of particular towns must be used
merely for illustration. It will probably be most conducive to clearness to consider
first the detailed powers (and correlative duties) acquired by the town communities,
and then the social structure through which they exercised them during the four
centuries of their growth; the decay of the town corporations may be left for final
consideration.
II — External Growth of Towns.
The actual transfer of powers from a feudal seigneur, whether king, noble, bishop
or abbot, to a body of his vassals, or the confirmation by him in them of powers
already assumed or retained in the form of local customs, was usually evidenced by
the delivery of a written instrument, a charter, in return for the payment of a sum of
money or the rendition of some other consideration. It is to the town charters,
accordingly, that one must look for the best record of the changes in the distribution
of social powers and duties that lay at the foundation of corporate town life.
The powers, franchises or libertates of the towns (except such as concerned their
internal organization) may be conveniently considered under four heads: (1) The
Firma Burgi (2) Tenurial Privileges, (3) Mercantile Privileges, and (4) Municipal
Courts.
1. The Firma Burgi. — There had been a tendency, for a long time before the era
of town charters began in the  twelfth century, to segregate the revenues derived from
the towns as well as those derived from other local organizations. The sheriff was the
royal officer for the collection of all the revenue from the county, including the towns
in it, but he very early came to be held accountable to the Exchequer for a given sum,
with the right to retain for himself all the surplus revenues that he could succeed in
extracting from the county; in other words, the county was farmed out to him or held
by him in ferm, usually for a limited period or during the pleasure of the king. If the
county was not held by the sheriff as former, he was said to be the custos of the
county, in which capacity he was required to account to the Exchequer for all revenue
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town was the bailiff, sometimes held accountable for all revenue collected, and
sometimes for a settled sum, with the right to appropriate the surplus; the bailiff
might then, like his principal, the sheriff, be either a castes or a fermer of the town.
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From the exchequer rolls extant it appears that the revenues of some of the towns
were reported separately, while those of others were included in the general revenue
of the county.
76 The revenue of each town was regarded as a piece of property, a unit
in itself, capable of being transferred from holder to holder like any other piece of
property; accordingly the towns “in royal demesne,” those whose inhabitants were
tenants of the king himself as lord, were often separated from those of the county and
conveyed to persons other than the sheriff, to an individual subject, a body of subjects
or, most important, to the group of tenants themselves. The firma burgi was the sum
payable to the king as consideration for the revenues of the town; the person (or
persons) who paid it was said to hold the town in form, whether perpetually, for a
term of years or merely during the pleasure of the king.
It is hardly necessary to suggest that the grant of a town in form did not imply a
conveyance of the land of the town; what was conveyed was its “issues,” consisting
chiefly of tolls of various kinds, the profits derived from the town courts and the rents
payable by the individual town tenants to the owners of the soil. If land escheated,
it escheated to the king and not to the town or other holder of the firma burgi.
The body of townsmen virtually took the place of the bailiff who had formerly
represented the sheriff (and through him the king) in the collection of the town
revenues.
77 The townsmen would still have to account to the sheriff for the ferm. But
there appears in all corporate life a repugnance to submit to the control of the
administrative organs of the state in which it flourishes. Just as the monastic bodies
had found relations with the bishops irksome, and had soon found means of severing
them, so now the town communities, having disposed of the much-detested bailiff
by purchasing the privilege of occupying his place, were very generally willing to pay
liberally for the privilege of accounting directly to the Exchequer for the firma burgi
and such other moneys as should be owing to the king.
78 Accordingly in the
exchequer rolls, the sums due from the towns are found entered separately from those
due from the rest of the county and are ordinarily paid by some officer or other
representative of the town.
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measure a consequence of it was the grant to them of lands and tenements (or the
privilege of acquiring and holding them) whose issues should be applicable to the
payment of the ferm. Though a contrary opinion is expressed by Madox,
79 it may well
be believed that the ferm of the town, as agreed on by the townsmen, would
frequently be larger than its revenues. The revenues were not all that was paid for;
the privilege of collecting their own tolls, rents and court fees (all to be properly
regarded in the same light as modern taxes, though then viewed as incidental to
property in some physical thing or public office), and of having in their own control
the social organs for their collection, was an element of freedom well worth buying;
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the holding of the firma burgi was nearly always accompanied by exemptions from
tolls in other towns, and other burdens that would, in a number of communicating
towns, decrease the revenues of each of them. Sometimes, too, towns decayed after
a perpetual annual ferm had been agreed on, and deficits were regularly left to be
made up by unwilling and incapable contributors or expunged from the exchequer
rolls in the clemency of the king.
81 Probably it was easier to get contributions for the
purchase of property whose revenue should be always applicable to the payment of
charges than to get contributions for immediate and final application. Again,
public-minded townsmen sometimes bequeathed lands and tenements to their towns
for such purposes. In many cases in which it appeared that towns were actually
unable to meet their recurring charges, the king conveyed to them sources of revenue
for their assistance. E.g., Edward II, in the ninth year of his reign, granted to the
citizens of Carlisle in aid of their ferm certain royal mills there and the right of
fishing in the Eden, with other profits.
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2. Tenurial Privileges. — Strictly feudal social relations, in their developed form,
were based on the tenure of land, though they were the outgrowth of earlier personal
relations.
83 But after all men’s relations to physical things are secondary; the primary
relations are their personal relations to one another — their human relations. It is
usual to regard the social changes following the eleventh century as caused by
changes in the tenure of land, but in such a view effect is unfortunately substituted
for cause. The feudal form of society may properly be regarded as a negative form
— a form attained by retrogression rather than by progress — one that was good for
society only because it was no worse — a refuge for mankind until the storm of the
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dependence and subordination that characterized feudalism were losing their strength
and passing away, it was in the nature of the succession of changes that they should
be reflected in concomitant changes in the tenure of land. It may hardly be said that
the system of land tenure was modified; it was rather gradually superseded by a new
system; feudalism was so rigid and inflexible that it could not be remolded or
expanded — it had to be broken into fragments.
This is not the place for a tracing in detail of the steps by which the older feudal
tenures were superseded; it must suffice to mention and account for the peculiar
privileges of landholding enjoyed as a feature of the organization of towns.
Originally, when feudal tenures approached nearest to systematic perfection at the
end of the eleventh century, obligations of varying degrees of independence and
servility rested on all tenants of land. In the manorial village, where the chief industry
was agriculture, the feudal obligations took the form, chiefly, of labor on the lord’s
demesne, or of other labor connected with the agricultural life of the village. But the
increase of population and the growth of a class of laborers brought about the use of
the demesne land of the manor largely in the same way as the common fields; the
lord and tenants were alike in position to make less use of personal services as a bond
between them, and the commutation of the services to fixed renderings of goods or
money gradually followed. The landowners became, to a large extent landlords
enjoying rent from tenants rather than feudal seigneurs enjoying a complex of feudal
services from subjects.
84 But outside of the agricultural life to which England was
almost exclusively devoted at the time of the conquest the changes were greater.
Whether there is some element in commercial and manufacturing life that makes
them unsuitable for the form that was characteristic of feudalism
85 may well be
doubted, but it is true that such life developed in England outside of the feudal forms
in which society was enclosed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Trading and the
pursuit of handicrafts had more remote relation to the land than had agriculture; if
organic relations of dependence and subordination were to be introduced into them,
they would have to be based on an element more vital to them; the future was to
show that the organization of commerce and industry had to be based on capital (in
the narrow sense) and not on land. The inevitable result of the development of the
new social activities was a diminution of the extent to which feudalism should be an
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feudal tenures were displaced, they must have given way even more readily in other
fields of activity. Now, the towns were the seats of the new social activities, and the
greater volume the activities attained, the greater was the separation from the older
feudal system of land-tenure. The socage tenure came to be a wide group
comprehending nearly all such varieties of tenure as had lost their peculiar feudal
character and had retained a mere shadow of their former obligations in the easy
burden of a moderate quit-rent or even nominal return; in that class belonged the
burgage tenure, the distinctive tenure of the townsman, which permitted him to hold
his land by the mere payment of a fixed rent, virtually paid to himself when the group
of townsmen to which he belonged had acquired their town in ferm.
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Townsmen acquired the privilege, by virtue of their membership in the community,
of freely alienating and bequeathing their holdings of land, especially if they had
acquired them by purchase and not by inheritance. It was the opinion of Bracton that
a burgage tenement could be bequeathed as a quasi-chattel, in which case the will and
property would probably be expected to come within the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts, but such was not eventually the rule established. Not only were
holdings of land transferred in the town court, but some of the cities and towns
established registers of wills where wills bequeathing burgages had to be enrolled;
some conveyances also had to be enrolled. Moreover, the validity of local town
customs as affecting the tenure of town lands was usually passed on by the town
courts without serious interference from “Westminster law.”
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The most conspicuous tendency was “to treat the burgage tenement as an article of
commerce; it is likened to a chattel; not only can it like a chattel be disposed of by
will, but it can be sold like a chattel.”
88 Some of the town charters relieved the
townsmen of feudal burdens such as those of marriage and wardship, so that the
tenure by which they held land was modified accordingly.
89 Some special tenurial
customs, as those of borough English, retrait liguages and retrait feudal, were
confirmed. It was well established — and specially granted in some charters — that
by membership in a town, a chartered borough, for a year and a day without being
reclaimed by his lord, the serf became a freeman and held his land accordingly.
Such bodies of tenurial privileges must have been very early in their origin; in fact,
they seem to have marked tile earliest differentiation of the townsmen as such from
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their tenures from others, and the earliest charter after the Conquest embodies
William’s promise that “every child be his father’s heir, after his father’s day.”
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But the tenurial privileges though important in themselves are more important as
elements in the life of the town groups and as marks of the townsmen’s participation
in it. They must have been most noteworthy in towns in which there were lands and
tenements under several seigneurs;
91 in such towns the peculiar tenurial privileges
granted by any one of them would be effective only in the cases of his own tenants,
and would serve to distinguish them sharply from the tenants of others. Similarity of
tenure peculiar to the group of tenants also served to make the group more compact
within itself, while it separated it more completely from other groups  — two
processes equally essential in the crystallization of corporate life and structure.
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3. Mercantile Privileges. — To the burgesses of medieval English towns the most
agreeable feature of the charters granted to them was their concession of trading
privileges. As the towns were the seats of the commercial and industrial development
that followed the establishment of order and security in the eleventh century, the
older restraints on the production and exchange of commodities were most irksome
to the townsmen, and the removal of them most welcome. Such privileges were
acquired piecemeal and without order or system. In Domesday Book it is recorded
that the men of Dover, in consideration of a payment to the king, enjoyed freedom
of tolls throughout England.
93 Sometimes the freedom from tolls extended to the
continental dominions of the English kings. In general, however, the important
English towns each followed the early example of Dover by purchasing exemption
by charter from the many kinds of tolls and fees that hampered trading in all parts of
England.
94 As an incident to the grant of exemptions, permission was usually added
to have a merchant gild, the necessary organization for the enjoyment of the
privileges. Very many small towns secured the privilege of holding markets without
further privileges; such towns hardly attained the status of corporations.
The exercise of such privileges had primarily to do with the relations of the
inhabitants of one town with those of another. Their significance in this study lies in
the fact that they were incidental to participation in the common, organized life of the
towns. Commerce was inter-municipal. The town was the unit through which the
merchant acted in his dealings not only in England but in foreign countries. The
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century. The law recognized and sanctioned the rights and duties flowing from the
use of the local unit. From the standpoint of commerce England was a federation of
municipalities. If the merchant enjoyed his privileges in other towns, it was because
he was permitted to rely on the charter of his own town in demanding them; if his
privileges were denied him, he could fall back on his own town to obtain redress.
Each townsman was responsible, not only for his own acts, but for those of his
fellow-townsmen, if damage should be done by failure to respect a “foreigner’s”
chartered privileges. Of so great force was the grant of mercantile privileges in the
evolution of municipal corporations in England that in the sixteenth century the
power of holding a merchant gild was gravely asserted to be a legal test of their
existence.
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4. Municipal Courts. — It hardly needed the keen sense of the medieval English
burgher to discover that the exercise of a power in society is conditioned largely by
its judicial interpretation and protection. If he and his fellow-townsmen were to nave
their social relations to one another and to the rest of the world removed from the
system of social relations generally prevailing about them, and to have them hardened
into a new and peculiar set of institutions, they must be judicially protected as far as
possible by reliance on the coercive power of society. The tendency of independent
group-life to complete itself has already been noted; if once a body of powers has
been conferred on a group of persons, and if they be of sufficient volume and strength
to survive in the group and conserve its identity as a group, they invariably exhibit
a tendency to attract other powers, and particularly such as are incidental to the
exercise of those already conferred and necessary to their full enjoyment. In that
tendency lies a general explanation of the growth in English medieval towns of
municipal courts (or, more properly, the adaptation of existing courts to town
purposes) with their peculiarities of procedure and exclusive jurisdiction,  involving
the limitation of the jurisdiction of other courts. “There can hardly exist a body of
men permanently united by any common interest that will not make for itself a court
of justice if it be left for a few years to its own devices.”
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Local courts had been a part of the tribal system of the Saxons transplanted by them
into Britain. When the feudal system had developed, the courts were kept intact, but
were brought under the control of the governing class; fortunately the element of
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of juries had been largely preserved. When the feudal control of the system came to
be superseded by that of burghal corporations, nearly all that was necessary was the
substitution of the mayor, bailiff or other town officer for the feudal lord, or his
steward, bailiff or other representative. Accordingly the town charters did not often
contain grants of the power of holding or presiding over town courts; the grant of that
power seemed to be implied in the grant of others more substantial. If a town were
conveyed to a body of tenants in form, part of what was conveyed was the issues or
revenue of its local courts; the inference was very clear that the issues should be
collected by a town officer; for that reason, doubtless, when the abbot of St. Edmunds
conceded Bury St. Edmunds in ferm to his men, he found it necessary to reserve the
power of holding the manor court.
97 In general the baronage, lay and ecclesiastical,
were very tenacious of judicial privileges, as in fact of most others it was the
communities of tenants holding directly from the king that most easily acquired the
control of their own courts. Some of the manorial courts held by the nobility have
continued in existence even until the present century.
Very frequently it was conceded in the town charters that townsmen (except
moneyers and royal servants) should not be compelled to “plead without the walls”
of their town except in pleas involving tenements held by them outside; and that if
cause of action arose within a town, pleas founded on it should be tried in the town
court. The jurisdiction of the town courts, however, was expanded rather on its civil
than on its criminal side, the latter extending no higher than infangthef and
utfangthef; on its civil side, the county court was virtually superseded by the town
court. New forms of procedure were also introduced, the most notable being the
reintroduction of trial by compurgation in place of the trial by battle earlier
substituted by the Normans; and even after trial by jury had become the rule outside
the towns, compurgation was still resorted to inside them. The jealousy of the county
administration also appeared in the quite usual provision that the town should have
the return of all writs served within it; the authority of the sheriff in the service of
process yielded to that of the town constable at the town limits. Substantially the
same result was accomplished in a few cases by raising a few towns to the dignity of
counties, as in the cases of London, York and Bristol, — or more truly, by giving the
town control over the county government in the same way in which it already had
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choice of the townsmen and the inhabitants of the county became, to some extent,
subjects of the town community; in some cases the jurisdiction of the town courts
was extended over a “suburban” district outside of the original town limits.
But the growth of the town courts and of their peculiar procedure, and the
readjustment of jurisdiction in respect  to territory, subject-matter and suitors were
rather effects than causes of the character of the towns; the absorption of the organs
of judicial interpretation and protection was a secondary movement in the growth of
town corporations; the primary movement was in the accumulation of a body of
social powers and privileges. The former served, however, to intensify the latter and
to give fixity and stability to its results.
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III — Internal Growth of Towns.
In the preceding sub-chapter have been considered the powers concerning chiefly
the antagonistic external relations of the townsmen, the relations due to their
increasing separation from the royal central power and feudal system, and their
relations to inhabitants of other towns. Along with antagonism to the rest of the
society in which a corporate group is found, it is essential to the nature of the group
as a corporation that it be internally organized, that interrelations not only be
sustained by the members, but that they also be orderly and settled, and given fixity
and stability in corporate institutions. A “privileged order” is a group distinguished
by the peculiar relations sustained by its members to the other members of the society
of which it forms a part, but it is not a corporation, because it lacks the internal
organization; the interrelations of the members of such an order are determined not
by organized institutions of the order, but merely by their status in the wider society.
The features of English towns now to be considered, having to do chiefly with their
internal structure, may be distributed under three heads: (1) Town constitution, (2)
Town legislation and (3) Taxation.
1. Town Constitution. — There was so great variety and such inequality of
development in the framework of the town governments that the general outlines
alone can be given here. A comprehensive and detailed study of the subject would
require an examination of the constitution of each of the many towns during the four
centuries of their development. It may at first thought be surprising that the earlier
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permission was given the cives, burgences or homines to elect freely their chief
officer to take the place of the former representative of the king or lord. The reason
doubtless was that a rudimentary system of local government was already in
existence, inherited from the older system of county, hundred and township, with its
feudal modifications, and was simply adapted to the use of the town as a
self-governing unit. The charters of full incorporation, those containing a more
detailed plan of constitution, date from the reign of Henry VI, the middle of the
fifteenth century, when the town corporations had become separated from the general
body of townsmen; the early privileges of the towns involved no great change in their
institutions; the later ones were clearly exceptional in the close governing body as
compared with the rest of the town and needed the legal protection of a distinct
definition by charter.
The commutation of the issues of a town in the firma burgi does not appear to have
resulted in making immediately elective by the town the officers that had formerly
represented the sheriff; the bailiff appears to have continued to be appointed by the
sheriff for the purpose, if not for that of collecting the issues of the town, of presiding
over its courts and assemblies. It is accounted by the historian a veritable revolution
when the election of the chief officer of the town was either conceded to the town or
more or less forcibly seized by it. The new elective officer was almost invariably
called the mayor, and the body of townsmen under him was frequently called the
commune — words that seem to indicate the influence of French towns on those in
England. The period of this movement in the direction of self-government was the
reigns of Richard I and John, the end of the twelfth century, about a century after the
beginning of the era of town charters.
99 Substantially the same result was
accomplished in some towns by the concession of the election of the bailiff, or in
small towns by leaving the town-reeve, already an elective office, free from the
influence of a bailiff or other representative of the central power. The mayor had at
first a small body of assistants between him and the body of electors, sometimes
called bailiffs, and probably older royal officers who had not been superseded by him
but had simply been subordinated to him.
100 Some of the towns were composed of
wards, originally probably separate townships united in a hundred, that retained their
older organization under aldermen elected by them; a body of assistants was thus
formed of the aldermen; later, towns were divided into wards for the purpose ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 78
supplying the body of aldermen or for mere police purposes; at all events, the body
of assistants or advisers was usually composed of representatives of geographical
divisions of the towns.
101 Thus there were officers for special town purposes, such as
the clerk of the market, appointed by the mayor either alone or in conjunction with
the body of assistants. When a town “became a county” (as it is usually expressed)
there was no radical change in the institutions of the town; it is better to say that the
county became subject to the town, the principal result of the change being that the
town secured the appointment of the sheriff and consequently the control of the
county court.
At the end of the first century after the beginning of the positive growth of town life
the element of self-government implied chiefly in the election of the mayor was
acquired; at the end of the second century a movement of more importance had been
consummated in many of the towns — the growth of the council. It has been the habit
to assume that English medieval towns were ideal democracies. But even in the
primitive township and hundred organizations there was a strong aristocratic element,
and in the later independent towns it became even stronger.
102 The four men who
accompanied the reeve to the hundred court were not mere representatives of the
township; they were probi homines. In the towns the chief burgesses, or capital
portmen, soon emerged above the common level of their fellow-townsmen. The king
or lord was in the habit of holding the wealthier citizens responsible for the
fulfilment by the town of its obligations. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
however, the towns were fairly democratic; during the fourteenth century there was
a steady decline in town democracy and the charters of the fifteenth century evidence
the organization of the town aristocracies in technical oligarchical corporations. The
early electorate had consisted of the inhabitants bearing scot and lot with their
fellows; in their annual moots for legislative and judicial purposes, they had all come
together to exercise their public duties as townsmen, even if their deliberations were
presided over by the bailiff of king or lord. As the administration of the town
government became more difficult by reason of the growth in business and
population, the town-meeting became inefficient. When deprived of the function of
initiating measures, the work of the official was still brought before the periodical
meetings of townsmen for approval. A final step was taken when the popular meeting
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council. The mayor, aldermen and common council became the type of the town
government.
103 In some cases the council seems to have been originated by the mayor
and aldermen, representing the aristocratic element, for the purpose of obtaining the
popular sanction of their acts necessary to their validity; in such cases the body was
composed of principal citizens summoned by the mayor; in other cases, however, the
council seems to have been demanded by the common people for the protection of
their rights.
104 Even in towns in which the council did not become one of the town
institutions the people, though deprived of actual organic participation in the town
government, yet prevented actual invasion of their rights by resort to force, as
particularly in places where the use of much common property (pasture-land and the
like) was enjoyed by the townsmen. By degrees the election of the mayor was lost to
the body of citizens, and the board of aldermen and common council became close
bodies, their members holding their offices for life and filling their vacancies by
co-optation. By the end of the fifteenth century the transformation was generally
complete.
105 The governing body came to be considered in law and fact the
corporation,
106 while the community, the body of town inhabitants, became a body
subject to the government of the corporation. To be free of a corporation now meant
not to be a participant in the organic activity of the corporation, the governing body
of the town, but merely to enjoy the advantages of life in the town under the control
of the corporation.
107 Thus the movement in ecclesiastical corporations was
duplicated in the towns. Monks originally been merely Christians, and the monastery
a corporate organization of them; eventually they became priests, and monastic
bodies became organizations of governing bodies in the church; likewise English
town corporations, from being substantially organizations of townsmen became
organizations of their governing bodies.
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2. Town Legislation. — If the earlier town charters contained no provisions for the
framework of town government, they were equally silent on the limitations of the
power of enacting by-laws
109 and other measures of local self-government. It was
recognized and well settled as a principle that no town legislative might invade the
limits of the royal or parliamentary law-making power, but the test was not often
positively applied, except in London and the other large cities; however, the fear that
the town charter or the powers granted by it might be summarily taken away by the
king, if the limits of local necessity should be exceeded by the legislative body, actedJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 80
as a deterrent. It was ordinarily perilous for a citizen to invoke the aid of the king or
his courts to determine whether the town had exceeded its legislative powers; he
would do it only in most flagrant cases. To get justice from a royal court was
expensive, and if given against a town or its officers was likely to be followed by a
punishment quite out of proportion to the offense and likely to react on the
complainant.
The limits of legislation were determined rather by the body of customs guaranteed
to the towns or of powers granted to them in their charters. The customs were not
always definitely known and it was virtually a matter of legislation to determine
whether a particular custom existed. The actual extent of a custom known to exist
had to be determined, and it was not always easy to distinguish between interpreting
customs and making laws. In the expanding life of the towns it often became
necessary to apply an old custom to new conditions — a necessity very likely to
justify the virtual enactment of laws. The town certainly had and exercised the
implied power to enforce and protect by appropriate and necessary legislation the
powers positively granted to it by charter. Of course, town legislation was liable to
be superseded at any time by a royal statute or act of Parliament, but as a matter of
historical fact, the towns suffered very little disturbance from that source before the
beginning of the thirteenth century.
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3. Taxation. — The financial burdens of the inhabitants of the towns were of two
general classes: those involved in their participation in the town life, and those
involved in their status as subjects of the King of England. The town’s governmental
institutions and its public industries were usually intended to be self-sustained
through the medium of fees and tolls or through application to their support of the
segregated revenues of parcels of property. The town-ferm was nearly always partly
paid from the revenues of property held by the town for the purpose. The town-wall
was kept in repair by certain townsmen in return for their holding certain lands and
tenements. Official salaries were few and small and universally supplemented by
fees. The principal tolls to which the town was entitled were passage, portage,
lastage, stallage, bothage, engage, tronage and scavage. In the event of an actual
deficit, however, the townsmen were required to contribute in proportion to their
ability. The entire control of the matter of taxation for local purposes was in the
town, except, it seems, that it could not levy new tolls or arbitrarily increase old ones,John P. Davis, Corporations, 81
and that it could not levy a tax for a new project, such as paving a street, without a
royal grant of permission.
The principal financial burdens, outside of those incident to the local government,
were the result of the king’s levying tallages, fines and amercements. The central
power levied them on the towns as units and left their distribution among the
individual townsmen to the town authorities; in the event of a failure on the part of
the townsmen to determine the several proportions of the levy that each should pay,
the central authorities stood ready to make the distribution through the agency of the
sheriff or of a jury or commission appointed for the purpose; a more expeditious
procedure was usually resorted to, however, in the forcible collection of the amount
due (especially if it were a fine or amercement) from a few of the wealthier
townsmen, who were to later recoup the payments from their fellows as they might.
When the period of parliamentary grants of subsidies arrived, the peculiar nature of
the wealth of the towns was recognized in their grant of a larger percentage of
personal property than was levied on rural taxpayers. The important feature of these
taxes as of those for local purposes was that they were collected without the intrusion
of outside officers; there was an element of freedom and self-government in the
absence of the royal tax-gatherer.
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IV — Decay of Towns.
The preceding sketch of town institutions and the social activity that was exercised
under their control and guidance, imperfect as it must be, is intended to exhibit the
important features of the towns in their positive development; the elements of
decadence have not been considered, unless some such elements are necessarily
involved in the growth of the oligarchical town corporation. The period of growth of
the towns as organic units ended in the fifteenth century; though the activity of the
towns has since continued to expand without serious interruption, the expansion has
taken place not in the towns as local units, but rather in England as a national unit.
It has been suggested that corporations are provisional social structures intended to
comprehend expanding social activity until the state, the wider and deeper
organization of society, may be able to comprehend it. The English towns had their
body of peculiar customs and social constitutions for maintaining and enforcing
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life. The central power, emerging from its feudal environment, was sufficiently
occupied in maintaining a bare existence; it was not able to comprehend even the
social activity already in existence, and its administrative system tended strongly to
assume feudal attributes; much less was it able to assimilate the new elements of
social life, for the most part mercantile and industrial activity, which found their sites
in the towns. The king had been far more favorable to the towns in granting them
chartered rights than had the nobility or churchmen, undoubtedly because of the
double relation of king and feudal seigneur that he sustained to them; if the
townsmen ceased to be his vassals, they still remained his subjects; if bishop or abbot
released his townsmen from their feudal obligations, there was no retracing the
step.
112 It was always recognized that the king’s position relative to that of the
nobility was strengthened by liberality with the towns, even though they were
accorded much independence; it not only subtracted power from the nobility, but
gave the king a most abundant source of revenue.
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Within the towns themselves and in their interrelations were movements that
reduced their social isolation — and most effective among them, the affiliation of
towns. The body of customary and chartered rights and powers and the necessary
social structure for their exercise that prevailed in a few of the larger and more
favored cities were used as models by other towns affiliated to them.
114 Thus London,
Oxford, York, Winchester and Hastings be came models for many other towns in
England; Bristol, Dublin and Kilkenny, for towns in Ireland; Hereford and Rhuddlan,
for towns in Scotland. Sometimes the model town had itself been constructed in
imitation of another town, as Rhuddlan in imitation of Hereford; and Dublin, of
Bristol. Even when a town was not mentioned as a model in a charter, its charter had
often been closely copied.
115 Sometimes charters recited that the king had allowed a
town to make its choice of the town it would use for a model. In some cases one town
would serve as a model in one particular, and another town in other particulars; in
some cases only one feature of a town’s liberties was imitated. Ordinarily, when one
town had been granted the liberties of another town, it demanded (as a matter of right
— sometimes specifically granted) and obtained a copy. of the model town’s charter
to aid in the determination of its rights and duties;
116 if afterwards doubts arose in the
interpretation of its constitution, it was at liberty to get advice and information from
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several towns, the tendency of affiliation was to produce uniformity.
117 Again, the
commercial intercommunication of towns rapidly increased and the contact of
citizens of different towns in markets and fairs tended to obliterate the divergences
of local customs. The impetus given to the commerce of foreign merchants in
England in the reigns of the three Edwards exerted a similar influence; the presence
of the foreigners aroused in the tradesmen of different English towns a sense of
community of interests.
In the administrative reforms of Henry I and Henry II, the towns were regarded
largely as distinct units. Before the middle of the thirteenth century the statutes that
affected the rights and duties of all townsmen comprehensively were few. With
Edward I, however, began a series of statutes directed to the concerns of merchants
(another word for townsmen) generally.
“Formerly there had been a vast number of separate local
jurisdictions, each united by a similar tie to the king or head, but
without any real connection with one another; now the towns in the
different parts of the Country were enabled to realize the interests
they had in common, to get over some of the old exclusiveness, and
to join in demanding measures for the common good of their class in
all parts of the realm.”
118
During the three centuries before the accession of the Tudors the social and legal
status of burghers had steadily approached uniformity; in the sixteenth century the
townsmen had become virtually an order in English society. In the fifteenth century,
if not earlier, the conception of a liber burgus had become so definite that a charter
granting merely the right to be a liber burgus conveyed a settled and determinate
body of rights.
119 And it was only when the townsmen had become rather a stratum
in English society than a federation of units; when, as Cunningham puts it, the
sections of society had become horizontal instead of vertical, that they took an active
part in securing the larger liberties of the English people; their previous attitude had
been negative rather than positive; their influence on the government had been
exerted to keep it from interfering with the towns; their desire had been to protect
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sought to make itself more nearly comprehensive of English society by expanding the
great council into a parliament, it had found two classes of social units without
representation, the administrative counties of the agricultural population and the
numerous corporate towns of the merchants and manufacturers, — very much as the
Pope, after monasticism had developed, found his Church divided into administrative
bishoprics and monasteries.
But the inevitable result of the summoning to Parliament of representatives from
the towns was to break down the barriers of corporate town life. The rights enjoyed
by townsmen ceased to be privileges because no longer exceptional; the only
exceptional rights remaining were those of the close town governing bodies, which
came to be very properly contrasted with the rights of the townsmen in general; the
corporation seemed to be a fit framework for town life in general only so long as it
was exceptional, in its rights and duties, in the larger volume of national life; when
the town life came to be correlated with the life that surrounded it, the corporate shell
shrunk until it included barely more than the privileged life within the town itself.
The main-spring of corporations is the private interest of the persons organized in
them; when the private interest comes to be reposed in a larger unit, the corporation
is destroyed or shrinks by the exclusion of those whose interest has been transferred.
It is suggestive that the fullness of town life, placed by Cunningham at the end of the
thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century, was coincidental with the
beginning of the modern parliamentary system, and that the decay of all the town
powers seems to have culminated in the reign of Richard II, when the system had
been fully established.
120 It is suggestive in the same connection that the fifteenth
century was characterized by the codification of town statutes in “black books,” “red
books,” and “white books,” and by the greater fullness of town charters; laws and
chartered rights could not rely for protection, either against the central government
or against the townsmen, on public sentiment; exceptional rights are strictly
construed and their record must be close at hand. The fifteenth century, too, was the
century of struggles between town classes, between rich and poor; the compilations
of laws and the more definite charters were for the defence of the rich governing
body, the legatees of the older corporate town powers.
The decay of corporate town life, then, was not equivalent to a decay of town life
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difficult to assign a reason for it, that when a wider social unit is in process of
realization and is seeking to absorb the activity of a narrower corporate unit, the
corporation can be used with little success as an administrative organ. An effort to
make such use of corporations is likely to result in Jesuitism. The history of English
towns after the period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when nationality was
attained, is in a succession of acts by which the actual work of government is
transferred from the obsolescent corporations to county authorities, justices of the
peace, parish authorities, commissions and boards. Whether unfortunately or not,
when England attained nationality, it was organized in a monarchical form, or at least
in a system of government in which the monarchical element predominated. In
resisting the establishment of constitutional government, the hollow shells of town
government still existing in the close corporations of the towns were used by the
monarchy largely as the means of maintaining an artificial and corrupt control over
the House of Commons. Lawyers even discovered that the test of the corporate
character of a town was its power to send members to Parliament.
121 From the reign
of Henry VIII to the Revolution many of the older charters were modified and new
ones granted to perpetuate and make even closer the close type of the town
corporation; during the eighteenth century and especially in the long reign of George
III, extending into the nineteenth century, there was no improvement:
“there is little reason to doubt that the form given to the governing
classes, as well as the limitation of the burgurship, during this period
was adopted for the purpose of influencing the choice, or nomination,
of members of Parliament.”
122
“The importance which the privilege of electing members of
Parliament had conferred upon corporate towns, or rather upon the
governing bodies there, and the rewards for political services, which
were brought within the reach of the ruling corporators, had caused
this function to be considered in many places as the sole object of
their institution. In some boroughs this right had survived all other
traces of municipal authority.”
123
“It had become customary not to rely on the municipal corporations
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The powers granted by local acts of Parliament for various purposes,
had been from time to time conferred, not upon the municipal
officers, but upon trustees or commissioners distinct from them; so
that often the corporations had hardly any duties to perform. They had
the nominal government of the town; but the efficient duties, and the
responsibility, had been transferred to other hands.”
124
The office of high steward (or patron) of the borough sprung up to make a close
connecting link between the corporation and the king and nobility; his function was
virtually to nominate its members of Parliament. By the Reform Act of 1832 fifty-six
of the nomination or “rotten” boroughs were denuded of the power to return
members; thirty boroughs were deprived of one member each, and two of two
members; sixty-four seats were distributed among other town populations; and the
county representation was increased by sixty-five seats; thus, to some extent, the
arbitrary element in parliamentary representation, a result of the prostitution of
obsolete town corporations to the support of a corrupt monarchy, was removed.
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In 1835, however, the Commissioners on Municipal Corporations in England and
Wales, appointed the year previous, found, as nearly as it could determine, two
hundred and forty-six municipal corporations in England and Wales. In general, they
consisted of a mayor, aldermen and common council, called collectively the town
council; the mayor was elected annually from among the aldermen or common
council by one or both of the bodies; the councillors were elected for life by the
common council or aldermen; the aldermen were elected by the aldermen from
among the common councillors, or past-mayors. In the community was a body of
freemen, admitted to the franchise by vote of the close corporation; the right to the
freedom might be derived from (a) birth of a freeman,
126 (b) marriage to a freeman’s
widow or daughter or (c) servitude through apprenticeship to a freeman; the freedom
might also be conferred by (d) gift or purchase.
127 With few exceptions the
corporations were making no effort to provide efficient local government. They
existed quite independently of the communities in which they were placed. Even
when there was a popular body in the corporation, it consisted of only a small body
of freemen far from being representative of the society of the town. Their chief
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political machines managed and controlled for partisan purposes. The acquisition of
the franchise was inspired, not by a desire to participate in local self-government, but
by the hope of sharing in the profits of election. The choice of incompetent town
officers, careless in the performance of their duties, resulted from the partisan control
of the municipal elections. The business of the corporation was transacted in secrecy,
sometimes enjoined by oath; the wholesome restraint of publicity was absent.
The mayor’s office was neglected and the recorder’s viciously filled; all offices
were regarded merely as matters of patronage, and some of them were filled by
nonresidents. Even the privileges of schools and hospitals were distributed for
partisan purposes. The criminal jurisdiction of the town courts was defective and
their personnel unworthy. The revenues of the town were frequently derived from
improper sources, being the price secured by the sale of their political power. The
public property of the towns was let to corporators at scandalously low rents or
otherwise corruptly used for their own profit. Corporate funds and revenues were not
devoted to municipal purposes, or, if so, with shameful waste and carelessness; in
fact, corporate property was not viewed as held in trust for the public; even funds and
taxes required by law to be used for specific charitable or other public purposes were
shamefully used by corporators for their private enrichment. Exemption of
corporators or freemen from tolls and other public obligations gave rise to grievous
inequalities. Fining citizens for refusal to accept onerous public offices was regarded
as a legitimate source of corporate revenue. In many towns there was no corporate
income and the public expenses were borne by the patron or parliamentary members
of the town; in others that had sources of income, their issues were absorbed in
salaries and the entertainment of the town council and its friends. Civil and criminal
justice failed to be administered in the courts because all jurors were freemen and
would not antagonize fellow-freemen by adverse findings; the jails were not properly
maintained, and the insufficiency of the police force in some towns had to be
remedied through local acts or the employment of private watchmen by citizens. In
consequence of the anomalous position of the corporations, there was widespread
discontent among the people.
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The report of the commission was followed by the enactment of the Municipal
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“that so much of all laws, statutes, and usages, and so much of all
royal and other charters, grants and letters patent... in force relating
to the several boroughs [in England and Wales, with the exception of
the City of London], or to the inhabitants thereof, or the several...
bodies corporate [therein] as are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this act,... be repealed and annulled.”
The act also provided, though it retained the structure of the old corporations, that
it should be uniform in all boroughs (except as to the number of aldermen and
councillors, the former, however, being in all cases one third the number of the latter)
and should be designated as the “Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses” of the town; the
mayor should be selected annually by the aldermen and councillors from among their
number; the aldermen, from four to sixteen in number, for terms of six years (one
half going out of office every three years but re-eligible) by the councillors from
among themselves or citizens qualified to be councillors; the councillors, from
twelve to forty-eight in number (with a small property qualification), annually for
terms of three years (one third going out of office every year but re-eligible), by
resident householders having paid poor-rates for three years; the rights of existing
freemen were preserved for their lives but their exclusive franchise was destroyed
and they were to have no successors.
129 By the measure, “second in importance to the
Reform Act alone,” “local self-government was effectually restored.”
130 The
movement was virtually an abolition of municipal corporations and the substitution
for them of sub-governmental bodies, lacking in most of the essential attributes of
corporations and deserving to be considered rather as organs of a nationally organised
society.
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It is worthy of note that when municipalities of England came to be reduced to
harmony with the wider national government of England, they were permitted to
retain, in most of its features, the form that they had acquired during their
development. The mayor, aldermen and burgesses were retained. The mayor was still
to be chosen by the aldermen and councillors from their own number. The
governmental structure of the new municipalities was changed but little. The changes
that were introduced were intended to adapt the old structure to new uses through the
limitation of terms of office, the expansion of the municipal suffrage and theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 89
consequent imposition of increased responsibility. In the capacity of local
corporations, the municipalities had served as organizations of local social units as
long as such units enjoyed a distinct existence; in so doing they had evolved a type
of structure; when it became necessary to organize the population of localities as
parts of a larger and inclusive unit instead of distinct local units, the type of
municipal structure that had been evolved was used for the purpose. When
corporations are absorbed by the state, their structure is more likely to be made a part
of that of the state than to be replaced by a new structure.VI. Gilds.
I. — Classes of Gilds.
The term “gild” is applied to four classes of associations: (1) Frith-gilds, (2)
Social-Religious gilds, (3) Ecclesiastical gilds and (4) Trade gilds, consisting of (a)
Merchant gilds and (b) Craft gilds. But the four classes are not exclusive; all gilds
possessed religious and social (fraternal) elements in varying degrees, and few gilds
are found to have been rigidly confined to the attributes of their class; yet the
classification is sufficient for purposes of description. Moreover, not all the gilds may
properly be considered corporations. Corporations are essentially developed forms
of association; they are not so much a particular class of associations as associations
of all kinds in a particular stage of growth. The test of the corporate character is
triple, involving the interrelations of the associated persons, their relations to other
individual members of society and their relations to the state. Associations not only
pass through preliminary stages in attaining the corporate stage, but they frequently
leave the latter, either relapsing into a lower stage by the loss of corporate attributes,
or advancing to a higher stage as administrative organs of the state through their
absorption by it. Corporate life might be described as a portion of the stratum of
associated life included between two cross-sections of it. It would consequently be
quite impossible, even if profitable, to entirely separate in study the peculiarly
corporate stage from the preceding and succeeding stages of associated life. The four
classes of gilds will accordingly be considered in turn.
II. — Frith-Gilds and Social-Religious Gilds.
1. In the seventh and eighth centuries the social organization of the Anglo-Saxons
in England had undergone many changes since the time of their immigration, but the
most important change had resulted from the partial relinquishment of the family as
the unit of rights and duties, and the formation above it of the state with its system
of government and laws. The disintegration of the family had been hastened most by
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growth of private ownership of land. The Frith-gilds were more or less voluntary
associations, not based on kinship, that partially replaced the old family unit in
Anglo-Saxon society; that is substantially all that may be said of them. Security of
person and property was becoming more necessary as the older social system was left
behind; neither a firmly established state nor a feudal baronage was yet at hand.
Perhaps there was a process of gradual disintegration of the family by the formal
admission of outsiders into the family bond, but history affords no evidence of it; it
seems unlikely, moreover, because the family and Frith-gild are explicitly contrasted
in the Anglo-Saxon laws.
Two of the laws of Ive have caused much controversy among students of gilds.
Whether it is safe to say that gilds existed in England in the seventh and eighth
centuries depends almost entirely on the construction put upon these two laws.
“He who slays a thief must declare on oath that he slew him
offending; not his gild brethren” (gegildan).
132 “If a man demand the
‘wer’ of the slain, he must declare that he slew him for a thief; not the
associates (gegildan) of the slain nor his lord: but if he conceal it, and
after a time it become known, then makes he room for an oath on
behalf of the dead man, that his kindred may exculpate him.”
133
What is meant by “gegildan” cannot be stated with certainty. It has been interpreted
to mean minor compulsory organizations of the state, such as the township and
hundred. Gross, who has given the subject probably the most careful examination,
admits that he does not know what the “gegildan” were but adopts the cautious view
of Schmidt that they were “gild-comrades” (Zahlungsgenossen) — those who
mutually paid for one another.
134 Thorpe even suggests that the word as used in the
first law cited may mean nothing more than “comrades in guilt.”
135 The word must
mean at least mutually responsible associations not based on kinship, whether
voluntary or compulsory.
136 In the laws of Alfred the distinction between the older
family organization and the new organization that was supplementing it is more
apparent.
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if he have maternal relations, let them pay a third of the ‘wer’; his
gild-brethren a third part; for a third, let him flee.”
137 “If a man kill a
man thus circumstanced, if he have no relatives, let half be paid to the
king; half to his gild-brethren.”
138
These laws are included with only slight changes in the code known as the Laws
of Henry the First.
“Si quis autem paterna cognacione careno male pugnet ut hominem
occidat, si tune cognacionem maternam habeas, reddat ipsa terciam
partem were, terciam congildones, pro tercia fugiat. Si nec maternam
cognacionem habeas, reddant congildones dimidiam weram, pro
dimidia fugiat vel componat. Si quis occidatur ejusmodi, secundum
regi, dimidium congildonibus.”
139
But the organization of the gild-brethren is still so uncertain that nothing save the
quality of mutual responsibility can safely be predicted of it.
The Dooms of London (Judicia Civitatis Londoniae) of the reign of Æthelstan, have
been somewhat extravagantly referred to as “a deed of incorporation by the prelates
and reeves of the Londoners for the repression of theft and maintenance of the public
peace.”
140 They appear to be a body of laws independently ordained by the bishops
and reeves of London and then given royal sanction by being annexed to the body of
laws ordained by the king and his witan.
141 They provided that when a thief had been
slain, one fourth of the surplus of his property after the payment of the”ceap-gild”
should go to the “fellowship”;
142 that each (“except the poor widow who has no
‘forwychta’ nor any land”) should contribute to a common fund to pay for stolen
goods, and that all should “have the search in common”;
143 that if any man “who has
given his ‘wed’ in our gild ships  should die,... each gild-brother shall give a ‘gesufel’
loaf for his soul, and sing a fifty or get it sung within xxx days”;
144 that whosoever
might should avenge the injuries of all, that they “should be all in one friendship as
in one foeship,” and “that he who should kill a thief before other men,... be xii pence
the better for the deed, and for the enterprise, from our common money...”
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fraternal feeling of mutual interdependence and close affection,”
146 “voluntary
associations for mutual support,”
147 or associations “for mutual help, made by the
people themselves when and as they found the need for it,”
148 then the London
Frithgild may be said to have been the first of English gilds, even though it is not
plain that it was fully voluntary and the dooms of London ordained for its
government were hardly “made by the people themselves.” It is difficult to discover
any essential difference between the organization of the London Frith-gild and the
prevailing organization of the population in townships and hundreds. The convivial
nature of the monthly meeting, of which “bytt-fything” was a feature, is of no
significance; the meeting was, after all, of “‘hyndrum’ and those who direct the
tithings” — of officers of the regular subdivisions of the state, not of officers of a
closer body within the body of the state. The most important fact is that the dooms
of London were expressly ordained for the people of London, that the body of
population subject to them was treated as an exception in the general body of English
people, — the first step towards corporate autonomy and independence.
2. Of the social-religious gilds there is some definite information concerning the
gild at Exeter, D’Orcy’s gild at Abbotsbury, the Thanes’ gild at Cambridge and the
Cnichten-gild of London, as well as some fragmentary references to others.
“This assembly was collected in Exeter, for the love of God, and for our souls’
need, both in regard to our health of life here, and to the after days, which we desire
for ourselves by God’s doom.” Meetings were held three times a year on feast days
of the Church; each member made a contribution for the common expenses, and a
priest at each meeting sang two masses, one for the living and one for the dead
members; each brother was also to sing two psalms, one for the living and one for the
dead. On the death of a brother, each other brother was to provide six masses or six
psalms, and to contribute five pence. If a brother’s house should be burned, each
other brother should contribute a penny for his assistance. Fines were imposed for
failure to perform fraternal obligations; “misgreeting” a brother was punished by a
fine of thirty pence.
149
In D’Orcy’s gild at Abbotsbury, contributions of money or wax were made by
gild-brothers on the occasions of religious services; at the same time each contributed
a loaf of bread for common alms. A fine was imposed for misgreeting another in the
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leave of the steward and the caterers, forfeit his entrance.’‘ In sickness, fraternal aid
was rendered; in death, burial was provided and the attendance of all the brethren was
required.
150
In the Thanes’ gild at Cambridge, “each gave oath upon the relics to the rest, that
he would hold true brotherhood to support him that Lath the best right.” Burial of a
dead brother was conducted by his brethren and failure to attend was punished by
fine. “Let the gildship inherit of the dead half a farm, and each gildbrother contribute
two pence to the alms, and out of this sum let what is fitting to be taken to St.
Æthelthryth.” Brethren were aided in need and against the depredations of thieves.
151
“If any gild-brother slay a man, and if he be a compelled avenger and
compensate for his insult,.. let each gildbrother assist... but if the
gild-brother with folly and deceit slay a man, let him bear his own
deed; and if a comrade slay another comrade through his own folly,
let him bear his breach as regards the relations of the slain.” 
Misgreeting was punished by fine. In sickness or death, a brother should be
removed whither he had willed.
152
The “Anglica Cnichteen-gild of London” is said to have been originally composed
of thirteen men who received a grant of land in eastern London from Cnut in
recognition by him of powers displayed by them in personal combats. The right to
hold land was accompanied by the right to associate and to bear the name
“Cnichtengild.” They were recognized in a charter of Edward the Confessor as
having a “gild,” rights in land, and a body of special customs. In 1125, fifteen men,
the successors of the original thirteen, gave to the church and canons of Holy Trinity
near Aldgate the land and soke called “Anglissah Cnichte-gilde” in return for their
admission to the monastery. They surrendered their charters to Holy Trinity, King
Henry confirmed their gift and their history as an association ended. There were
Cnichten-gilds in Winchester and Canterbury also.
153 To what class of society the
cnichten belonged is uncertain, but it is plain from the evidence of the conveyance
of land by the Cnichten-gild of Canterbury to Christ Church that its membership was
partly or wholly composed of merchants.
154 If the word “Cnicht” be equivalent to
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composed, to some extent, of the same class, especially as it is known that thanehood
could be acquired by making three successful voyages to foreign lands. The
Cnichten-gilds were at least probably restricted to the more prominent and influential
classes in the towns.
3. There were also gilds organized under the auspices of the Church and composed
wholly or partly of the clergy. One of the laws of King Edgar seems to indicate that
such associations existed in his reign. “We enjoin, that no priest deprive another of
any of those things which appertain to him; neither in his minster, nor in his
shrift-district, nor in his gild-ship, nor in any of the things appertaining to him.”
155
There were gilds of the Kalenders (the most noted one being in Bristol) composed
at first of clergy alone, who met on the first day of each month, but afterwards
admitting lay-members, sometimes limited in number, and both men and women.
William of Worcester is authority for the statement that the Gild of the Kalenders in
Bristol “was founded in honor of the feast of Corpus Christi, long before the Norman
Conquest, about the year 700,” but the statement is discredited. Annexed to its
normal activity as a gild, it had as one of its functions the custody of the archives of
the town, the keeping of a monthly record of all public acts and the registration of
deeds and rolls, and the maintenance of a school for Jews and other strangers for the
purpose of bringing them up in Christianity.
156 In the fourteenth century, clergy were
sometimes admitted to membership in secular Social-Religious gilds, but were not
allowed to hold offices in them or participate in their deliberations.
157
Bishop Osbern and the canons of St. Peter’s monastery at Exeter were members of
the gild at Woodbury, gathered “in the name of Christ and St. Peter the apostle”; at
Easter, one penny for every hearth was to be paid to the canons; for every departed
gild-brother one penny for every hearth was to be contributed as “soul-shot, be it a
man be it a woman who belongs to the gildship”; “and the canons are to have ‘the
soul-shot,’ and perform such service for them as they ought to perform.”
158 In Bishop
Wolfstan’s gild, the bishop was associated with the abbots of Evesham, Chertsey,
Bath, Pershone, Winchcombe and Gloucester, and the dean of Worcester. They were
to “be faithful to our temporal lord King William and to Matilda the lady,” to be
obedient to God and St. Mary and St. Benedict and to be “quasi cor unum et anima
una.” Every week there were to be two masses in each monastery. “ It is the
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their common need.” “Each shall perform and, for his own account, buy a hundred
masses, and bathe a hundred needy men, and feed them, and shoe them. And each
[shall] sing himself seven masses and for thirty days set his meat before him, and a
penny upon the meat.”
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After the Norman Conquest, the Frith-gilds appear to have lost their identity as
social units. Their social functions came to be performed by other kinds of
associations, by the towns, Trade gilds, and Social-Religious gilds. Moreover, the
growth of a national government and of the feudal system provided new centres
around which the old mutual responsibility might revolve. The Ecclesiastical gilds,
also, seem to have been crowded out by the development of a more completely
organized church.
160 Yet there is reason to believe, notwithstanding serious breaks
in the historical evidence, that the SocialReligious gilds contrived to be prominent
and influential factors in English town-life until the middle of the sixteenth century.
But they had scarcely any new features. All their essential elements as gilds were
already present at the time of the Conquest, the restricted membership, the periodical
meetings on feast-days of the Church, the contributions to a common fund for
purposes of religious worship and of fraternal and general charity, the feasts, and
fraternal aid in sickness, distress and death.
In the second Parliament of 1388, held by Richard II at Cambridge, writs were
ordered to be sent to all sheriffs directing them to call upon the”Masters and Wardens
of all gilds and brotherhoods” for returns
“as to the manner and form and authority of the foundation and
beginning and continuance and governance of the gilds and
brotherhoods aforesaid: as to the manner and form of the oaths,
gatherings, feasts, and general meetings of the brethren and sisters;
and of all other such things touching these gilds and brotherhoods:
also as to their liberties, privileges, statutes, ordinances, usages, and
customs and moreover as to all [their] lands, tenements, rents and
possessions, whether held in mortmain or not, and as to [their] goods
and chattels, and as to the true value of said lands, tenements, rents,
and possessions, and the true worth of said goods and chattels: also
as to the whole manner and form of all and every the premises, andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 97
of all other matters and things in any way concerning or touching the
said gilds and brotherhoods”; “And that the said masters and wardens
shall bring and lay before us and our said council... the charters and
letters patent, if they have any, granted by us or any of our forefathers,
in any way touching or concerning the aforesaid gilds or
brotherhoods, upon pain of the revocation and perpetual annulling of
the charters and letters aforesaid, and of all the liberties, immunities,
privileges, and grants contained in [them]”
to await such further orders as should be given by the council and Parliament.
161 In
compliance with the terms of the writs, many reports
162 were made in behalf of the
gilds, from which their character at that time may be quite fully learned. A brief
consideration of them will substantiate the statement that they differed little from
those of the eleventh century.
The gild, founded and organized by the town or by a group of people within it, was
almost universally dedicated to some saint or religious symbol,
163 and was usually
known by that name except when it happened to be the only or most prominent gild
in a town, and then it was often known by the name of its location. Among the
purposes of the gild were the “amendment of the lives and souls” of the brethren and
sisters and the “nourishment of love” between them, prayer for all manner of men at
every meeting, the maintenance of a saint’s image in a church; the “maintenance of
the play of the Lords’ Prayer in York, for the benefit of both hearers and upholders,”
and “to hold certain [religious] services and the better to secure the liberties of the
town.” The head officers were from one to four wardens (usually with a small body
of assistants called stewards), — an alderman, steward and two assistants, — or an
alderman, chamberlain and eight assistants. Other officers were deans, clerks,
bellmen and beadles. In some gilds small salaries were paid to some of the officers.
The officers were elected annually by the whole fraternity, annual reports were
required and refusal to accept office was punishable by fine. Ordinances were enacted
by the consent of all at annual or quarterly meetings, but they were not to be against
the common law or the”King’s right.” From one to four meetings were held each
year. Both men and women (whether resident or not) were admitted to membership
on vote of the fraternity or by leave of the warden and twelve members.
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entrance oath to keep the ordinances of the gild was usually imposed, and sometimes
a “kiss of love” had to be given to the newcomer by all present. The ordinances of the
gild were read to new members (and sometimes to all members) so that they might
not plead ignorance of them. Entrance fees and annual and quarterly dues were levied
and voluntary contributions recommended.
165 Property in the form of lands and
tenements, grain, cattle (leased by the year) and articles used in religious ceremonies
was owned by the gild.
166 Many members (and even non-members) donated or willed
property to the gild for general or special purposes.
The regular and special meetings were usually held after more or less elaborate
devotional services in the church of the patron saint of the gild or elsewhere, the
expenses of which it had partly or wholly defrayed. Some of the gilds maintained
chaplains, chapels or chantries; others provided that a chaplain should be maintained
if the gild could afford it, the poor of the gild having the first claim on its resources.
All meetings were characterized by the usual feasting and drinking, for the provision
and regulation of which the ordinances contained many rules, as that no brother
should enter the “ale chamber” without permission of the warden, that the officers
should have certain allow ances, that “no brother nor sister [should] be so hardy, [as]
to sleep, nor let the cup stand by him,” and that no brother should sit at the feast
longer than the aldermen; many of the gilds had processions and games and a few
produced spectacles on the occasions of their meetings.
167 Absence from the meetings
(especially on the part of members in town when they were held) was punished by
fine. Members were not to attend meetings in a tabard or cloak or in bare legs or
barefooted. Some gilds had a livery worn at all meetings and at the burial of brethren
and all public courts in which the gild participated; if a brother could not afford a full
suit of livery, he was provided with at least a hood at the expense of the fraternity.
All brethren were to be good men or men of good repute; no others were admitted;
if members committed crimes, violated the canon law or were otherwise seriously
remiss, they were subject to expulsion, until, at least, their conduct should be
amended. Brethren unruly, boisterous, heedless of the ordinances or rebellious of
tongue toward the aldermen were subject to punishment by fine. Penalties for
wronging one another or disclosing to outsiders the affairs of the gild were provided.
No gild-brother might become surety for another for debt or trespass or other
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should quarrel or disagree, their matters of difference should be submitted to the
aldermen alone or with a part or all the brethren; if they should disregard the decision
reached or should again quarrel, they should be subject to expulsion; suits at law
should be resorted to only on consent of the gild after its efforts to reach a settlement
had proved unavailing. Fraternal aid was extended in old age, sickness, loss by
robbery and damage by fire or the sea. Money was loaned from the common-box in
times of need, security for its repayment being sometimes required. Young brethren
were helped to find work. Young unmarried women of the gild were also materially
assisted:
“If any good girl of the gild, of marriageable age, cannot have the
means found by her father, either to go into a religious house or to
marry, whichever she wishes to do; friendly and right help shall be
given her, out of our means and our common-chest, towards enabling
her to do whichever of the two she wishes.”
168
Brethren distressed in their business were assisted, unless their straits should be due
to their own folly, riotous living, rising too late in the morning or sloth and indolence.
Members unjustly imprisoned were visited and comforted. Members on pilgrimages
to the Holy Land or elsewhere were exempt from the payment of fees, or positively
assisted, accompanied outside the walls of the city on setting out and met on
returning. When a brother died, all (on penalty of being fined) attended the services
at his burial, defrayed the expenses of it, and made offerings not only for the masses
for his soul’s welfare but for general alms;
169 if he died out of town, his corpse was
brought back at the expense of the gild, or services were held even in its absence; if
he were drowned it was the duty of his gild-brothers to search the sea for his body (to
a distance of six miles). In some towns the gild had peals rung in honor of dead
brethren. One of the ordinances of the Gild of Palmers, at Ludlow, provided that a
brother might keep night-watches with the dead on condition that he”neither call up
ghosts, nor make any mockeries of the body or its good name nor do any other
scandals of the kind.”
In addition to purely social-religious functions, many gilds assumed a variety of
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highways and the repair of town-walls. The Gild of Ringers, which flourished at
Bristol in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the Gild of Minstrels and Plays,
found in Lincoln at the end of the fourteenth century, aimed to promote the
cultivation of music.
170
With few exceptions the gilds that made returns in 1389 had been formed in the
fourteenth century. The returns are not proof of an historical continuity of Social-
Religious gilds from the eleventh to the fourteenth century, and there is little
supplementary evidence. But, on the other hand, there is nothing to account for an
exceptional outburst of such organizations in the fourteenth century. The close
similarity of the gilds then existing to those of the eleventh century is in itself an
argument for the continuation of such a social structure during the intervening two
centuries — an argument strengthened by the fact that Merchant gilds, with all the
dominant characteristics of the purely Social-Religious gilds, were most prevalent in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. If there is some uncertainty of their activity
during some centuries, the middle of the sixteenth century is very definitely the time
when their activity ceased. In the act of 1545 for the dissolution of colleges in the
reign of Henry VIII,
171 “fraternities, brotherhoods and guylds” were included with
“colleges, free chapelles, chantries and hospitalles”; many were expressly named for
dissolution, and commissioners were to investigate many others; but by the more
general provisions of the act of Edward VI of 1547 for the same purpose, all
fraternities, brotherhoods and gilds in England and Wales and the King’s other
dominions, except those of “Mysteries or Crafts,” and all their property should be in
the possession of the King “without office or inquisition.”
The derivation of gilds is as doubtful as most questions relating to them. The class
of writers that are inclined to find an origin in Roman institutions for many other
features of the structure of Anglo-Saxon and English society, look to the Roman
“collegia” and “sodalitates” for the source of English gilds; but it certainly is
impossible to prove a continuity of organization from the Roman to the Anglo-Saxon
period; the only argument seems to be based on the mere similarity of the institutions,
and that, of course, is hardly sufficient. Other writers have sought to trace gilds to the
old heathen sacrificial feasts of the Teutons, at which either kinsmen or larger groups
of tribesmen gathered; but there was no stable organization or fixed body of relations
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meeting for religious worship with its accompanying feasting and drinking. Gilds
have also been called “artificial families,” with the clear intimation that they have
their source in the family — a suggestion that can be based on hardly more than
fancy. Perhaps they may be most easily explained (or their explanation avoided) by
deciding that they were merely “natural” or “spontaneous” organizations, having their
origin in the spirit of the time or in current conditions.
The status of a corporation was hardly attained by any of the three classes of gilds
described. The attitude of the state toward associations of its subjects may be of four
kinds; it may (a) oppose, (b) permit, (c) encourage or (d ) demand them. (a) If the
state is opposed to them and they exist in spite of its efforts to suppress them, they
are assuredly not corporations. (b) If the state is indifferent and merely permits them
to exist, they are likewise not corporations, wanting as they are in the power to enlist
the coercive power of the state in the maintenance of a body of rights and powers. (c)
The ideal attitude of the state towards corporations is one not of passive indifference
but of active encouragement; the state recognizes the public importance of their
functions and secures the performance of them through the bestowal of the necessary
rights and powers and of the legal sanction to make them fully operative. (d ) If the
state compulsorily and arbitrarily divides its subjects into groups for governmental
purposes, they are not corporations, even if they have in their own control the
administration of the affairs of particular importance to them. Thus the Frith-gilds,
though they appeared to be executing “agreements,” were virtually compulsory
organizations of local populations; the attitude of the state towards them was one of
more than mere encouragement. On the other hand the Social-Religious and
Ecclesiastical gilds exercised functions not recognized as essential to public welfare;
the attitude of the state was correspondingly passive. Yet whether purely voluntary
or compulsory, the associations had the internal organization that would be
serviceable for corporate activity; the use of such an organization would be calculated
to train the people in preparation for more indenendent self-control.
III. — Merchant Gilds.
The Merchant gild (or gild merchant, as it was usually called) was merely a gild of
merchants. A gild was an association of persons for the preservation of the peace, the
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phase of social activity of common interest to its members; merchant gilds differed
from other gilds in having for their purpose the protection and promotion of the
economic interests of merchants. It would be hardly right to say that they were
derived from other kinds of gilds. Mutual responsibility and mutual advantage
organically rendered was a universal characteristic of local medieval society; the
social unit through which they had to be secured was necessarily a small unit. The
particular kinds of gilds prominent in each successive period depended on the social
needs of the time. The merchant gild did not make its appearance until after the
Conquest because, doubtless, the economic development of England had not earlier
attained a point at which there was a trading class to organize. Possibly the mutual
interests of traders, unimportant as they must have been, had previously found
protection under the guise of the Cnichten-gilds; the reference to one of the earliest
merchant gilds, the so-called Chapmen’s Gild at Canterbury in the archepiscopate of
Anselm, seems to indicate such a connection. Writers have often without warrant
considered the Cnichten-gild of London a merchant gild. But mere speculation is
idle: the first historical evidence of a gild that may certainly be called a merchant gild
is in a document evidencing the conveyance by the Chapmen Gild of Canterbury of
some houses to Christ Church between 1093 and 1109, and in a charter of Robert
Fitz-Hanon to the burgesses of Bereford between 1087 and 1107.
172 As a matter of
historical evidence, then, the merchant gild made its appearance in England at the end
of the eleventh century. Closer relations with the Continent and the greater security
of life and property afforded by the rigorous rule of the Conqueror gave an impetus
to English commerce at home and abroad; moreover, a considerable body of traders
followed William to England, — such at least is a fair inference from the frequency
with which French surnames are found among the merchants of London and other
important towns of the period. The merchant gild as an institution may have been
imported by the foreigners into England, for it flourished on the Continent among
peoples with whom the English were in close contact before it arose in England; but
the weight of evidence is against such an origin; it was not found in London where
the influence of the foreigners was greatest and it was found in many small and
remote places
173 whose influence must have been slight; moreover, the governing
class of the Normans do not appear to have favored its transplanting. It was
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The origin of the merchant gild in England must be ascribed to those conditions and
to the character of the local social structure within which the new conditions would
have to be correlated with existing social activity. Institutions are not easily
transported. The rise of the new commercial life and the wide application of the
principle of mutual responsibility and mutual advantage in local groups in state and
church and secular society are quite sufficient to account for the rise of the merchant
gild in England.
As an institution of local social organization, the merchant gild flourished in
England during three hundred years, the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
the charters granting it being most numerous in the reigns of Henry I, Henry II,
Richard I and John. For the sake of convenience, its earliest features will first be
considered, and then the respects in which it changed during the three centuries.
The power to organize and maintain a merchant gild was usually conceded to the
people of a locality by the king, or by a secular or ecclesiastical lord (latterly with the
consent of the king), in a charter along with other municipal franchises of the
character already described.
174 But the franchise differed from most of the other
municipal franchises as involving the right to form an association for certain
purposes.
“If we attempt to expand the brief phrase used in the charter we seem
brought to some such result as the following: The king gives to the
burgesses a right to form or retain an association for the purpose of
employing to the best advantage those mercantile immunities which
by other words of his charter he has conferred upon them. They are
to be toll-free; they may organize themselves for the purpose of
maintaining this freedom.”
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The work of organization was initiated, if the general rule may be inferred from the
case of Ipswich in 1200, by the organized municipality. When the burgesses of
Ipswich had received their charter from King John in 1200, they first organized their
municipal government by the election of their bailiffs, coroners and other capital
portmen. The latter then ordained that there should be elected by the council of the
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“approved and lawful men”; the five were then to make oath that they would “well
and faithfully maintain the said gild and all things appertaining to it.” The alderman
and four assistants having been chosen in a popular town meeting and duly sworn,
announced that all freemen of the town were to come before them on a future day to
organize their gild and pay their house (or fees). Further the municipality, — the
bailiffs, coroners and popular body, after discussing how the gild should be
maintained, decided that the alderman and his successors in office should have the
monopoly of “buying and selling certain kinds of stone and marble,” with the duty
of making an annual report to the bailiff and coroners of his profits therefrom.
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Once organized, the gild elected its own officers, maintained its own treasury, held
its own meetings and passed and kept in a separate roll its own ordinances.
Most frequently, as in Ipswich, the gild was presided over by an alderman, assisted
by two or four associates called stewards or wardens, but in some towns his place
was occupied by one or two stewards, masters, wardens, or keepers. There were also
usually several minor officers, such as door-keepers, treasurers, clerks and marshals.
The officers were annually elected by the brethren of the gild. The duties of the
alderman or other head officer were, in general, to preside over the deliberations of
the gild, to enforce its ordinances, to care for its property, to collect its fines, entrance
fees, assessments, tolls and profits from monopolies and other revenues, and to settle
disputes between gildsmen.
177 The meetings of the gild, at which members were
admitted, ordinances made and other gild business transacted, were annual,
semiannual or quarterly, and were called “morghespeches.” Membership in the gild
was obtained by election by the brethren and the payment of an entrance fee (usually
lower in the case of relations of existing brethren). “The newly elected member was
required to take an oath of fealty to the fraternity, swearing to observe its laws, to
uphold its privileges, not to divulge its counsels, to obey its officers, and not to aid
any non-gildsman under cover of the newly acquired ‘freedom’” — a requirement
sometimes prudently supplemented by the demand of sureties for fulfilling the new
obligations.
178 Not only were there burgesses who were not brethren of the gild
merchant, but there were gildsmen who were not burgesses, both among residents
and non-residents of the town. Burgesses were eligible to membership but had to be
formally admitted by the brotherhood. Sometimes villains, but usually only freemen,
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ecclesiastics, were often admitted to the gild.
179 Monks
180 and women, who could not
be burgesses, were admitted to the fraternity. It is possible that in some towns villains
might be burgesses but not gildsmen, or vice versa. In many towns the tenants of
privileged sakes of bishops, abbots, barons or constables of castles were not
burgesses but might be and often were gildsmen. In some towns, as in Andover,
gildsmen were of two classes, those of the “ free gild “ and of the “ villein gild”;
181
like wise there were grades of membership, as untransferable (except to near
kinsmen) or limited to the life of the holder. Membership in the gild, however,
entailed the burden of being “at scot and lot” with the burgesses —  of sharing with
them the financial burdens of the municipality,
182 while simple burgess-ship
depended normally on the holding of a burgage in the town.
A gild court was evolved from the activity of the gild, having jurisdiction not only
over its members, but In some cases even over non-members. Infractions of
ordinances were punished by fines, expulsion and forfeitures of goods. At first the
judicial function appears to have been exercised almost entirely in the
“morghespeche” or periodical meeting; later, ordinances were summarily enforced,
to a large extent, by the head officer. The tendency of independent associations to
attract  judicial powers has already been noted in the rise of the municipalities; it will
be observed quite as prominent in other forms of association as in municipalities and
gilds.
The merchant gilds also preserved many of the usages of the social-religious gilds.
The morghespeches and other general and special meetings were characterized by
much feasting and drinking. “To drink the gild merchant “ was significantly a usual
expression for holding a gild meeting. The gild fraternity usually adopted the name
of a saint or religious symbol, maintained priests, chapels and chantries and attended
devotional services on feast days in a body. All gildsmen were required to attend the
burial of a brother and contribute to its expense, if necessary, and to provide prayers
for the welfare of his soul. Brethren in sickness, distress and poverty were aided,
from a common-chest, and alms were distributed in general charity.
183 Disputes
between brethren were settled by fraternal mediation. Slander and misgreeting were
discouraged by adverse ordinances and penalties.
The general purpose of the gild merchant was to regulate trade
184 in so far as it
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as should reasonably subserve that purpose seemed to be implied in the grant to
maintain an organization. Almost the only right specifically mentioned in the charters
in addition to the general right to have the gild was “that no one who is not of the gild
may trade in the said town, except with the consent of the burgesses,” — and that
was not a universal provision; it was hardly necessary to its exercise that the power
be specifically granted. By their ordinances tolls were levied on non-gildsmen from
which gildsmen were exempt either wholly or in part nor might they keep shops or
sell specified articles at retail or in quantities less than specified, though most kinds
of victuals in common use were excepted from the rule, and its operation was
generally suspended during fairs (and sometimes on market days). No regrater (or
engrosser), one who bought for the purpose of reselling, —  except a gildsman might
sell many articles at retail, nor might others buy of him, except gildsmen or
townsmen. Frequently non-gildsmen might not trade with each other. Goods to be
sold had to be exposed at the common hall or in the market-place, and sales had to
be made within specified hours. Many articles might not be sold to foreigners
(non-townsmen) at all. Stranger merchants might remain in town no longer than forty
days and during their stay had to conduct their transactions in the presence of
gildsmen. The foreigner might not disguise the sale of his goods under the name of
a gildsman, nor might he enter into partnership will. him. Gildsmen possessed the
right of pre-emption of goods exposed for sale against a foreigner, and even against
a townsman not of the gild; they had likewise the right to make a first offer for
cargoes brought to some ports. But a gildsman exercising the right of pre-emption
had to divide his purchase with fellow gildsmen, if they should demand a division
Concerning some commodities there were special regulations in some towns, as that
no fishdealer might cut his fish for sale without the license of the gild, and might not
have a license as long as a townsman had fish to sell; that a dealer in herrings might
spend only one market-day in a town; that (at Reading) a foreigner should forfeit his
corn if he brought it before three o’clock on the market-day; and that no foreigner
should bring tanned leather to Reading except at times of fairs. From all such
ordinances, however, the non-gildsman, whether resident or foreigner, might
purchase immunity. Such was the merchant gild as it appeared in its stage of greatest
efficiency. An effort has been made to present an image of the ideal to which it
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modified by its environment and that in common with other social institutions it was
in process of change during the entire three centuries of its existence, whether the
change was due to its own activity or to that of other institutions with which it
necessarily came in contact. There remain for consideration, then, the historical
changes through which it passed in (a) its internal relations, (b) relations to the town
and (c) its relations to industry and commerce and their other organizations.
(a) It is assumed that in its earliest stages, before it became recognized as a definite
part of the social machinery of town-life, the merchant gild was a simple association
of merchants for their common good like the social religious gilds. If so, there must
have been a substantial equality of membership. Before the rise of the towns as
possessors of a body of franchises, liberties and immunities, not only within their
own limits, but beyond them in every part of England, the merchant gild must have
had only a small body of powers and those necessarily restricted to the interrelations
of their members. The membership of the gild must have consisted almost wholly of
residents of the town in which it flourished; and the townsmen were on nearly the
same social plane.
There are many reasons to believe, in the dearth of historical information, that the
early merchant gild was very democratic. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
however, the town population was being differentiated into well-defined classes. A
landless class in the towns increased in number and a class of merchants arose — a
class of townsmen who produced not entirely for consumption but partly to get a
surplus for exchange. A class of non-residents with a surplus to exchange desired to
enjoy the mercantile privileges of the towns, which they could do only under the
regulations of the gild.
Even a class of artisans, humble as they must have been, must have needed the
privileges of the merchant gild as well as the noble baron or abbot with his quantity
of agricultural goods to exchange. In the presence of such changes in the society and
social life affected by the activity of the gild, it is not difficult to understand how,
from being democratic in the beginning of the twelfth century, it came to be a closer
and more aristocratic body at the end of the thirteenth century. The changes that
characterized the towns themselves were closely paralleled in the merchant gilds. In
one gild the differentiation in gild membership was constitutionally recognized by
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body of assistants necessary to the alderman in the administration of his office
hardened into a prominent part of the gild machinery, while the non-official body of
merchants originally a part of the self-governing fraternity came to participate less
fully in its direction. Mere exemption from the restrictions of the gild without
membership in it became as suitable to the needs of the merchant as full membership
in it; so it must have appeared to the non-townsman and lower classes of townsmen,
who could view the gild only as a restrictive organization; only substantial
townsmen, persons vitally interested in the promotion of the town, could heartily
endorse the measures of the gild. Freedom of the gild, like freedom of the town,
became a term of passive, not active import, — the right not to be interfered with by
an organized body, not the right to participate in it. The merchant gild, from being
a democratic self-governing organization, became an oligarchical corporation to
which the state had virtually delegated the power of controlling the economic activity
of a local body of subjects.
(b) The relations of the merchant gild to the state were maintained through the
municipality; even where there was no “free borough” and yet a gild merchant, the
community of inhabitants was recognized as a basis for the formation and
maintenance of the gild. The men of a town might organize a merchant gild, whether
or not they had such a municipal organization and such a body of rights as would
make them a “free borough.” The organization with which it came in contact or
which it supplemented was the town. The merchant gild seems seldom or never to
have been directly dealt with by the Crown. When a charter of liberties or franchises
was granted to a town, its people were in possession of a body of powers whose
exercise would result in undoubted benefit to them. The most substantial of the
granted powers and almost the only ones through which they would come in contact
with the people of other towns had to do with trade and commerce. Without putting
too much stress on the medieval tendency to apply the principle of mutual
responsibility and mutual advantage to all groups of persons engaged in the same
occupation, living in the same restricted locality or otherwise dominated by a
common interest, the control of buying and selling might have been expected to be
reposed in the buying and selling class, the merchants. The use of the powers granted
by charter was recognized to be of importance to the town; the powers could be used
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and they were permitted to form an independent organization for the more efficient
exercise of them. The conditions were those that are always present in the growth of
corporations, — the recognition of the public importance of the activity of certain
classes acting in response to the demands of their own interest, and the consequent
bestowal upon them of an organization through which, by pursuing their own
interests, they may promote the public welfare. The merchant gild was, then, a
corporation whose organization was initiated by the municipality or community in
which it flourished.
The relations of the gild merchant to the towns have been the source of much
controversy. Some writers have described the gild merchant as merely a voluntary
association of merchants acting in matters of common interest for their mutual
advantage, and sustaining no organic relations to the town. Others have described it
as “the department of town administration whose duty was to maintain and regulate
the trade monopoly,”
185 “an official organ of the municipality”
186 “and an organized
part of the town constitution,”
187 though “at first merely a private society,
unconnected with the town government, having for its object the protection of its
members, the tradesmen of the borough, and the maintenance of the newly
invigorated trade interests.”
188 Still others have identified the merchant gild with the
town itself,
189 have supposed the town to be simply a development of the gild
190 or
have found in the grant of the power to have a merchant gild the supreme test of the
municipal character of a community.
191
There is no evidence that at any time the merchant gild was merely an association
of persons, like a social-religious gild, promoting the interests of its members. When
it first appears, it is as the repository of exceptional mercantile powers that have been
bestowed upon the town community, unless indeed the Cnichten-gilds and
Chapmen’s Gild of Canterbury be considered the direct predecessors of the later
merchant gilds, and of them unfortunately, nothing definite may be said.
In the possession and exercise of the exceptional mercantile powers that had been
granted to towns, the volume of social activity controlled by the gild was greater than
that of the municipal organization itself, while it had less opposition to overcome.
The area of the town activity was, for the most part, that formerly occupied by the
king and baronage — political activity — and was of course strictly construed; the
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existence and to the extent that it was increasing had never been under the control of
king or baronage; the town, consequently, had to encounter more opposition than the
gild in the exercise of its powers. The court feet also often remained in the hands of
the feudal lord, abbot or bishop, and the field of town government was narrowed
accordingly; the later degeneration of the feet court in the fifteenth century and its
displacement by the justice of the peace must have had the same effect. Again, the
town was frequently in conflict with the tenants of privileged sakes and adjoining
areas; the membership of the gild, however, tended to include them; their interests
were opposed to those of the townsmen but likely to be in harmony with those of the
gildsmen. The substantial class of townsmen were the merchants, and as such the gild
was their organization, while they participated in town life and town government
merely as townsmen; their interest in the gild was closer and more real to them than
their interest in the town. The mere initiation of the gild organization by the town did
not make it subordinate to it or a department of town administration. The merchant
gild of Ipswich was not a department of the administration of the town of Ipswich.
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a most noticeable feature of town life was
the identity of town officers and gild officers, but such identity does not imply that
there was an organic connection between the town and gild governments. During the
century of the three Edwards, during which the merchant class became a ruling
oligarchy in the towns, a townsman became mayor because he was a prominent
merchant and consequently prominent in the merchant gild; he was not made
alderman of the gild because he was prominent in the town government. The truth
probably is that in the contact of the two organisms, the one of greater strength, the
gild, was gradually absorbing the vitality of the weaker, the town, by controlling it
through the identity of officials. In some towns the municipal government was
actually supplanted by that of the merchant gild; in others the gild became the
dominant force in the town government, but manifested itself through identity of
officers or the less tangible identity of class interest.
The error in identifying the gild with the municipality is due to a failure to consider
that the franchise to have a gild merchant was only one of the franchises usually
granted to a mediceval town, though the gild merchant (and the municipal power that
it wielded) was usually the most important element of town life; besides, the earlier
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found in some places in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As a rough test of the
municipal character of a community, the possession of the merchant gild was not
always misleading, as that franchise was nearly always only one of several that
together were sufficient to constitute a “free borough.” It is hardly necessary to add,
in the light of what has been said, that the town was not derived from the gild, though
its development was greatly promoted by it.
(c) The class of artisans during the twelfth century was quite insignificant. Most of
the goods sold in markets and fairs were the “extracted” products of the land and sea,
agricultural products, fish and minerals and products for immediate consumption or
luxuries requiring little of the labor of artisans. Nor was there a marked
differentiation of merchants into classes. During the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries classes of artisans arose and to the class of general merchants were added
classes dealing in particular lines of goods. What was the position of the earlier
craftsmen (including both artisans and dealers in special goods) in the merchant gild,
or whether they had any recognized status in it at all, is uncertain; at all events,
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they came to be organized in craft gilds.
Suffice it to say at this point — the question will be considered later — that in some
places the merchant gild became a composite body formed by the union of craft gilds,
while in others they simply ceased to exist, except as purely socialreligious bodies,
leaving the field of economic regulation to the town corporation and the craft gilds.
The fourteenth century was one of decay for the merchant gild as an independent
institution. By the fifteenth century it had ceased to be a force in English municipal
life though its name was perpetuated in some obsolete bodies.
IV — Craft Guilds.
As the merchant gilds were organizations of the general mercantile bodies of
English towns, so the craft gilds were organizations of the separate bodies of traders
and artisans into which the wider bodies were differentiated in the course of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In considering them the same plan may be used
that was used in considering the earlier organizations. First, they may be described
as they normally appeared; then the historical changes that they underwent may be
detailed. Such a method of considering any social institution has its manifest
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condition of change, the forms or combinations of relations in which it is enclosed
are always subject to modification, whether in the nature of growth or decay, and
whether due to purely internal cause or to contact with their environment. There is
in any given institution, however, what may fairly be called its normal condition,
when its structure is clearly adapted to its functions and no part of it is plainly
abortive or over-developed, even if there be no particular time at which all its parts
are doing simply the work for which they are fitted and no more, and when their
correlated activity is harmonious. The normal condition of an institution is not
necessarily that in which it is accomplishing the most or greatest results; it not
infrequently happens, especially in periods of rapid social change, that the condition
of an institution becomes abnormal and by reason of the absence of appropriate
means through which social activity may be exercised, it is called upon to do and
does work for which it is not intended or adapted, but which is greater and more
important to society than its own work normally performed. Nor is the existence of
an institution’s normal condition coincidental with its possession of fixityor stability;
peculiarly enough, the contrary is nearer the truth; rigidity is rather a mark of
decadence than of vigor. When its condition is normal an institution is likely to be
impressionable and readily adaptable to fluctuations in the conditions of the field of
activity embraced by it; it owes its strength not to its rigidity but to its flexibility.
In general, the craft gilds had most of the religious and fraternal characteristics of
the social-religious gilds and merchant gilds. Almost universally dedicated to some
saint or religious symbol,
192 and known by its name or by the name of the trade or
craft organized within them, they contributed to the maintenance of lights and torches
at religious services, supported chapels, priests and chantries in cathedral, monastic
or parish churches, attended masses and funeral services in a body, made offerings
and presented street-spectacles on feast-days of the Church and aided in the
maintenance and repair of church structures. Their periodical meetings for the
election of officers, the enactment of ordinances and the punishment of members for
infractions of them were characterized by the usual fraternal feasting and ale-
drinking. They aided their members in sickness, helpless old age, poverty,
commercial failure, loss by shipwreck and fire and other distress, and after their death
defrayed, if necessary, the expense of their burial and of masses and prayers for the
repose of their souls. They aimed, finally, to maintain a standard of morality andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 113
fraternal courtesy by a code of appropriate ordinances and the necessary penalties of
fines and expulsion.
The system of government was also quite similar to that of other secular gilds. The
head officer, — master, bailiff, warden, or overseer, — was elected annually by the
whole fraternity. In the smaller gilds the head officer was usually the only officer,
being informally assisted as occasion required by the advice of the more influential
and “reputable” members of the fraternity. In the larger gilds the head officer was
usually a master, assisted by regularly elected wardens, two to six (in one gild,
fifteen) in number, the latter performing the actual work of government, and the
former acting as presiding officer. The general meetings of the gilds were called
hallmotes, as among the bakers, or loghallmotes (hallmotes for recapitulating laws)
193
as among the fishmongers,
194 and were held from once to four times each year.
Failure to attend them was punishable by fine, as was also refusal to accept office.
195
Officers usually served without compensation or with only such as was afforded by
fees,
196 but in some of the larger gilds they received small salaries;
197 they were
always required to take an oath before the mayor or other head officer of the town
upon entering office,
198 and were punished for neglect of official duties.
199
The membership of the fraternity consisted of the men of the trade or craft admitted
to it by consent of the whole body or its officers, and no one might “use the craft “
in the town without being a gildsman or at least paying tribute to the gild. In general,
also, and acting subject to its regulations, craftsmen became qualified for
membership only by being vouched for as competent and trustworthy by persons
already members or by serving an apprenticeship.
200 Teaching a trade or craft to a
person without making him an apprentice was forbidden. On admission to the gild,
both strangers and apprentices had to take an oath to keep the ordinances of the gild,
and had to pay an entrance fee, as well as to enter into frankpledge.
201 The usual
minimum term of apprenticeship was seven years. On the death of a member, his
widow might carry on the business until she should marry again, when, unless she
should marry a gildsman, she had to dispose of her stock or tools and leave the
business. The employment of women, however, except one’s wedded wife or
daughter, was forbidden.
202 Masters were not to entice journeymen or apprentices
from one another or to retain them after learning that they had “wrongly” left others
or that “they had not parted in a friendly and reasonable manner”;
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lads as apprentices for the purpose of selling them to other masters was also
forbidden.
204 Nor might masters receive apprentices unless able to sustain them until
the fulfilment of their covenants. Apprentices had to be enrolled before the town or
gild officers at the beginning of their apprenticeship and again presented at its
completion.
205
Like the merchant gilds and unlike the social-religious gilds, the craft gilds enacted
and enforced ordinances (also called “points,” statutes and articles) for the control
and regulation of the economic activity of their members, the chief purpose being to
secure honest dealing and work from the tradesmen and craftsmen,
206 at a price fair
to both producer and consumer. The ordinances were made by the town on its own
initiative, or made by the gild and approved by the town, or independently made by
the gild. They were sometimes enforced by the town on information by gild officials,
and sometimes independently by the gilds. They provided that deceit should not be
practiced in the making of goods, either by the use of defective material or by inferior
workmanship.
“No one of the... trade [of Furbishers] shall make in his house, or
allow to be made, pommels or hilts of swords, if they be not of good
pattern and steel; and the scabbards must be made of good
calf-leather; and if any one shall be found doing to the contrary
thereof, let him lose such false work, and be punished at the
discretion of the Mayor and Aldermen.... No one shall cause a sword
that has been broken to be repaired or made up again, in conceit or
subtlety, to the deceiving of the people....”
207 “No man shall make a
girdle of any worse leather than ox leather.”
208
By the ordinances of the weavers it was provided that no cloth should be made of
flocks or thrums or of English or Spanish yarn mixed, that Spanish wool only was to
be dyed in “bleache,” that cloth was to be of only a certain weight, and that
woof-threads should not be used for warp; and the weight and width of cloth were
carefully provided for.
209 Cappers were to make caps of wool, black, white, lana,
grisa; old caps were not to be dyed black, because thus they could often be sold for
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color would be taken out by rain;
210 later it was provided that caps should not be
worked in chalk or coal; even later, since “false” caps made of flocks instead of wool
were brought into the country from abroad, foreign merchants were required to swear
(and give security) that they would remove such goods from the country and not
bring them in again; while all such caps found in the country in future were to be
burned and their makers to be amerced. Lorimers should use no cast-iron or other
defective material in making bridles, and old bridles should not be furbished up for
sale; no joiner should make saddle-bows except of specified wood and in a particular
manner, and no painter was to paint saddle-bows, made outside of the City, until they
had been examined by the inspectors of the lorimcrs and by them certified by mark
to be of proper material.
211 Inferior leather should not be substituted by cordwainers
for other leather;
212 nor, more specifically, should they “sell to any person shoes of
bazen as being cordewayne, or of calfleather for ox-leather.”
213 Beef was not to be
baked in pies and sold for venison, and rabbits were not to be baked in pies and so
sold at all.
214 “No girdler should cause any girdle of silk, of wool, of leather, or of
linen thread, to be garnished with any inferior metal than with latten, copper, iron and
steel [and not with] lead, pewter, and tin, and other false things.”
215 Working at night
was almost universally prohibited, because work then done was not sure to be well
done, and was not easily inspected, and tended to deprive some members of the craft
of work.
216 Likewise work was usually prohibited on Saturday afternoons, on
feast-days of the Church (and on the eve of double feasts) and particularly on that of
the patron saint of the gild, and in Christmas week and Easter week.
217
Buying and selling were closely regulated at every point. Forestalling was
particularly prohibited and regrating strictly limited.
“No one of the trade [of Pepperers of Soperlane] shall mix any manner of wares,
that is to say, shall put old things with new, or new things with old, by reason
whereof the good things may be impaired by the old; nor yet, things of one price, or
of one sort, with other things of another price, or of another sort.... No person shall
dub any manner of wares: — that is to say, by putting in a thing that was in another
bale, and then dressing the bale up again in another manner than in the form in which
it was first bought; so as to make the ends of the bale contain better things than the
remainder within the bale; by reason whereof the buyer may be deceived, and so lose
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ginger, cloves, and such manner of things as may admit of being moistened; that is
to say, by steeping the ginger, or turning the saffron out of the sack and then
anointing it, or bathing it in water; by reason whereof any manner of weight may be
increased, or any deterioration arise to the merchandise.”
218 “No one of the... trade [of
Pelterers] shall work together old and new materials of his own; no one working at
new ‘werk’ shall sell or buy old furs, or any manner of old budges, as those who do
so are held suspected of mixing old and new together”;  and no one should mix
together seasoned and unseasoned or superior and inferior furs.
219 Lead brought into
the city or old lead should not be bought for resale, and “all [plumbers] as well poor
as rich, shall be partners therein, at their desire.”
220 Fishmongers might not go beyond
certain limits (the chapel or the Bridge, Castle Barnard and Jordan’s Quay) to meet
fish, or buy them in ships before the ropes were ashore, on pain of forfeiting the fish
bought. Strangers were not to buy fish of strangers, nor was a freeman to be in
partnership with a stranger. Fish were not to be sold at retail on the quay, but only in
the two fish-markets in London. Regrating of fish was not permitted until the king
had first bought what he wanted in the market; likewise dealers in poultry were not
allowed to go out of the city to meet incomers for the purpose of forestalling, but
were to buy in the city, after buyers of the king, barons and citizens should have
bought what they wanted — i.e., after the third hour and not before.
221 While the sale
of victuals by the producer directly to the consumer was generally favored, the sale
of other goods by foreigners at retail was forbidden.
“Whereas foreign folk of divers countries do bring to the city [of
London] divers manners of hats to sell, and carry them about the
streets, as well before the houses of freemen of the said trade, as
elsewhere; and thereby bar them of their dealings and of their sale, so
that the freemen of the said trade in the city are greatly impoverished
thereby; it is agreed that no strange person bringing hats to the said
city for sale, shall sell them by retail, but only in gross, and that, to
the freemen of the city on pain of losing the same.”
222
Baskets for fish were to be of proper size, were to contain only one kind of fish,
and were not to be “dubbed” (filled with better fish on top than below),
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offense punished by imprisonment and an order that the offender be “held as a
cheat.” Sturgeon that came in barrels were to be of one taking and one salting. Fresh
fish were not to be bought or sold for resale before sunrise or salt fish before prime.
As to oysters and whelks, he alone who got them must bring them to the city, and
boat-loads of them might not be sold in gross before noon. Fish arriving in the night
were not to be unloaded until sunrise, unless the weather should be rainy, and then
they should lie upon the quay of the city in the keeping of the sergeant of the street,
until sunrise.
“No manner of fish that comes by land in baskets shall be harbored
in shops or in houses; but [the dealers] shall sell the same before their
shops in view of the people; save as to the reputable men of the trade,
who may harbor their own fish upon view of the sergeant; provided
that, without concealing or disposing of anything, they fully | bring]
the same to market for sale on the morrow, under pain [of forfeiting
them].” “No man shall commit forecheap (preemption or forestalling)
against another in dealing... but the reputable men of the trade shall
make their purchases... in a fair manner, without injury done to any
other person, and without any such forecheap; and neither for anger
nor for spite, shall any vendor hold his fish too dear: and if vendors
do so, the mayor and reputable men shall assign proper persons to
assess the same.”
224
Likewise the size of nets to be used at certain times and in certain places was
minutely regulated.
225 Even the maintenance of credit (in its narrow sense) was
roughly protected: “no butcher Shall] sell... his wares, after he has once or twice
failed in his payment, until such time as he shall have fully paid up all that he is in
arrear; this in order to destroy the bad repute of the trade.”
226 No thief was to remain
among the Tapicers, but was to be removed and punished.
227 Conviction of a felony
entailed the loss of membership in the gild. Defence against bad debtors u as
provided:
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who shall serve such their debtors, that such sum is so due to them,
then, in such case, if after the said warring they shall serve them, the
furriers who shall have been so warned shall be bound to pay the debt
to such creditors, in case the debtors shall not give security to the said
creditors for the debt that to them is so due.”
228
It followed, from the close control to which each craft was subjected, that members
of one craft should not interfere in the work of other crafts, or that subdivisions of a
craft should be strictly confined to their own kind of work; e.g., no maker of “tourte”
bread was to make white bread for sale, or vice versa. Likewise the secrets of each
trade or craft were to be preserved inviolate by its members.
229 The prices of goods
and the wages of labor were determined. If buyers should pay or sellers accept more
than the legal price, it was a punishable offence. Likewise if masters should pay or
men accept more than the legal rate of wages, they were fined. “And if the men are
rebels and contrarious, and will not work, then, the four masters shall have power to
take them before the mayor and court of Gihald of the town, to be there dealt with
according to law and reason.”
230
The ordinances of the craft gilds, except to the extent that infractions of them were
punished in the periodical hallmotes, were enforced in gild courts held by gild
officers, gild courts held by town officers or in the town courts themselves. In the two
latter cases, the gild officers acted largely in the capacity of prosecutors. The officers
elected by the gilds had the power to search the shops and houses of the members at
all times,
231 and the men of a trade or craft were usually required to live (and work)
in the same neighborhood,
232 and work within stated hours for the purpose of making
the work of searching more effective; for the same purpose, nearly all transactions
had to be conducted in the market-place or in such places and under such
circumstances that they would afford publicity of their nature.
233 If defectively made
(“false”) goods should be discovered, they were brought before the court for
destruction, confiscation
234 or amendment; punishment by confiscation of goods,
imposition of fines, imprisonment and expulsion from the gild varied with the nature
and grade of the offense. For the purpose of enabling searchers to trace false goods
to their makers, the craftsman was very often required to put his private mark on all
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used by the wardens and searchers as a certificate of inspection and approval;
unmarked articles were sometimes subject to summary confiscation or destruction,
whatever their quality; and counterfeiting marks was a serious offense. Turners were
required to put their marks on all wooden measures turned by them.
235 “Helmetery
and other arms forged with the hammer” were not to be exposed for sale until marked
by the wardens after assay of them, each helmet-maker had his own “sign,” which
might not be counterfeited by another.
236
In some cases, town and gild courts had concurrent jurisdiction over persons and
goods involved. Disputes between fellow-gildsmen were usually determined by the
gild courts. If a gildsman should be impleaded in the town court, the gild officers
might demand that the controversy be removed to their own court, even when the
complaint had been made by a non-gildsman.
237 When questions in dispute were
proper to be submitted to a jury, it was sometimes required that the jury be composed
partly of gildsmen and partly of others. The gild courts were presided over by the
regular head officers of the gild and not by a separate judiciary. From some gild
courts an appeal might be taken to the mayor, as from that of the weavers instituted
in the twenty-eighth year of the reign of Edward I.
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The revenues of the craft gilds were derived from fees for binding apprentices and
admitting new members to the freedom of the craft, and from the annual dues paid
by the brethren, as well as from fines and amercements for infractions of gild
ordinances — though the latter source of revenue was usually absorbed wholly or in
part by the municipalities and state. Some charges were also levied on goods in
stages of exchange, as on cargoes of fish brought to the markets of London for sale,
and on manufactured goods inspected. Much property was also bequeathed to the
gilds by members on their death, to be used by them for general purposes, or to be
administered by them for some special religious or charitable purpose, with the usual
stipulation that masses and prayers be provided for the repose of the donor’s soul.
If such were the normal constitution and activity of the craft gilds, there remain to
be considered the historical changes through which they passed in (a) their internal
relations, (b) their relations to town and nation and (c) their relations to trade and
industry and to their other organizations.
(a) The changes in their internal relations were very similar to those that took place
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co-extensive with the craft of a town, at first participated fully in the life of its
organization in the gild; and maintained an approximately pure democracy in it. But
even before a body of advisers to the officers had a constitutional status in the gild,
steady influence was exerted on the government of the gild by its “reputable men”;
239
in some of the more important gilds, the ordinances early contemplated recourse to
them for advice by the masters and wardens in the administration of their offices.
240
The earlier somewhat indefinite body of “reputable men” hardened by the end of the
fourteenth century into a definite organic part of many gilds and was usually referred
to as “the eight,” “the thirteen,” ”the twenty-four” or other number;
241 by the
sixteenth century it was known as the court of assistants and had absorbed most of
the vital powers of the gild,
242 the enactment of ordinances, the admission of
members and the election of officers, including the filling of its own vacancies by
co-optation; it was also the body from which the gild officers were chosen, and of
which they became members again by virtue of their having “passed the master’s or
prime warden’s chair.”
243
Besides the intrusion of the court of assistants into the gild constitution, distinctions
arose among the members as such; well-defined classes were the outcome of
differences in wealth. Though the differentiation was caused to some extent by the
use of a distinctive dress,
244 its effect must have been confined to making plainer and
more manifest the effects of the more fundamental causes; the adoption of a
distinctive dress; must have been largely incidental to the influence of general
tendencies. At all events, many of the companies into which the gilds developed in
the sixteenth century contained a body of wealthy members “called” by the court of
assistants from the general membership and known as the “Livery” or “clothing,”
245
because their earlier exclusive ability to afford a distinctive dress had grown into an
exclusive right to wear it. Even in the social-religious gilds of the fourteenth century
brethren had been expected to wear a livery on all public occasions, at gild meetings,
and at burial services; if too poor to provide an entire suit, a hood at least was worn,
which was furnished to the impecunious of some gilds at the expense of the
common-box. But after the lapse of a century, assuming for the moment the identity
of the two kinds of gilds, the class of members able to provide their livery and attend
all the banquets and semi-public functions that were coincidental with its use, was
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Exeter, at the end of the fifteenth century, it was ordained that every member who
was “privileged” of the craft and of the value of twenty pounds in goods should be
“of the fellowship and clothing of the master and should pay yearly twelve pence and
his offering at Midsummer at their feast,” while every other member, “not privileged”
should pay six pence yearly.
246 In the London Livery Companies the livery became
the body from which alone the officers might be elected and vacancies in the court
of assistants filled.
247 The livery, the “clothing,” at first a symbol of membership in
the gild, thus became the mark of an aristocratic class within it.
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But the differentiation of classes was not confined to the higher grades of gildsmen;
even before the livery and court of assistants were emerging at the top of the scale as
expressions of differences in economic status, the delimitation of the system of
apprenticeship and the rise of a class of wage-working journeymen were producing
similar results at the bottom.
249 In the thirteenth century, when the craft gilds had
hardly attained a condition of self-sufficiency, admission of members had been left
largely to the determination of the gild on the basis of the fitness and ability of
applicants to “use the craft,” while the dependence on apprenticeship had been slight.
In the two following centuries the relation was reversed; apprenticeship became the
chief, in some gilds the sole channel (except that of family relationship) through
which craft-membership could be attained.
250 At the same time apprenticeship itself
and the relations of masters and apprentices involved in it assumed definite and
settled form. In the fifteenth century the term of years, which had previously been left
largely to agreement in each case, came to be limited to “at least seven years,” — in
fact, such limitation had been recognized as one of the “customs of London.” The
master was to provide his apprentice with food and clothes and other necessaries and
was to teach him the craft; on the other hand, the apprentice was to obey his master
and not marry without his consent, and to submit to be reasonably (“duly but not
otherwise”) punished.
251 The enrollment of the apprentice before the town officers
at the beginning and end of his apprenticeship was uniformly required. The number
of apprentices was also restricted in various ways. To prevent the attraction of labor
from agriculture to the trades and crafts after the economic upheaval consequent on
the ravages of the Black Death, Parliament enacted that all who had followed
agriculture until twelve years of age should continue to follow it
252 and that none
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shillings a year.
253 Bondmen and villeins were declared ineligible to apprenticeship.
254
Such large fees were demanded at the binding of the apprentice and at his
admission to the freedom on the conclusion of his term as to cause a restriction of the
number of apprentices and invite interference by King and Parliament.
255 The number
of apprentices that a master might have before the fifteenth century seems to have
been limited only by the ability of the master to sustain and instruct them. Other
restrictions, however, gradually found enforcement in the codes of gild regulations,
by which the number of apprentices should depend on the rank of the master in the
gild, or by which more than one might not be bound without the consent of the
wardens of the gild or the chamberlain or other officers of the city. As compared with
the number of journeymen that a master might employ, it became the rule that he
might have one apprentice for the first three journeymen and one for each additional
journeyman — a proportion that was sanctioned by Elizabeth in the Statute of
Apprentices
256 for the crafts of clothmakers, fullers, shearmen, weavers, tailors and
shoemakers, for the purpose, probably, of keeping them in harmony with the system
generally prevalent in current industry.
257
At first it was possible, in fact as well as in theory, to set up as a master and
employer of others immediately on the completion of the term of apprenticeship; But
very early even the small amount of capital required in medieval trade or industry
necessitated the lapse of a few years before the potential master could become an
active one. During such time he was a journeyman, or servant, as he was more
usually called. Before the fourteenth century there was probably no great inequality
in the numbers and status of masters and journeymen but the further rapid
development of trade and industry and of the factor of capital in them during that
century decreased the proportion of masters and increased that of journeymen,
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while they became further separated in the social and economic scale. And the
movement was made more rapid by the more or less arbitrary exaction of large fees
for the admission to the freedom and particularly to the status of a master and
employer; the fees were so large and plainly opposed to the public welfare that both
towns and nation protested.
259 The rise of a well-defined class of wage-working
laborers in the journeymen produced a body of distinct social interests
260 at the same
time that the governing body was shrinking so as to exclude not only the mass of
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journeymen in many crafts assumed a separate organization, with more or less
autonomy, being either almost distinct from that of the masters, distinct in
organization but subject to the other, or merely recognized as a distinct administrative
group within the wider body.
The tendency towards the formation within crafts of separate organizations of
workmen as distinguished from employers, to which Ashley
261 has been the first
English writer to assign due importance, is best exemplified, in the present condition
of the historical evidence, in the career of the Bachelor or Yeoman Company of
Taylors. In 1415, a complaint was lodged with the mayor and aldermen of London
that the journeymen and servants of the tailors were living apart by themselves in
companies without the license of the officials of the city or of the Taylors’ Company
and that they were in the habit of assembling in great numbers and “making
conventicles” in divers places and beating, wounding and ill-treating persons, and
especially that they had assaulted a master of the craft. The master and wardens of
the craft, called before the mayor and aldermen to answer why they permitted “their
servants and apprentices to inhabit houses of this kind alone by themselves, in
companies, without a superior to rule them, and to commit and perpetrate these evils
and crimes so lawlessly,” expressed great regret and asked that certain yeomen be
summoned. After an examination of the yeomen, the mayor and aldermen decided
“that the servants of the aforesaid trade shall be hereafter under
government and rule of the Master and Wardens of the aforesaid
trade, as other servants of other trades in the said city are, and are
bound by law to be, and that they shall not use henceforth livery or
dress, meetings or conventicles, or other unlawful things of this
kind,”
and ordered them to leave the houses within four days. In 1427, however, they
asked permission to have an annual meeting in the church of St. John Jerusalem on
St. John’s Decollation Day and there “to offer for the deceased brothers and sisters
of the brotherhood,” but permission was denied them “unless with and in the
presence of the Masters of the said trade.” In 1613, the Yeomen Company, from the
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classes, — (1) bachelors in “foyne” and those in “budge,” and (2) freemen or
brethren elected to be recorded on the company’s books as such, — and to have been
governed by four wardens substitute elected by the Taylors’ Company from among
the yeomen and assisted in the administration of their offices by “sixteen” elected by
the yeomen from their own number. The wardens substitute acted under the direction
of the Court of Assistants. The Yeoman Company had a separate treasury, clerk,
bedel, benefactions and alms. Merchants and yeomen held their feasts on different
festival-days of the church, and no social equality or relationship existed between
them. Each had the care of its own poor, but the Merchant Taylors held estates in
trust for the yeomen, and had control of their funds. Disagreements between the
wardens substitute and the sixteen were frequent. In 1649, the workmen modestly
asked that two of the substitutes be practical tailors and that orders for the purpose
of preventing the competition of foreigners be enforced. In 1661, the wardens
substitute were not sworn in, the separate organization of the Yeomen Company
ceased to exist, and its business was taken in hand by the Merchant Company.
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Likewise “ordinances, articles and constitutions” were “ordained and granted” by “
the worshipful masters and wardens with all the whole company of the craft of
Blacksmiths of London, to the servants of the same craft” in 1434, by which they had
their own wardens and a separate organization; there was a provision, however,
reserving an appeal from the wardens of the yeomen to the master of the craft.
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Here and there among the records are found indications that a distinction, though
by no means clear or definite, had grown up between apprentices and servants or
journeymen, such as must be assumed in interpreting the ordinance of the
Blade-smiths “that no one of the trade shall teach his journeymen the secrets of his
trade, as he would his apprentice.”
264 So, too, it was provided by the Bachelor or
Yeomen Company of Taylors that its members should not reveal its secrets to a
“master [master’s?] prentiss.” Possibly apprenticeship was considered in some crafts
a preparation for mastership, the rank of employer, as distinguished from that of a
simple workman. Such a distinction was by no means universal; the apprentices
usually merged in the class of workmen or laborers.
By reason of the social movements within the membership of the organized classes
of tradesmen and craftsmen, the “freedom of the craft” came to have a new
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economic relations of the entire body, it finally conveyed merely the right to follow
a particular vocation in a town. Speaking broadly, the craft gild, company or mistery
developed, before the end of the sixteenth century, from a self-governing
organization of men of a craft into a close corporation imposing from above a code
of regulations to which the men of the craft should conform. The solidarity of the
earlier organizations had been disintegrated by the formation and crystallization of
classes within the crafts with bodies of interests rather in opposition than in harmony.
The social conditions under which the men of a craft had a common interest in the
craft itself were on the point of giving way to new conditions under which separate
classes in the crafts would have greater affinity to corresponding classes in other
crafts than to other classes in their own crafts; to use Cunningham’s apt phraseology,
industrial society in the “gild system” was divided into classes by perpendicular lines;
the growth of class interests would eventually lead to the substitution, as it has in the
present century, of a division of horizontal lines.
265 The power to regulate industry,
as reposed in the original gilds, was hardly exceptional in the society of which they
formed a part; it was not so much a privilege, a right restricted to a person among his
fellows, as a public right, the right to participate in the life of a social unit, though
assuredly a local and occupational unit; after the development described, however,
the control of industry, as far as it was exercised, became more nearly a privilege, an
exceptional power, a right in derogation of the rights of others, even within the small
unit.
It was somewhat broadly stated, in describing the normal craft gild, that it “had all
the religious and fraternal characteristics of the social-religious gilds, and merchant
gilds.” Perhaps the statement in such a general and positive form is not fully justified
by the historical evidence, unless it be assumed that many craft organizations were
wide variations from the normal type. The gilds (in the broad sense of the term) were
of three kinds, according to their origin, (1) those of spontaneous origin, (2) those
whose origin was due rather to the town’s need of police machinery, virtually
compulsory in origin, and (3) the later bodies in which were reposed a body of
privileges granted by the Crown. To the first the term gild was most properly applied;
to the second, the term craft or mistery; and to the third, the term company; though
usage was far from consistent or invariable. There is some slight historical evidence
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associations by the assumption of economic functions. The membership of some of
the social-religious gilds consisted wholly or predominantly of craftsmen and took
their name from their craft,
266 though few of them appear to have had ordinances for
the control of trade and industry.
267 There is very slight evidence that the gilds of the
second class developed the social-religious and fraternal features; or if they had them,
that they manifested them in the same organization as the economic features. The
third class were clearly successors of the first two classes and universally had the
features in question. Among the many sets of craft ordinances found in the records
of the city of London, as they appear in the Liber Custumarum, Liber Albus and
Memorials, those of the “Whit tawyers” alone contain provisions of a social-religious
nature;
268 though the bodies of ordinances regularly approved by the city government
may not, as suggested by Ashley,
269 have shown the social-religious features of the
craft; there was no reason for the enrolment at the Guildhall of any but the economic
ordinances.
270
It is in respect to these features that the Reformation in the sixteenth century
worked some important changes, though the extent of the changes has been
exaggerated to include other changes. The religious features of the gilds were, of
course, those primarily affected; the other features were affected only secondarily and
derivatively. Such property as the gilds held subject to “superstitious uses” was
confiscated; in general, if only part of the income of parcels of property was devoted
to such uses, they were assumed by the Crown only to such extent as they were so
devoted, the previous “superstitious” burden being resolved into a rent charge
payable to the Crown.
271 The element of common life involved in the religious life
of the gilds under Catholicism was an important one and its partial destruction by the
Reformation removed a strong bond from the interrelations of the gildsmen.
(b) The earliest evidence of English craft gilds is in the Pipe Roll of the thirty-first
year of Henry I, in which the Weavers of London, Lincoln, Oxford, Huntingdon and
Winchester, the Fullers of Winchester and the Cordwainers of Oxford appear to have
made payments to the exchequer for their recognition by the Crown. So, too, the
Weavers of London, York, Lincoln, Huntingdon, Nottingham and Oxford, the Fullers
of Winchester, the Bakers of London, and the Corvesars of Oxford are mentioned in
the Pipe Rolls of Stephen, Henry II, Richard and Henry III, as charged with or
rendering annual payments to the exchequer for their gilds.
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II seems to have been to give autonomy to the crafts as compared with the towns. He
issued a charter to the weavers of London that ensured them virtual independence of
the city government.
273 In the twenty-sixth year of his reign (1180) eighteen gilds of
London, including the Goldsmiths, Butchers, Pepperers, and Cloth-finishers, were
amerced as adulterine (set up without warrant).
274 But it is not to be inferred
therefrom that the craft gilds continued to sustain direct relations to the king and to
derive their powers from him. They had rather the status of independent
municipalities and soon came into collision with the municipal bodies of the towns;
eventually they had to yield to them and enjoy their rights as communities subject to
the towns. During the reigns of Richard and John the towns acquired powers so
substantial that a return to the policy of Henry II by Henry III was not successful in
maintaining a direct connection between the Crown and the gilds. The charter of the
weavers of London, which had been granted by Henry II, was annulled and their gild
destroyed by John in return for a payment by the City, but was confirmed by Henry
III in an “inspeximus” charter;
275 like wise the weavers of Oxford [had] fined in a
cask of wine, to have a writ commanding the mayor and provosts of Oxford to let
them have the same liberties in that city, as well in “cloth-working as in other things,
which they had in the times of King Henry II, King Richard, and King John.”
276 From
the middle of the thirteenth through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the normal
status of the gilds was one of subjection to the towns.
277 Some of them must have had
an independent origin and, as already suggested, there is reason to believe that they
first existed in the form of social-religious gilds; but many others were only the result
of an organization for police purposes imposed on bodies of tradesmen and craftsmen
by the towns. Even when recognized by the king, they were to look to the town for
their powers.
The relations of the gilds to the towns appear most plainly in the manner of
enacting and enforcing their ordinances. They were sometimes enacted by the town
and nothing but their enforcement left to the gild; even when the gild had the power
to enact its own ordinances, it had the obligation of enforcing other ordinances
emanating from the town and statutes enacted by the king and Parliament. More
frequently the gilds formulated their ordinances and presented them to the town
government for enactment, approval or confirmation,
278 though sometimes with the
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gilds.
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From the formal language found in the gild ordinances, such as those collected in
the Liber Custumarum and Memorials of London, one might be inclined to infer that
little independence had been exercised by the gilds, but it is probably true that the
gilds were given a pretty free hand; there appears to be no record of a petition for the
approval of ordinances that was denied, though it is doubtful whether such a denial
would have found a place in the public records if it had been made; the language used
in the town records must have been purely formal in many cases; it seems that in one
case the gild had been enforcing ordinances not enrolled at the Guildhall, though it
had others that had been regularly approved there.
280 The facts that the town
government had not the technical knowledge necessary to judge what ordinances
were best for the actual work of a craft, and that it was lax in enforcing them,
281 the
presumption that the crafts were given wide powers in practice. In the fiftieth year of
Edward III, when certain fullers asked that a proposed “point,” forbidding the use of
urine in fulling cloth, be accepted and enrolled by the mayor and aldermen of
London, the latter called two successive meetings to ascertain whether the rule would
be acceptable to the whole trade, and having so ascertained, granted the petition; it
is significant that the merits of the proposed rule in itself were not enquired into.
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In the enforcement of its ordinances, however enacted, the gild exercised little
independence. The first masters, wardens and other head officers were usually
appointed by the town, though in some cases elected by the gild; their successors
were uniformly elected by the gild. In the majority of them, their searchers and
overseers simply brought false goods and implements and their makers and users
before the town courts;
283 their functions were inquisitorial rather than judicial.
284 In
a few gilds a court was maintained and justice dispensed by the masters and wardens,
especially between gildsmen. From some gild courts an appeal lay to the town
courts.
285 In one craft, at least, it was optional with the craftsman whether he would
be judged by the wardens of the craft or by the mayor and aldermen.
286 Some gilds
had the power to remove cases involving gildsmen from the town courts to their own
courts, though to amerce only men of their own craft.
287 In their relations to nation
and town in the enactment and enforcement of their ordinances, the gilds underwent
less change than in any other. After the sixteenth century many of their powers
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as in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, by the enactment of ordinances subject
to the approval of national or municipal organs, and their enforcement through the
medium of justices of the peace and mayors or other political officers. On the whole,
gild ordinances were not so readily accorded approval during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries as previously, but largely because the relations of many
companies to the industrial activity of society had become merely nominal;
moreover, the national government had assumed much more extended control over
trade and industry and had left the companies a more limited field for the exercise of
their powers. Within the limited field, however, the method of their activity was
substantially the same as it had been when the field was wider. Even as early as the
reign of Edward III the stronger gilds had sought sanction in royal charters largely for
the purpose of enabling them to hold property in mortmain, but they differed little,
in their actual activity, from those that had not sought such sanction. In the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, however, the movement became more general and operated
as a process of selection, preserving the stronger gilds, particularly those that had
accumulated a considerable amount of property through bequests, donations and the
collection of fees, and leaving the weaker ones to decay and the surrender of their
powers to national and municipal agencies. Elizabeth is said to have been opposed
to the gilds, though the opposition had a wider basis than that of a mere royal policy.
Recognition by the Crown became, at all events, a necessary element of corporate
existence as it had not previously been, and distinguished the “companies” from the
older gilds. Some of the companies acquired sufficient strength to ensure their
existence only through combination of gilds. The importance of the change has been
both exaggerated and disparaged. Some writers have considered the incorporated
companies as new creations, widely separated from the gilds and crafts that preceded
them; others have insisted that incorporation made no difference with the crafts and
consequently left them in the same social position that they had previously occupied.
The general effect of the movement was to preserve an industrial structure that
industry had largely outgrown. It can hardly be denied that the second half of the
sixteenth century was a period during which the older conditions of industry gave
way to new ones; the incorporation of the mercantile companies acted as a
perpetuation of the aristocratic control of industry into which the gild system had
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period, which aimed to preserve through national agencies the industrial relations that
had grown up under the gild system. It is true that incorporation worked no material
change in the gilds or crafts that became companies; what it did tend to do was to
preserve them in the presence of an environment to which they must otherwise have
succumbed.
The use of the craft gilds, with their varying degrees of autonomy, for the purpose
of the police supervision of townsmen is evidence of the difficulty of extending the
governmental powers of a political group over the social activity of component
groups that has once been given an independent organization, especially when such
activity is in process of expansion. During the centuries in which the craft gilds
flourished England was enjoying a rapid economic growth. Earlier organized in
merchant gilds, the differentiation of the older trading classes into new classes of
artisans made it no easier for the towns to regulate the economic relations of
townsmen than it had been before.
The division of town population on an economic basis into groups as craft gilds
provided a convenient means for enforcing police measures not relating to trade or
industry. Thus, in 1982, to provisions for “the safe-keeping of the city of London,”
the ringing of curfew, inquiry as to suspected persons, inquisition of inns, closing of
ale and wine shops, and night-watching the town and river was added a provision —
“As to the trades: — that every trade shall present the names of all persons in that
trade and of all who have been serving therein, where they dwell, and in what
ward.”
288 In 1370, when an attack on the city of London was apprehended, the mayor,
aldermen and commonalty decided to keep forty men-at-arms and sixty archers
between the tower of London and Billingsgate,
“which watch the men of the trades underwritten agreed to keep in
succession each night... as follows: — Tuesday, Drapers and Tailors;
Wednesday, Mercers and Apothecaries Thursday, Fishmongers and
Butchers; Friday, Pelterers and Vintners; Saturday, Goldsmiths and
Sadlers; Sunday, Ironmongers, Armourers and Cutlers; Monday,
Tawyers, Spurriers Bowyers and Girdlers.”
289
In 1422, Parliament had enacted that all the weirs or “rydells” in the ThamesJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 131
between Staines and Gravesend and Queensborough should be destroyed;
accordingly the mayor and common council of the city of London ordained that two
men from each of twenty-six crafts should accompany the mayor to execute the
statute.
290
The relations of the towns and crafts as organic bodies having been considered, it
may be well to review the changes that took place from the standpoint of the
individual townsman and his relation to town and gild. The earliest craftsmen had
been aliens and not townsmen neither enjoying the advantages nor bearing the
burdens of burgessship. In the twelfth century and in the early part of the following
century they appear to have been a subject class. They could not become burgesses
without forswearing their craft. A townsman could not be accused by a craftsman;
nor could he be convicted on his testimony.
291 The historical sources do not reveal
the steps by which the progress was made, but from such a status of servility he had
risen to the level of full burgessship by the latter part of the thirteenth century. It may
perhaps be assumed in accounting for the rise of the artisans in importance in the
towns (a) that they were increasing in number, (b) that many who had been serfs of
the feudal lords became free and (c) that they increased in prosperity and
consequently in wealth. The first step was, then, that burgessship was denied the
craftsmen; the next, that he was permitted to be both burgess and craftsman; the third
step, that he might not be a craftsman without being a burgess, soon followed. Finally
freedom of the town was conditioned on freedom of a gild.
292 The gild became the
medium through which burgessship was attained and exercised. Such a relationship
between gild membership and participation in town life could not be long sustained
without finding expression in the town constitution. Accordingly, in the governing
bodies of many towns the craft gilds were given representation.
293 In some towns the
domination of the gilds was carried so far that the town government was
constitutionally nothing more than a federation of gilds. Such relations also had their
effect on the gilds themselves. Instead of being organizations of tradesmen and
craftsmen in the town, they tended to become merely sections of the town population,
the pivot around which their social life revolved being participation in town life and
not engagement in trade or craft. Accordingly, the combination of gilds became
frequent, when the centripetal force of burgessship became stronger and the
centrifugal force of economic interests became weaker.John P. Davis, Corporations, 132
In considering one other feature of the relations of the craft gilds to the organization
of the wider society in which they flourished, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat
a movement that has already been referred to and will be more fully described in a
later chapter.
294 The allimportant fact of the history of England in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries was the development and attainment of nationality under the
Tudors. The crafts were not affected as much directly by that great fact, as indirectly
through its influence on the towns. By the middle of the sixteenth century the towns
of England had generally become close corporations having only slight relation to the
actual work of town government, denuded of most of the powers necessary to do
such work, and supplanted in doing it by agencies more directly subordinate to the
national government. It hardly need be suggested that under the influence of the
movement there was a strong tendency towards the national incorporation of gilds
(now more usually called companies or fellowships), to the widening of the
geographical area of their activity
295 and to the use of them to a limited extent as
organs of the state. E.g., largely because they were organized groups, the state used
them for the important purposes of taxation, mostly in the form of forced loans. Gilds
had previously been recognized by the king, particularly in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. But the attitude of the crown towards the earliest gilds, those of which
there is bare mention in the pipe rolls of Henry I and his successors, had been largely
permissive, somewhat similar to the attitude towards the bodies of Jews in several
cities. As soon as the growth of towns had become an influential movement, the gilds
were viewed by the crown as subject to them and in general continued to be so
viewed as long as the towns retained their vigor. Some gild corporations had been
created by royal charter as early as the century of the three Edwards, but the removal
of gilds from the control of the towns implied in it had sometimes resulted in serious
conflicts of interests, and had been followed by a pruning of gild powers as in the
entertaining case of Exeter. The craft gilds, instead of presenting their ordinances for
approval to mayors and aldermen, now had to submit them to the judges of national
courts.
296 In many cases the ordinances of the gilds were given effect throughout the
nation in relation to matters that had hitherto been regarded as of local concern. On
the other hand, matters of national importance were given over to the control of
incorporated companies or supplemented by their activity.
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though it is a justifiable conjecture that he might have been a member of it and a
sharer of its privileges, especially if he combined with his craft the work of selling
what he produced and did not confine himself to piece-work or servants’ labor for his
fellow-townsmen, and if he also accumulated sufficient wealth to have influence in
the community. It is certain that in the twelfth century he was required to forswear
his craft to obtain admission to the gild merchant. The organization of the craftsmen
in gilds, even if favored by the town authorities for police purposes, must have united
with the differentiation of the general merchant class into distinct classes more nearly
on a level with the craftsmen to elevate their status in the town. The disintegration
of the gild merchant with the increasing prosperity of the class of artisans must have
secured for them the more independent social life that they enjoyed from the end of
the thirteenth century. The difficulty of accounting for the changed condition of the
artisans has led some writers to attribute it to more or less sanguinary conflicts
between the craft gilds and merchant gilds in which the former were able to throw off
the oppressive yoke of the latter; though the theory is discredited by the absence of
historical evidence in support of it, the same objection must be urged to other
theories that have been advanced in the same connection. It is merely suggested here
that the merchant gild may have dissolved without serious conflict of interests into
the several classes in which the merchants were afterwards organized, while the
classes of artisans may have arisen in the social scale through the increasing
importance of their economic activity and their closer relations with the new classes
of merchants. At all events there is no evidence of organic relations between the
merchant gilds and the craft gilds; the former gradually disappeared and the latter
gradually took their place, except to the extent that it was taken by the towns under
the domination of influential merchants; in addition to the narrower field covered by
the old merchant gilds, the craft gilds also afforded a social structure for the
newly-developed manufacturing activity of the artisans, the older bodies having had
to do almost entirely with extracted products, not with transformed products.
Some differences between the merchant gild and craft gild may be conveniently
noticed at this point. The former received its powers from the Crown, not directly,
to be sure, but through the medium of the community in which it existed; peculiarly
enough, it was not dealt with directly by the Crown, being viewed rather as the whole
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quite otherwise. The craft gild, however, was uniformly viewed as an organization
subject to the town and as getting its powers from it and not from the Crown
297 until
the decay of town governments and their replacement to a large extent by national
agencies. The difference was doubtless due to the fact that the towns had secured
independence and strength by the time the craft gilds were in a flourishing stage.
While the gild merchant had its origin in the grant of the power to have it in the
charter of the town, there is a quite uniform absence of mention of craft gilds in town
charters. It seems never to have been necessary for the town to obtain from the
Crown the power to bestow upon its component groups the social structure necessary
to bring the pursuits of their interests into harmony with town life in general. To put
the idea in another form, there was a general relation of equality in the merchant gild,
of subordination in the craft gild, sustained to the town. The extra-territorial
jurisdiction of the merchant gild, its power to act beyond the limits of the town in
which it existed and to extend its privileges to non-residents, does not appear to have
been possessed by the craft gild,
298 until they merged in the later national companies;
that was one of the powers that went to the town in the distribution of the functions
of the gild merchant; if a craftsman had rights to be protected away from his own
town, they were protected through his citizenship in the town, not through his
membership in the craft gild.
In the early years of the gild system, when industrial processes were comparatively
simple, and few classes intervened between the producer of raw material and the
consumer of the finished product, it was possible for gilds to be almost mutually
exclusive, but with the economic development of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries contact of gilds with one another became closer and resulted in the
formation of a variety of relations, largely according to the relations of the economic
activities organized within them. Sometimes two bodies of craftsmen, recognized as
having distinct and perhaps conflicting interests, were united under one governing
body composed of representatives selected by each craft.
Quite frequently the ordinances relating to two conflicting crafts were combined
in one code,
299 even if separately enforced.
300 Sometimes the gild of one craft was
given control of the men of another craft with powers of search and presentation.
301
Sometimes a craft was divided into separate crafts, as when the development of
particular kinds of work in it had created wide differences between its members.
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Especially was such a division likely where the dealers in goods were combined with
the producers of them in the same craft. As some trades (and especially the woollen
trade) became more highly developed, the several processes between the producer
and consumer were represented by separate crafts. Even when an actual division did
not take place, distinct interests within the craft were early recognized, as in the
ordinance of the braziers providing that at least one warden should be a worker in the
trade while the others should be chapmen.
303 Some gilds became so much more
important and influential than others in their community that they were distinguished
in classes, as in the well-known division of the London companies into “greater” and
“lesser” companies. 
The most suggestive feature of the relations that gradually came to exist between
the several crafts is that the artisan crafts were usually subordinated to the trading
crafts. Even in a craft in which were combined both trading and working classes,
there was a plain tendency to make it the sole organization of the former by crowding
out the latter or leaving them to become bachelors’ or journeymen’s companies.
From 1300 to 1450 the craft gilds were, on the whole, efficient organizations of
trade and industry. So long as the social unit was local, so long as each town
community was nearly self-sufficient and both demand and supply had reference to
the population of its limited area, while town society was largely democratic, the
influence of aggregated capital small, and industries simple and not divided into
several processes, it was possible for the gild organization to endure. With increased
communication between English towns and the growth of a foreign commerce the
gild barriers were broken down. Both within and without, the craft gild was losing
its control of economic activity. The membership of the gild had less and less
reference to the trade or industry whose name it bore. Moreover the gild exercised
a diminishing control over trade and industry. After the middle of the sixteenth
century, the gild or company was so plainly a body having merely a profitable control
over certain fields of industry instead of an organization for the control by the
tradesmen or craftsmen of their own conditions that Elizabeth and dames I. could see
nothing objectionable in investing private individuals with similar powers in the
“monopolies” created by them. The governing body of the craft had shrunk into a
close corporation virtually outside of the craft itself and simply deriving revenues
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public functions of the body had vanished and in their place was a body of rights
private in their nature. So clearly had the incorporated company slight influence over
economic activity and so clearly had it become the channel through which general
participation in the town life was reached that one might in London be permitted to
engage in any trade or industry by obtaining the freedom of any company and through
it the freedom of the city. As far as trade and industry alone were concerned the gilds,
with few exceptions, ceased, after the sixteenth century, to promote them, if they did
not even restrain them.
V — The London Livery Companies.
The livery companies of London have been mentioned generally as the developed
forms of the earlier gilds but deserve more particular notice because they represent
what has survived from the gild system since the middle of the sixteenth century.
They have been regarded by some writers as a distinct class of organizations, but may
more properly be regarded merely as gilds modified by new conditions. In some of
them there has been no break in corporate existence from the thirteenth century to the
present time; such of them as were created in the seventeenth century were made to
conform with the companies then in existence and can hardly be considered evidence
of a purpose, either on the part of the crown or on their own part, to institute a new
class of corporations.
They were called “livery” companies because they had secured from the city of
London permission to wear a livery or distinguishing dress, though by the sixteenth
century its use had come to be restricted to a definite and distinct class of their
numbers. They differed from the earlier gilds or crafts, which had been normally in
direct subjection to the municipalities, in their having obtained recognition by charter
from the crown, though perhaps not as technical corporations. The fishmongers had
received royal sanction of their rights and duties as early as the reign of Edward I;
eight of the companies appear to have received charters from Edward III.
304 When
they received their first charters they were not different from the other trade and craft
gilds of the period. In each succeeding reign they secured confirmation of their
former charters by “inspeximus” charters of the new sovereign until the reign of
James I, when most of them obtained new charters and fourteen new companies were
created.
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municipal officers of the city of London had been assumed by them; moreover, they
participated in the government of the city through their predominant representation
in the common council, the aldermen being representatives of the wards of the city.
The mayor of the city, who had to be taken from one of the great livery companies,
306
was sometimes significantly described by virtue of his office “master of all the
companies” or the “warden of all the companies.” Twelve
307 of the companies,
through their greater wealth and importance, and through their larger representation
in the government of the city, had come to be distinguished as the “great” livery
companies,
308 the others being known as the ‘lesser” or”minor” livery companies.
Among the former, moreover, an order of precedence had been established,
309 which
was of later importance almost solely in regulating their participation in civic
pageants and “tidings.” The chief characteristics that distinguished the livery
companies of London from the older gilds and crafts at the beginning of the reign of
Elizabeth were, then, (a) their possession of select bodies known as the “livery” or
“clothing,” (b) their incorporation or equivalent sanction by the crown, (c) their
control of the government of the city and (d) their division into “great” and “lesser”
companies with an order of precedence in the former.
The Reformation exerted its influence on the companies as on most other social
bodies, by lessening somewhat the bonds of association. They had accumulated
considerable property from which the income, wholly or in part, was expended on
masses, obits and other religious ceremonies; such property, to the extent to which
it was devoted to “superstitious uses,” was assumed by the crown. They were
permitted to redeem the property, however, by paying to the crown the amounts
formerly devoted to superstitious uses capitalized at five per cent.
310 The amounts
paid in redemption were raised by loans and subscriptions of members. One effect
of the change was to relieve the companies of duties that had been especially
appropriate for them. They became, to a certain extent, investors in property for the
sake of its income instead of administrators of funds devoted to the welfare of their
members’ souls. Aside from the economic effects, much of the influence of
Catholicism as a binding social force had been lost. Under the changed conditions,
religious worship could not be so essentially a part of their common life. Yet after the
Reformation, each of most of the companies attended a particular church, a part of
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masses had formerly filled.
Within the companies the centre of corporate power was in the court of assistants,
a body of from ten to thirty-five members, serving for life and filling their vacancies
by cooptation; they “called” freemen to the livery, elected all the company’s officers
and had the direction of all its affairs. The executive officers were from one to six
wardens; in some of the companies the chief executive was the prime warden, in
others, a master, whether or not regarded as one of the wardens. They were elected
annually from among the liverymen
311 by the court of assistants and became
assistants at once, ex officio, or after having “passed the master’s or prime warden’s
chair.” The livery was also a body limited in number, though varying in size from
fifty (in the great companies)
312 to four hundred members, called from the freemen
by the court of assistants, and including the masters, wardens and assistants.
313 By the
end of the sixteenth century the color of the livery worn by each company became
settled, though formerly it had been changeable, and the style became the same in all
the companies — an indication that the relations between the separate companies and
between them in the aggregate and the rest of society had crystallized. A peculiar
development, possibly the result of the growth of the restricted livery, was the
exclusion of women from the companies, except so far as they enjoyed mere freedom
of them; it may have been due to some extent to the partial elimination of the
religious element from the companies by the Reformation; at all events, there is
almost no mention of women in their records after the sixteenth century; they
certainly were not called to the livery. The oligarchical constitution outlined had
become a fact by the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, but it was not yet
recognized in the charters of the companies; even during her reign only one new
charter was granted to a company, the older charters of the other companies being
simply confirmed by “inspeximus” charters. In the reign of James I, however, the
new charters granted, whether to the old companies,
314 or to the fifteen newly created
companies, distinctly recognized and sanctioned the developed constitution.
It is only in a limited sense that the freemen may be said to have been a part of their
companies. The freedom might be acquired in four ways: (1) By apprenticeship or
servitude, (2) by patrimony or birth, (3) by purchase or “redemption” and (4) by
conference honoris causa. (1) A person became qualified for the freedom by an
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merely colorable, a matter of form, without reference to the trade or craft of either the
company, master or apprentice; frequent enactment of ordinances that it should be
real and not merely colorable seemed to be unavailing. (2) All legitimate children,
both male and female, born to freemen after the freedom had been acquired, were
eligible to the freedom by virtue of such birth.
315  (3) The freedom might be conferred
in return for the payment of a sum of money, in which case it was technically said to
be acquired by redemption. (4) The freedom was frequently conferred as an honor on
distinguished persons. Henry VII and Prince Henry (son of James I) thus became
merchant taylors; James I, a clothworker; and Charles II, James II and William III,
grocers; Elizabeth was a “free sister” of the mercers. Persons were admitted to the
freedom on proof of their qualifications by the masters and wardens; when conferred
by redemption or honoris causa, it appears to have been by the court of assistants or
livery. Membership in the companies was exclusive; a person might be a member of
only one company, and he might transfer his membership from one to another. (1)
Liverymen could be called only from freemen, and only from the wealthy and
influential ones. In 1697 the court of aldermen of London enacted “that no person
should be allowed to take upon himself the clothing of any of the twelve companies
unless he have an estate of £1000; of the inferior companies, unless he have an estate
of £500.”
316 (2) Freedom of the city of London was consequent on membership in a
livery company. (3) Freedom of a company enabled the freemen to follow the trade
or craft controlled by the company; the rule was apparently broadened at times so
much as to enable a person to follow any trade or craft if free of any company.
317 (4)
Freemen were exclusively entitled to pensions, alms or other charitable aid from the
large funds of the companies devoted to such purposes; similarly many educational
advantages in institutions partly or wholly controlled by the companies were
restricted to their freemen’s families. If liverymen became bankrupt, or failed to meet
the terms of agreements for the compromise of their debts, they lost the status of
liverymen; if they applied for aid from the charitable funds, they similarly lost their
status, to the extent, at least, of ceasing to be more than nominally liverymen; fees
for admission to the livery being refunded to them.
The Reformation or the middle of the sixteenth century is usually assigned as the
date at which the companies ceased to exercise control over trade and industry, but
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such control even at the present day. In 1884 the London Livery (companies
Commission reported that the Fishmongers’ Company still appointed and paid “fish
meters” to examine fish offered for sale at Billingsgate Market and condemn such as
they should find unsound, which were deodorized and removed at the company’s
expense; the company also prosecuted infractions of the provisions of the Fisheries
Act
318 against the sale of undersized fish or of fish during “close time.” The Society
of Apothecaries were reported to exercise the power conferred by Parliament of
examining candidates for licenses to practice as apothecaries, granting such licenses
and of recovering penalties from persons practicing without them. The Scriveners’
Company exercised a similar control over candidates for the office of notary, by
imposing examinations on them and preventing them from practicing without having
taken them. The Founders’ Company had legal authority to stamp weights.
319 The
Gunmakers’ Company tested and marked guns, pistols and small arms, and
prosecuted offenders against the act
320 from which their authority was derived.
321
Most of the new companies created during the seventeenth century were active until
at least the middle of the eighteenth century. The power to enact ordinances was not
fully used after 1550 by the older companies, but the right of search and approval was
by no means unused. Three tendencies are noticeable in the control exercised over
trade and industry: (1) The membership of the companies had continually less
reference to the trade or craft indicated by their names.
322 As early as 1415, the
membership of the drapers had not been confined to tradesmen; in 1445, only one
member of the skinners was a skinner by trade; after 1502 the Merchant Taylors’
Company was open by charter to all trades; in 1882, the liveries of the companies
were found to be composed chiefly of professional men, wealthy business men and
retired merchants.
323 The rights of control over trade and industry were a source of
income to the companies; the rights were exercised by a group of persons without
reference to their participation in the social activity controlled. From the standpoint
of the crown the companies were not different from the “monopolies” created by
Elizabeth and James; in fact, the powers exercised by the “monopolists” were the
same, in most cases, as those formerly possessed by the companies and were viewed
as merely transferred from them to the favored patentees of the crown. The power
granted to the “monopolists” was not so much that of exclusive production or sale
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from Elizabeth a monopoly of the gauging of beer, it was at once met by an objection
from the Brewers’ Company, who plainly regarded the scheme as a contemplated
invasion of their chartered rights, though each party to the controversy insisted rather
on considerations of expediency. Likewise the monopoly of “searching and sealing”
leather was in derogation of the rights of the Leathersellers’ Company. Indeed, the
chief complaints against the granting of monopolies came from the livery companies,
though their opposition was made more effectual by the excessive rapacity of their
opponents. (2) The subdivision of companies was not commensurate with the
increase in the number of distinct trades or industries. Largely because the control of
the companies was so distant and so lightly used, newly differentiated occupations
were retained under the older organization or expressly subjected to it. Thus by a
charter granted by William and Mary to the Grocers’ Company, confectioners,
druggists, tobacconists, tobacco-cutters and sugar-refiners were retained or brought
within its jurisdiction and subjected to its right of search; the name of the company,
by its charter of 1607, was “the Freemen of the Misteries of Grocers and
Apothecaries of the City of London”; in 1617, however, the apothecaries secured a
separate charter from James I on the ground “that the ignorance and rashness of
presumptuous empirics and ignorant and inexpert men may be restrained, whereupon
many discommodities, inconveniences and perils do daily arise to the rude and
incredulous people.”
324 Organ-makers continued to be governed by the Blacksmiths’
Company, though the clockmakers subject to it obtained a separate charter. On the
other hand, some divisions seem to have been hardly demanded by the conditions of
industry, as the separation of the bowyers from the Fletchers. The division of the
barber-chirurgeons into Barbers and Surgeons was apparently justified. After the
middle of the sixteenth century, it is believed, no organized companies were united;
the last union was probably that of the stock-fishmongers and salt-fishmongers in the
Fishmongers’ Company in 1536 by charter of Henry VIII. (3) The authority of the
companies was extended beyond the city, in some cases over the whole of England.
By the middle of the sixteenth century many foreign as well as native tradesmen and
artisans had settled in the suburbs of London, outside of the jurisdiction of the
companies; by statute in the reign of Henry VIII, their business and work were
subjected to the inspection and approval of the London companies.
325 By the charters
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right of regulation and search was expressly extended to include territory from two
to seven miles beyond the limits of the city, as, for example, in the case of the
Apothecaries’ Company in 1617. The Merchant Taylors’ silver yard was made a
standard for the Bartholomew cloth-fair. A similar extension of the powers of the
Goldsmiths’ Company had long antedated the Reformation. In the charter granted to
it by Edward IV it was provided “that in all trading cities and towns in England
where gold-smiths reside, the same Ordinance be observed as in London, and that
one or two of every such city or town, for the rest of that trade, shall come to London
to be ascertained of their touch of gold, and there to have a stamp of a puncion with
a leopard’s head marked upon their work, as of ancient time it has been ordained.”
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The same company had as one of its functions the “trial of the pyx,” which it still
performs.
327 In 1884 the Stationers’ Company still maintained, by virtue of the
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1842, a register of all publications.
328 Perhaps it
is only another way of describing the geographical extension of the companies’
powers to say that they were coming to exercise rather national than local powers.
329
The political relations of the livery companies to the government of metropolitan
London have remained substantially unaltered to the present day. A “common hall”
consisting of all liverymen free of the city proposes the names of two aldermen, one
of whom is elected mayor by the court of aldermen. Until the passage of the Reform
Act
330 members of Parliament had been elected by a common hall, but by that act the
electorate was broadened by allowing ordinary electors to participate with the
liverymen. The sheriffs, chamberlain, and other city officers are chosen by common
halls. Constitutionally the metropolis remains little more than a federation of livery
companies. Aside from their political relations to the government, the companies
were used as organs of the state and city because they were organizations of large
groups of citizens and because they represented, broadly speaking, the organized
wealth of the city. In their corporate capacity they had become very wealthy through
gifts and bequests of property by members and others for various purposes chiefly of
a public nature, such as the maintenance of hospitals, almshouses and schools, and
exhibitions and scholarships in colleges, for the payments of pensions and the
distribution of charity in other forms; the income of the property was often in excess
of the amounts expended in the execution of the trusts with which it was burdened
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the fees paid for binding apprentices, admitting candidates to the freedom, advancing
freemen to the livery, dues periodically paid by members and fines levied for the
infraction of rules. Contributions had also at times been made by members which, if
not repaid, became part of the corporate property. Fees for “searching and sealing”
goods, testing measures and similar public duties were considerable. Moreover, their
members (liverymen) were nearly all wealthy and could be resorted to when the
corporate funds were insufficient. When the king or city needed funds for any
purpose, or desired the promotion of a public enterprise, resort was had, especially
until the end of the seventeenth century, directly to the companies and indirectly
through them to their members.
331 When lotteries were projected by the crown, the
companies and their members were invited to subscribe for shares; they afterwards
complained that there had been delay in the payment of prizes. During the period of
the Civil War and Commonwealth, Charles as well as the Parliamentary party and
Cromwell extorted loans from them. The usual procedure was to make a demand on
the mayor of the city for the service; he in turn issued “precepts” to the companies
for the loans, which were made out of corporate funds, money borrowed by the
companies or contributions levied on their members (liverymen); during the Civil
War some of the companies were reduced to the necessity of disposing of their plate
to meet the exactions of the state. Only a small part of the loans were ever repaid.
The halls of the companies also proved very convenient for barracks during the war
and afterwards for the administrative offices of the departments of the
Commonwealth government.
In times of war, the companies were required to furnish ships and quotas of
soldiers. When England was threatened by the Armada, they furnished thirty-eight
ships. For a long time they had also to maintain armories and powder magazines. In
1572 the creation and support by them of a standing force of three thousand soldiers
appears to have been contemplated by the crown. In manning the ships provided by
them for the use of the crown they were apparently permitted to impress the
necessary number of men for seamen and marines. As in the exaction of loans, the
crown required the city to provide the ships, soldiers and supplies; the mayor
thereupon issued precepts to the several companies for their shares of the service.
An interesting function of the companies was the maintenance of a supply of corn
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maintain such a supply for the purpose of selling it to the people at a reasonable price
when by reason of scarcity its market price had become excessive. Incidentally the
habit had been contracted of applying to the companies for loans with which to lay
in the supplies, and of answering their demands for repayment by suggestions that
they take the corn itself. Finally the companies maintained the supplies themselves
in the municipal storehouses at “the Bridge,” where the city had kept them, and later
more prudently in their own storehouses. The custom ceased on the destruction of the
companies’ storehouses in the great fire of 1666. Likewise, in the seventeenth
century, 
“for a constant supply of sea coal for the use of the poor in times of
scarcity, and to defeat the combinations of coal dealers,  the several
city companies... were ordered to purchase and lay up yearly...
quantities of coals, which, in dear times, were to be vended in such
manner and at such prices as the lord mayor and court of aldermen
should by written precept direct, so that the coals should not lie sold
to loss.”
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The companies were also the sources from which were derived the economic means
of promoting voyages of discovery, the establishment of new trade with foreign
peoples and the colonization of new lands. In some cases the companies or their
members acted on their own initiative; in others they were more or less unwillingly
induced to adventure capital through precepts issued by the mayor at the instance of
the crown. But they not only contributed money in furtherance of such projects,  —
they also conferred upon them the form of organization in which their own affairs
were conducted. In general the great companies engaged in foreign commerce and
colonization during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
constituted on the model of the London Livery Company. The Merchant Adventurers
appear to have been at first organized within the Mercers’ Company; later they had
a separate organization, but were subject to ordinances enacted by the Mercers and
had to render a sort of tribute to them; finally they attained complete independence.
Until 1526 the Merchant Adventurers and Mercers used the same books for recording
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of the Grocers’ Company and used its halls for meetings until the great fire of 1666.
The East India Company had as close connection with the Levant Company as is
implied in the use of the books of the latter for the meetings held in organizing it, and
was moreover closely related to the Grocers’ Company through the partial identity
of their fields of activity and of their membership. Precepts do not appear certainly
to have been called for in the organization of the purely commercial companies, but
they were issued for setting out voyages of discovery; in the former, private interest
could probably be relied on for a motive force, while in the latter the element of a
definite prospect of gain was wanting. For a similar reason — because the public
purpose was magnified and private interest was without a stimulus — the issuance
of precepts for subscriptions was occasioned by projects of colonization. In the
charter granted to the London Company in 1609 for the colonization of “South
Virginia,” the names of most of the important livery companies of London appear as
“adventurers.” In response to the demand made in its precept, the Merchant Taylors’
Company subscribed £200, one half as its corporate subscription and one half as the
subscription of individual members. When the lottery permitted by the charter of
1612 was set up, the companies were required (invited or requested by precept) to
subscribe for shares, and the drawing was held in the hall of one of them. The most
interesting colonization project in which they participated was that of the Irish
Society. James I, in 1609, invited the city of London to plant and govern a colony on
lands forfeited by rebels in the county of Ulster in Ireland — a project which he
described as “likely to prove pleasing to Almighty God, honorable to the city, and
profitable to the undertakers.” The mayor thereupon summoned a meeting of
representatives of the twelve great livery companies (four from each company) to
consider the proposal. As a result, the companies advanced for the execution of the
project various sums which were afterwards increased to £5000 for each company or
£60,000 for all. They also provided for the government of the colony by a governor,
deputy governor and twenty-four assistants, the recorder and five of the aldermen of
London to be members of the court, and all members to be “free of the city.” The
body, known as the “Irish Society,” was incorporated by James in 1613 as the
“Governor and Assistants of the new Plantation in Ulster, within the realm of
Ireland.” A new county was laid out for it on the site of the old city of Derrie and in
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divided in twelve equal parts among the several livery companies, but a part
remained undivided under the administration of the Irish Society.
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The companies were also, in a measure, made media for the publication and
enforcement of laws and proclamations. In 1579, when a libellous book was
published about a prospective marriage of Elizabeth to the Duke of Anjou, precepts
were sent to all the wardens of livery companies directing them to warn their
members not to possess or harbor but to suppress such literature. Sumptuary
legislation, such as related to the kinds of caps and other clothing that should be worn
by different social classes, was brought to the attention of the companies and its
enforcement enjoined by precepts.
No small part of the companies’ activity was expended in the presentation of
pageants on land and river on public occasions, such as the return of the king or
queen after an absence from the city or country. The “lord mayor’s show,” presented
annually under the auspices of the company of which the mayor was a member, was
a most elaborate and expensive function; it is said to have been most magnificent
from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. When foreign
ambassadors or other distinguished persons arrived in London, it was not unusual for
the great livery companies to provide a fitting reception for them, sometimes
including a street pageant. When the Russian ambassador was expected to arrive in
the city in 1617, the companies were ordered by precept to provide a number of the
members of each of them to accompany the mayor and aldermen to receive him at the
quay. Likewise the funerals of the companies’ members or of the king or prominent
persons were ceremonies in which the companies participated with the usual
elaborateness. Another phase of the ceremonial side of the companies’ life was and
still is the giving of banquets, both periodically and on special occasions, —
apparently the most enduring feature of gild life for nearly a thousand years. Some
of them were intended chiefly for their own members, such as the “election banquet,”
the survival of the early annual meeting of gildsmen for the election of their officers
and the transaction of their other business; others were intended to add dignity to
public occasions, such as the election and inauguration of a lord mayor; others still
were given in honor of distinguished English or foreign statesmen or other persons.
During the reigns of Elizabeth and the Stuarts there was much interference by the
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by lease and otherwise. It ought hardly to be regarded as a movement of importance
for it was certainly prompted by little more than a sordid purpose to derive pecuniary
and political advantages from the companies’ management of their affairs. But the
matter terminated in 1684 in the issuance of writs of quo warranto against the
companies. The charter of London, or its body of privileges, had already been
declared forfeited and the companies did not wait for adverse decisions; they
subserviently surrendered their charters to Charles II with petitions, in most cases, for
a regrant of their privileges. When a committee of the Grocers’ Company, appointed
for the purpose, waited on the King’s secretary they were told that the King was not
disposed to deprive them of their property powers, but desired only “a regulation of
the governing part, so as his majesty might for the future have in himself a moving
power of any officer therein for mismanagement, in the same way and method that
they themselves now used, and claimed to have by power derivable from the
crown.”
334 By the new charters granted by Charles II it was provided that wardens’
and clerks’ names should first be presented to the King for his approval; if they
should be approved, they should assume office, but if rejected, successive new
elections should be held by the courts of assistants until the King’s approval should
be obtained. Moreover, any warden, clerk or assistant should be removable by order
of the privy council, and none should be elected to the livery without the approval of
the mayor and court of aldermen of London. Before James II fled from England in
1688, he prepared by an order in council to restore the companies’ charters to them.
After the Revolution the companies were restored by statute to the status held by
them before the writs of quo warranto were issued under Charles II.
335 New charters
were granted to some of them by William and Mary.
After the beginning of the nineteenth century the wealth of the livery companies
increased very greatly, chiefly by reason of the rapid rise in the value of the large
amounts of city real estate owned by them. Their somewhat anomalous character and
activity led to the appointment in 1880 of a royal commission of twelve members 
“to inquire into the circumstances and dates of their foundation, and
the objects for which they were founded, and how far those objects
are now being carried into effect... to inquire into and ascertain the
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of admission of freemen, livery, and other members... to inquire into
and ascertain the property of, or held in trust for or by [them], both
real and personal, and where the same is situate, and of what it is
composed, and the capital value of the several descriptions of such
property, and [its] annual income and the mode in which [it] is
managed and the income is expended [and] to consider and report
what measures [if any] are... expedient and necessary for improving
or altering the constitution of such companies, or the appropriation or
administration of the property or revenues thereof.”
It was found that in 1880 the income from property held in trust had been about
£200,000, and from corporate property between £550,000 and £600,000, a total of
from £750,000 to £800,000; the property was estimated to be of the value of at least
£15,000,000, while the indebtedness of the companies was about £180,000. The
companies whose affairs were investigated were the twelve great livery companies
and sixty lesser livery companies; it was found that since 1835 thirteen companies
had become extinct; four unimportant companies were not included in the
investigation because they were not technically “livery” companies. When their
report was made in 1884, the commission were 
“of opinion the state should intervene but only for the purposes of (1)
preventing the alienation of the property of the companies of London,
(2) securing the permanent application of a considerable portion of
the corporate income thence arising to useful purposes, (3) declaring
new trusts in cases in which a better application of the trust income
of the companies has become desirable.”
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No changes have resulted directly from the investigation. Indirectly it has
influenced the companies on their own initiative to devote a larger part of their
corporate income to public purposes, such as the establishment and support of
institutions for technical education.
The history of the livery companies of London is interesting evidence of the
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been exercised within it. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they had been
social organizations of tradesmen and artisans for the control of their economic life
in substantial harmony with the gild system. When the gild system, speaking broadly,
ceased to be an efficient organization of industrial society after the middle of the
sixteenth century, the London livery companies shared with the rest of the system in
the loss of their control over trade and industry. They continued to exist, however,
for five general reasons: (1) London had never possessed the homogeneity that
characterized most other English towns; it had always been rather a federation of
units than a distinct unit, whether of geographical units that crystallized in wards, or
of units of population organized in gilds. The conception of gild representation in the
government of the city was on that account more easily realized. When once admitted
to participate as units in the government of the city, the superior vigor of their
corporate life made it readily possible for them to almost wholly absorb it. One
reason for the persistence of their life is that they were largely identical with the city
government and found in their exercise of political power a function capable of
perpetuating them. (2) London, to both its advantage and disadvantage, was nearer
to the royal government than any other city in England; its powers were greater,
while its duties were also heavier. Its government, constructed by confederation of
gilds, could not be so easily modified by the centralizing influences represented in
the crown; at the same time, the growth of royal power demanded greater services of
a national character; both tending to strengthen the gilds as organizations by
increasing their autonomy and broadening their functions. They became organs of the
expanding national government, as similar organizations in other cities could not. (3)
They were the organizations of the great commercial wealth of London, irrespective
of the occupations of its owners. In many cities the governing body itself had become
the organization of the wealthy classes; in a few of them, a predominant gild or
company had displaced it; in London, the companies served the purpose. Perhaps
inseparable from the possession of great wealth was the social-fraternal ostentation
of its owners through the social machinery of the companics, providing a strong
corporate bond and enriching the companies through the benefactions of their
members. (4) Before the establishment of the East India Company and other great
foreign commercial companies and of the Bank of England at the end of the
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government could resort for the satisfaction of its financial needs; it had no “financial
agent.” The city of London, acting through the livery companies, supplied the want
until more convenient institutions could be evolved from experience. It was a crude
expedient, but its use for the purpose tended to perpetuate the corporate existence of
the companies. (5) Finally the large accumulation of corporate wealth, whether held
in trust or absolutely, as distinguished from the wealth of private members,
strengthened the life of the companies. In fact, the administration of their trust estates
and the expenditure of a part of the income from corporate estates on entertainments
and benevolences have been the chief functions of the companies since the middle
of the last century.
337 The holding of property by a corporation is theoretically
subsidiary to the accomplishment of some public purpose, but when the purpose has
been lost to view, or has been accomplished, the accumulated property, especially if
large in amount, tends to hold the corporation together, because it is so difficult to
distribute the property equitably. The Livery Companies Commission were evidently
perplexed by the problem what disposition should be made of the companies’
property, if they should not be maintained as corporations. The London livery
companies, to recapitulate, were maintained beyond the time of decay of their
medieaval functions by (1) their intimate connection with the municipal government
of the city, (a) their use as organs of the expanding central government, (3) their
service in the expression of the power and ostentation of the exceptionally wealthy
classes of London, (4) their use as organizations through which the financial needs
of the nation and city might be supplied and (5) their accumulated corporate wealth.
VI.
It is impossible to designate exactly the point in history at which the associations
included under the general name of the “gild system” attained the degree of
development implied in the term “corporation.” Even as loosely as the term is
commonly used, one would hesitate to apply it to the gilds of the thirteenth century,
while the justice of applying it to the London livery companies of the eighteenth
century is unquestionable. The mere use of the words “corporation,” “body
corporate” or “body politic” in historical documents is not a safe basis of judgment,
and for reasons that will appear more fully in a later chapter, the technical legal tests
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somewhat careful examination of the associations discussed in this chapter, in the
light of what has been said of the nature of corporations, will be of service.
All the gilds (even including the rudimentary organizations imposed on bodies of
tradesmen and craftsmen for police purposes) were recognized by the state, — in
other words, they were protected in the exercise of their powers, though to a varying
extent, by the coercive force of politically organized society, whether wielded by king
or municipality. But bare recognition is not enough; corporations are creatures of the
state, the term implying that the state has a more than passive interest in them. The
Frith-gilds have already been considered from that point of view. The ecclesiastical
and social-religious gilds may have been of benefit to society, may have aided
humanity in its progress towards the indefinable goal of perfection which it is ever
striving to attain, but they were not so viewed by the state, by society as it happened
to be organized during the time when they flourished; its attitude towards them was
merely permissive, tolerative. The same statement would be almost true of the
earliest trade gilds, of the merchant gilds in the twelfth century and of the craft gilds
in the century following. The passive attitude hardly became clearly one of activity
before the reigns of Richard I and John in the case of the merchant gilds and the
century covered by the reigns of the three Edwards may be safely called the period
during which a similar transition took place in the attitude towards the craft gilds. It
is doubtful whether such a change of attitude towards the ecclesiastical and
social-religious gilds ever took place; their chief importance in the development of
corporations is that they provided an interior organization, a system of relations
between their members, that might be used and indeed was used as a social structure
for other kinds of social life. The best evidence of the change of attitude towards the
craft gilds lies in the fact that many trades not voluntarily organized in gilds were
compulsorily organized by the municipalities on the model of the true gilds.
To what extent were the gild relations voluntary or compulsory, and what degree
of stability did they possess when once assumed? The ecclesiastical and social-
religious gilds were clearly voluntary associations and there is no reason to doubt that
members might retire from them at will. They were by no means the only media
through which the soul’s welfare in the future world might be assured or the
fraternal-social impulses of men in this world afforded gratification. They occupied
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merchant gilds and the later craft gilds occupied exclusive fields of life. The early
buyer and seller and the later tradesman or craftsman had to belong to a gild. It must
not be said that his membership in the gild was voluntary; he might exercise his will
in determining whether he would buy, sell, trade or manufacture, but if once he
should choose, his membership in the gild followed as a matter of compulsion. But
there was a channel through which a voluntary element crept into the gilds. The
membership in the gild conveyed the right to participate in certain lines of economic
activity as well as to control them; if the former should be emphasized but a little, the
sufferance of the gild would be of as great advantage as its franchise; and that was
exactly what happened, if not always in form, at least quite universally in substance.
The tradesman or artisan simply paid tribute to the gild for the permission to engage
in a trade, or industry, while the gild virtually shrunk into a smaller body in the
exercise of control over it. Then membership became truly voluntary. In many gilds
the distinction between persons who merely wanted to trade or manufacture and
others who actually expected to attend gild feasts, Occupy offices and be of one
“clothing” or another was clearly and unequivocally made; the former were
eventually excluded from the gild organization; the latter constituted the gild and
membership in their number was not compulsory. The two sides of gild life had
become separate; doing business and imposing the conditions under which it should
be done had come to be distinct; the former was left to a social class substantially
unorganized; the latter became the function of the gild. Membership in the gild was
not voluntary until the shrinkage described had taken place. When once the
obligations of membership in a trade gild had been assumed, they were not easily laid
aside. One could belong to only one gild at a time, and once he had chosen his
occupation and entered the appropriate gild, all the social usages of the time were in
opposition to his making a change or even allowing his children to make it.
Moreover, other crafts were not expected to admit readily a deserter from his own
craft. Membership in a craft carried too much with it to permit it to be easily laid
aside. One’s residence, his status in society, his credit, his fraternal relations with his
fellows, were dependent on his membership in his gild. Moreover, even if surrender
of membership in a gild had been readily permissible, entering another gild in order
to follow another occupation would have been necessary; the general obligation of
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social shrinkage in the gild had taken place, it was only by consent of the narrower
body that the burdens of membership might be laid aside. When the precepts of the
Stuarts had become too frequent, liverymen of the London companies would have
been glad to surrender their membership but could not do it. Membership in trade
gilds, then, may be said to have been characterized by a high degree of stability, and
its assumption was hardly voluntary until the gilds had departed from their
democratic basis and were becoming virtually organizations of the governing or
directing element in trade and industry.
More important, possibly, is the question of the internal status of the gilds: whether
the centre from which their restricted social force was exerted, the source of their
activity, was within or without them; whether in exerting their social force, either in
the preliminary stage of determining to what end or in what manner it should be
exerted or in the later stage of actually exerting it and transforming it into social
effects, they were self-sufficient or in their weakness had to be supplemented by
auxiliary social agents; and whether they possessed the power of maintaining their
character as associations, groups of persons, without aid or interference from the
outside in the replenishment of their membership. The ecclesiastical and
social-religious gilds were essentially autonomous; no preliminary act of Church or
State was necessary to set their social force in motion or to keep it in motion except
in so far as the statute of mortmain required the consent of the state to their holding
the property that served to some extent as the economic basis of their activity; nor
was the command or consent of external social agents prerequisite to their enactment
or enforcement of ordinances; likewise they controlled their own membership,
granting or denying admission to applicants as they pleased and expelling undesirable
members. As far as the qualities of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and selfrenovation are
concerned, the ecclesiastical and socialreligious gilds were in plain possession of
them. But the powers of the trade gilds were so much more vital to society that they
were unable to exercise them in so great independence of nation and town. The
developed merchant gilds and craft gilds, however, with the exception of those
described as compulsorily organized by the town, were fairly autonomous; they
generally elected their own officers, though the first ones were usually appointed by
the town govermnent, and though all had to qualify themselves for their offices by
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their powers belonged to them and their gild life had an independent centre. But they
were not fully self-sufficient; their ordinances were sometimes enacted for them by
the town or nation; their assent, at least, was usually sought; even when they enacted
their own ordinances, they had to submit them to superior social groups for approval.
When their ordinances were to be enforced, they seldom had the power to enforce
them in their own courts; and when they had such power they often had to submit to
a review of the decisions of their own courts or officers by municipal or national
authorities; more usually they had the bare power to present infractions of their
ordinances before the higher authorities for their consideration. Yet though they
appear as a matter of theory to have been very dependent on the municipal and
national authorities in putting their powers into effect, they were nevertheless, in
actual practice, subjected to very slight control from the outside. Through the
inability of the town to enact technically proper ordinances, and through the influence
of their own compactly organized members, the gilds were generally able to get such
ordinances as they desired, and in the enforcement of them, gild loyalty could safely
be relied on to give them weight without resorting to mayors and judges for
punishment of their infractions. When their relations to industry became more remote
and their importance to the actual economic activity of society decreased, they were
allowed greater independence by the state. It is needless to add that their control over
their membership was nearly exclusive. Even in their early stages, when they were
substantially organizations of all the persons engaged in a particular vocation, trade
or industry, they were always allowed to determine whether applicants for admission
were proper to be admitted; though the children of gildsmen had the privilege of
entering the gilds on payment of lower fees than others, the gild had to pass on their
admission; likewise the gilds had the power to protect their membership by expelling
their members for infractions of ordinances; apprenticeship, as a channel through
which members might be admitted, was under their close control. When the gilds had
developed into companies, virtually organizations of the upper classes in trades and
crafts, or of persons having no connection with them, membership was still more
closely limited; even apprenticeship led only to the status of a shopkeeper or
workman in the trade or craft, and not to membership in its organized governing
body. In general, and especially in their later development, the trade gilds, exclusive
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autonomy, self-sufficiency, and self-renovation that is one of the attributes of
corporations.
The feature of compulsory unity in gilds of all kinds was so conspicuous at all
times that attention need hardly be called to it. But the unity of the gilds was in the
early centuries rather political than personal. Though the gild acted as a unit, it was
mostly for the purpose of determining how each member should act in the sphere of
social life within its limited field. The ecclesiastical gilds, standing midway between
the monastic organizations and the later gilds, afforded, under ecclesiastical
management, the means for the salvation of the souls of individuals; likewise the
social-religious gilds, though not under the direct management of the Church,
provided social machinery through which the brethren might be more fully assured
of welfare in the future life, and also regulated the social relations in the present life
to one another, and, to some extent, to outsiders. In the trade gilds, moreover the
element of unity was largely in the possession of social machinery for the regulation
of the personal activity of members. The individual was not lost sight of — he was
rather held up to plainer view. The gilds were not so much active social agents
themselves as they were political organizations within which the individual might
more effectively act, in other words, they were political units. When in the course of
their development the governmental part of the gilds became distinct from the social
functions of their members, their unity assumed a different form and became more
nearly real, as they became more nearly governing bodies, to the exclusion of persons
subject to their regulations. While the relations of gildsmen to outside members of
society rested on them individually (though acting under rules imposed by the whole
gild) their interrelations were sustained largely through the medium of their
governing body, for whose use a more or less elaborate accumulation of economic
goods was necessary. The gilds maintained commonboxes to make effective their
system of almsgiving, had candelabra and funeral palls for religious purposes and
stage property for plays; many eventually owned common halls, almshouses, schools
and hospitals. The interrelations of members may be said not to have been terminated
by death. As in life members united in religious services for their souls’ future
welfare, so at death they aimed to carry beyond the grave the advantages of gild
membership by bequeathing property in return for masses and prayers for the repose
of their souls to be rendered through the same gild machinery. The gild as a groupJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 156
thus came to be the owner, in many cases, of considerable amounts of property,
augmented by many fees paid for binding apprentices, admitting to the freedom and
the like; while concurrently the gild was virtually shrinking into its governing body,
and its actual control over industry was gradually wasting away. The effect was a
conception of the gild as a body actually doing for society instead of imposing
regulations under which society could do for itself. When that conception had been
attained, the way was clear for the modern corporation with its conception of
personal unity in place of the older one of the political unity of the gild. 
What was said of the merchant gilds must with equal truth be said of the
ecclesiastical, social-religious and craft gilds. Their vital principle was the private
interest of their members. The universal element of religious service had for its
purpose the betterment of the gildsman’s status in the future life. The distribution of
alms among members was certainly not prompted by a desire to benefit society in
general; even the distribution of alms to non-members was intended to benefit rather
the donor than the donee; it was a reflection of the self-abnegatory religion of the
Middle Ages. The supervision of economic processes and the maintenance of a
standard of skill and fair dealing were certainly for the protection rather of
fellow-gildsmen than of the other members of society with whom they came in
contact, though the state was amply justified in finding in them means of benefiting
society in general. The private interest, however, was not manifested by each
gildsman in his own commercial and industrial activity; it was manifested rather in
his fellow-gildsmen’s work; it was a social or political interest. The private interest
of tailors, as far as the gild system was concerned, did not impel them to make and
sell clothes; it impelled them rather to organize their group so that each tailor, in
making and selling clothes, might do so under such regulations that he would not
thereby do injury to his fellow-tailors. The movement discussed in the preceding
chapter, however, wrought a change in the nature of the interest, though it still
remained private interest. When the positive functions of gilds in making and
enforcing rules of individual activity had virtually disappeared, leaving the older
governing body of the gild separated from trade and industry but compactly united
in the administration of a fund of gild property, the private interests of its members
centred in the participation in the fruits of its accumulated wealth and social prestige.
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but also only those whose functions are (a) public and (b) appropriate for social
activity. What is a public function depends, practically, on the state of public opinion
at a given time. Though dependent to some extent on the nature of the activity itself,
yet the question whether its performance is a public function is answered by the state
in view of many considerations that it is not necessary to detail. The preservation of
the peace was regarded as a public function in the ninth and tenth centuries, and if the
state had not accomplished it through the Frith-gilds, it must of necessity have found
some other means of accomplishing it. The maintenance of a social organization by
means of which the religious sentiments of a people may find expression has often
and perhaps well been regarded by the state as one of its functions. It was so regarded
from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries, but the ecclesiastical and social-religious
gilds were not considered as necessary for the purpose. The State and Church had an
Organization adequate for the purpose without them. Yet they were allowed to exist,
for while they were not positively necessary, they did not detract strength from the
regular religious organization. Whatever was the attitude of the state, in view of the
existing organization of society on its religious side, the religious work of the
ecclesiastical and social-religious gilds was public in its nature, as affording a social
medium through which the individual might approach perfection. Even in their
social-fraternal aspects, the latter class of gilds were clearly performing public
functions, even if the state, in their absence, would not have considered it a duty to
provide other institutions to take their place. The regulation of trade and industry is
conceded to be a public function, though it has not always been so readily conceded
as now. In so far, then, as the merchant gilds and craft gilds regulated the economic
activity of their members, they were performing a public function. The unit of
organization was small, to be sure, but social progress was necessary to enable
society to grow out of the gild into the town and out of the town into the nation. The
degree to which the economic activity of society may best be regulated must always
remain an open question, but that some regulation is necessary cannot be doubted.
Whether the state shall regulate trade and industry directly or indirectly through more
or less voluntary sub-groups of citizens is a question of expediency; under the system
of trade gilds, the state adopted the latter method and relied upon the power of
revision and prior approval to keep the self-interest of the gildsmen from
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activity of society was not the only public function that devolved on the gilds. The
participation in town government, the presentation of plays and pageants on public
occasions, the entertainment of notable citizens and foreigners and the maintenance
of schools, almshouses and hospitals were public functions that they continued to
perform even after they had virtually lost their effective control of trade and industry,
though the effort involved in their performance was hardly commensurate with the
private compensation of members incident to it.
To what extent were the functions of the gilds appropriate for associate activity?
To what extent did they demand the existence of bodies of persons instead of
individuals? The stage of development in which the gilds were essentially
organizations of groups of persons for their self-government in some field of activity
presents a simple case. The term self-government implies group activity in the work
of government, whatever the field covered and whatever the end aimed at, whether
the preservation of the peace, the celebration of religious services, the maintenance
of fraternal relations or the regulation of trade and industry. But when the element of
self-government was modified, as in the ecclesiastical gilds or later trade gilds, or
virtually eliminated, as in the still later trade companies, — i.e., when the gild came
to be merely the governing body of the group that previously had been entirely
included in it, — the appropriateness of the work of regulation for associate activity
is not so plain. Elizabeth and James, in granting patents of monopoly, were evidently
of the opinion that such duties could properly be reposed in the hands of individuals.
As a general principle, the fact that a function is public in its nature lends a
presumption that it may best be performed by associated persons; the volume (if the
expression may be used) of the work is likely to be beyond the capacity of an
individual; its possession of the public character makes it necessary that it be closely
adjusted to its environment, that it be correlated with the activity of other social
agents, — a work that may best be done by a deliberating body of persons; moreover,
it is likely to have such need of continuity that the life of the individual must be
extended into the possibly endless life of a group. The effective regulation of trade
and industry, so far as it was accomplished at all after the gilds had ceased to be
potent, was the work of Parliament; the creation of monopolies resulted in failure, —
indeed, it was hardly intended to provide an effective supervision of trade and
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vanished power of the control over the economic life of society had tended to destroy
the character of the gilds and trade companies as associations, their other public
functions tended to preserve it; the maintenance of the gild machinery was necessary
for the administration of the accumulated property, the presentation of pageants, the
participation in town life as numerical divisions of the people and the provision of
public entertainment.
It appears, then, to be an impossibility to designate a particular point of time in
history at which the corporation appeared in the gild system; the whole course of
development was uneven, as between different classes and sub-classes of gilds, and
as between the several qualities that in combination characterize the ideal
corporation. VII. Educational and Eleemosynary Corporations.
I — Origin of the Universities.
On the demise of the institutions of the Western Roman Empire, the preservation
of the remnants of Greek and Roman learning and the feeble maintenance of
education were left, with much else, as a heritage of the Church and especially of its
bodies of monks. Un-Romanized Christianity and Roman learning found a common
refuge; some of the monasteries, like that of Viviers, founded by Cassiodorus, appear
to have been devoted rather to the ends of learning than to those of religion. Even the
municipal schools that survived in Italy and in southern France, where Roman
institutions had taken root most firmly north of the Alps, succumbed to the Frankish
invasions and left to the monks such part of the field as they had not previously
occupied. The Benedictine reorganization opportunely gave an impetus to
monasticism at the beginning of the sixth century, even before the barbarian
migrations had ceased; in the convents based on the Benedictine rule was the sole
refuge of learning from the sixth to the ninth century, or until the reaction in the
Church by which on one hand the regular life of the monasteries was introduced into
cathedral chapters, and on the other, the monasteries were transformed into
cathedrals. In both monastery and cathedral, however, education was long intended
solely to qualify monks and canons for the performance of their religious duties and
not to raise the general level of learning in society. As the life of convent or chapter
was lived as an end in itself, so learning, subordinated to that life, found no wider
purpose. It was only at the beginning of the ninth century that the larger monasteries
made a distinction between the ololati and outsiders in their schools; but by that time
they had shrunken from bodies of laymen into an order of the priesthood; the
differentiation in the body of scholars was parallel with the change in the status of the
monks in the Church. The cathedral chapters were manifestly bodies of priests and
their schools were more readily opened to the reception of outside scholars. But what
is more to the purpose, neither the monastery nor cathedral schools had a distinct
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occasionally some outsider employed by them, whose duty it was, under the direction
of the abbot or chapter, to instruct the group of scholars made up of both oblati and
outsiders.
The first important modification of the control of learning and education by the
Church was involved in the establishment by Charlemagne of his School of the
Palace in 782 in charge of Alcuin. The implied reform, however, was rather in the
substance of learning and education than in the form of the schools. The Emperor,
consistently with his general policy, aimed not so much to found schools exempt
from ecclesiastical control as to found a school suitable for the education of the
nobles of his court and the imperial administrative officers and to secure through it
the supervision of the monastic and cathedral schools of his empire; far from an
intention to do away with the existing ecclesiastical system of education, he sought
merely to improve and reinvigorate it.
The School of the Palace was hardly more than a cathedral school without the
cathedral; Alcuin himself had been scholasticus of York before he had been called
into the service of the Emperor, and became abbot of Tours when his years of active
service were ended. He was at once the head of the School of the Palace and the
imperial minister of education. The schools of the Empire had shared in the general
demoralization of State and Church under the Merovingians; the need was not so
much to found a new system as to secure the old one from corruption and impotency.
To be sure, Charlemagne was far in advance of his time in entertaining a broader
view than his contemporaries of learning as an element in the life of society; he was
able to see that education ought to be something more than preparation for the life
of a monk, canon or priest, but outside the School of the Palace he sought no new
agency for its promotion. The most that he did was to secure an increase in the
number and an improvement in the quality of the existing schools, without organic
changes in their system. Though in general Louis simply followed the policy of his
father, his reign affords a dim view of the future release of learning from the control
of the Church. In 822, in his capitulary of Attigny, he insisted that learning and
preaching were essential to the welfare of the state and that only those should preach
who were well-educated, that each one preparing for successive grades of the
priesthood ought therefore to have a place of study and a master, and that schools
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made it plain that the unit of the single monastery or cathedral was not large enough;
accordingly, in 829, the bishops petitioned Louis to provide for the establishment of
three large public schools, open to both monks and clergy, in the three most
convenient cities in the empire, “ in order that his father’s efforts and his own might
not fall into decay.” The petition, though without results, is incontrovertible evidence
of the tendency that was later to result in the growth of the University of Paris from
a cathedral school too large for the control of bishop or cathedral chapter. 
Learning and education continued to be almost wholly monopolized by the Church
and to find expression through the machinery of cathedrals and monasteries; they
were not yet under the control of a body of persons with a distinct and separate social
organization for the general reason that their scope was little wider than that of the
learning involved in the religious activity of the priest and monk. The differentiation
of university from church, of learning for its own sake from learning as part of the
mechanism of religious worship, had to await an expansion of the volume of learning
itself. The reigns of Charlemagne and Louis contain evidence of the beginning of
such an expansion in the existence of a class of scholars in the monastic and
cathedral schools and in the School of the Palace who were not to become monks or
priests and in the recognition, though indistinct, that learning and education had
social functions outside of the Church. As a matter of organization alone, there was
no change in the educational system until the rise of the medieval universities save
such as was implied in the establishment of the School of the Palace; but the revival
of learning that was to be the indispensable condition of the growth of new
educational institutions began to manifest itself in the first half of the ninth century.
The early Christian Church had instinctively repelled pagan learning. It was one
manifestation of its exclusiveness. In any conflict of religions it might with reason
be expected that the adherents of one would condemn the learning of the adherents
of the other along with their religion; most of all, the circumstances under which
Christians struggled with their opponents and their insistence on the universality of
their religion made it inevitable that pagan learning should share to a large extent in
the defeat of pagan religions. In the contest between a narrow and militant
Christianity and the literary store of the Virgils and Ciceros, full of pagan thought
and sentiment, literary taste and culture had to yield for several centuries to the
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paganism was not so destructive of classical learning as the conversion of the
barbarians. When the higher classes of Romans were brought within the pale of
Christianity, they necessarily brought with them an appreciation of the strength and
beauty of Greek and Roman letters; the converted barbarians, however, brought little
but superstition and rudeness. Even the store of culture added to the society of
Christianity by its conquest of the higher classes of Romans must have been small,
for it was a religion that had its origin and early growth among the humbler classes;
the eventual absorption of the more cultivated part of Roman society could hardly
have assured the preservation of the culture that had formerly been monopolized by
them. But classical learning had inherent strength. Wherever a remnant of culture and
literary taste remained, the appeal of the classical philosophers and poets for
recognition was heard. Classical learning was too strong in itself to be utterly
destroyed. Here and there a monk had to suffer rebuke from his abbot for concealing
a Virgil in his cell, but the abbot himself was more than likely to have his own Virgil.
Notwithstanding the theoretical opposition of the monks to pagan learning, it was in
their cloisters that its remnants found refuge. Yet the monks degenerated greatly in
learning. It is not far from the truth to say that the early growth of Christianity was
destruction of pagan culture; what it substituted for it was a body of faith and
sentiment that inculcated humility and simplicity in the concrete relations of social
life, as taught in the holy Scriptures and in the patristic literature with which they
were supplemented. However fortunate that much of the literature of Greece and
Rome was in later centuries to be restored to its place as a part of the world’s store
of learning, the Church was not to act as a willing agent in its restoration; to some
extent that result was incidental to the attainment by the Church of other results more
directly aimed at, but for the most part, in its participation in the restoration of
learning, the Church received its impulse from without. It was not for the sole
purpose of promoting the general culture of society or even of the secular and regular
priesthood that the Church at first resorted to the stock of classical learning, — the
purpose was much narrower.
Before the ninth century the purpose of the Church was to subordinate learning and
education to religion. If a monk or priest were to have learning, it should be only of
such character and quantity as would enable him to efficiently perform his religious
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it had to be supplemented with that of the vanquished pagans. The language of the
literature of the Church was Greek and Latin, and that of the worship of the Western
Church was Latin, which could not well be maintained in its purity without recourse
to the works of classical masters. Even if their substance was regarded as dangerous
for the Christian, the use of them for the sake of the literary form in which they were
cast prevented them at least from becoming wholly unknown and kept them near at
hand for the exceptional monk whose taste should tempt him to prohibited familiarity
with them. If with passing time the Christian repugnance to pagan learning should
be lessened as the actual conflict with paganism and the eventual victory over it
receded into the more distant past, its use for the sake of the language in which it was
written would serve as a vehicle for its reintroduction as a factor in the advance of
society. It is significant that, even in the days of Abelard, the little instruction on the
subject of Latin literature that was given at Paris was imparted under the head of
grammar.
The religious life could not be complete in itself, even though for centuries it could
be so magnified in the minds of men that other sides of life could be subordinated to
it. In times of reliance on tradition, when society was fortunate in retaining what it
had without aspiring to more, it could not be expected that the world’s body of
learning would be created anew; in the nature of things, the wisdom of the Greeks
and Romans had to be resorted to as a basis for the practice and worship of
Christianity. If the date of Easter was to be determined, pagan arithmetic and pagan
astronomy had to be used in determining it. The phenomena of the physical world
could be understood, for the most part, only through the medium of pagan learning.
Thus the mass of older learning was kept alive by the Church, not as much for its
own sake as for the sake of the religion to which it was made subservient. The fact
of most importance is that it was kept alive at all. Most of the institutions of the Dark
Ages possessed the negative merit of conserving in the presence of destruction.
Though the Church did not create a body of secular learning from the fifth to the
ninth centuries, it at least preserved from destruction a portion of the older learning,
even if only incidentally to the maintenance of its own activity. Moreover, as long as
the body of secular learning could be kept subordinate to religion, neither large
enough in quantity to approach an equality with it, nor of such a quality as to be
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social structure for it. Charlemagne and Louis saw but dimly the greater importance
of learning than the Church had assigned to it. They set in motion, both in the
ecclesiastical schools and in the School of the Palace, forces that would so enlarge
the social functions of learning and education and so set them in opposition to the
Church that cathedral schools would not be adequate organizations for them and the
cathedral school of Paris would become a university.
If the use of pagan learning for the sake of the language in which it was written and
for the purpose of supplementing purely Christian learning outside of the strict lines
of religion itself had resulted mainly in its preservation, the use of it within the circle
of the Christian religion for the purpose of interpreting and elaborating it as a
religious system was productive of greater results. Western Christianity was busied
until the sixth century chiefly in getting itself established as a religious belief, as a
basis of human conduct, in opposition to the pagan elements of Roman and barbarian
life with which it came in contact. When it had achieved success and in so doing had
incidentally erected a wide-extending governmental structure, the Roman Catholic
Church, it entered what constituted the second stage in its development — the
elaboration of a system of dogmas. Its first step was to get itself lived; the second to
systematize itself and justify the social structure through which it was lived. Until the
ninth century most reliance was placed on tradition based on the literature of the
Church itself. But the elements of faith and tradition which had produced the
superstitious mysticism of the monasteries had to be supplemented by a larger use of
reason. As pure reason is merely an implement for the ascertainment and correlation
of truth, there could be no sound objection to the use of pagan systems of reasoning
in the elaboration of Christian truth. The study of dialectics was accordingly extended
in the monastic and cathedral schools, first in the domain of secular knowledge and
later in that of Christian doctrine. Alcuin and John Scotus Erigena, in the School of
the Palace, gave increased attention to the logic of Aristotle. Rabanus Maurus,
sckolasizcus of the monastery of Fulda, with exceptional liberality aimed to promote
the interests of Christianity through ample instruction in pagan literature and
learning, and especially in pagan philosophy; his pupil, Lupus Servatus, went even
further in the same direction. From the field of philosophy, the use of dialectics
passed over into that of theology; the question of the reality of universals could not
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Anselm, the last of the great monastic teachers, made a critical application of the
scholastic philosophy to theology but remained orthodox. Roscellinus, however, in
attempting the same work, ended in being heretical. Finally, at the beginning of the
twelfth century, Abelard appeared as the greatest exponent, first in philosophy and
then in theology, of the speculative spirit that insisted on applying to all things the
test of reason, and secured for himself and his teachings the condemnation of the
Church.
With Abelard was reached the point at which pagan philosophy ceased to be the
willing servant of Christianity. The conflict was between the tendency to apply
reason in the elaboration of Christian dogma, championed by Abelard, and the
monastic tendency to rely on blind faith and tradition, represented by St. Bernard.
Though the latter triumphed for the time, the former was too strong to be
permanently defeated. The monastic schools ceased to include outsiders among their
scholars, and the cathedral schools became more independent of the Church. But the
dominance of the scholastic philosophy was not sufficient to force the Church to the
limit of its powers in the control of education. The end of the eleventh and the
beginning of the twelfth century witnessed the beginning of a genuine revival of
learning, as a part of a more general outburst of human energy. Charlemagne’s
project of a world empire had failed, and from the ruins of his Frankish Empire had
been laid the foundations of modern European states which had been fairly settled by
the end of the tenth century; political and social order had been established in Europe,
if even at the expense of the rise of the feudal system. Though the adjustment of the
personal elements of the Teutonic peoples and the organic elements of Roman
institutions had not been fully accomplished, the turning point of civilization had
been passed in the tenth century and humanity had begun again to press forward.
Possibly the passing of the millennial year and with it the escape from the
apprehended destruction of the world had given to humanity renewed hope and an
impulse to advance; the dismal tenth century, at all events, was succeeded by a
transitional century in which were gathering the forces that constituted the progress
of the four centuries before the Renaissance. Monasticism had taken on renewed life
in the Clugniac reorganization in the tenth century and under the reforms of St.
Bernard at the beginning of the twelfth century. The crusades, manifestations as well
of a renewed spirit and energy as of increased religious zeal among the nations ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 167
western Europe, were bringing them together as well as putting them in contact with
the civilization of the East. A revival of architecture in the beginning of the Gothic
period was at hand. The complete works of Aristotle, previously represented in Latin
translations of only a part, were giving a stronger impulse to the scholastic
philosophy at the beginning of the thirteenth century.
The schools increased in number and improved in quality. The monastic schools,
which in the ninth century had been superior to the cathedral schools, seemed to be
impervious to the influence of the scholastic philosophy in the fullness of its
development and ceased to contain secular scholars. The cathedral schools, however,
located in the larger cities, and exposed to all the awakening influences of the revival
of learning and of the more general revival of human activity of which it was only a
part, and less under the conservative influence of monasticism and feudalism, were
crowded with scholars. If a date must somewhat arbitrarily be taken for the beginning
of the university era, it must be the beginning of the twelfth century. “Abelard,
though not in any strict sense the founder, was at least the intellectual progenitor of
the University of Paris.”
338 In his lifetime all the forces necessary to account for the
rise of the universities came into full operation, — the revival of learning, the
antagonism of the scholastic philosophy (and, more broadly, of pagan learning) to
Christianity, and the presence of an increasing body of men devoting themselves to
learning and education for purposes other than that of the practice of Christianity.
Abelard himself was a typical university student and teacher of the Middle Ages.
II — The English Universities.
If the history of the English universities is to be divided into periods, there may be
said to be three of them: (1) The period from the twelfth to the sixteenth century,
characterized by their attainment of their greatest independence of Church and State,
the perfection of their system of internal relations and their gradual disintegration
into colleges; (2) the period from the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth
century, characterized by their increased subjection to Church and State, the
substantial maintenance of the system of internal relations (except as affected by the
crystallization of the colleges) and the increased autonomy of the colleges; and (3)
the period of which the nineteenth century is the beginning, characterized (to the
present time) by an increased but more systematic control by the State, the markedJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 168
loss of influence by the Church, the broadening f the basis of the system of internal
relations, and the decrease of the autonomy of the colleges (tending to convert them
into virtual departments of a restored university unit).
It is the intention, in this study of corporations, to consider particularly the rise and
development of the English universities; but, strictly speaking, they had, in common
with other European universities, their rise and early development in France. While
municipalities and gilds, as well as the later corporate companies of the sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had separate origins, though under substantially
similar conditions, in the several nations of western Europe, and were much more
uniform in their development than is usually supposed, the university movement was
not confined to separate nations in its origin but was peculiarly European in
character; it had its rise and development earliest in France; by the time the revival
of learning attained such force in other parts of Europe as to demand separate
institutions for its expression, it had already assumed them in France. The University
of Paris was the great “mother of universities”; the origin of nearly every mediaeval
European university may be traced directly or indirectly to migrations from it or to
intentional imitations of it. On account of the paucity of historical evidence, the
nature of the origin of the University of Oxford is not definitely known. It has
heretofore been quite generally considered to have had an origin independent of the
University of Paris, and to have been evolved from the ecclesiastical schools of
Oxford; the latest investigations make it appear likely that it was formed, like most
others, by a migration from Paris; in either case, the historian has felt justified in
supplying the early unknown history of the one by resort to the known facts of the
early history of the other, on the assumption, of course, that if the one was not an
offshoot of the other, it must at least have had a similar origin and early development.
There is one striking advantage to the student of the general subject of universities
in such a method of treatment: the facts of the rise of the University of Paris show
very clearly the connection between the old and new social forces and their organic
structure, between the old ecclesiastical schools and the medieval university, but after
it was once established, it was retarded in its further development by its social
environment to a greater extent than the English universities; probably the best
method of obtaining a clear understanding of the rise and development of the typical
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development in Oxford.
III — The Universities and the Church.
At the end of the eleventh century the number of scholars in Paris noticeably
increased. France was the foremost European nation of the time and Paris was the
chief city in Christendom. The Carolingian reformation of education and the renewed
encouragement of learning had exerted their greatest influence on French schools.
France was the source from which the first crusades derived their greatest strength,
and the nation in which the reviving influences of contact with the East were most
strongly felt. The strength of monasticism, too, was in France; there the
reorganization under the Clugniacs had originated and there the reforms of St.
Bernard were to have their rise.
The centre around which learning and education revolved in Paris at the end of the
eleventh century was its cathedral school. There were other schools at Paris. The
school of the Collegiate Church of Ste. Genevieve was on the “Mount” across the
river from the Island of Paris; scholars afterwards seceded to it from Paris on a few
occasions and Abelard himself had lectured in it when he had been denied permission
to lecture in Paris. A school was also maintained by the canons of St. Victor in which
William of Champeaux lectured after he retired from Paris. But it was the cathedral
school that grew; the others enjoying no permanent growth. It had formerly been only
one among several in France, and it had not been pre-eminentamong them; the
cathedral schools of Tours and Rheims and the monastery school of Fulda had been
widely known in Europe before either the masters or scholars of Paris had given it
a superior name. William of Champeaux was its first great master and Abelard its
first great scholar; by the time of the death of the latter, in the middle of the twelfth
century, the cathedral school of Paris had attained the position of preeminence that,
as the later university, it long retained. Abelard was the typical medieval master and
scholar; in him are found the qualities that characterized his social class for centuries.
His connection with the Church was purely formal. His method of study was critical;
in his study even of theology he departed from the traditions of the Church; the study
of philosophy and theology which he stamped with his personality was the chief work
of the universities of Europe until the Renaissance of the fifteenth century. As a
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this master or that; as a master, he taught in one school or another as he found the
conditions most favorable, and attracted by his reputation a body of pupils, who
followed him from place to place. Tout, except for the large number of its noted
masters and scholars and the greater fame of its lectures, the cathedral school of Paris
in the twelfth century was like other cathedral schools in Europe; in form and
organization it was not distinguished from others.
No university developed out of a monastic school. In the eleventh and twelfth
centuries the monks yielded to the secular clergy their place as participants in the
revival of learning and education. The reorganization of nonasticism in those
centuries exhausted its effects within the monastic orders themselves. Monasticism
was made stronger in opposition to the social movements of the time rather than in
sympathy with them; its renewed vigor was due rather to lessening its points of
contact with the world than to increasing them. When next monasticism should make
an effort to bring itself into harmony with the intellectual progress of the Middle
Ages, it was to be through the medium of the mendicant orders (which were not
strictly monastic orders) of the thirteenth century; until that time, the control of the
monks over learning and education must have decreased.
It appears that before the intellectual revival of the eleventh century the
scholasticus was usually one of the monks or canons to whom the duty of instruction
was delegated by the abbot or chapter. When it became necessary to give instruction
to the increasing number of secular scholars and to provide instruction of a higher
grade and quality, the scholasticus or his assistants might be non-capitular persons.
Next he was found acting more in the capacity of a superintendent of the schools than
in that of an instructor in them; then he was frequently known as magister scholarum
— the master of the schools — and the practical work of instruction was left to
lecturers much less likely to be members of the chapter. As the distance widened
between the superintendent of the schools and the lecturers, the office of magister
scholarum disappeared and his place was taken by the chancellor as the
representative of the bishop, while the lecturers — masters — suffered less
superintendence, being licensed by the chancellor to lecture. Originally the schools
were part of the cathedral establishment, being held in buildings connected with or
near the cathedral; later they were held, under some restrictions, in buildings rented
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Moreover, the masters came to depend upon the fees of their pupils for their
maintenance and to depend less on the bishop, his chancellor or the cathedral chapter.
Far from sustaining an organic connection with the cathedral chapter, they wandered
from one school to another, as the conditions of prospective success or independence
attracted them. Masters might not lecture within the jurisdiction of the bishop,
however, without obtaining from his chancellor a licentia docendi and paying him
for its granting such fees as he should demand. The chancellor, moreover, might
exercise his discretion to refuse the license, or, if he granted it, might afterwards
summarily deprive the master of it; similarly he might prohibit a scholar from further
attendance on his master’s lectures though the scholar did not need his consent to
attend them in the beginning. But Pope Alexander III (and the third Lateran Council,
held in 1179) decreed that no fee should be charged for the licentia docendi by the
chancellor and that it should be freely granted on demand to any one qualified to
receive it. Almost all that was left to the chancellor by the middle of the twelfth
century was the authority to exercise his judgment on the qualifications of the
applicant for the license to teach. As he had no personal information on which to base
a consideration of the applicant’s qualifications, he quite unavoidably found it
necessary to resort for it to the masters under whom he had studied; it very easily
became customary for the chancellor to rely on the recommendation of the
applicant’s former masters.
Up to this point the masters and scholars had been acquiring distinctness as a class
— the first step in the social movement that usually results in corporate institutions;
there had been no appreciable development of organic interrelations between the
members of the class. The first step in that direction seemed to have been involved
in the admission to membership in the class. When the scholar had received his
license from the chancellor, — had become a licentiate — which it would hardly be
possible for him to do except on the recommendation of his master, he was not
considered by the other masters to be one of them until he had given under the
direction of his own master a public exhibition of his ability to serve in the position
to which he aspired. His old master then placed the magisterial biretta on his head,
bestowed upon him the emblematic ring and open book and received him as a master
with a kiss and a benediction; the new master was expected to provide for his
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licentiate upon his duties as a master — such the public exhibition was considered
to be — was his “inception,” principium (or “commencement”). Later it became
customary to permit some of the older and more advanced scholars to begin their
preparation for mastership a considerable time before their inception by lecturing to
a certain extent on prescribed subjects; they became known as “bachelors.” The terms
“master” and “doctor” had the same significance; they signified a scholar who had
become a qualified teacher of others, and accepted and recognized as such by his
fellow-teachers; the former term came to be restricted in use to the department of arts
and the latter to those of divinity, medicine and law. The insignificance of the
beginnings of the interrelations of the masters appears in the character of certain
statutes or customs reduced to writing about Halo. The masters had made rules, (a)
prescribing a uniform dress for the members of the body, (b) demanding a designated
order in lectures and disputations and (c) requiring the attendance of masters at the
funeral services of their dead colleagues. To secure the observance of the rules the
masters had taken an oath to withdraw their consortium from those who should fail
or refuse to observe them. One of the masters had suffered the prescribed penalty of
virtual expulsion, but his fellows had generously decided to accord him readmission;
in order to do so, how ever, they had to secure absolution from their oath by the Pope.
Pope Innocent III gave his sanction to the readmission of the expelled scholar, and
in so doing left the only extant evidence of the rules that had been violated.
The regulative power over masters and scholars, before they attained an
autonomous and independent position in the society of their time, was reposed, for
the most part, in the chancellor, as the representative of the bishop, and through him
of the Church. He had the power and authority of a judge. The masters and scholars
were viewed as “clerks,” and as such were amenable to the spiritual jurisdiction of
the ecclesiastical powers; the chancellor was of course the one with whom they came
into direct contact. Yet it was rather a privilege, because through their liability to the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction they escaped liability to the harsher and more exacting
jurisdiction of the secular courts. Though the chancellor had a prison, incarceration
in it was regarded not so much as a punishment in itself as a restraint preliminary to
the real punishment, the imposition of a penance or some other kind of spiritual
burden. In 1215, the Pope granted to the masters the authority to hold trials of their
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be permanent.
The corporations of the Middle Ages were formed more by external than by
internal forces. It was not so much the desire of members of a group to attain
autonomy and independence, as the desire of other social organizations to accord
them such qualities and at the same time to impose upon them corresponding
burdens, that so often resulted in their corporate organization. Thus it was long after
the beginning of the thirteenth century before the University of Paris had an official
head, and the first movement in that direction was involved in the power conferred
by the Pope on the body of masters in 1210 to elect a procuretor ad litem (proctor)
to represent them and make answer for them as a body in suits against them pending
before the Roman court.
The attitude of the king towards the body of masters and scholars and the nature of
their relations to the townsmen with whom they came in contact is revealed in an
event of the year 1200. It was one of the riotous conflicts between students and
townsmen so common in university cities and towns in Europe throughout the
Middle Ages. The disturbance began in a tavern. An assault on the servant of a
German student was followed by an attack on the tavern-keeper by the student and
a body of friends among his fellow-students. Thereupon the provost, followed by a
body of citizens, stoned the hostel in which the students lived and killed several
students, among whom was the German student himself. Upon the demand by the
students of redress from the king, coupled with an implied threat to migrate from
Paris in case their demand should not be granted, the king imposed severe
punishments on the provost and his fellow citizens that had participated with him in
the riot. Furthermore, he conceded to the scholars that such of them as should in
future be arrested by either royal or municipal officers should be surrendered at once
to the bishop or his representative for trial. It was further provided that the townsmen
should take an oath to respect and protect the privileges of scholars and even assume
to inform on their own initiative against citizens who should fail to likewise respect
them. The provost, as the representative of the body of townsmen, was to take a
similar oath before the assembled masters that he would not violate the privileges of
the scholars. Goods of scholars should not be levied on by secular officers and those
accused of assault on scholars should not be accorded the choice of trial by batter or
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individuals; they were treated as members of a class rather than as members of an
organized corporate body, except to the slight degree perhaps involved in the
appearance of the provost before the assembled masters.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century, then, the University of Paris had been
so developed from the cathedral school of Paris that its masters and scholars were
recognized by both Pope and King as a distinct class of persons in comparison with
the monks and canons of the Church and with the townsmen of Paris. Though the
codified rules and statutes under which their activity was regulated were not
numerous, they possessed a body of customs sanctioned in use by both Church and
State. Their body of powers had been acquired largely at the expense of the bishop
and his chancellor and of the cathedral chapter of Paris; as a consequence, their
relations to the chancellor, with whom they had closest contact, were rather of
opposition than of agreement. Their interrelations as well as their relation to
townsmen were still subject to the jurisdiction of the chancellor. They had
successfully asserted control over admission to their membership. They had not,
however, perfected a system of personal interrelations; they had hardly progressed
sufficiently in that direction to need a body of officers or system of government; their
relations with other members of society were on a personal basis. The conditions in
Paris are found almost exactly duplicated in Oxford where the authentic history of
the first English university begins. The parallel is so close that it lends a very strong
presumption to the interesting theory advanced by Mr. Rashdall that the University
of Oxford had its origin in a migration of English scholars from Paris about 1167. If
his theory must be rejected, the more objectionable theory must be substituted that
the University of Paris was intentionally duplicated at Oxford. Similarity of
conditions of growth even if conceded could hardly be made to account for so great
similarity of structure and activity.
IV — Universities from 1200 to 1310.
Early in the thirteenth century the University of Oxford, whatever its prior history
may have been, appears to have taken up the course of the development of learning
and education at the point to which the University of Paris had already carried it. In
a comparative study of European universities, it would doubtless be made plain that
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intimately connected at many points; important steps in either were likely to be
followed by sympathetic changes in each of the others;
339 to the extent that the
universities of Europe derived their powers from the papal chair and submitted to its
supervision, their development was likely to be along the same general lines;
moreover, there was an almost constant interchange of masters and scholars carrying
with them new ideas and new methods. Leaving out of view in the present study,
however, the participation of the University of Oxford in the general university
movement in Europe, it may best be considered, during the first period of its
development, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, according to the changing
relations accompanying its contact with its environment on its several sides, and then
according to the changes in the interrelations of the masters and scholars, though
space may be afforded for only the most important facts. The subject may be
conveniently treated under the following heads: (1) Relations to the Church; (2)
Relations to the State; (3) Relations to the Town; and (4) Internal Relations.
(1) Relations to the Church. — Much of the history of the University of Oxford
revolves about the office of the chancellor, because it was at once the medium of
connection with Church, State and town, and of the interrelations of the masters and
scholars. The conditions under which the chancellor acted in Oxford were so much
more favorable to the autonomy and independence of the University than they were
in Paris that the University of Oxford approached more nearly the type of the
mediaeval university after the middle of the thirteenth century than the University of
Paris. Oxford, unlike Paris, was not a cathedral city; it was in the extensive diocese
of the Bishop of Lincoln and remote from his see. The Bishop of Lincoln was far
from wielding as much influence among English bishops as the Bishop of Paris
among French bishops. There was no cathedral chapter at Oxford, as at Paris, jealous
of the expanding powers of the University. Moreover the see of Lincoln was vacant
for forty years before 1214, the period during which the University of Oxford was
finding its place as such among the universities of Europe. It is not entirely clear,
from the language of the Legative Ordinance of 1214, whether the office of
chancellor was occupied at that time, if indeed it had ever been occupied. At all
events, when he appeared a few years later, it was rather in the capacity of head of
the University than in that of representative of the bishop. The offices of chancellor
and rector, separate in Paris, the former as the representative of the bishop andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 176
guardian of his rights, and the latter as head and representative of the University,
were merged in Oxford, though the chancellor (as Grosstête) was sometimes also
called rector. His powers were at first quite identical with those of the chancellor of
the Bishop of Paris: he granted licenses to masters and deprived them of their
licenses and had power to deny the privileges of the masters’ lectures to scholars;
moreover, as an ecclesiastical judge, he had a limited jurisdiction over masters and
scholars (as clerks) which he enforced by penance and excommunication. But the
most important fact in the early history of Oxford is that the relations of the
chancellor to the bishop were so distant as to permit the future transferrence of the
basis of his power from the Church to the body of masters themselves. He always
appeared, not as the upholder of episcopal rights, but as the champion of the
University’s privileges. In 1257, when the dispute of the Bishop of Lincoln and the
University as to the rights of the latter was reviewed by the King on the question of
the authority to impose suspension from regency as a penalty for neglect to attend
Congregation, the chancellor, instead of having espoused the cause of the bishop, had
evidenced his identity with the University by sanctioning the decree of suspension,
while the bishop had been left to rely for the protection of his rights on a formal
objection in his behalf by the Archdeacon of Derby; the disclaimer by the University
of an intention to infringe on the rights of the Bishop of Lincoln or his church could
not have been entirely disingenuous.
The chancellor had originally been appointed by the Bishop of Lincoln. The first
departure from the rule was in basing the appointment on the recommendation of the
University. Step by step the point was reached where the bishop’s part in the
selection of a chancellor consisted in a confirmation of his election by the University.
In 1300 it had for some years been a subject of dispute whether the chancellor was
elected or merely nominated by the University; in that year the question was
conceived to be involved in the more technical question whether it was the duty of
the chancellor to call in person on the bishop to receive his confirmation of the
choice already made by the University; eventually the bishop issued the commission
to the newly chosen chancellor without insisting on the strict observance of the rights
that he claimed, but with the reservation which had become usual that it was done
degratia special). A half-century later, in Ado, the Bishop of Lincoln had delayed to
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Archbishop of Canterbury, interfered with an admonition that he proceed to issue the
commission at once; when the admonition had been unheeded, the archbishop
himself issued the commission. When the matter reached the Pope for review, he
recognized the right of the archbishop to issue a commission to a chancellor of the
University, but only in case of neglect on the part of the Bishop of Lincoln to issue
it. In 1368, the confirmation by the bishop had become a meaningless form and had
even not been sought in some cases; at that time the Pope decreed that in future it be
altogether dispensed with. The revolution was complete; the chancellor, at first the
representative of the bishop and appointed by him, had become the head of the
University and elected by it.
The Church was tenacious of its jurisdiction over masters and scholars, based on
the theory that they were clerks and having its origin in the times when it was true
that they were under its direct protection. Before the chancellorship had become
firmly settled, it was provided by the Legative Ordinance, in 1214, at the conclusion
of the trouble between King John and the Pope, that if the townsmen of Oxford
should arrest a scholar, they should at once surrender him “to the Bishop of Lincoln,
the archdeacon of the place, or his official, the chancellor, or to whomsoever the
Bishop of Lincoln should have appointed to this office.” Near the end of the century,
in 1280, when the contest between the Bishop of Lincoln and the University was at
its height, the latter claimed and by solemn oath in congregation undertook to
maintain against the former certain jurisdictional powers then exercised by the
chancellor and by them declared to have been exercised by him customarily “from
time out of mind”: (a) that a layman might be cited by a scholar before him, (b) that
the probate of scholars’ wills lay in him, (c) that he had the right of “inquisition” into
the moral conduct of scholars and (d) that masters might insist on pleading in his
court alone in matters relating to contracts entered into with the University. Though
the chancellor himself was not inclined to go as far as the masters in his claims of
jurisdiction, he would concede no more to the bishop than that he might exercise
jurisdiction on appeal or in case of the chancellor’s neglect or failure to exercise it.
Later, when the matter came up before a provincial convocation of bishops for
consideration, the archbishops and other bishops were found in opposition to the
Bishop of Lincoln; his claims were accordingly disregarded and the extreme position
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chancellor’s court to the organized body of masters themselves. The bishop yielded
with the usual formal reservation that his concession was “an act of pure and
voluntary grace.” If exemption from the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Lincoln was
broad, the exemption by a bull of Pope Boniface IX, in 1395 (though it was revoked
by John XXIII in 1411), of the University from that of all “archbishops, even legati
nati, bishops and ordinances” could hardly have been more comprehensive. The
chancellor’s court had originally or at least in 1214 been merely that of the bishop’s
officer; in 1280 his jurisdiction had become so independent that the bishop lost even
the right of entertaining pleas on appeal; little more than a century later, the only
ecclesiastical jurisdiction superior to the chancellor’s was that of the Pope himself.
While in 1214 the grant of jurisdiction had been to the bishop or to the chancellor as
his representative, such grants after 1300 were to the chancellor alone — and he had
then become the representative of the University.
A noticeable and important tendency in the history of the University of Oxford (and
one that will be the subject of further comment) was that of the Pope to grant
privileges: to the University, even against the episcopal and higher ecclesiastical
ranks. For an example, in 1254, when Alexander IV confirmed “the immunities,
liberties, and laudable, ancient and rational customs, and approved and honest
constitutions from Innocent IV,” he also granted to the masters and scholars of the
University exemption from summons by papal delegates to answer outside of Oxford
concerning contracts made within it.
340 In the same year, when the University was
involved with Henry of Lexington, Bishop of Lincoln, in the long dispute over their
conflicting rights, the Pope appointed the bishops of London and Salisbury
“conservators of the rights, liberties, and immunities of the university.” The
extraordinary exemption of the University from the jurisdiction of all ecclesiastical
powers but that of the Pope himself by Boniface IX in 1395 has already been alluded
to.
The withdrawal of the monks from the educational field in the tenth and eleventh
centuries has already been noted and an explanation of it has been sought in the great
change in the attitude of the monastic orders towards the rest of society. The general
purpose of St. Francis and St. Dominic was to make their orders a force in society,
while the ideal of St. Benedict and St. Bernard had been to make the monastic life
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not so much because the hardships involved were valuable in themselves as because
they enabled them more effectively to accomplish among other men the work they
had set themselves to do. The Mendicants were not wanting in an appreciation of the
weight of the new social factor of revived learning, as represented by the universities
of Europe, but they were justified in viewing it to some extent as a weapon in the
hands of rivals that might be serviceable in their own hands. Accordingly, within a
few years after their orders were founded, both the Dominicans and Franciscans
appeared at Oxford, the former in 1221, the latter in 1224. Likewise, later in the
century, the Carmelites appeared in 1256 and the Augustinians in 1268. The matters
of interest are of course the nature of their relations to the organized body of masters
and scholars and the effect of their contact. The universities were the embodiment of
the new social element of learning and education; the Mendicants were the
instruments through which the partially re-awakened Church sought to recover,
among other things, the power that it had earlier exercised in the field now covered
by the universities. What was to be the result of their coming in contact?
The Dominicans and Franciscans at first set up their schools within the city of
Oxford; but before many years they found that their relations to the University would
be more faithfully reflected in a location outside its walls; they accordingly retired
to the suburbs, whither they were followed by the later Mendicants. They assumed
an attitude of comparative independence, pretended to educate their scholars in their
own schools and according to their own methods and promised no allegiance to the
statutes of the University. In 1252 a statute was passed by the University that
inception as a doctor of theology be preceded by a period of lecturing as a bachelor
and by inception as a master of arts, unless the chancellor and regent-masters should
consent to dispense with the requirements. The statute was important not so much in
results due to its enforcement as in the assertions of right involved in it. The
inception as a doctor of theology be preceded by a period of lecturing as a bachelor
and by inception as a master of arts, unless the chancellor and regent-masters should
consent to dispense with the requirements. The statute was important not so much in
results due to its enforcement as n the assertions of right involved in it. The inception
as master of arts involved the taking of an oath of obedience to the statues of the
University that would not have to be assumed by the scholar who incepted in
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either because the statute was not enforced or because it was found easily complied
with by the Friars, there was no serious friction in the thirteenth century. It was
perhapts owing to the comparative weakness of the University itself during the first
century of its growth that contact with the Friars resulted in no harsh relations; the
University was occupied during the second half of the thirteenth century in its long
and at times bitter conflict with the Bishop of Lincoln, in achieving a degree of
independence of him that was necessary to its own existence; it will be seen later that
during the same time it was accumulating powers drawn from both king and town
and perfecting its internal government. The fourteenth century was the century of the
universities’ greatest independence while the first half of it was that of the
Mendicants’ greatest vigor; it was inevitable that the incompatible aims of
independence on the part of the Friars and of control on the part of the University
should result in a trial of strength.
Its victory of 1300 over the Bishop of Lincoln had hardly been won when the
University began to take measures to bring the Friars under its control. The
examinatory sermons of bachelors of theology had been delivered at the Friars’
convents until 1303, when it was ordered by statute of the University that henceforth
they be delivered in St. Mary’s, the University church. Seven years later the same
measure was taken with regard to the sermons preached by doctors of theology on the
eve of their inception, the theological vespers; those were also removed from the
convents to St. Mary’s. It was even required that the degree of bachelor of theology,
previously conferred in the Mendicants’ separate schools, be taken in the University.
Under the statute of 1252, graces dispensing with some of the requirements for
inception had been freely granted, but now all requirements were insisted on, and
perhaps with unnecessary strictures. Not only were no degrees to be conferred unless
the recipient should take an oath to render obedience to the statutes of the University,
but even Friars who were already masters or doctors were required to take the oath,
and one Dominican doctor was actually expelled for his refusal to take it. Further
stubbornness on the part of the Friars was punished by their excommunication by the
Archbishop of Canterbury — a punishment that entailed loss of revenue from
confessions, and defections of auditors from sermons and of scholars from the
schools. Their greater unpopularity, due to their unyielding attitude towards the
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But the conflict was not strictly between the Friars and the University. The four
faculties of the University were those of arts, medicine, law and theology. The
Mendicants aimed to fortify themselves by controlling the theological faculty and
maintaining it in independence of the other faculties, the conflict, then, on its organic
side was within the University. At the outset, in 1303, what might be called a
constitutional statute was passed that a statute should be valid in the whole
University if passed by the regents of only two faculties and a majority of the
non-regents. The statutes passed in 1310 removing the theological vespers to St.
Mary’s and requiring the degree of bachelor of theology to be taken in the University
lacked the concurrence of the theological faculty, but were nevertheless enforced.
The matters in controversy, including that of the granting of graces or dispensations
by the chancellor and regent-masters, were taken at once before the Pope. After
investigation and hearings in England by a body of four (two secular and two regular)
arbitrators, it was decided, as to graces, that every master should take oath not to
deny them to a Friar “out of malice, or hatred or rancor,” though he might do so “for
the common utility and honor of the university”; such a denial should be referred to
the chancellor, proctors, and regent-masters of theology, who upon hearing the
reasons assigned by the objecting master, might either sustain or overrule his
objection; the constitutional statute passed in 1303 was virtually sustained by a
decision that a valid statute might be passed by a majority of three of the faculties,
the non-regents being counted as one faculty, which majority, however, should
include the faculties of arts and non-regents; due notice to all voters was provided for
by the requirement of a preliminary promulgafion of each proposed statute in a
general congregation of regents, at which a copy of it should be served on a master
of each faculty, the voting to take plane fifteen days later. The decision was
sanctioned and enforced by both Pope and King in 1314. Though the conflict was
prolonged for a few years, it finally ended in 1320 in the surrender of the Friars to the
University. In 1358, the University easily enforced a statute forbidding the Friars to
accept as novices boys less than eighteen years of age. It was likewise provided by
statute that at no one time should more than one doctor in each Mendicant order have
a seat in convocation. By the bull of Boniface IX, in 1395, the Friars were not
exempted from the comprehensive jurisdiction of the chancellor, but were expressly
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The fourteenth century, as it has been suggested, was the century of the greatest
independence in the University of Oxford. In the second half of the century the
independence to which both King and Pope had contributed resulted in the rise and
growth of Wycliffism. The University formerly honored with the name of “the
second school of the Church,” became under the influence of Wycliffe and his
followers, as Archbishop Courtenay well described it, “the university of heresies.”
But it was soon restored to conformity with the Church, though not so much through
the efforts of the Church itself as through the intervention of a monarchy more
zealous for it than the papacy. The Catholic Church, moreover, had been largely
nationalized in England and had to look to the King for support. So thoroughly was
the University permeated by the spirit of Wycliffe that an order to condemn the
heresies of Lollardism met with no compliance in 1409. In 1411 they were
condemned by the Council of London. The subjection of the University was
accomplished and its future subservience assured through the restoration of the
episcopal power of visitation. Though at first, in 1411, the visitation of the
Archbishop of Canterbury was resisted, even when supported by a royal writ that
such power belonged to him, submission soon followed — even before Parliament,
in the same year, had confirmed the power of the Archbishop as visitor. The
submission was followed at once by the passage of a statute by the University that
disseminators of Lollardism should be punished by excommunication, that candidates
for degrees should abjure it and that heads of colleges and halls should exclude all
who promoted or were even suspected of promoting it. In 1414 the University was
so spiritless as to submit to visitation even by the Bishop of Lincoln, though the right
had been recognized by King and Parliament only in the Archbishop.
The suppression of Lollardism left the University of Oxford intellectually stagnant,
nor was its intellectual activity aroused until the Renaissance in the second half of the
fifteenth century introduced a new element. Wycliffe was the last of the scholastic
philosophers and the heretical movement that bears his name was the last effort to
reform Catholicism by the older method. Wycliffe is called the “morning star of the
Reformation”; he was more truly the”evening star of scholasticism.” But until the
Reformation in the sixteenth century, the University of Oxford remained passive
beneath the control of the Church; its constitutional structure had been perfected (as
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beginning of the following century the Church had simply posed upon it the visitorial
system that kept it within the bounds of orthodoxy. In the first stage of its
development, the Church had conceded its independence largely because was unable
to prevent it; in the second stage, the Church restrained it without destroying its
autonomy; in the third stage, the Church was to recognize its strength and use it as
an implement for the advancement of its own interests. But the third stage was to
begin with the Reformation; A forerunner of future conditions was the concession (in
1490) of power to the chancellor (with the faculty of theology) to license preachers
to serve in any diocese of England.
2. Though the powers of the University of Oxford had their source in the Church,
and though the masters and scholars were considered to be under its special
protection and jurisdiction, the field of learning and education was left to the Church
no more exclusively than any other, however strenuously the ecclesiastical claims
might be advanced. It is hardly necessary to suggest that there was no strictly drawn
line which Church or State refrained from crossing, from one side or the other.
Before the Reformation the most usual course pursued by the University in its
accumulation of powers was to secure their concision by both Pope and King,
whether the one conceded and the other sanctioned and confirmed or each conceded
separately, the one by papal bull and the other by royal charter. The extent of the
King’s interference in matters over which the Church had theoretically exclusive
control varied only with the conditions and circumstances of the time. After the
complete victory of Innocent III over John, it could hardly be expected that royal
approval would be sought for any measures decided on by the Church. During the
fourteenth century the Church was being “nationalized” to a certain extent and the
exercise of ecclesiastical authority was conditioned to an equally increasing extent
on royal assent. At the end of the fifteenth century the monarchy was found almost
outdoing the papacy in its zeal to bring the University back into harmony with the
orthodox teachings of the Church. The University itself was not likely to discriminate
nicely between matters to be laid before the King and those to be laid before the
Pope. If the removal of a chancellor or proctor seemed to promise relief from an
abuse that had caused complaint, the King did not hesitate to apply the remedy
summarily without regard to the offiecr’s relation to bishop or archbishop or Pope.
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to preserve them from imprisonment by royal order. Disputes relating to matters
within the control of the Church were constantly referred to the King and
peremptorily settled by him.
The King sustained exceptionally paternal relations to the University. With good
reason he regarded the famous seat of learning as an ornament to his realm.
Whenever the body of masters and scholars came into collision with any other class
or power, the complaints that they were usually only too ready to make were very
likely to find a willing listener in the King. Scholars on the way to and from Oxford
were accorded special protection from violence. When the Jews of Oxford became
extortionate in their demands of usurious interest, a royal writ was speedily issued
to set a reasonable maximum rate. When a migration of dissatisfied masters and
scholars from Paris took place, a cordial invitation to attach themselves to the
English universities was extended to them. When there had been secessions of
considerable numbers of students from Oxford in 1260 and 1263, and they had
migrated to Northampton and there founded a new university, the King saw fit soon
afterwards to abolish the new university by royal writ and order the seceding scholars
to resume their place in Oxford. In the frequent ruptures with Oxford townsmen, the
clerks were always able to get more than justice at royal hands. If the Bishop of
Lincoln was striving to regain his diminishing authority over the University, he could
count on no assistance from the King. When the Mendicants sought to maintain their
schools in independence at the side of the University, or to intrench themselves in the
control of its theological faculty, the royal sanction was cheerfully given to an award
making them subject to statutes of the University that could be passed against their
will. 
As might be expected from the extent of the field over which the Church exercised
control of the affairs of the University, and within which, consequently, the King was
not so likely to exercise his full authority, the principal matters in which he interfered
were those involved in the relations of masters and scholars to townsmen and to the
royal courts. There was a multitude of particular disputes between the University and
the city of Oxford in which he intervened without establishing a system of organic
relations between the two bodies. The University frequently made complaints of the
unsanitary condition of the narrow,dnd filthy streets and alleys of the city — due in
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dwellings — and of the faulty conduction of the pavements or of the foulness of
water used by townsmen in making bread and beer; such complaints invariably
elicited royal orders for the summary amendment of the conditions complained of the
royal prodigality in conferring on the University substantial municipal powers, at the
expense of the city corporation, until it became itself virtually a municipality, will
appear when the organic relations of the University and city of Oxford are
considered. 
If the description of medieval university life that historians have constructed from
the scattered sources are faithful, the mediaeval scholar must have come into close
and frequent contact with courts of justice. As early as 1214 the right of the
chancellor to assume jurisdiction of a case in which a scholar was a defendant had
been granted by a Legative Ordinance. In 1275 jurisdiction was conferred by royal
writ on the chancellor over all personal actions in which a scholar should be a party,
whether defendant or plaintiff. In 1288 the chancellor’s jurisdiction was extended
beyond the walls of the city so as to include the students’ playground, Beaumont
Fields. In 1290, of all cases in which either party should be a scholar, only such as
involved a charge of mayhem or homicide were left outside his jurisdiction. The
King’s bailiff was punished for having held the chancellor’s authority in too slight
esteem and was for the future subjected to his orders, though he might, if aggrieved,
make complaint to the King. In 1405 the apex of judicial  authority seems to have
been attained when Henry IV granted to the University the authority to demand and
assume jurisdiction over privileged persons (masters and scholars and their
defendants, and the officers and employees of the University) charged with felony;
they were to be tried by a jury composed in equal parts of privileged persons and
townsmen, before a steward, who should be appointed by the chancellor but
approved by the Lord High Chancellor.
There was no end of factional troubles among masters and scholars, ranging from
mere personal disputes to conflicts between faculties over their relative authority.
Unless the Pope Archbishop should intervene, — which was less probable after the
end of the thirteenth century, — the royal court was the only forum in which such
troubles could be adjusted. The right to expel a master, or to adopt a particular mode
of procedure, was very likely to be drawn by the defeated party before the King for
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expulsion of the Irish from the University because of their insubordination; the act
is said to have been enforced three years later.
Down to the end of the fourteenth century the general policy of the Crown and
Parliament was to concede liberally to the University such authority as an
independent exercise of its powers seemed to demand. It was viewed as an object in
itself; though the King might take pride in the increase of learning and the growth of
a learned class, the universities were not considered to be a necessary element in the
life of the English people and in the operations of the King’s government. A change
in the view was first caused indirectly through the Church. During the second half of
the fourteenth century the Catholic Church in England was undergoing the process
of nationalization that was to result in the sixteenth century in a separate national
Church; the Crown was gradually assuming the control over the Church that had been
exercised by the papacy. When the independence of the University of Oxford found
expression in heretical Lollardy at the end of the fourteenth century, the King was
even more ready than the bishops to restore it to orthodoxy. The distinction between
relations to Church and relations to King becomes more difficult to maintain; the two
sets of relations become to a large extent identical. When the restoration of the
visitorial power of the Church over the University became necessary to undo the
work of heresy and prevent its recurrence in the future, the archbishop fortified
himself with a royal order and later with a parliamentary statute in confirmation of
the right asserted by him. The time had arrived when the developed monarchy would
primarily use the Church to strengthen its own position and would secondarily
prevent the universities from asserting their independence against the Church. The
independence earlier conceded to the universities had sufficed to show what strength
they might exert; now such strength was not to be permitted by the Crown to detract
from that of the Church.
The change appears plainly in the later development of the chancellorship. During
the thirteenth century, when the form of the University of Oxford was being gradually
evolved, the chancellor’s term of office was two years. The accumulation of powers
(especially judicial and administrative powers) by the University had been largely in
the person of the chancellor; the University’s control of him and its enjoyment of the
powers wielded by him had been maintained by the body of masters and scholars
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to obstruct him in the performance of the activity of his office. When the constitution
of the University had become well settled at the beginning of the fourteenth century,
and the separation  of the chancellor’s office from the Church had become fully
accomplished, re-electionsof the chancellor, which formerly had not been frequent,
began to be more usual. During the fifteenth century the tenure of the office, became
permanent and its occupants, instead of residing in Oxford, were non-residents. The
chancellor resided at court and his active duties in Oxford were performed by a
vice-chancellor, whose appointment by the chancellor was perfunctorily confirmed
by convocation. Instead of being the medium through which the ‘autonomy and
independence of the University was exercised, the chancellor had become the
instrument tough which its dependence on the Crown was assured. Between the
revival of the right of visitation in the Church and the control of the chancellorship
by th:Crown, it was possible to make the University completely subservient to an
autocratic monarchy and a narrow prelacy, while it was left out of harmony with the
mass of the people. But it must be said that the attitude towards the University was
rather negative than positive; the aim was rather to restrain it from exercising
dangerous autonomy than to use it as a positive instrument in furthering the aims of
Church or State; the change to the latter attitude followed the Reformation in the
sixteenth century and belongs to the second period of the history of universities in
England.
3. Relations to the Town. — The relations of the canons of cathedral chapters and
monks to the citizens of media-val towns had not always been harmonious. Any
privileged class within the town walls, whether protected by King, noble, bishop or
abbot, had usually to defend their privileges with vigor if they were not to fall before
the strong corporate spirit of the town. As a general rule, the towns succeeded before
the end of the Middle Ages in bringing the privileged classes within them into
substantial conformity with their own population. In the case of the universities,
however, the town was destined to defeat in its struggle with the privileged class of
masters and scholars.
In 1209 occurred in Oxford one of those riots between townsmen and scholars that
were so important because they frequently entailed a readjustment of the organic
relations between town and university at the hands of the higher authorities of State
and Church. When it became known that some scholars had killed a woman, theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 188
mayor and burgesses made an attack upon their hostel for the purpose of arresting
them. They seized some of the occupants of the hostel and later executed two or three
of them; the ones (so it is said) who had been instrumental in causing the death of the
woman, having sought safety in flight, were not apprehended. The strongest weapon
of the mediaeval university before 1400 in its contests with townsmen was its power
to remove from one place to another with slight inconvenience to either masters or
scholars. The University as a body owned almost no property. There was no large
fixed library and the University owned no buildings; the few books in use belonged
to the masters, who read them to their scholars, while the houses used for schools or
hostels were rented from townsmen or other owners. The towns usually depended
largely on the bodies of masters and scholars for their prosperity; few measures that
the University could take would injure the town more than to simply leave it. A
modified form of the same punishment was a cessation of lectures, the power to
declare which the Pope at one time granted to the University of Paris for its own
protection. Contrasted with the Benedictine monk, who had been required to take an
oath of stabilitas loci, the mediaeval scholar found protection for his liberty in
instabilitas loci. When the disturbance took place in Oxford in 1209 it resulted in a
suspendium cleracorum; most of the masters and scholars dispersed in several
directions, some of them collecting in Cambridge and there founding the University
of Cambridge. Matthew Paris is authority for the statement that the scholars dispersed
amounted in number to three thousand. King John was already embroiled in his
dispute with Innocent III, and no heed was given to the trouble between the town and
University of Oxford until the submission of John in 1213. In the following year the
Pope’s legate issued his Legative Ordinance for the settlement of the present and the
avoidance of future difficulty in Oxford. In reparation of their unjust treatment of the
scholars, the townsmen were to march in procession, without shoes or coats, to the
graves in which they had buried executed scholars and thence remove them to the
cemetery — an act very material to the welfare of Souls of the dead. Each year
forever afterwards the town should make a payment of forty-two shillings for
distribution among poor scholars, and on St. Nicholas’s Day each year they should
provide a feast of bread, beer, pottage and meat for one hundred poor scholars to be
selected by the Abbot of Oseney and the Prior of St. Frideswide’s with the assistance
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If the townsmen should in future arrest a clerk, they should surrender him to the
Bishop of Lincoln or his representative (archdeacon or chancellor) for trial. Victuals
should be sold by townsmen to scholars at reasonable prices. For twenty years the
rent of hostels and schools should be what it had been before the dispersion of the
scholars, except that one half the rent for the first ten years should be remitted; after
the expiration of the twenty years, the rent should be taxed by four burgesses and four
scholars jointly. Observance of the provisions was assured by requiring an oath to be
taken annually by fifty (or as many as the bishop should demand) substantial
burgesses. Masters who had continued to lecture after the secession of the other
masters and most of the scholars, were punished by suspension for three years from
the exercise of the privilege of lecturing.
The chancellor had no prison in which to confine clerks awaiting trial or sentence
in his tribunal. In 1231 the mayor and bailiffs of Oxford were required by order of the
King to permit the chancellor to use for his purposes the prison belonging to the
town. A little later the constable of the royal castle of Oxford was likewise required
by another royal order to permit the chancellor to make use of the castle prison in
addition to that of the town. Furthermore, both the royal and municipal peace officers
were placed at the disposal of the chancellor in the administration of his court; the
sheriff as well as the mayor and bailiffs was required to afford him assistance in
putting his orders and decrees into effect.
In 1244 another constitution-making riot took place. There had been considerable
friction between the scholars and the body of money-lending Jews that had settled in
Oxford. The medieval student appears to have been generally impecunious. A vicious
raid was made by a mob of scholars on the Jewry which was stayed only when fifty
of the raiders had been thrown into prison. Yet when the matter was referred, in the
usual course of such matters, to the King, he assumed the attitude characteristic of
him when either scholars or Jews were involved. In a charter he conceded that
henceforth the Jews should receive no more than twopence in the pound per week for
interest on loans made to scholars. To insure justice — to the scholars — future
disagreements between them and the Jews with relation to the payment of loans and
interest were to be brought before the chancellor for his adjudication. The occasion
afforded the King an excuse for conceding also that the chancellor assume and
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personal property, in which a clerk should be a party. Four years later a second
charter authorized the chancellor and proctors to be present at and assist in the assize
of bread and beer held by the mayor and bailiffs of Oxford; the mayor and bailiffs
were also required on entering upon their term of office to take oath that they would
respect the liberties and customs of the University. In 1255 an additional assurance
of the rights of scholars was provided in the requirement that a layman who should
make an assault on a clerk should be imprisoned in the tower of the castle until he
should make such satisfaction to the clerk as should meet with the approval of the
chancellor. Edward I confirmed a custom that houses in Oxford once rented by
masters or scholars for schools or halls could not be let to laymen as long as clerks
should stand ready to take them; he also confirmed the older custom of the taxation
of halls by a joint board of burgesses and representatives (called taxers) of the
scholars, which had been approved by the Legatine Ordinance of 1214. In 1275
scholars were exempted by royal writ from view of frank pledge, aids, talliages,
watches and other similar burdens to which townsmen were subject. The chancellor
was given power, to a certain extent, to regulate the peace and quiet of the town by
restraint of vicious classes, as by the imprisonment of prostitutes. In 1288, as already
suggested, the jurisdiction of the chancellor was enlarged so as to include Beaumont
Fields, the playground of scholars without the walls of the city. Two years later cases
of mayhem and homicide were made the only ones beyond the jurisdiction of the
chancellor, if only either party should be a clerk. Two years later the jurisdiction was
made to cover all civil actions that should arise in Oxford and all criminal actions
(excepting only cases of mayhem and homicide) if a clerk should be a party in either
class of actions; and all the servants of clerks, as well as bedels, parchmentmakers,
illuminators, copyists, barbers and all others “of the clothing of the clerks,” were to
enjoy the clerical exemptions, except that they should be subjected to the burdens of
taxation borne by townsmen if they should embark in business. The chancellor was
given authority to survey and condemn unsound food in the town market. 
In the middle of the fourteenth century — more exactly, in 1354 — the most
sanguinary fight between University and town in their history took place, — and was
followed, as usually, by the royal concession of additional privileges to the chancellor
and University and of scant justice to the offending townsmen. Both parties
surrendered all their charters absolutely into the hands of the king. By way of partialJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 191
reparation of damage done, the town was required to pay to the University the sum
of £250 as satisfaction for all damage except such as arose from mayhem and
homicide; all goods of scholars seized by the townsmen were to be returned. An
interdict imposed on the town was raised on the consideration that annually in future
the mayor and bailiffs at the head of sixty burgesses should appear in the church of
the University (St. Mary’s) and there celebrate mass for the repose of the souls of
clerks who had been killed in the riot; each of them, in addition to their defraying the
expense of the mass, should make an offering of one penny, of which poor scholars
should receive forty pence and the curate of the church the residue. As part of the
readjustment the king conceded to the chancellor the authority to impose punishment
for bearing arms or disturbing the peace, whether by scholars or townsmen; the
assessment and taxation of scholars and others likewise privileged; the assize of
bread, wine and ale; the assize of weights and measures (conducted by a clerk of the
market); the punishment of regrating and forestalling, and the survey and “correction
of victuals”; and control of the cleansing and paving of the streets. The limit of
jurisdiction, previously set at the crimes of mayhem and homicide, was removed in
1405, when Henry IV granted to the chancellor the power of withdrawing from the
regular courts the cases of privileged persons charged with felony; but they were to
be tried not by him in person, but by a steward appointed by him subject to the
approval of the Lord High Chancellor, before a jury composed in equal parts of
townsmen and privileged persons. Another remarkable function later exercised by the
University was that of conducting inquisitions into the delinquencies of the
townsmen; there was nothing startling in the claim advanced by the University in
1280 that the chancellor should have the power to inquire into and correct the
delinquencies of scholars, but it is no uncertain evidence of the humility of the
townsmen that they permitted their town to be divided into districts, each to be
assigned to a doctor of theology and two masters of arts for the collection of
evidence, and their fellow-townsmen to be brought before the chancellor for
excommunication or the imposition of penance. Tournaments and jousts were also
forbidden in Oxford or its vicinity, and the chancellor might exercise a censorship
over or even forbid theatrical performances.
So effectually had the University of Oxford withdrawn one power after another
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nearly every department of their municipal life that the latest writer on mediaeval
universities is fully justified in declaring. “By the middle of the fifteenth century the
Town had been crushed, and was almost entirely subjugated to the authority of the
University. The burghers lived henceforth in their own town almost as the helots or
subjects of a conquering people.”
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4. Internal Relations. — A corporation is distinguished from a mere class or order
chiefly by the internal system of relations between its component members. A group
of persons that may be called a corporation must have such governmental machinery
that its group unity may be assured, its character as a group perpetuated, and the
objects of its existence accomplished. The body of masters and students in Paris at
the beginning of the thirteenth century were hardly more than a mere class. A
beginning in the direction of self-control had been made in the assumption by the
masters of the control of admission to their status. Before that step had been taken the
body of masters and scholars had been merely a class of persons without a code of
exceptional rights in society save such as were due to their connection with the
Church, without control of their own membership and without an organization
through which to independently accomplish their purposes. Even the Legatine
Ordinance of 1214, by which the masters and scholars of the University of Oxford
were accorded substantial privileges, was not addressed to them, but “to the burghers,
bishop and all the faithful in Christ.” The chancellor had been the agent through
whom the Church directed and regulated the activity of the group. In Oxford the
relations of the Church to the University were so loose, owing to the want of a close
connection between the Bishop of Lincoln and the chancellor or whatever resident
representative occupied his place in Oxford, that the chancellor by degrees became
the head of the University, elected by it and maintaining its immunities and privileges
even against the bishop himself; the act of confirming the choice of the University
had become an empty form and had been dispensed with by the end of the thirteenth
century. 
The earliest division of the body of masters and scholars was into nations. The
origin of the division, found in all medieval universities, is involved in obscurity. It
is not difficult to imagine that in Paris scholars of the same nationality may have
associated in their social life by living in the same hostels or in the same
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governed in their relations to one another by the laws and customs of their own
country, but the facts that there were four nations in Paris and that some. Of the
nations were composed of scholars of divers nationalities seem to indicate that what
may have originally been a spontaneous grouping on the basis of nationality was soon
taken advantage of for other purposes. The medieval student was likely to be a
turbulent person and his turbulence was not likely to be mitigated by his
surroundings; nor was there a very wide social gulf between the scholar and his
master. It was a quite universal principle in the Middle Ages that the preservation of
the peace should be accomplished by binding groups, on whatever basis formed, by
mutual oaths and by requiring them to elect a representative to act as their foreman,
stand responsible for their keeping their oaths and aid in their enforcement either by
punishing violations or reporting them to higher powers. It was a refinement of the
essential principle of feudalism. As in that of Paris, so in most other medieval
universities, there were four nations. Early in the thirteenth century, at least as early
as 1228, four nations existed in the University of Oxford, each with its elected head.
In the course of a few years, certainly before the middle of the century, the four had
been reduced to two nations, those from the north of the Trent being known as
Northerners, and those from the south of the river as Southerners; the Scotch were
included in the former, the Irish and Welsh in the latter. If members of different
nations fell into a quarrel, they could rely for assistance on the nations to which they
belonged. Settlements of such quarrels as well as of others involving the nations
more generally were frequently made by representatives of the nations, the settlement
being ratified at a meeting of the nations including masters and scholars. Such
settlements were sometimes very formal in character, articles of peace being drawn;
each student then was required to take an oath that he would observe them, the
elected leaders being also bound by oath to have them enforced and report violations
of them. That the organization by nations extended a little beyond the keeping of the
peace is indicated by the provision of a charter of Henry III granted in 1248, by which
the two proctors (elected representatives of the nations) were permitted to participate
with the chancellor in the assize of bread and beer held by the mayor and bailiffs of
Oxford. But though in other medieval universities, and especially in that of Bologna,
the organization by nations came to be the predominant organization, in Oxford it
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however, continued to be chosen from north and south and to perform certain duties
as executive officers, such as to summon and preside at congregations, and to
demand oaths to preserve the peace, but they were properly considered not as chiefs
of separate divisions, but as officers of the whole body.
It must not be assumed that all the university life revolved about the centre of the
organization of nations. In general, during the whole thirteenth century the centre of
activity at Oxford was in the process of determination. The Church, through the
Bishop of Lincoln, had contained the original centre; the body of masters succeeded
in establishing a competitive centre; the wider body of masters and scholars, as
organized in nations, possessed a centre for some purposes. The transferrence of
authority from the Church to the masters through their gradual assumption of control
of the chancellor has already been described. The body in which the corporate powers
rested at the end of the century was the body of masters. The control of admission to
their own body was obtained by the University of Paris before the history of the
University of Oxford probably began. Control of the activity of masters by their
associates was constantly strengthened. By the Legatine Ordinance of 1214, masters
that had continued to lecture in Oxford after the suspendium clericorum, probably
decreed by the masters as a body, were punished by three years’ suspension from the
privileges of lecturing. The status of a scholar came to be recognized as dependent
upon the masters; in All the expulsion from Oxford by the sheriff of all scholars not
studying under a regular master was ordered by the king. The control of the
chancellor’s office was in the possession of the masters that elected him. In the
middle of the thirteenth century university statutes were passed “by authority of the
chancellor and masters regent, with the unanimous consent of the non-regents.”
Where the pressure upon the masters to preserve their unity did not come from
without, the most effective instrument used by the body of masters to accomplish that
end within itself was the “withdrawal of the fellowship of masters,” the penalty
suffered (in the middle of the thirteenth century) by those who on their inception
refused to take the  oath to keep the peace and obey the statutes of the University.
The original significance of becoming a master has been considered. Very early it
became true that not all who acquired the right to lecture implied in the mastership
cared to avail themselves of its exercise, though it had been granted originally on the
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mastership was readily viewed as an evidence of the scholar’s completion of his
work, — rather as the end of his studying than the “commencement” of his lecturing.
The degree became largely a certificate of merit and was granted as such by a
dispensation (or “grace”) on the part of the masters, relieving the inceptor from the
obligation of subsequent lecturing and other conditions relating to the practical
significance of the degree; possibly the masters were very willing to confer
exemptions that would keep their number small at a time when their whole
remuneration consisted of fees paid by scholars. Those masters who actually lectured
were called regent masters or regents; those who did not lecture were called
non-regent masters or non-regents. The lecturers were divided into the four faculties
of arts, medicine, law
342 and theology. The separate faculties, however, never attained
a great degree of independence of each other; though each had charge of matters
relating particularly to its own work, it was always liable to be overruled by the other
faculties. The only departure from the principle that the whole body of masters was
the true unit of university life was in the attainment by the faculty of arts of a position
of predominance over the other faculties in some respects; the initiation of statutes
was under its control, though it never succeeded in establishing the power to veto
statutes after their passage; in 1252 a statute was passed that “no one should be
admitted to the license in theology who had not previously been a regent in arts”;
moreover, through the control of the body of non-regents by the artists, the faculty
of arts had an ally that virtually doubled its weight in the deliberations of the
university body.
At the end of the thirteenth century, when the constitution of the University had
become substantially settled, the system of government was as follows: (1) When the
regent masters of arts met in a body for the purpose of transacting matters relating to
their department, they were known as the Congregation of Regents in Arts, or more
familiarly, the Black Congregation. They elected the two proctors, of whom the
senior presided over their body when in session, though both were executive officers
of the whole University. One of the most important of their duties was the celebration
of inceptions in arts. Constitutionally more important, they had the authority to
entertain a preliminary discussion of proposed statutes intended to bind the whole
University; when assembled for that particular purpose, they were called the Previous
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faculties, called the Lesser Congregation. It was virtually the legislature of the
University. Matters of business, in the narrower sense, came before it, such as the
management and disposition of its property and the details of income and
expenditure. It elected the chancellor. Technical educational matters relating to the
work of lecturers and scholars and the conferring of degrees were considered.
Theoretically the chancellor himself conferred the degrees  — the original licentiae
docundi, — but the Lesser Congregation had the power to dispense by “graces” with
some of the conditions earlier imposed, unless the dispensation were reserved by
statute for the consideration of the Full Congregation. It was very easy to confuse the
dispensation and the implied recommendation with the conferring of the degree,
especially when the granting of the grace became a quite universal preliminary; the
power of actually conferring the degree was accordingly lodged in this body later. (3)
The third body was the congregation of all regents and non-regents, and was called
the Great Congregation or Full Congregation. If the Lesser Congregation was the
ordinary legislature of the University the Great Congregation might be regarded in
some respects rather as a constitutional body. It alone had the power to pass a
“permanent statute.” It also acted on some matters specially reserved for it. The
separate faculties voted in separate places as units. The nonregents also voted as a
separate unit and as such were called one of the faculties.
In the administration of his court the chancellor brought his powers to bear on
clerks in their contact not only with townsmen and the wider body of the king’s
subjects but also with one another; in the latter class of relations his jurisdiction had
increased largely at the expense of the Church, and consequently suffered less from
the supervision or interference of the king or his courts. In 1280, when the University
succeeded in defending the jurisdiction of the chancellor against the Bishop of
Lincoln, and even secured from a provincial convocation of bishops a denial of the
right to even exercise an appellate jurisdiction in the classes of cases in question, a
judicial action of the chancellor was treated much as one of his administrative acts
would be treated. An appeal lay from his decision to a Congregation of regents and
then to a Great Congregation of regents and non-regents. Controversies of small
importance, however, were heard by the Hebdomadarius, a bachelor of law appointed
by the chancellor each week, as indicated by his official name; they might then be
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to act in his place; they might then be carried higher by appeal like other
controversies. As a matter of practice, cases when appealed to the congregations were
not heard bythem directly and in full session, but by boards of delegates of each
faculty selected for the purpose. It may be said, then, that in the regulation of the
relations of masters and scholars to one another or to the University, a system of
specially designed courts had developed in the Hebdomadarius, the chancellor or his
representative, and the boards of appeal of the congregations.
V — The Colleges in the Universities.
The movement that resulted in the gradual dissolution of the University of Oxford
into its colleges must be approached from two directions, from within the University
and from without it; it was the composite effect of the internal tendency to
community of living and the external application to university life of external forms
of ecclesiastical organization. In the early part of the thirteenth century the scholars
of Oxford lived in the houses of townsmen or in small groups in hostels or halls. The
lectures to which they listened were delivered in schools rented by the masters and
doctors. The domestic life of the hostels or halls and the activity of the schools were
quite distinct. Under the circumstances, little control over the personal conduct of
scholars could be exercised by the University. The scholars of mediaeval universities
were turbulent in the extreme. If the spirit that dominated mediaeval institutions were
to manifest itself, the scholars would be expected to find spontaneously an
organization in smaller groups, and then be held accountable for their behavior
through an elective head by the University. The individual scholar, living by himself,
and pretending to keep the peace through his individual efforts, would be out of
harmony with medieval institutions. If the statements of historians may be credited,
the “chamber-dekyns,” the scholars that lived in lodgings with the townsmen, were
the most troublesome and unruly members of the University. In tavern brawls, “town
and gown” riots and contests between university nations they were always prominent
actors. Moreover, many who came to Oxford, not to study, but to enjoy the
attractions that a university town presented even in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, assumed the name of scholar merely as a cloak for their excesses;  such
persons adopted the life in lodgings of the “chamber-dekyns” and increased the
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Oxford is evidenced by the royal order as early as 1231 that all scholars be expelled
by the sheriff from Oxford except such as were studying under a regular master. In
1432 it was enacted that all scholars should reside in colleges or halls, on pain of
imprisonment, and that no townsmen should accept scholars as lodgers unless he had
the special license of the chancellor so to do.
There is good reason to believe that the several hostels or halls were occupied by
scholars having common sympathies due to their having come from the same county,
region or nation. In the continental universities the hostels were very frequently
occupied by fellow-countrymen. Meagre as are the details of early life in them, they
are sufficient to indicate a considerable degree of organization. The residents of the
hall elected a principal, probably annually, and possessed bodies of rules to which the
scholars had to conform. An officer called the “impostor,” elected or appointed each
week, acted as a dean in the enforcement of the rules, punished infractions of them
by the imposition of fines and made a report to the principal at the end of the week.
Moreover, disputations came to be regularly held in the halls, thus supplementing the
work of the masters. It is very likely that the principal supervised such work to some
extent, for it was finally required that he should be a graduate. The University
gradually asserted its authority over the halls. In 1411 self-government was to some
extent assured by a university statute that no principal of a hall should be permitted
to receive into his hall scholars expelled from others for breaches of their statutes. An
arbitrary requirement of qualifications in principles was involved in the refusal of the
chancellor to sanction the leasing of halls to certain principals and in his later
assumption of the right to expel them if exceptionable in character. In the code of
statutes passed in 1432, some of which must have been merely in confirmation of
existing customs or rules, it was required that scholars reside in the halls of principals
“lawfully approved and admitted by the Chancellor and Regents.” At about the same
time statutes for the regulation of the halls were enacted by the chancellor “with the
advice and consent of the Congregation of Masters and of the Principals of Halls.”
The University assumed the right to veto statutes enacted by the halls, and even
enacted statutes for them without their participation or consent. The principal, too,
was, in 1432, required to be a graduate. By the end of the fifteenth century the
University had established complete control over the halls.
The period, covering about sixty years of the fifteenth century, between theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 199
suppression of Lollardism and the Renaissance was one of stagnation in Oxford. In
1438 it was complained that the halls were deserted, and that the number of scholars
had dwindled from several thousands to one thousand; in Into only twenty of the
former two hundred schools are said to have remained in use. The loss of members
and decrease of activity were almost entirely at the expense of the unendowed halls.
When the reaction came at the end of the century it had its effect not in the revival
of the halls, but in the enlargement of the colleges. Moreover, during two centuries
the halls had largely come under the control of the colleges. By the end of the first
period of university history the system of halls was a thing of the past; the few that
remained were merely appendages of the colleges.
After the Mendicants set up their establishments in Oxford in the thirteenth century
many scholars made their home in them and studied in their schools. In most respects
they offered advantages superior to those of the halls. They were better regulated and
better managed. The discipline to which their inmates, both friars or novices and
secular scholars, had to submit commended them to parents and guardians of younger
scholars. The students did not indulge in riots, and the social life of the houses was
quieter and more favorable to study. They possessed libraries, if their meagre
collections of manuscripts deserved the name. Finally, the religious instruction and
exercises that seem to have been wholly wanting to the halls, were not overlooked
in the houses of the Mendicants. The older Benedictine monasteries followed the
example set by the Mendicants and also set up their halls and colleges in Oxford. In
1289, at a chapter-general of Benedictines held at Abingdon, a tax of two pence per
mark on their revenue was imposed on all their monasteries in the province of
Canterbury to provide for the foundation and support of a studium for Benedictine
monks at Oxford. In such institutions the monks from the several monasteries appear
to have occupied separate parts of the hall under whose roof they formed a common
domicile. Likewise some of the larger monasteries, as that of St. Peter at Gloucester,
established separate studia at Oxford, though they frequently admitted monks of other
monasteries and even secular scholars. The organization of the Benedictine and
Mendicant studia was merely that of the monasteries themselves; they were presided
over by a prior, elected by the chapter-general for studia open to all monasteries, and
appointed by the abbot for such as were intended exclusively for the monks of a
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chief importance in the development of the college system lies not so much in their
direct imitation by founders of colleges as in the stimulus they gave to such founders
to introduce the institutions of the Church into the field of education.
It is universally agreed by historians that many of the Oxford scholars were drawn
from the lower and poorer classes of society. The frequency with which the “poor
scholar” is mentioned in the sources of university history is a sound basis for the
statement. The plane of life of university scholars was mean in the extreme. Actuated
by love of learning and the philanthropic purpose of aiding poor scholars, the desire
to promote the interests of the Church or the more personal desire to better the
superstitious philanthropist’s status in the future life, certain medieval philanthropists
set apart property by gift or will for the support of poor scholars. Thus William of
Durham, in 1249, left to the University by will the sum of three hundred and ten
marks for the support at Oxford of ten scholars, natives of the county of Durham, and
John Balliol made a similar benefaction for poor scholars about fifteen years later;
no system of organic relations between the beneficiaries was established in either
case; they appear to have not even lived together at first. A few years afterwards
Dervorguilla, wife of John Balliol, increased his benefaction so that it would provide
each of sixteen scholars with an annual stipend of twenty-seven marks, and collected
the beneficiaries in one house; in 1282 she provided a set of statutes by which they
should govern themselves; in 1292 the University took a similar step with the
beneficiaries of William of Durham, bringing them together in the “Great Hall of the
University.” Walter de Merton had given similar assistance to poor scholars at
Oxford. In 1264 he had founded a “House of the Scholars of Merton” at Maiden, in
Surrey, and had placed it, together with the estates intended for the support of the
scholars, in charge of a warden and bailiffs; two or three priests or chaplains were
attached to the establishment; the scholars, twenty in number, were to live together
in a hall or house at Oxford, or wherever else there should be more suitable
university schools. In 1274 the establishment in Surrey was united by Walter de
Merton with the body of scholars in the hall at Oxford under a comprehensive code
of statutes, which are considered to have served as a model for not only University
and Balliol Colleges, but for most of the later foundations in both Oxford and
Cambridge. Such was the origin of the three earliest Oxford colleges, exhibiting all
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individual beneficiaries of William of Durham, Balliol or Walter de Merton did not
differ at first from other scholars. When they were brought together in a common
house they constituted a hall. When their self-governing interrelations and their
relations to the property whose income they enjoyed and to the Church whose
interests they promoted were given stability and permanence by a body of statutes,
they constituted a normal Oxford college. Though each college had its peculiarities
of organization, they had greater similarity than is usually supposed. After
considering their general features, an examination of their relations to the University
and Church and to each other will be of advantage.
The founders of colleges were those who provided by gift or will the endowments
for their support and eomposed the bodies of statutes by which they should be
governed. A few were founded by the king or queen and a few by wealthy private
persons, but the majority by bishops and others who held high office in Church or
State.
343 In order, particularly, that the statute against alienating lands in mortmain
might not be violated, and, more generally, that the royal favor might not be wanting,
the consent of the king was first obtained; in order, similarly, that no obstacles might
be presented by the Church, the sanction of the Pope was also obtained. In the early
history of some colleges, the endowment was for a time vested in an outside body,
who managed the property and turned over to the college the revenue derived from
it; thus the endowment of Exeter College was early in charge of the dean and chapter
of Exeter, who managed it and remitted periodically to the college the revenues
received from it. The endowment of the original founder was in most cases
augmented in later years by those of other benefactors, who were sometimes honored
with recognition as co-founders; the successive endowments were not always
amalgamated; the later ones were frequently kept distinct and devoted to the support
of additional fellows or lecturers under a distinct body of statutes. Part of the
endowment was usually the land and buildings occupied by the college; though for
some years rented property might be used, the college eventually acquired land for
its purposes. The  founders of colleges were actuated by three motives: they aimed
to advance the interests of the Church, to promote education and learning or to better
their own prospective status in the future life; they were usually actuated by all three
motives in combination. The interests of the Church might be advanced in no better
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not merely in the restricted field of theology, but also in the wider field of general
knowledge; a college might even be intended to combat a particular heresy, as
Lincoln College
344 to combat Wycliffism, or, like New College, to compete with the
monastic and Mendicant orders by raising the intellectual plane of the secular
priesthood. Even though in most cases the learning that a poor scholar might be
assisted to secure may have been intended to strengthen the Church, in many of them
pure love of learning for its own sake was sufficient arouse the benevolence of the
founder. The most common aim was more purely personal; the extension of
assistance to needy scholars was a form of charity that, along with the advancement
of the interests of the Church, was expected by the superstitious mediaeval founders
of colleges to redound to their advantage in the future life;
345 not only was that result
expected to follow the act of charity, but particular provisions were usually made that
their endowments should be compensated for by the colleges to some extent, by the
celebration of masses and the offering of prayers for the repose of their souls and of
those of their ancestors and descendants. A somewhat more worldly phase of the
motive of personal interest appears in the frequent reservation of preferences for
“founder’s kin” in the bestowal of memberships in the colleges. It was quite in
harmony with the religious motives of founders that colleges should be nearly always
dedicated to saints or religious symbols, and that their names should be as frequently
religious in suggestion.
The members of a college — using the term not in its technical strictness, but so
widely as to include all the members sustaining organic relations to the group and
excluding only mere employees — were (a) the visitors, (b) the head, (c) the fellows,
(d) the scholars, (e) the almsmen, (f) the commoners, (g) the lecturers and (h) the
chaplains. (a) The visitor was virtually the successor of the founder, and had the
power to investigate the affairs of the college at any time, to ascertain whether the
statutes were being faithfully observed, to compel compliance with their terms, to
receive newly elected heads into their office and to remove heads if on complaint of
the fellows they should be found “useless or negligent, or luxurious or vicious,” or,
more generally, if their retention in office would be detrimental to the welfare of the
college; the validity of some acts of the college, such as the passage of new statutes,
often depended on the sanction of the visitor; in some colleges he had power to
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ones; the visitors were most usually bishops or archbishops, though the king, the
chancellor or some master of the University, a mendicant friar or private person held
the office in some colleges; in a few cases (of the early colleges) the right of
visitation was vested in two or three persons acting jointly; in only one college was
the visitor elected by the collegiate body. (a) The head of the college, variously called
warden, master, provost, president or rector, was quite universally (except in the early
history of some colleges) elected by the fellows or a select number of them, though
not necessarily from their own number; he was required to be in holy orders, but was
to lose his office on the acceptance of a benefice or the acquisition of an independent
income;
346 though in some of the earlier colleges he was elected annually, his office
came to be universally permanent; he had actual oversight of the work of the college
and particularly of the administration of its endowment; he presided over the fellows
in their meetings and was usually elected from among their number; in the later
history of the colleges, he became somewhat more remote from the fellows, lived in
a separate house and deputed many of his functions to a sub-warden, vice-president
or dean. (c) The fellows originally named by the founder constituted a close body,
statutorily limited in number to from ten to seventy members,
347 filling their
vacancies by co-optation
348 and devoting them selves to the particular studies
prescribed by statute; they were the original “poor scholars” of the thirteenth century
and formed the nucleus of the collegiate body; their chief qualifications were that
“they excel in poverty, ability and manners” and be of legitimate birth,
349 but kinsmen
of the founders and natives of particular counties or dwellers in the vicinity of college
estates or scholars on the foundation were frequently given a preference by statute in
elections to fellowships, as well as to the scholarships; the fellows also exercised the
legislative powers of the college, within the limits imposed by the
foundation-statutes, though often subject, in many particulars, to the sanction of the
visitor and to his interpretation of the limits of their powers; they might similarly
secure the removal of the head, if he should be unfaithful to his office, by complaint
to the visitor after having thrice admonished him; some of the fellows also usually
performed official duties, as those of vice-principal, bursars, secretaries or chaplains,
for which they received remuneration in addition to their fellows’ stipends; they were
usually admitted on probation for one or two years before entering into their full
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in the management of collegiate affairs; they were often in separate classes having
different rights and duties and perhaps supported on the endowments of distinct
benefactors, the legislative power being frequently exercised by one, the senior or
earlier endowed class, to the exclusion of others; they were uniformly required to be
in holy orders or to enter them within a limited time after election or after having
taken a degree, but they lost their fellowships and their stipends ceased if they
accepted a benefice, acquired an independent income, renounced celibacy, ceased to
reside in college or to study diligently, “entered any religion” by becoming a monk
or friar or accepted a fellowship in another college; the fellowships of the thirteenth
century had been intended to aid the scholar until the attainment of his degree, but
they later gradually became permanent, at least to the extent of covering the period
between the degree and the benefice; likewise the fellows had originally been mere
scholars studying for degrees, but later bodies of statutes required them (or a part of
them) to be at least bachelors
350 and to assume the work of instructing inferior
scholars in the college; though even then the fellowships were often limited to a
definite number of years (as to fourteen years in Exeter College) they might be
summarily (without right of appeal) expelled for committing crimes, violating the
statutes, raising scandals or quarrels, or fermenting discord, and might be readmitted
only in cases of small misdemeanors followed by unfeigned penitence; it was wisely
provided that they should not be admitted on the request of lords or other influential
persons. (d) Below the rank of fellows in the developed Oxford college and
supported on the same foundation
351 were the scholars, limited in number and
coming, like the fellows, by preference from particular counties or parishes; they
were undergraduates admitted on probation for a year after an examination by a
college examiner to determine their admission or rejection, and held their
scholarships for a limited period or until they should have taken their degrees, in
some colleges they were preferred in the election to vacant fellowships;
352 in addition
to their attendance on the masters of Oxford schools they were instructed, especially
from the fifteenth century, by the fellows and latterly by special principals and tutors
who might or might not be fellows concurrently; in addition to the pursuit of their
studies, they were required to wait on the tables in the common-hall and perform
other menial services for the fellows, to sing in the chapel, and to otherwise act in a
subordinate capacity in the common life of the college.
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of the earlier colleges and dependent on fixed allowances from their revenues were
a small number of indigent men and women, who were, of course, no part of the
student body; thus it was provided in the statutes of Queen’s College that thirteen
poor men and poor women should be fed daily in addition to a general distribution
of soup at the college gate. (f) Beside the fellows and scholars, many colleges had
within their walls a body of scholars who were “not on the foundation,”
354 who did
not share in the college revenues, but paid for their accommodations, and were
usually called “non-foundationers” or “commoners,” while other colleges would not
admit merely boarders or roomers, but only those who also received instruction;
usually limited by statute to the “high-born,” to sons of the nobility and gentry, they
were admitted by common consent of the fellows on condition (in University
College) “that before them [each] shall promise whilst he lives with them, that he
will honestly observe the customs of the fellows of the house, pay his dues, not hurt
any of the things belonging to the house, either by himself or those that belong to
him”; the class increased with the disappearance of the old Oxford halls and with the
growth of a system of instruction within the colleges, while by reaction the halls
suffered from the absorption of scholars by the colleges. (g) As the activity of the
colleges became more complete in itself and to comprehend more fully the
instruction of their inmates, lecturers, readers and tutors in special branches of study
were attached to them and supported on definite stipends paid from their revenues;
in most cases, the work done by them had previously been done by fellows, who
received fees and other compensation for it, and even after they were separately
provided for, they were often made eligible to fellowships concurrently. (h) The
religious side of college life was never neglected by founders; the fellows were in
many colleges required to act in the capacity of chaplains, but in most of them
chaplains were specially provided for; sometimes elected by the fellows or appointed
by a bishop or dean and chapter with their consent, they generally owed their office
to the choice of some authority outside of the collegiate body.
Several features of the life of the medieval Oxford colleges not directly involved
in a description of the classes of persons comprehended in them may be noted with
profit. Their domestic life was regulated to the minutest detail by their statutes. The
hours of rising, of the two principal meals of the day and of retiring were definitely
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the amounts of them that should be consumed and the limits of the expense to be
incurred in providing them were prescribed. The head (if he did not live separately)
and the senior fellows, with perhaps some of the lecturers and “commensales,” might
alone dine at the high table in the common-hall; an inferior class dined at a lower
table; and still lower classes used the remaining tables indiscriminately; the poor
scholars that waited on the tables ate after the others had finished. The common
speech at table was required to be in Latin; if a scholar should make bold to use his
mother-tongue, he was subject to reproof by the principal, and if twice or thrice
reproved without amendment, to be put away from the table and to be last served; at
Queen’s College, a single exception, French might be spoken in place of Latin. A
domestic establishment complete in all respects was contemplated; clerks,
secretaries, caterers, dispensers, millers, bakers, cooks, scullions, brewers, porters,
barbers, gardeners and nightwatchmen were among the employees provided for by
statutes. If a common dormitory was used, a monitor usually presided over it to
observe and report infractions of rules. If separate chambers were used, the number
of occupants allotted to each was settled; if a fellow was entitled by the statutes to the
services of a poor scholar, they were required to occupy separate beds in the same
chamber. The care of the person was not beneath the consideration of the statutes.
Even the manner of shaving the head was dictated. “No fellow, chaplain, clerk,
scholar or chorister shall grow long hair, or a beard, or wear peaked shoes, or red,
green or white shoes.” A college livery was often prescribed and sometimes
furnished annually, at least to the extent of a hood, at the charge of the college
revenues. In their manners, members of superior classes were charged not to be
overbearing towards their inferiors, and the rich were not permitted to oppress the
poor. Creating or disseminating scandal, inciting quarrels or discord or revealing the
secrets of the college might be punished by expulsion. Fellows were not to delay to
use their good offices in pacifying controversies, and had power to punish minor
infractions of rules summarily. For the further preservation of order and enforcement
of regulations, the scholars were frequently divided into groups of ten with a dean
over each group. All forms of rudeness, such as jumping, shouting, dancing in the
chapel or halls and playing on musical instruments immoderately, were punishable.
Most of the crimes known to the mediaeval criminal calendar were catalogued in the
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poaching, fighting or quarrelling, drinking to excess, frequenting taverns and
play-houses and wandering about at night after the college gates had been closed was
emphasized. Amusements were closely restricted, especially within the college walls;
among the rougher diversions, attendance either as participant or spectator at tiltings
and wrestling and boxing contests was forbid den. Suffering the presentation of
comedies in college near the end of the fifteenth century was an exceptional
indulgence. The presence of guests was regarded as detrimental to study; they were
accordingly excluded except they should be prominent persons to be entertained by
the warden. The rule of exclusion was extended from guests to animals and birds.
“No one shall keep in the college hounds, rats, ferrets, hawks or falcons for sport, or
monkeys, bears, foxes, deer, badgers or any other wild beasts, that would be
unprofitable or dangerous to the college.” That the fellows might not plead ignorance
of the statutes, they were publicly read to them once a year. Murmuring against them,
or incorrigibility for a week, was punished by expulsion. If the external world was
carefully excluded from the college, its internal life was with equal care preserved
from actively coming in contact with the outside world. Residence in college, in
some of them even during vacation, was mandatory, except when the coming of a
pestilence made it advisable for the whole body to retire for a time from the city. In
the management of the college estates, the provisions for which were in great detail,
an annual tour over them by the head and fellows (or part of them) was made at the
time of the annual audit of accounts. For the transaction of the more important
business, the election and admission of fellows, and the inquisition into the work of
the scholars, from one to three chapters were held annually. If the warden or other
head should become incapacitated for the discharge of his duties, he was relieved by
the election of another in his place and retired on an ample pension. Likewise the
fellow or scholar was provided for in sickness and even supported outside the college
if his restoration to health demanded it. On the other hand, fellows were enjoined to
aid and assist the college if after the severance of their connection with it they should
find exceptional fortune in the world. 
There was nothing in the original extension of aid to “poor scholars” by William
of Durham, John Balliol, and Walter de Merton in the middle of the thirteenth
century to threaten a serious modification of the scholars’ relations to the University.
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in the previous “spontaneous” growth of the Oxford halls. When the benefactors
brought their benefactions into harmony with the existing aularian system by
introducing community of living among the several groups of beneficiaries, they did
no more than to promote the disintegration already implied in the development of
halls, though the influence of adding a more substantial economic basis could not
have been slight. The extent to which the halls became independent and autonomous
centres of study and instruction within the University, and in a sense in opposition
to it, has been suggested; in their activity, however, they did not compete with the
University so much as they really supplemented its activity; the University schools
still flourished and the inmates of halls still attended lectures in them; the
disputations and other exercises of the halls were to a large extent new elements in
University education, the elements that are now exaggerated in college courses in
which textbooks are used. The Mendicants and monks took a step in advance of the
hall communities in providing more extensively for the instruction of their scholars,
for the plain purpose not of supplementing but of supplanting the work of the
University schools. The University was more or less successful in its contest with the
friars because it had the support of the Church. When the secular colleges were
founded by ecclesiastics or by persons under their influence, largely for the purpose
of fighting the friars and monks with their own weapons, the work of disintegration,
already well begun by the halls and religious houses, was carried rapidly forward.
Though the University was able to establish complete control over the halls through
the power of disqualifying or removing their principals and of making, vetoing or
modifying their statutes, it very clearly had to be content with control and not aspire
to the absorption of the halls; to the extent that they flourished, even under the
direction of the University, the University was not performing its functions directly,
but indirectly through the halls as organs. Even more truly was the University unable
to fully control the interior activity of the religious schools; the moderate control that
it succeeded in establishing consisted partly in placing limitations, in the first
instance, on the admission of scholars to them, and later on the admission of their
scholars to the status of University graduates, and partly in circumscribing the
participation of their representatives in the government of the University itself. Just
as in the halls, the extent of the work done in the religious schools was the measure
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rely on its being done indirectly through them. The colleges were far more
independent and autonomous than either the hall communities or religious bodies.
At first, however, they relied on the University schools for the instruction of their
scholars; they were content to prescribe the domain of their scholars’ work and to
regulate the details of their common life. Such educational work as they did was
largely supplemental, like that of the halls; the nature of it is clearly suggested in one
of the statutes of Balliol College, by which it is provided that under the supervision
and correction of the principal there should be one “sophism” each week “to be
discussed and determined” in the house ‘’and this should be done in turn, in such
manner that the sophists should introduce and reply, and they should determine who
should have determined in the schools.” It was a common statutory provision that
“poor scholars” should be daily “opposed” by the fellows at dinner before going to
their own table. The fellows, called scholars in the statutes of early colleges, were at
first merely what their name indicated — scholars — and were not required to be
graduates; the more advanced fellows were then given the somewhat indefinite duty
of aiding the less advanced ones in their studies; next the fellows (or part of them)
were recognized as definitely obligated to instruct others on the foundation, as in
New College, where the “tutorial” system is said to have had its origin, and were
allowed for their services compensation in addition to their stipends, as well as fees
paid to them by the scholars; in short, the fellows developed into teachers and were
required to be graduates, while those actually engaged in studying formed a new and
inferior class, known by the name the fellows had originally borne — scholars. As
the system of teaching became more nearly complete in the colleges in the fifteenth
century, special lectureships in some branches of work were endowed for the
accommodation of the scholars. The movement extended even beyond the boundaries
of the colleges when at the end of the fifteenth century their lectureships were thrown
open to the whole University, as were those in theology, moral and metaphysical
philosophy and natural philosophy in Magdalen College, and those in Greek and
Latin in Corpus Christi College. Nor did they suffer seriously from the competition
of the meagrely endowed University lectureships founded by Henry VIII. As college
instruction became more extended, the University dispensed more fully with the
requirement that scholars hear lectures in the University schools, as it with equal
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Meanwhile the commensales, originally merely boarders in the colleges, attending
the University schools, had become pupils in the colleges and were not accepted
unless they would not only live but also receive instruction in them. The college
instruction had first been extended in the higher faculties, instruction in arts and
grammar being left longer to the University schools and grammar schools; in the
statutes of Queen’s College it was first provided that arts should be taught in college;
by the end of the fifteenth century all effective instruction in arts had been absorbed
by the colleges. Pupils had been received from the grammar schools of Oxford
(supervised by the University) and from other grammar schools; the colleges
provided for such instruction within their walls by a teacher of grammar, who might
or might not be a fellow, until, as in Magdalen, the scholars’ fitness to begin arts
should be determined by examination; in this field New College even expanded
beyond Oxford and the University by relegating the work in grammar to Winchester
College, from whose graduates its scholars were exclusively chosen; other colleges
were obligated to maintain from their revenues grammar schools outside of Oxford,
to which, however, they sustained no other close relations. The broad fact is that by
the middle of the sixteenth century the work of instruction in the University had been
transferred from its schools to the colleges, and that in many of them scholars might
obtain all the instruction leading to their degrees without attending the University
schools at all. The development of the “college monopoly” was promoted even by the
character of the books used. The expensive manuscripts of the thirteenth century had
been almost exclusively the property of the lecturing masters, but when the colleges
were founded their statutes usually extended to their scholars the common use of the
books in the college libraries. The colleges first established what are now known as
“entrance examinations,” thereby assuming the determination of the fitness of a
prospective scholar for the status to which he aspired. The University came to depend
for its definition of a scholar on the determination of the statutes of the colleges.
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The power of conferring degrees, however, never departed from the University; every
step leading to the degree might be under the control and supervision of the colleges,
but the final conferring of the degree remained the function of the University.
The Oxford colleges, whether founded by churchmen or by persons under their
influence, were so manifestly the fruits of a pious purpose that they were given forms
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permanence of their constitution and the fidelity of their life to the purpose of their
foundation were assured by their almost universal subjection to the visitorial
authority of bishops. Some of them, not only from their structural form, but even
from the substance of their activity, might justly be classed with the chapters of
cathedral or collegiate churches, their educational structure and activity being
conceived as merely annexed to them, just as most other ecclesiastical corporations
had schools annexed to them; but in others the structure, though plainly
ecclesiastical, was predominantly occupied by educational activity, while the
substantially ecclesiastical functions were performed by chaplains or otherwise
subordinated to the educational activity. The normal form of the Oxford college,
however, was that of the chapter of a collegiate church, though Henry VIII converted
Wolsey’s Cardinal College into a dean and canons of Christ Church Cathedral with
its Bishop of Oxford. The original endowment of Lincoln College consisted of the
impropriations of three churches served by the fellows (though with the aid of
chaplains); the three churches, with the college, virtually constituted a collegiate
church, with the rector and fellows for its dean and chapter.  It may hardly be said
that monasteries or Mendicant houses were used as models of the colleges; when an
attempt was made to place both secular and regular scholars on an equality on the
foundation of Canterbury College, it proved a failure, and the former were eventually
subordinated to the latter. If the colleges were intended to do for the Church what the
Mendicant and monastic houses were doing for their orders, it was only a particular
manifestation of the general purpose of their foundation. They were intended to
promote the interests of the Church by supplying it with priests, and especially with
learned priests — and that was the point of contest with the religious orders, — by
protecting it against heresy, and by providing it with a body of ecclesiastics who
could capably fill the great offices of state at that time invariably held by them. In
accordance with their threefold purpose, theology and the canon and civil law were
given such prominence in foundation statutes that the colleges may be well said to
have been little more than ecclesiastical seminaries. The fellowships were almost
universally not intended for the promotion of learning for its own sake, much less for
the modern purpose of scholarly research, but to make learning subserve the ends of
the Church; accordingly fellows were required to be in holy orders at the time of their
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projected themselves into the Church by holding advowsons of benefices to which
they nominated their fellows in the order of their seniority; some colleges, too, were
virtually chapters of corporate churches, their fellows being members. The
ecclesiastical nature of the colleges was also reflected in the routine of their interior
life. Frequent (sometimes daily) masses had to be celebrated and daily prayers
offered for the repose of the souls of founders or other benefactors and their ancestors
and descendants, of the king and queen and their predecessors and successors, of the
Englishmen who had fallen in a French war and of other persons. Each meal had to
be preceded by a benediction and followed by the offering of thanks or prayers or the
recital of the De Profundis; while dinner was in progress, either the chaplain or a
scholar (who served in his turn) read aloud a portion of the Scriptures or of the
writings of the Doctors of the Church. In some colleges even the canonical hours
were observed. Inseparable from the college was the chapel in which the chaplain (or
a fellow serving in the capacity of chaplain) officiated, while the scholars sang and
otherwise participated in the services, and in which all scholars were required to
perform their devotions on all Sundays and saints’ days. In Queen’s College a
provost and twelve fellows were provided for in imitation of Christ and the Apostles,
and the founders hoped that the scholars would be seventy-two in number, in
imitation of the Disciples. But with all the strictness and elaborateness of their
religious life, no “rule” was imposed on the colleges; they remained secular
establishments. In general, the system of colleges was the medium through which the
Church regained over learning the control that it had exercised before the rise of the
university movement and during it, early stages; during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, the University of Oxford had attained such independence that it menaced
the stability of the Church; through the disintegration of the wider University body
into colleges and through the control or the colleges by the Church, an ecclesiastical
sovereignty over the realm of learning was so firmly re-established by the sixteenth
century that it was not disturbed until the nineteenth century.
VI  The Universities from 1550 to 1850
When the first period of the history of the English universities came to an end with
the general historical period of the Middle Ages, their constitution was in most
respects fully established. During the second period of their history their structure
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movements of modern history; they yielded only so much as was unavoidable and
retained enough to assure the conservation of their principal elements in the presence
of wide-spread change. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, through all the
political changes caused by the despotism of the new Tudor monarchy, the imperious
tyranny of the Stuarts, the leading iconoclasm of the Commonwealth and the
constitutional kingship of the Hanoverians, through all the religious shifting of
Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Puritanism, Presbyterianism, non-conformity and
dissent, and through all the great intellectual movements from the Renaissance and
the Reformation to the beginning of the liberal development of the present day, the
English universities, as institutions, remained substantially intact. Serious
modifications of their medieval structure have been mostly temporary. The Middle
Ages were characterized by the rearing of imposing institutions rather than by the
development of ideas to find expression in them; the Catholic Church was greater
than Catholicism; feudalism was greater than kings or barons. Modern history, on the
contrary, has been distinguished by the growth of ideas rather than of institutions;
Protestantism is greater than the Protestant Churches; liberty and equality are greater
than parliaments and constitutional kingships.
Even abstract thought, in the limited field that it occupied before the Reformation,
was cast in the imposing and symmetrical form of the scholastic philosophy. The
great movement of civilization in the Middle Ages was one of reabsorption, of
regaining the body of knowledge left by the ancient world and providing institutions
for it; the most effective force in Christianity had to lie dormant until the
Reformation should arouse it, because humanity had not yet absorbed the product of
Greek and Roman life. The work of humanity in the modern era has been that of
expansion in ideas within the structural framework left by the Middle Ages, and the
vexatious side of the problem of civilization has been not in the incapacity to
generate and develop ideas, but in the inability to provide an adequate social structure
for them. The aim of the present day is not to get men to do — they do enough and
do it well, — but so to regulate their relations in the doing that it may not be wanting
in effect. The recently renewed interest in medieval institutions can be explained only
by a renewed appreciation of the need of developing an organization of present
society that will allow present social forms the degree of activity necessary to their
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world those of the English universities have proved to be most enduring, have
suffered the least change in response to the demands of modern life. The study of
university history on its formal side is therefore less difficult after than before the end
of the fifteenth century and may be disposed of with some degree of brevity. For the
sake of convenience, the second period may be considered under the three heads
already used in connection with other subjects: (1) Relations to the State, (2)
Relations to the Church and (3) Internal relations, — though the facts included under
the second heads were more or less completely merged with those under the first
head after the Reformation and may not always be easily distinguished or distributed.
1. The attitude of the new Tudor monarchy towards the universities was
characterized by the same element of despotism that pervaded its relations to all other
national institutions. They had been promoted largely for the sake of learning itself;
they were now used to subserve the interests of the monarchy. Though Henry VIII
was a true friend of learning, its exponents, like the Church, the courts and
Parliament, must support his pretensions. When he was seeking a divorce from
Catherine, in 1530, he demanded that the University of Oxford unite its sanction with
those that had been obtained from continental universities. Though with reluctance
and only after some of the younger masters of arts had been persuaded to withdraw
from convocation and withhold their adverse votes, the University yielded. So, too,
in 1534, when separation from Rome was about to be consummated by the royal
assumption of the title of “Supreme Head of the Church of England,” the University,
all its charters having four years earlier been delivered into the king’s hands, there
to remain for thirteen years, was found compliant in approving the step even before
it had been taken. When James I had found the theory of the “divine right of kings”
a sufficient basis for the imperious tyranny of the Stuarts, he found in the Arminian
party in the University his strongest adherents and accordingly favored their control
of the institution, though he had brought with him from Scotland predilections for
Presbyterianism. When the doctrine of “passive obedience” needed support, the
University convocation almost eagerly passed a resolution in condemnation of all
resistance, whether offensive or defensive, to a reigning sovereign.
On the other hand, the University, while it had been able in the fourteenth century
to rely on the Crown for protection against other powers in the state, found it
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conciliation and obsequiousness, against the Crown itself. The chancellor, originally
the representative of the Church in its control of learning, but long the active head of
the University and resident in Oxford, became its ambassador or advocate, almost the
royal minister of higher education, and resident at court, leaving his active work as
administrative head to be done by a resident vice-chancellor; he must now be a
courtier or courtly prelate, a Leicester or a Laud. Every radical change of policy,
whether political or religious, was accompanied by a demand for a revision of the
statutes of the University involving, at least in theory, even its constitution; whether
the new code of statutes in answer to the demand emanated from the Crown directly,
or indirectly through the subservient chancellor or a royal commission, they were
properly known as the “Edwardine,” the “Marian,” or the”Caroline” statutes, though
the university might in form have asserted the right to perfunctorily approve them or
pass them at the dictation of their actual makers. While the new codes were in
process of compilation, the constitution of the University was frequently suspended.
So dependent was it in the reign of Henry VIII that it humbly surrendered all its
charters into the hands of Cardinal Wolsey with the request that he should use his
own pleasure in amending them; when they were returned five years later, with a new
one from the King, they were received with the greatest obsequiousness; even later
in the reign they were again in the King’s hands for a period of thirteen years. The
spoliation of the monastic houses by Henry VIII and Edward VI made the University
and its component colleges tremble for their own revenues, and when fear of
spoliation was past the desire of sharing with the courtiers in the spoils was fully as
destructive of independence. With the increasing power of Parliament in the
government came the necessity of securing its recognition of the corporate status in
an enactment, in 1570 (or 1571), 
“that the... chancellor of the University of Oxford, and his successors
forever, and the masters and scholars of the... University of Oxford
for the time being, shall be incorporated and have a perpetual
succession in fact, deed, and name, by the name of ‘the Chancellor,
Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford.’” 
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to elect two burgesses to Parliament who should inform that body “of the true state
of the university and of each particular college.” Even in the reign of Elizabeth, at the
time of the statutory incorporation of the University, Parliament had not hesitated to
interfere by legislation in its internal affairs. In two acts of the thirteenth and
eighteenth years of her reign it was provided, by the earlier, that college estates
should be leased for twenty-one years or not to exceed three lives, and by the later,
that one third of the rentals reserved in such leases should be rendered in corn or malt
estimated at 6s. 8d. and 5s. per quarter; in 1589 followed an act to prevent the sale
and collusory resignation of fellowships and corrupt election to them.
The University and the Anglican Church became as dependent on the Crown as the
Crown on them. When the civil war broke out the University was more than loyal to
the Stuarts; though for other reasons in addition to that of the loyalty of the
University, Oxford became the base of Charles’s military operations and virtually his
capital, the schools and halls being converted into barracks, mints and storehouses,
as well as into royal palaces and courts, until the city was captured by the
Parliamentary army. When James II, by his Declaration of Indulgence, in 1687,
sought to confer on Roman Catholics the right of admission to corporations, and
began the enforcement of his policy in the place where his arbitrary will would be
most likely to meet with no opposition, he very consistently chose the University of
Oxford; on the resistance of Magdalen College to his mandate to elect Parker to its
presidency, already filled by a candidate of their own choice, a royal commission
expelled the president and twenty-five fellows, though James afterwards reinstated
them when the loss of his throne was threatened by the nation. Yet such an affinity
seems to exist between corporations enjoying special privileges and the arbitrary
rulers upon whom the possession of the privileges depends, that the University of
Oxford, notwithstanding the arbitrariness of James II, continued for eighty years to
be the stronghold of Jacobitism; not until the accession of George III were the results
of the revolution of 1688 accepted in Oxford otherwise than as an unavoidable
calamity. The University had become so dependent on the Crown and had left so
little of its spirit of fourteenth-century independence that in 1759 its power to repeal
any of the Caroline statutes without the royal consent was denied by the proctors,
though they were not sustained in their opposition; the power had certainly not been
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In the reign of Henry VIII began the succession of royal and parliamentary
commissions and boards of visitors, so frequent in time and so comprehensive in
purpose during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that they threatened at times
to form a permanent part of the University constitution. A commission appointed by
Edward VI under the great seal was designed chiefly to eliminate popery from
Oxford and in effecting its purpose destroyed ‘’superstitious” emblems, and after
expelling all Catholic masters and scholars, introduced Protestants (some of them
aliens) in their places; it eventually provided a complete code of new statutes,
afterwards known as the “Edwardine statutes.” When Mary ascended the throne, the
tables were turned. Most of the Protestants fled from Oxford, but such as remained
were burned at the stake or expelled by a board of visitors deputed in 1556 by
Cardinal Pole, the new Catholic chancellor; English Bibles and Protestant books in
the libraries were burned; the code of “Marian statutes” was the work of the visitors.
Elizabeth had no sooner succeeded Mary on the throne than she suspended all
academical elections at Oxford and appointed a board of visitors for the purpose of
enforcing compliance with the act of supremacy on the University; nine heads of
colleges and many fellows and others were expelled for non-compliance. With such
a chancellor as Laud, Charles I hardly needed to resort to commissions; a delegacy
of convocation spent four years in codifying the University statutes; the code was
then corrected and amended by Laud, and, after a year for the suggestion of further
amendments by the University and colleges, was finally promulgated by him in 1636
with the confirmation of the king; the new statutes were called the “Caroline” or
“Laudian” statutes and remained in force (except during the interregnum of the
Commonwealth) until the middle of the nineteenth century. When Oxford had been
captured, in 1646, during the civil war, by the insurgent forces, Parliament at once
suspended academical elections and the renewal of leases of college estates “ until
the pleasure of Parliament be made known therein.” In the following year an
ordinance was enacted “for the visitation and reformation of the University of Oxford
and the several colleges and halls therein,” by a board of twenty-four visitors, of
whom fourteen were laymen and ten were clergy. It was intended at first largely as
an inquisitorial body, having actual power to act in lesser matters, to provide
information for a standing committee of lords and commons and to submit reports
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and used them to depose ten heads of colleges and many professors and fellows,
filling many of their places at once with their own nominees; they further supervised
and directed the administration of the University and colleges in all its details.
Cromwell himself became chancellor in 1650, and in 1652 the board of visitors was
merged in a resident commission consisting of the vice-chancellor, three heads of
colleges and a prebendary of Christ Church, which should put into permanent effect
the more fundamental changes made by the original board of visitors; in 1654, the
commission was again changed, but not essentially, and continued to govern the
University for four years. The commission exercised substantially all the powers
formerly exercised by the chancellor and visitors of the University and colleges; the
degree of permanence enjoyed by it had threatened to convert the University into a
state institution. When weakness developed in the government of the
Commonwealth, the University resumed many of the powers that it formerly
exercised and the restoration of the monarchy completed the change. Soon after
Charles II had reached London, he appointed a new board of visitors to undo the
work of Cromwell, but its changes were almost entirely personal, and not
constitutional; a few heads and fellows of colleges were replaced by others and little
else occurred. The numerous other commissions cannot be examined in detail; the
general result of their activity, however, was to reduce the independence of the
University and to bring it into greater harmony with the state and with the changes
in the Church caused by the interference of the state.
After the Revolution of 1688, the state seemed to sustain a somewhat modified
attitude towards the University largely because religious questions had lost their
previous importance in national politics and because the University itself had
declined in importance. The century following the revolution is rightly called by
Brodrick “the Dark Age of academical history.”
356 Only when a rebellion in behalf
of the Pretender was threatened, early in the reign of George I, did the government
consider the strong Jacobite sentiment worthy of notice. On that occasion, it was
proposed that the king be empowered for seven years
“to nominate and appoint all and every the Chancellor,
Vice-Chancellor, Proctors, and other officers of the [two] universities,
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exhibitioners, and all members of and in all and every the college and
colleges, hall and halls in the said universities or either of them upon
all and every vacancy and vacancies”;
another plan suggested contemplated the election of heads of colleges by certain
officers of state and the distribution of other positions and the management and
disposition of college revenues by a commission. Neither plan, however, was
adopted.
2. Much that might be said of the relations of the University of Oxford to the
Church after the Reformation has been placed under the head of its relations to the
state; the state acted through the Church and usually treated the University as a part
of the ecclesiastical system. But some of the more intimate relations must be
considered. For two centuries the contest between the secular church, which tended
to become nationalized, and the monasteries, which had adhered closely to Rome,
had been bitter in the University; the suppression of religious houses at the
Reformation ended the contest and left the national church in control, while some of
the colleges profited by the diversion to them of the property of the suppressed
bodies, and Christ Church and some professorships were endowed from it. The
University was now dominated by the Anglican Church and opposed Catholics,
non-conformists and dissenters, as the Catholic Church (in England) had formerly
opposed the monks and friars and Lollards. The University was narrower under the
Church of England than it had been before the Reformation. The continual weeding
out of Catholics at one time and of Protestants at another left it thoroughly lifeless,
except as a seminary for the clergy, to whom its fellowships were almost all confined.
When the policy of the state was sufficiently liberal, as in Elizabeth’s reign, to admit
any but adherents of the Anglican Church, the University simply became the
battle-ground of theological controversy to the exclusion of everything else. It shared
to only a slight extent in the revival of the brilliant Elizabethan era. After the
Reformation, too, more avenues had been opened to the energetic man of education
than the career in the Church that had formerly been all that he could hope for, not
so much as a result of the Reformation as of the broader movement against tradition
and in favor of individual development of which it properly formed a part. Under
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Church not only by restricting the membership more closely through the imposition
of test-oaths but by opening benefices more numerously to graduates. The intimacy
of the dependence of the University on the Established Church appears most clearly
in a petition of the resident graduates to Parliament in 1641 when it was threatening
the exclusion of the bishops from the House of Lords; the petition prayed for the
maintenance of the bishops and their Cathedral churches, as, among other things,
“the principal outward motive of all students, especially in divinity,
and the fittest reward of some deep and eminent scholars; as affording
a competent portion in an ingenious way to many younger brothers of
good parentage who devote themselves to the ministry of the
gospel;... and as funds by which many of the learned professors in our
university are maintained.”
357
The University was not widened at the Revolution and continued thereafter, during
its dismal eighteenth century, the narrow seminary of the Anglican Church that it had
become. Subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles at matriculation and declaration of
conformity to the liturgy of the Established Church on acceptance of a fellowship and
the obligation of entering holy orders continued to be exacted until the middle of the
nineteenth century.
3. At the end of the fifteenth century the crystallization of University activity in the
colleges had been quite complete. The colleges suffered so little internal modification
until the middle of the nineteenth century that they need no consideration; a lesser
proportion of the fellows in the post-Reformation foundations were required to be in
holy orders, and the old group of theology, canon law and civil law was not so
generally imposed on fellows, — in fact, the study of the canon law was abolished;
laxity in the enforcement of the minor regulations of daily life and of the more
important requirement of residence by heads of houses and fellows might be a subject
of complaint; many minute regulations of living and study like those of the Laudian
statutes were provided, but they would hardly change one’s general impression of a
college or its inmates when compared with that of the college at the beginning of the
sixteenth century.
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until it controlled not only the membership of the University but also its government.
After the chancellor became habitually non-resident and rather the University’s
“friend at court” than its head, the vice-chancellor, appointed by him, became the
acting head; in 1569, he was required by the Edwardine statutes to be elected by the
congregation; twenty years later his nomination was again vested in the chancellor
and has since so remained. By the same statute of 1569, passed under the influence
of Leicester, the Black Congregation as far as concerned its power to give
preliminary consideration to measures to be brought before convocation was
abolished, and in its place was substituted a body consisting of the vice-chancellor,
doctors, heads of colleges and proctors. In 1629, the older methods of electing
proctors, either by vote of the entire academic body or by vote of congregation, were
discontinued and cycles of twenty-three years were settled during each of which, in
future, each college, according to its size and importance, should elect a definite
number of proctors. Some years later the Laudian (or Caroline) statutes confirmed
the use of the proctorial cycles and further provided that in each college the proctors
should be elected by the doctors and masters of a given rank. By the Laudian statutes
the administration of the University was given to the Hebdomadal Board, composed
of the vice-chancellor, heads of colleges and proctors; the vice-chancellor, moreover,
was to be nominated annually by the chancellor from the heads of colleges in rotation
with the approval of convocation.
But while the college monopoly seems to have been complete in 1636 and to have
been formally maintained until the nineteenth century, some movements in the
history of the University of Oxford plainly tended in the opposite direction — to the
ultimate restoration of the University unit. Wolsey is said to have had in
contemplation the establishment of University professorships and of University
lecture-rooms at the time of the foundation of his Cardinal College. Henry VIII
afterwards founded his five Regius professorships of Divinity, Civil Law, Medicine,
Hebrew and Greek, though he provided them only with a meagre endowment of £40
annually. Some such professorships had previously been established and others were
afterwards added, even during the dismal eighteenth century. The establishment of
professorships and lectureships in separate colleges but open to the whole University
must have had a similar tendency; Henry VIII stipulated with the colleges that such
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that they should be attended daily not only by the scholars of the colleges in which
they were maintained but also by the scholars of all the other colleges. One of the
effects of the closer supervision of the universities and colleges by the state through
the agency of ministerial chancellors and boards of visitation was to introduce a
considerable degree of uniformity into the conditions prevalent in all of them, for it
was inclined to treat them rather as one body. According to the Edwardine statutes,
the retention of a fellowship was made conditional on six months’ residence, lectures
were to be followed by examinations and matriculation examinations were to be held,
— rules apparently enforceable in all colleges, whatever their previous custom may
have been; likewise the limitation of fellowships to a term of years, enforced in a few
periods, appears to have been applicable to all and not to only a part of the
colleges.
358 The commissioners appointed by Edward VI were given power to
consolidate several colleges into one, but did not exercise it; they had also projected
the plan of having separate colleges devoted to special branches of study, as New
College to arts and All Souls’ to civil law, but did not execute it. The University also
acquired some new functions or more effectual organs for the exercise of those that
it already possessed. In 1581 a statute passed by convocation provided that all tutors
should submit to be examined and licensed by a board composed of the
vice-chancellor and six doctors or bachelors of divinity. Representation in
Parliament, conferred by James I in 1604, was conferred on the University without
reference to its colleges.
359 The cheapening of books after the sixteenth century may
have operated to decrease the corporate spirit of the colleges by permitting the
scholar to study with less dependence on the books owned by the college and used
in common. The Laudian statutes provided for a system of public oral examinations
for the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts, to “be conducted, in rotation,
by all the regent masters, under the orders of the senior proctor,” and covering
branches of study in which, by the statutes, the candidate should be required to have
heard lectures. Whatever centripetal forces of University activity were effective in
overcoming the centrifugal forces of college activity, the principle was still severely
applicable in 1770, that no single one of the heads of colleges, or all of them together,
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VII — The Universities Differ 1850.
In 1850 a new period in the constitutional history of the English universities began,
though some preliminary reforms had taken place between 1800 and 1830. The
Laudian statutes had provided that in the University of Oxford examinations for the
degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts should be conducted in rotation by
all the regent masters, under the orders of the senior proctor, but during the
eighteenth century the system had fallen into decay; no responsibility rested on the
examiners, they received no compensation, and their positions lacked permanence.
In 1800, the system was amended by the division of candidates into two classes, to
whom “pass” and “honor” examinations were respectively given; the candidates for
honors were subdivided into two classes according to the degrees of merit attained
by them; the examiners, moreover, were given responsibility and standing by being
made appointive officers, receiving salaries and serving for definite terms. Even as
amended, the system suffered much further modification in the course of thirty years,
the principal changes being the substitution of written for the oral examinations
required by the original Laudian statutes, as well as by the amendatory statute of
1800; the candidates for honors were divided into three instead of two classes the
system of honor schools was also given a beginning by placing mathematics in a
school separate from the classical school. In 1850, however, the system of
examinations was amplified so that they should be held at the end of the second, third
and fourth years, the last being the final examination for the degree of Bachelor of
Arts, two “pass” examinations were to be held each year in the several branches o{
study, the honor schools were increased to four by the addition of one for natural
science and one for law and modern history to the classical school and the school of
mathematics; the number was later increased to six by the division of that of law and
modern history into one for jurisprudence and one for modern history and by the
addition of one for theology. But such changes, great as they were, demanded only
slight constitutional changes; to the extent that they exerted an influence, they served
to magnify the importance of the University in comparison with its component
colleges. The University was exercising its power to determine to what candidates
it should grant degrees by setting a higher standard or at least by insisting on a more
rigid adherence to the standard formerly too loosely maintained. The inevitable
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University by which almost all its work of instruction was done. The colleges,
however, were so heavily encumbered by the mass of medieval restrictions under
which they worked that the national government, it was generally agreed, had to be
appealed to for the initiation of fundamental reforms.
In 1850, accordingly, and largely at the instance of the authorities of the University
and colleges themselves, a royal commission was appointed for an investigation of
the state of the University and colleges, and of their discipline and revenues. After
a thorough investigation, the commission made many recommendations, of which
part were put in force by an act of Parliament of 1854 and part by ordinances of
executive commissions provided for by the act. The chief reforms were as follows:
The Hebdomadal Board, the organic embodiment of the college monopoly, gave
place to a Council composed of elected representatives, in equal numbers, of the
heads of colleges, professors and resident masters of arts. The Convocation, which
had come to perform its duties perfunctorily, conducting its transactions in Latin and
doing little more than to grant degrees, was superseded by a new body, called the
“Congregation” and composed of all resident members of Convocation, and
permitted to use English in its deliberations. Existing professorships were
reorganized and re-endowed and new ones were founded from contributions levied
on the colleges. The colleges were given new constitutions and new codes of statutes
and their fellowships were made accessible to all candidates on the basis of merit;
new fellowships were required to be created in studies established or recognized by
the University. The number of scholarships and their stipends were increased. Private
halls were provided for so that the “unattached” or “non-collegiate” element might
be restored to the membership of the University. No religious test should be imposed
on scholars at the time of their matriculation or of their receiving the degree of
Bachelor of Arts, but only on candidates for the degree of Master of Arts and for
fellowships in the colleges; in 1871, such religious tests as remained were abolished
by act of Parliament, except such as were necessary to maintain the exclusive
connection of the faculty of theology with the Church of England.
In 1872, renewed agitation for the reform of the universities resulted in the
appointment by the crown of a second commission, purely inquisitorial in character,
for the investigation of the revenues and obligations of both the Universities of
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an act of Parliament was passed in 1877 for the appointment of executive
commissioners with wide powers to reorganize the interrelations of the two
universities and their colleges; that the pursuit of a conservative course in the
readjustment of revenues might be assured, the needs of the several colleges were to
be given prior recognition, and representatives elected by them were to sit in
conjunction with the commissioners. The work of the commission, approved by the
crown in 1882, for the universities and colleges substantially new constitutions and
codes of statutes, though some of the old features were retained. Professorships,
readerships and lectureships were newly founded or given an increased endowment.
The appointment and control of the important University examiners were regulated.
The University was provided with more ample funds for the maintenance of its
buildings and the satisfaction of its other needs. The courses of study were divided
into homogeneous groups under the limited supervision of Boards of Faculties. The
colleges were assessed definite percentages of their revenues to the amount of
£20,000 for the payment of the increased expense, and provision was made for the
application of surplus revenue to University and college purposes, while a reduction
of expenditures was sought in lowering the stipends of fellows. The fellowships were
not to be tenable for life unless connected with an University or college office,
though many of them were at the same time given such connection; the remaining
fellowships, about one hundred in number, were made terminable at the end of seven
years and were freed of obligations of residence and of service in University or
college offices; the restrictions on almost all headships and fellowships were
removed. Scholarships were made uniform as to the age and emoluments of the
scholars who should hold them. But the legislative organization of the University
remained as it had been left by the act of 1854, while the general form of the colleges
was only slightly modified. On its organic side, the University was still, in many
respects, only an aggregate of colleges; the autonomy of the colleges had been
diminished but not destroyed, while the University’s area of activity had been greatly
widened. The instruction by University professors and the tuition by college tutors
continued to flourish side by side. Scholars were not absolutely required to attend the
lectures of the University, though their increased endowments and improved
organization made them more attractive to scholars. Though matriculation might be
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through the colleges by such scholars as should become inmates of them. The
extension of the “combined lecture” system, by which, as in a few colleges since the
seventeenth century, scholars of one college might attend lectures in others, broke
down the barriers between the colleges, while it did not make closer the connection
between their inmates and the University; in fact, the tendency was in quite the
opposite direction, for the system permitted the tutors to specialize their work, in
application of the principle of division of labor, and to make their “combined” work
more effective in the presence of competition by the University. The most important
fact was that equality of status was established in the fellowships and scholarships
of the several colleges; the first step in the amalgamation of confederated states in a
single state is the eradication of the differences between them; likewise the Oxford
scholar became more truly a member of the University when his status in his own
college became the same as that of his fellow-scholars in other colleges. The
abolition of religious tests tended to destroy similarity of membership in the
University while it had the more important effect of bringing scholars as a class into
greater harmony with the outside world — the University became more
cosmopolitan. The “university extension” movement is a legitimate outcome of the
broadening of the basis of university membership.
The comprehension of a wider area by the University of Oxford in the exercise of
its public functions appears plainly from a University statute of 1857 providing for
the examination by it of middle class schools as a means of establishing organic
relations to them. In 1873, a second step in the same direction was taken by the
assumption of the work of examining public schools and granting to their pupils
certificates of their proficiency; it is interesting to note, too, that the work was to be
done by a joint-board of the two Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, —
convincing evidence of the diminishing autonomy of the two corporations; the
movement is said to have been inspired by an apprehension of impending “state
supervision” of the public schools — a confession that the universities were invading
a field of activity rightfully belonging to the state.
“Notwithstanding the bold amendments which it has undergone, the constitution
and educational system of the University must be regarded as still [in 1894] in a state
of transition.”
360 The most that may be said of the changes in the English universities
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activity of the universities not only absolutely, but relatively to that of the component
colleges. The plain tendency has been towards the restoration of the university as the
real unit of higher education from its former status as a federation of colleges. The
colleges have themselves tended to become more similar to each other in constitution
and membership, though dissimilar (yet co-operative) in their activity, while the
relations of their members to the university have become closer and more vital; in
other words, the colleges have tended (though not strongly) to become co-operating
departments of the university. In their relations to society the universities have largely
ceased to contain a membership of persons entirely distinct and different in their
rights and duties from other members of society and consequently have become more
similar to each other; they have come to a realization rather of their affinity to society
than of their distinction from it, — attraction has succeeded repulsion; they have
accordingly extended their area of social activity and have (to a slight extent)
occupied it in common, while they have been treated by the state in legislation and
administration rather as divisions of one body than as separate bodies; in fine, they
have tended to develop from autonomous corporations into administrative organs of
the state.
VIII — Modern English Universities.
The University of Cambridge was so similar in development to the University of
Oxford that for the purposes of this study a consideration of it may be dispensed
with, but the University of Durham and the University of London possess a few
features that may be adverted to with profit.
The University of Durham was founded in 1832 largely through the influence of
the Bishop of Durham. It was to consist of a warden or principal, other necessary
officers, professors and readers, tutors and students, and was to be established
according to such regulations as the dean and chapter of Durham Cathedral (in whom
was confided the discipline) with the consent of the bishop (who should be visitor)
should prescribe; stalls in the cathedral were to be annexed to the office of warden,
and to the professorships of divinity and Greek; the professor of mathematics and
other officers were to be elected by the dean and chapter. In 1835, by statute of the
dean and chapter, the ordinary management of the University, under the bishop as
visitor and the dean and chapter as governors, was vested in the warden, a senate andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 228
a convocation; the warden was to be the active head of the University and to
convoke, dissolve and preside over both senate and convocation, to have both an
original and casting vote in each and to have a previous veto in convocation, subject
in some cases to appeal to the dean and chapter and bishop; the senate was to consist
of the chief officers
361 of the University, to transact the ordinary business of the
University and originate resolutions in more important matters for conformation by
convocation; the convocation, composed of the warden and such doctors and masters
in divinity, law, medicine and arts from Oxford, Cambridge and Dublin as should be
members of the University of Durham, to be increased in future by the doctors and
masters of Durham, was to confirm or reject without amendment measures presented
by the senate. It was incorporated in 1837 as “The Warden, Masters and Scholars of
the University of Durham,” with the power to confer degrees.
362 In 1841 the office
of warden was annexed to that of the dean of Durham. The original six fellows were
eventually increased to twenty-four, of whom all should have the degree of Bachelor
of Arts, not more than one third should be laymen and each should hold his
fellowship for eight years (or if in holy orders, for ten years) but should lose it on
marriage, admission to a preferment in the cathedral or to a benefice; all elections to
fellowships were to be on the basis of merit, including both learning and morals.
Scholars were to be admitted on examination and to submit to annual public
examinations. No religious tests were to be imposed at matriculation, but only on
application for a degree or other academical privileges, though all scholars were
required to attend church services daily. Peculiarly enough, a college was established
within the University, and other colleges or halls were contemplated, with tutors and
censors to regulate the studies and conduct of scholars, of whom all had to be inmates
of some such college, house or hall. An interesting amalgamation of university,
college and cathedral chapter! The University of Durham represents very faithfully
the structure of the university as modified to suit the purpose of a liberal Church. The
control of the Church was assured by vesting the government in the dean and chapter,
and by the union of the offices of dean and warden as well as those of the canons and
chief instructors. Though the instruction was to redound chiefly to the interest of the
Church, not all the fellowships were reserved for fellows in holy orders; not only
were some of the fellowships open to those not in holy orders, but religious tests
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safely permit. If colleges and halls were provided for, they were clearly intended
rather as departments for the organization of the domestic life of the scholars than as
autonomous units of instruction, and were not allowed to threaten the disintegration
of the University itself.
If the organization of the University of Durham was what might reasonably have
been expected from a liberal bishop and cathedral dean and chapter after England’s
six centuries of university history, that of the University of London was what might
likewise have been expected from the exercise by the state of the power of
establishing a great university on its own initiative after an equal experience. In 1836,
William IV granted to a number of noblemen and gentlemen a charter for a new
university, to be called “The University of London,” of which they should constitute
the senate,
363 “for the advancement of religion and morality, and the promotion of
useful knowledge [and] to hold forth to all classes and denominations... without any
distinction whatever, an encouragement for pursuing a regular and liberal course of
education.” The senate, appointed “for the purpose of ascertaining by means of
examinations the persons who [had] acquired proficiency in literature, science and
art by the pursuit of [a] course of education and of rewarding them by academical
degrees, as evidence of their respective attainments, and marks of honor
proportionate thereto,” was to be composed of a chancellor, vice-chancellor and
thirty-six fellows, of whom all should be qualified by the possession of doctors’,
masters’ or bachelors degrees, besides such persons as the crown might see fit to add
at a subsequent time. In addition to the senate there was to be a convocation,
consisting of all Doctors of Law, Doctors of Medicine, Masters of Arts, Bachelors
of Law and Bachelors of Medicine of two years’ standing and Bachelors of Arts of
three years’ standing, electing its own chairman for terms of three years, and
empowered to discuss and declare its opinion on any matter relating to the
University. The chancellor was to be appointed by the crown and to serve for life; the
vice-chancellor was to be elected annually by the senate from among the fellows;
vacancies among the fellows were to be filled by the remaining fellows or by the
crown from a list of three nominees presented by convocation for each vacancy. The
crown was to be visitor. The power to appoint examiners and other officers and
servants was to be exercised by the senate. The administration of the University and
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approval of one of the secretaries of state. The degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Master
of Arts, Bachelor of Laws and Doctor of Laws were to be granted only to graduates
of University College (London), King’s College (London) and such other institutions,
whether in London or outside, as the crown should authorize; the degrees of Bachelor
of Medicine and Doctor of Medicine were to be granted to graduates of such
institutions as should be approved by the secretary of state at the suggestion of the
senate.
364 Examinations for degrees were to be held annually and such fees were to
be charged for them as should be approved by the Commissioners of the Treasury.
The University has been without endowment, has been required to submit annually
to the Commissioners of the Treasury an account of its receipts and expenditures, and
has been supported by parliamentary grants, its fees from examinations having been
expended in rewards and scholarships; the duties of the members of the senate have
been gratuitously performed.
The University of London is merely a university superstructure for the colleges
connected with it. When considered together, the University and the several colleges
connected with it are not unlike either of the older Universities of Oxford or
Cambridge except that the new institution touches the state at more points, does not
pretend to be a “teaching university” and is far more distinct from its colleges in its
administration than are the older universities. In the University of Durham one
extreme was attained by the amalgamation of the University and its colleges, while
in the University of London the other extreme was attained by making the University
more distinct from its colleges than is any other similar institution. It is interesting
in the extreme that though the University of London was merely an institution
initiated by the state to confer degrees indicative of work accomplished by separate
colleges, it should be given the form evolved in the history of the Universities of
Oxford and Cambridge; the weak element in its constitution was its only new feature
— the body of fellows; the corresponding bodies in the constitutions of Oxford,
Cambridge and Durham were composed of persons having a vital connection as
instructors or administrators with the colleges, but in the University of London, the
distinct interests and geographical separation of the colleges made such a body
impossible and compelled reliance on a body composed of prominent educated
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IX — Schools and Eleemosynary Corporations.
In the grades of schools below the universities and their colleges a considerable
diversity of organization prevailed until the nineteenth century, during which,
however, comparative uniformity has been attained through the interference of the
state. The reason for the diversity was, doubtless, that the scholars themselves did not
participate in the control of their own organization. The scholars of grammar schools
were readily recognized, both by their age and by the inferior rank of their studies,
as a dependent class. Most of the schools, moreover, originated in the period of the
Renaissance and Reformation, the last half of the fifteenth and the first half of the
sixteenth centuries; by that time the movement in all mediaeval corporations towards
the restriction of the governing powers of their members to a close administrative
class within them was well-nigh complete; burgesses were no longer mere citizens
but members of close governing bodies in the towns; the fellowship of a gild was not
the entire body of gildsmen but merely the governing body of wardens and assistants
or other higher rank of gildsmen; so, too, in the colleges of the universities, the
fellows, who had earlier been merely scholars governing themselves, had become the
collegiate body in which was reposed the government of scholars and the
administration of college affairs; it might be expected, then, that the grammar schools
founded in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would be only bodies of scholars
subjected to a “governing body” of some kind. As far as the scholars themselves were
concerned, their organization for the purpose of instruction was simple and uniform;
they were merely grouped in classes according to their work or their social status and
subjected to rules made by the governing body and executed by head-masters and
their under-masters, ushers or other assistants; a rudimentary element of autonomy
existed in the monitorial system, and the status of scholars in some schools was
preliminary to the enjoyment of a similar or more exalted status in university or other
colleges, or even in the governing body of their own school, but in itself it was purely
dependent. In the governing bodies, the real corporations, much variety of form
appeared. The corporate bodies to which the grammar schools were subjected were
purely ecclesiastical and secular corporations, formed either for their own peculiar
purposes or for the express purpose of governing the schools, — municipal
corporations, corporations formed for general charitable purposes of which one was
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administration of schools. They may broadly be divided into two classes; in the first,
ecclesiastical elements were prominent, and the force of the Reformation was not
seriously felt; — in the second, ecclesiastical elements were excluded and the
influence of the Reformation appeared in the substitution of secular elements.
Westminster College, or St. Peter’s College at Westminster, was an appendage of
the dean and chapter of Westminster, which had been a monastery before the
Reformation, had been suppressed as such and made a collegiate church and later a
cathedral church by Henry VIII and even later restored to the condition of a collegiate
church by Edward VI; as a monastery it had supported a school, though far less
important than the one maintained after its suppression; associated with the dean and
chapter in the appointment of its head-master and in its government were the dean
of Christchurch, Oxford, and the master of Trinity College, Cambridge. Winchester
College, however, founded by Wykeham in 1379 as a preparatory school for New
College, Oxford, was not subjected to a purely ecclesiastical corporation. Its
governing body consisted of a warden, sub-warden and ten fellows, elected by the
warden and fellows of New College, while the school itself, superintended by a
head-master and usher, contained seventy scholars; the members of the governing
body, however, were all priests, and were assisted by a body of chaplains and
choristers in the execution of the religious part of the bishop-founder’s plans; the
governing body did not constitute a church, but was exactly modelled on the
predominant type of Oxford college; the fellows were expected and intended to
devote themselves primarily to learning. Eton College was modelled on Winchester
College by its founder, Henry VI, and consisted of a provost, ten fellows, a
schoolmaster and twenty-five poor scholars, with the necessary chaplains, clerks and
choristers; but the provost and fellows constituted a collegiate church into which a
parochial church had been converted for the purpose of founding the college; its
endowment was derived almost entirely from suppressed alien priories; it was
intended as a preparatory school for King’s College, Cambridge, just as Winchester
for New College.
But after the end of the fifteenth century, founders of endowed schools appear to
have had less confidence in the permanence of ecclesiastical institutions and to have
preferred to entrust their benefactions to secular corporations. John Colet, though
dean of the cathedral chapter of St. Paul’s, conveyed the endowment of St. Paul’sJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 233
School to the Company of Mercers of London with the direction that they should
“have all the care and governance of the school [and should] every year choose of
their company two honest and substantial men called the surveyors of the school,
which in the name of the whole fellowship [should] take all the charge and business
about the school for that one year”; he assigned as the reason for his preference of the
London company “that there was no certainty in human affairs, but that, in his
opinion, there was less probability of corruption in such a body of citizens than in any
other order or degree of mankind.” The Merchant Taylors’ school, however, was
founded directly by the Merchant Taylors Company, with the assistance of some of
its members, about 1560, and has been maintained by it ever since; the master and
wardens and all past-masters were to be the”surveyors” of the school. Shrewsbury
School was founded by Edward VI about 1554 on an endowment consisting of
church property appropriated by him; he conveyed the property to the town
corporation of Shrewsbury, in which he also vested the government of the school
under the Bishop of Lincoln as visitor; in 1798, after a long quarrel between the town
corporation and the head master over the question of his independence of it,
Parliament interfered and vested the government of the school in twelve trustees,
together with the mayor, who should preside over them and have both an original and
casting vote; vacancies in their body were to be filled by the town corporation from
three nominees of the trustees; St. John’s College, Cambridge, was to have the power
to appoint the head-master. The “free grammar-school of John Lyon, in the village
of Harrow upon the Hill” and its endowment were placed in control of six “keepers
and governors” of the school, who should, among other things, maintain the school
from its endowment and perpetuate their own existence by filling their vacancies by
co-optation. In 1611, Thomas Sutton conveyed in trust to a body of sixteen
“governors” lands for the establishment of a hospital and free school, who should fill
their vacancies by co-optation,
365 make all necessary statutes for the administration
of their double charge and appoint the master of the school and other officers; such
was the organization of the Charterhouse School. Somewhat similarly, Lawrence
Sheriff conveyed lands to two trustees who were to maintain from their revenue a
school and almshouses at Rugby, and so reconvey the lands to other trustees that the
latter would perpetuate their maintenance.
366 By decree of the court of chancery in
1653, however, the succession of trusts was replaced by a self-renewing board ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 234
twelve trustees.
The periods of the Renaissance and Reformation were prolific of endowed
grammar schools, and elementary schools, most of which were placed under the
government of town corporations, some of them more or less modified for the
purpose by the addition of outside members, of distinct self-renewing bodies of
trustees or governors, or of bodies more or less composed of members holding their
places by virtue of their offices in Church or State.
The grammar schools of Edward VI, endowed from the property of suppressed
monasteries and priories, were nearly all given over to municipalities, like
Shrewsbury School. In very many of the grammar schools, even of those governed
by municipalities, the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge obtained a more or less
exclusive control of the appointment of the master, and were closely affiliated with
them through the medium of scholarships in the colleges held by the schools.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the schools remained substantially
unchanged in their constitutions, though in many of them the members of the
governing body came to view their positions almost solely as sources of revenue, to
the detriment of the schools as educational institutions. In fact, during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries many new endowed schools were founded,
though nearly all of them were organized on the same plan as those of the later
Reformation. When the time to reform them came in the nineteenth century, they
were all dealt with by the same general method. The courts of equity had always
exercised jurisdiction over them as trusts, whose execution it could enforce, or
modify. In many cases the courts had interfered to enforce schemes involving
reorganization of the governing bodies, redistribution of revenues or rearrangement
of curricula. But the court of chancery was an inadequate medium of reform, and its
work had to be supplemented by parliamentary action. The general method of
Parliament in the several classes of schools included two steps, (a) an investigation
of the corporations, their revenues and the schools maintained by them, with
recommendations for their reform, and (b) an enforcement of the recommendations.
The first step was undertaken by an Inquisitorial and advisory commission, the
second step by an executive commission either temporary or permanent in character.
Of the commissions to inquire into the affairs of the endowed schools there were
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Commission of 1861 and (3) the Schools Inquiry Commission of 1864. The first
commission investigated the elementary schools; the second, nine particular public
schools and colleges, Westminster, Winchester, Eton, St. Paul’s, Merchant Taylors’,
Shrewsbury, Harrow, Charterhouse and Rugby; the third, such schools as had not
been investigated by the two earlier commissions. The work of each commission, and
the action based on its recommendations, will be briefly considered.
(1) The Commissioners of Popular Education were appointed by the crown in 1859,
“to inquire into the state of popular education in England, and to consider and report
what measures, if any, [were] required for the extension of sound and cheap
elementary instruction to all classes of the people.” In their report in 1862, they
expressed the opinion that the court of chancery was not a suitable body for the
reformation and supervision of the schools for popular education and that the powers
of the charity commissioners I were ineffectual for the purpose; they therefore
recommended that the work be placed under a committee of the Privy Council. No
action, however, was taken on the recommendation until after the reports of the two
succeeding bodies of commissioners.
(2) In 1861 a royal commission was appointed “for the purpose of enquiring into
the nature and application of the endowments, funds and revenues belonging to or
received by the... colleges, schools and foundations” of Eton, Winchester,
Westminster, Charterhouse, St. Paul’s, Merchant Taylors’, Harrow, Rugby and
Shrewsbury, “and also to enquire into [their] administration and management... and
into the system and course of studies respectively pursued [in them] as well as into
the methods, subjects and extent of the instruction given to [their] students.” The
recommendations of the commission were carried into effect through a body of seven
executive commissioners appointed by virtue of the Public Schools Act of 1868. The
governing bodies were allowed a limited period (about a year) in which to make the
changes themselves subject to the approval of the commission; after the expiration
of the time such changes as were still not made were to be made by the commission
itself. Westminster College was provided with an endowment of lands, buildings and
funds separate from those of the dean and chapter, and was given a new governing
body composed of the dean of Westminster, dean of Christchurch (Oxford), master
of Trinity College (Cambridge), two members elected by the dean and chapter of
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one member elected by the masters and seniors of Trinity College (Cambridge), one
elected by the Council of the Royal Society, one appointed by the Lord Chief Justice
of England, one elected by such masters of Westminster as should be graduates of the
English universities and not less than three nor more than five members elected by
the governing body itself. Winchester College (it was recommended) should have a
governing body consisting of a warden, four stipendiary and seven honorary fellows,
the four stipendiary fellows being distinguished in literature or science and having
served as head-master, second master or assistant master, the seven honorary fellows
being the warden of New College (Oxford), three appointees of the crown and three
chosen by the governing body. Eton was to be governed by a body of nine, ten or
eleven fellows; the provost was to be appointed by the crown and to be relieved of
the spiritual charge of the parish of Eton, and though to be a member of the Church
of England, not necessarily to be in holy orders. The fellows were to consist of the
provosts of Eton and King’s College (Cambridge) ex officio, five nominees of the
University of Oxford, the University of Cambridge, the Royal Society, the Lord Chief
Justice and the masters of Eton, and the remaining two, three or four elected by the
fellows themselves.
Some of the schools under secular control were reformed in a similar manner. It
was recommended that the governing body of St. Paul’s be amended by adding to the
master, wardens and surveyors one or two other members elected by the Mercers’
Company and an equal number appointed by the crown, but the recommendation was
not executed. No recommendation was made as to the Merchant Taylors’ School.
Shrewsbury School should have a governing body of thirteen members, three elected
by the municipality of Shrewsbury, one by the masters and fellows of St. John’s
College (Cambridge), one by the master and fellows of Magdalen College
(Cambridge), one by the dean and chapter of Christchurch (Oxford), three by the
crown and four by the governing body. Harrow School was to be strengthened by
adding to the six original “keepers and governors” six others distinguished by a
reputation in literature and science. The recommendations concerning Charterhouse
and Rugby schools were quite similar. To the sixteen governors of the former it was
proposed that four others eminent in literature and science be added, and then that the
whole number of twenty be gradually reduced to the original number of sixteen by
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recommendation was based on the view that “the task which these bodies will have
to undertake... is that of blending a due proportion of modern studies with the old
classical course without destroying the general character of the public schools.” Of
the twelve trustees of Rugby it was desired that they “be persons qualified by their
position or attainments to fill [their] situation with advantage to the school” and that
four of them be “of generally acknowledged eminence in literature and science. “
(3) The third commission, to investigate the schools not comprised in the work of
the two former commissions, was appointed in 1864. The first commission had
investigated elementary popular schools; the second nine particular grammar schools;
the third was intended to investigate in general the rest of the grammar schools. The
commission presented its report in 1867–1868. It proposed that the head-master of
an endowed school appoint and dismiss his own assistants and have entire charge of
the administration of the school; and that the governors, subject to schemes adopted
by superior authorities, “use the funds of the endowment as shall be found expedient
for the good of the school,” appoint and dismiss masters, determine the subjects of
instruction, fix the fees of scholars and the salaries of the employees, maintain halls
(in boarding schools) and grant or refuse licenses to separate boarding houses.
Through provincial and central authorities the schools were to be graded in districts
with relation to each other, consolidated, enlarged or suppressed. Schemes for the
resettlement of educational trusts proposed by the provincial and approved by the
central authority were to be presented to Parliament. The schools should be
periodically inspected, have their accounts audited and their scholars examined by
the central authority or its representatives.
367 The report was followed by the passage
of the Endowed Schools Act of 1869, providing for the appointment of three
commissioners by the crown. They should have power to prepare schemes for the
administration of endowments of the schools which should be submitted for approval
to the committee of the Privy Council on education. The governing bodies of schools
might present to the commissioners schemes for their consideration and might appeal
from their decision to the Queen in Council, by whom in turn the scheme in
controversy might be referred to Parliament for further consideration or back to the
commissioners with a proper order. In general, it was provided that endowments
supporting both schools and other charities might be divided, part going under the
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commissioners.
Under the legislation based on the above-described investigations the older
corporations have been so changed in character that they have become virtually new
corporations. The important features of the reforms were the following: (1) Such of
the colleges as had been under the control of the Church were released from it,
though a sentiment of conservatism gave the older ecclesiastical corporations
representation on the governing body. (2) The colleges dependent on the colleges of
Oxford and Cambridge were made independent of them, though they, like the
Church, were given a limited representation in the governing bodies. (3) Likewise the
extensive influence of municipalities was reduced to a limited representation. (4) A
national element was added in representatives named by the crown and high officers
of state and elected by the governing bodies themselves. (5) A clear distinction was
made between the governing bodies and the schools, — which had not been done at
all before the Reformation and had afterwards been incompletely done, — and such
a composition of the former was provided for that they should be fairly representative
of enlightened public opinion. (6) The new governing bodies were so broadened that
“though not unduly large, they should be protected by their numbers and by the
position and character of their individual members from the domination of personal
or professional influences or prejudices and [should] include men conversant with
the world, with the requirements of active life, and with the progress of literature and
science.” (7) Perhaps all the other features of the reform are comprehended in the
implied recognition that (at least popular and intermediate) education is intended not
so much for the benefit of the scholar himself as for that of the society of which he
forms a part, and that the schools, if not governed directly by the state, ought at all
events to be governed (with slight reference to the wishes of the original founders)
by such a composite body that the maintenance of their due relations to society would
be assured; the demand that literary and scientific studies be combined with the older
classical studies was based on the new view of education.
X — Inns of Court and Inns of Chancery.
The origin of the inns of court and inns of chancery, to which Sir John Fortescue
accorded the dignity of “The University of the Laws,”
368 is involved in obscurity. The
generally accepted explanation is that they grew out of the common life of lawyers,John P. Davis, Corporations, 239
students and officers of the courts. When in the thirteenth century the Court of
Common Pleas, by the terms of Magna Charta, as originally granted by John and as
subsequently confirmed by Henry III,
369 came to be held in a definite place, the king’s
palace at Westminster, instead of following the king from place to place,
370 the
attorneys and officers of the court found places of living as near as convenient to both
the palace and the city of London. The buildings taken for the purpose, called houses,
hostels or inns, and distinguished from others as those of the “court,”
371 had earlier
been used as the houses of the suppressed order of Knights Templars and the palaces
of noblemen; the four inns of court were accordingly known as the Inner Temple, the
Middle Temple, Lincoln’s Inn, and Gray’s Inn. The practitioners in the courts had
earlier been almost exclusively ecclesiastics, but in the thirteenth century the clergy
were forbidden by the Church to practise as advocates in the temporal courts; the lay
advocates were thereby undoubtedly increased in number and made more distinct as
a class. The inns of chancery
372 appear to have been used more by the officers of the
courts and younger students of law than by those who had been admitted to the
higher ranks of the profession, but their origin may be reasonably assumed to have
been similar to that of the inns of court. Each inn of chancery belonged to or was
dependent on one of the inns of court. Clifford’s Inn, Clement’s Inn and Lyon’s Inn
(the latter torn down in 1868) were dependent on the Inner Temple; New Inn and
Strand Inn (the latter destroyed in 1594), on the Middle Temple; Furnival’s Inn and
Thavie’s Inn, on Lincoln’s Inn; and Staple Inn and Barnard’s Inn, on Gray’s Inn.
There is fragmentary historical evidence of other inns both of court and of chancery,
but the ones mentioned were of most importance. Fortescue wrote of ten inns of
chancery but a century later only nine of them could be positively identified. All the
inns were supported by the rentals of chambers, charges for commons,
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contributions of members and fees for admission and advancement to successive
ranks; their societies owned no property except the houses and the personal property
with which they were furnished. A review of the several classes into which the
inmates of the houses were divided will show their relations to one another and to the
state.
When a student began the study of the common law, he entered one of the inns of
chancery, in which his elementary work was to be done. After two or three years of
residence and work in an inn of chancery, he might enter an inn of court and later beJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 240
called to be an inner barrister; the next step was to become an utter barrister. The
distinctions of inner barrister and utter barrister probably had no reference to the
courts but only to the exercises in the houses. The chief exercises were in the form
of moots or discussion of feigned cases. The cases were stated in the form of
pleadings by the inner barristers (younger students) after supper in the common hall
presided over by the reader; they were then taken up and discussed by utter barristers
(older students). They were next discussed by the “cupboardmen” — two more
advanced barristers who appear to have participated separately in the exercises of the
meeting and occupied a position in the hall near the cupboard, — with whom the
benchers present also discussed the legal questions involved in the cases; the reader
finally closed the discussions by delivering a formal opinion on the cases. Moots
were distinguished as “grand” and “petit,” the former appearing to have been held in
the inns of court at the time of the “grand readings,” and the latter in the inns of
chancery before the readers appointed for them, and were preceded by the less formal
and elaborate “bolts,” private disputations by students on legal questions with a
bencher and two barristers. The student became an inner or utter barrister by being
formally “called” by the reader to take part in the mootings; the distinction of “inner”
and “utter” is said to have arisen from the fact that the younger students sat at the
inkier end and the older students at the outer end of the form occupied during the
disputations. The rank of utter barrister was attained only by participation in the
required exercises in the inns, of which certificates had to be presented to the
pension, parliament or council of the benchers. The readings were given and the
exercises held chiefly in the vacations of court, though also during the term-times of
court; the word vacation accordingly came to be used in the inns quite synonymously
with the word term in other educational institutions.
374 Stowe in his Survey of
London, states that the year was divided into three parts, (1) the learning vacations,
(2) the term-times and (3) the dead or mean vacation; the learning vacations were two
in number, the Lent vacation, beginning on the first Monday in Lent, and the summer
vacation, beginning on the Monday after Lammas-day, each continuing three weeks
and three days. The readers that officiated in the Lent vacation were full benchers,
had read before, and were known as “double-readers”; those in the summer vacation
had just been appointed, were reading for the first time and were called “single
readers.”John P. Davis, Corporations, 241
Barristers regularly became ancients by seniority, though sons of judges might
attain their “antiquity” by right of inheritance and the rank was conferred cause
honoris on persons of distinction. From the class of ancients the benchers in their
periodical meetings elected the readers, whose function it was to lecture to the
students on legal topics and preside over the discussion of the moot cases. The
benchers (or “masters of the bench”) were the governing bodies of the inns of court
and filled their vacancies by co-optation from the numbers of the utter barristers; the
preliminary step was the election of a candidate each year to the position of reader,
from which after having read (or lectured) publicly he entered into the full status of
a bencher. Sometimes candidates were made benchers without reading, a
considerable fine taking the place of the actual work of reading; in some cases, also,
the person elected reader became a bencher at once and made a deposit of a
considerable sum to be repaid to him when he should at a future time have performed
his duty of lecturing. They were not limited in number, though after the sixteenth
century they arbitrarily restricted the admission of new members. They elected
annually from their own membership as their presiding officer a treasurer or
pensioner. At meetings called pensions, parliaments or councils and held quarterly
or more frequently, they elected treasurers, readers and committees to audit the
treasurer’s accounts, and transacted the current business of their houses; barristers in
the preliminary status of benchers were sometimes admitted to a limited participation
in the proceedings. On entering an office the officer had to take an oath to faithfully
perform his duties; likewise a common member began his membership with an oath
to obey the rules and regulations of the society. By the common law the judges of the
superior courts were the visitors of the inns and might entertain appeals from the
orders of their governing bodies. All members of the societies of the inns (except the
mere beginners below the rank of inner barrister) were comprehensively called
apprenticii, but those who were permitted to practice in the courts were particularly
known as apprenticii ad leges; the term junior barrister was applied to inner
barristers and utter barristers, while the term senior barrister was substantially
equivalent to apprenticius ad legem.
When a barrister was called to the rank of serjeant —  and only benchers of inns
of court were called to it — he ceased to be a member of the society and became an
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Inn in Chancery-lane. From the serjeants-at-law alone all the judges of the superior
courts were chosen, as well as the higher legal officers of the crown, such as the
attorney-general and solicitor-general.
The inns of court had no organic connection with one another, and though their
governing bodies often deliberated in conference on matters of common concern, the
orders issued in consequence were made separately by each house;
375 no one of them
enjoyed precedence over either of the others. The inns of chancery were governed
directly by a principal and small body of ancients, and their readers were appointed
by the benchers of the inns of court to which they were severally subject. Those who
had studied in an inn of chancery dependent on one inn of court might enter a
different inn of court on payment of a somewhat larger fee. For example, it was
ordered in the tenth year of the reign of Elizabeth that if one had been of an inn of
chancery belonging to the Middle Temple, he might enter that house upon payment
of 40s.; if of any other inn of chancery, upon payment often.; if of no inn of chancery
at all, he should pay £6 13s. 4d.
As in most other mediaeval institutions of education, the attainment of learning was
not all that was sought; in addition to their study of law, the inmates of the inns of
court and of chancery were taught to dance and sing, and to play on musical
instruments; “upon festival days and after the offices of the church are over, they
employ themselves in the study of sacred and profane history.”
376
Connected with each inn was a church or chapel, in which religious services were
provided for the inmates; the Inner Temple and Middle Temple, however, made joint
use of the Temple Church, in which the anomalous Master of the Temple officiated.
The society of the inns was also enlivened by masques and revels, at which high
officers of state were sometimes present, and by the elaborate celebration of festival
days of the Church, especially of Christmas.
377 The regulations dealing with the attire,
personal appearance and deportment of the inmates were numerous and minute. The
order that the beard be not allowed to grow long was often made; it was made more
definite in the Inner Temple, in the reign of Philip and Mary, by limiting the beard
to three weeks’ growth on pain of forfeiture of twenty shillings, though in other inns
persons of the quality of knights were exempt from the restriction. Guests and
strangers might not be admitted to the chambers; laundresses and victual-women
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fomenting of quarrels, especially on the occasions of revels and Christmas
celebrations, was discouraged by appropriate penalties. In Gray’s Inn no gown,
doublet, hose or other outer garment of light color might be worn, on pain of
expulsion. Playing at dice, cards or otherwise, in the hall, buttery or butler’s chamber
was forbidden except during the twenty days into which the Christmastidewas
extended. At the end of the sixteenth century it was ordered in the Inner Temple that
wearing a hat or cloak in the Temple Church, in the hall, buttery or kitchen, at the
buttery-bar or dresser or in the garden, should be punished by a fine of 6s. 8d.; that
fellows should not enter the hall with any weapons except their dagger or knife upon
pain of forfeiting £5; and “that they go not in cloaks, hats, boots and spurs into the
city, but when they ride out of the town.”
378 So great was the success in inculcating
gentility of manners by the governors of the houses that many persons of quality sent
their sons to attend them not so much to study law as to acquire the habits of good
society. Nearly every act of importance was accompanied by a banquet; in fact, that
feature of the life of the houses outlasted more substantial functions.
379 Almost the
only forms of punishment were”excommunication” (deprivation of the privilege of
dining in common with one’s associates) and expulsion from the inns, though fines
were also imposed for a few offenses; members expelled from one inn were not
admitted into others.
The brief description of the organization and life of the inns of court and of
chancery that has been given applies to them in most respects as they existed in the
fifteenth century. In the sixteenth century many evidences of decadence made their
appearance. The membership, always largely restricted to the higher classes, became
even more closely confined to the noble and wealthy. It was ordered by James I, in
the first year of his reign, that “none be from henceforth admitted into the society of
any House of Court that is not a gentleman by descent.”
380 Many were allowed to
omit the elementary stages of instruction; in the fifth year of the reign of Elizabeth
it was ordered that admission to the Inner Temple should be only on payment of 40s.,
unless the applicant were the son of one of the bench or utter-bar, or had been for a
year of one of the inns of chancery belonging to the house. The readings (or lectures)
came to be perfunctory in character, and the mootings were neglected. Henry VIII
issued a commission to “inquire into the form and order of study and course of living
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justices, the chief baron and all the other justices of both benches and the barons of
the exchequer that the readings in the inns of chancery be not discouraged by
excessive charges and that readers be selected on account of learning and merit and
not of mere seniority. In the seventeenth century further efforts were made (especially
by Cromwell) to regenerate the houses, but with ill success; they came to be hardly
more than mere “lodgings.” In the nineteenth century, lectures and moot-courts have
been re-established,
381 but hardly more than partial success can be expected without
more radical reforms. A royal commission was appointed in 1854 “to inquire into the
arrangements in the inns of court for promoting the study of the law and
jurisprudence, the revenues properly applicable and the means most likely to secure
a systematic and sound education for students of law, and provide satisfactory tests
of fitness for admission to the bar.” In the following year it suggested in its report the
constitution of a university composed of a chancellor, barristers-at-law and masters
of laws, the chancellor elective for life by all barristers and masters of laws, and
aided by a senate of thirty-two members (eight elected by each inn of court), one
fourth of whom should retire annually; the government of the university should be
vested in the chancellor and senate; a vice-chancellor, treasurer and secretary should
be elected by the senate; students should be examined for admission to the inns of
court, on application for degrees and for admission to the bar, by examiners
appointed by the senate; readers in addition to those already in service were to be
appointed by the senate on its own initiative or on the application of the bench of any
inn of court. The plan was not adopted, however, and the houses have remained
substantially unchanged.
The inns of court, in the actual educational work of preparing lawyers for practice,
have been largely superseded by other agencies, such as the universities and societies
of lawyers.
382 The little that has been accomplished has been in the direction
indicated by the suggestion of the commission of 1854. Even before the commission
had been appointed the inns of court (in 1851) had aimed to secure concerted action
through a Council of Legal Education composed of their representatives. In 1869,
they issued “Consolidated Regulations of the Four Inns of Court” and shortly
afterwards introduced a system of examinations. The inns of court and inns of
chancery were essentially medieval institutions, so similar to the gilds and early
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organizations that were not modified in form or given new functions in
post-Reformation society, they were hardly more than survivals, after the beginning
of the seventeenth century, of a past social order, not typical of the society in which
they existed, not expressing any distinct force of the new time, and existing by the
inertia of tradition rather in conflict with their social environment than in harmony
with it.
XI. — Charitable Corporations.
If a strictly logical order had been followed in considering educational and
eleemosynary corporations, the general subject of endowed charities would have
preceded that of colleges and schools and would have followed that of the
universities. A consideration of colleges and schools seemed to follow appropriately
that of the universities, though organically they differed greatly. The general subject
of endowed charities would include that of the colleges and schools, because the
latter were only particular kinds of charities. It is suggestive of the new views of
education entertained in the nineteenth century that the term charity does not usually
suggest to the mind an educational institution, though until the beginning of the
century the term was more widely used. The difficulty of classifying the corporations
considered in this chapter also suggests the difference in principle between the
universities and the eleemosynary corporations, including colleges, schools, asylums,
almshouses and miscellaneous charities; the former assumed an organization
prompted largely by forces within the group of scholars, a spontaneous form (if the
term “spontaneous” is not too freely used); upon the latter a form was imposed by
forces external to the acting groups, a form hardly described as spontaneous. But
putting aside the question of classification, the endowed charities, exclusive of those
of an educational character, consisted of asylums or hospitals, almshouses and
miscellaneous institutions, which may be considered together. Little more can be said
of them than has already been said of colleges and schools; a few paragraphs, indeed,
will serve to fairly complete the subject and show the similarity of such institutions
to others already described.
Before the Reformation, non-educational charities were not as a rule separately
organized, but were administered as departments or appendages of organizations
intended for a wider purpose. The churches and monasteries, though much of theirJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 246
charity was unregulated, frequently had a fixed part of their organization devoted to
its management; among the monasteries, especially, the organization varied from the
mere maintenance of an official almoner who dispensed doles indiscriminately at the
monastery gate to monasteries devoted almost entirely to the entertainment of
travellers (particularly pilgrims), the care of the sick and demented, the rearing of
orphans and waifs and the maintenance and repair of bridges and highways, — just
as schools varied from those taught by the official scholasticus to the monastic
houses of Oxford and Cambridge devoted almost entirely to study and instruction.
The physical basis of the charities varied correspondingly; nearly all monasteries set
apart certain rooms for the care of monks in their sickness or other incapacity; some
had separate buildings for the purpose, especially when care was extended to
outsiders; others had establishments at a distance supervised by a prior or master and
his assistants in direct dependence on the superior abbot; finally, the establishment
was in a few cases complete in itself and presided over by an abbot and convent of
monks. Likewise the gilds extended aid in charity to their own members and
sometimes even to outsiders, and maintained for the purpose separate buildings in
charge of a master or governor, after the manner of the still existing London Livery
Companies; it will be remembered that the bachelor fellowships found in a few of the
gilds were maintained largely for the administration of the gild’s charities among its
common members or freemen. The municipalities also administered some charities,
but not so often, like the gilds, from their own resources as from those placed in their
hands by individuals. In very many statutes of university colleges and endowed
grammar schools, themselves regarded as organs of charity, it was provided that a
number of poor persons (not scholars) should be maintained on the foundation.
In the sixteenth century, however, with the suppression of monasteries and of
hospitals and almshouses dependent on them, and with the partial decay of the town
corporations, a large part of the stream of charitable benefactions was diverted in the
direction of corporations created for the express purpose of administering them.
Many of the hospitals, lazar-houses and almshouses formerly maintained by the
monasteries were bestowed, with their endowments, on the towns corporations, to
ensure the faithful performance of their duties by the towns, the bodies of burgesses
were frequently modified by the addition of outside members, or their activity was
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endowments that would formerly have been placed in charge of ecclesiastical bodies
were intrusted to such of the gilds or companies as survived the sixteenth century.
But for the great mass of eleemosynary endowments new bodies of trustees or
governors were created. And of such bodies there were, according to their
composition, four classes; — consisting of (1) the original nominees of the founder
and their successors chosen by co-optation to fill vacancies, (2) the incumbents of
offices in Church and State or in other corporations, (3) the holders of particular
lands, usually those constituting the endowment and (4) heirs of the founder or of
persons designated by him. More properly it might be said that the corporations
consisted of one or more of the elements described, for a very small minority of them
would fall in only one of the four classes. Whatever the form of the corporate body,
a visitor was usually (but not always) provided for in the person of an officer of
Church or State.
The charitable purposes to which endowments were devoted were various. The
preamble of the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses
383 recited that
“lands, tenements, rents, annuities, profits, hereditaments, goods,
chattels, money and stocks of money [had] been... given, limited,
appointed and assigned... some for the relief of the aged, impotent
and poor people, some for maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers
and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in
universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks and highways, some for education and
preferment of orphans, some for or towards relict, stock or
maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages of poor
maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen,
handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or
redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor
inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers
and other taxes.”
Very frequently more than one charitable purpose was intended to be subserved by
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Rugby School, provided for the construction and maintenance of some almshouses
on the same foundation with it; likewise John Lyon provided that the “keepers and
governors” of his school at Harrow should also administer an endowment for the
maintenance and repair of certain highways in the vicinity; in the last mentioned case,
the estates of the two foundations were separate, but in many others a single
endowment was intended to support several foundations; in some cases the founders
were careful to provide the several fractions of revenue that should be devoted to
several charities, while in others they were to be supported by the revenues of the
endowment in gross. The bodies described were characterized by their simplicity and
fixity of form. No distinct demarkation of classes of members, and especially of a
governing class, appears to have been developed in them. In fact, they were, in
themselves, only the governing organs of institutions and could hardly, in view of the
fact that they were composed of few members (usually not more than twelve), have
developed further in that direction. No dominant executive office was developed.
By the Elizabethan Act of Charitable Uses, passed in 1601, the first great statute
for the regulation of such bodies, it was aimed to secure, largely through the
instrumentality of the court of chancery, the faithful execution of their trusts by such
bodies. It was provided that the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal
might award commissions to bishops and “other persons of good and sound
behavior” empowering them to enquire either in groups of four of their own number
or by juries of twelve men or otherwise, concerning the administration of property
devoted to charitable uses as described in the preamble, and upon the results of their
enquiry to make such orders, judgments and decrees as would secure the faithful
employment of the trust estates. The orders, judgments or decrees were not to be
repugnant to the orders or statutes of the founders of the charities and were to be
valid and capable of execution until reversed or altered by the Lord Chancellor or
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal; they were to be certified by the commissioners to the
court of chancery, which might thereupon make such orders for their execution as it
should consider fit; if any one should be aggrieved by them, he might, by making
complaint to the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, secure an
examination and hearing, with the possible result that the orders might be annulled,
modified, altered or enlarged. The statute was not, however, to extend in its operation
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Etonor Winchester, to cathedrals or collegiate churches, to cities or towns, or to
charities in them having special governors, or to colleges, hospitals or free schools
for which their founders had provided special visitors, governors or overseers. The
chief result of the operation of this statute was to bring into harmony with the mass
of “governing bodies” of charities others, rudimentary and imperfect in form,
depending for their perpetuation upon successive re-enfeoffments of estates or the
untrustworthy incidents of heirship and ownership of land; many such bodies were
replaced by self-renewing bodies of from six to twelve members, modified frequently
by the possession of members ex officio, subject to visitation by some officer of
Church or State. The purpose of this statute, like that of the Statute of Laborers, and
of most of the other chief enactments of the reign of Elizabeth, was conservative; it
was to perpetuate old social relations through new social structure; the desires of
founders were to be respected and executed, even if a reorganization of governing
bodies should incidentally be necessary; in the present century, the reform of
universities, colleges, schools and other eleemosynary corporations has been based
on a recognition of the impossibility of executing the desires of the founders of past
centuries under present social conditions.
From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, then, the mass of eleemosynary
corporations remained substantially unchanged. In 1818, in accordance with recent
parliamentary legislation,
384 commissioners were appointed for the investigation of
charities (except the universities and colleges) and continued, with their successors,
to make frequent reports until 1830. The investigations were carried forward by
similar commissions under later statutes until 1853, when by the Charitable Trusts
Act
385 of that year a permanent body of four charity commissioners (with a secretary
and two inspectors) was created, with power to enquire into the condition of all
charities in England or Wales, and to demand and receive from them annual reports
of their income and expenditures. Trustees of charities might receive from them on
application instructions as to the execution of their trusts and be indemnified by
following them. Suits relating to charities (except when property or relief should be
claimed adversely to the charity) might not be prosecuted without the consent of the
commissioners before whom they were laid for their consideration; they were also
to have control of the form and manner in which they were prosecuted and might
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the exercise of his discretion in the institution of actions. Proposals of trustees to
have timber cut, roads laid out or minerals mined on trust land or to sell it might be
sanctioned by the commissioners. Schemes proposed by trustees for the application
or management of a charity (if they could not be carried out by the courts) might be
approved, either with or without modification or alteration, by them, but all such
schemes should be annually reported to Parliament. Exempt from the operation of the
act were to be the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, London and Durham and
colleges in them or in any cathedral or collegiate church, any building used bona fide
for a religious meeting-house, institutions maintained by voluntary contributions and
missionary institutions or societies — though the exemption might be waived by a
formal application to be admitted to the benefits of the act. Between 1859 and 1869
such educational charities as had been within the jurisdiction of the charities
commissioners were either reformed or placed under other commissioners.
By the legislation of the nineteenth century therefore the eleemosynary corporations
of England have either been reduced or made readily reducible to a greater harmony
with modern society through control by the state. In their composition they have had
to submit to a liberal infusion of membership especially fitted for the execution of
their duties, and to become rather representatives of society in the control of their
institutions than bodies of persons enjoying a proprietary interest in them.
XII — Comparison of Educational and Eleemosynary Corporations.
The corporations considered in the present chapter, it need hardly be suggested, are
most confusing in their variety of form and in the counter-currents of their
development. The monasteries, cathedral chapters and collegiate chapters, the gilds
and the later mercantile and colonial companies may with moderate ease be
distinguished from one another, and may be seen to have an even development, but
the educational and eleemosynary corporations have the characteristics of all the
others in combination, have hardly a distinct form in themselves and are remarkably
uneven in development. To add to the confusion, they occupy the whole period from
the time of feudalism to the present, and are not confined as are the gilds or great
commercial and colonial companies (broadly speaking) to either of the two great
periods preceding and succeeding the middle of the sixteenth century, the dividing
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chief features, their form and growth, be briefly recapitulated.
The universities and inns of court before the sixteenth century followed
substantially the type of the early gild. The masters among the scholars corresponded
closely to the masters of trades, but below the rank of the masters the analogy of the
universities and trade gilds was not so close; the scholars corresponded somewhat to
the apprentices of the masters of trades; when the bachelor’s degree came to be
distinctly recognized, it gave its holder a status similar to that of the journeyman; but
in some of the European universities the custom of lecturing on probation for a few
years after the master’s degree was taken supplied a class more similar to the class
of journeymen. The truth is that the universities anticipated the restriction of the
powers of control to the masters of trades by early confining the corresponding
functions to the doctors and masters. The universities of England were almost from
the beginning corporations of masters
386 and did not include scholars in their
organization except as a subject class.
The colleges in the universities and some of the public schools followed the
ecclesiastical type exhibited in the monastery, cathedral chapter and collegiate church
chapter. The head and fellows corresponded almost exactly to the abbot and monks
or dean and chapter; the scholars were in nearly the same position as the novices of
the ecclesiastical bodies. The relation was even closer than one of mere resemblance;
the colleges were truly ecclesiastical bodies established and maintained in the service
of the Church.
Such of the non-ecclesiastical grammar schools, elementary schools and charitable
institutions as were governed by bodies specially created for them, were subject to
the control of corporations very similar to what was left of the gilds and
municipalities by the sixteenth century. They fall into the same general class as the
close corporations of burgesses, the livery companies of London and the great
commercial and colonial companies that flourished from the sixteenth to the
nineteenth centuries. The universities were at first recognized by the State and
Church merely as classes of individuals and not as organized autonomous groups.
The powers necessary in the regulation of the relations of masters and scholars to
each other and to the rest of the world were not delegated in a body but one after
another until the organized groups had attained the status of corporations. At first
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than any other class of subjects as such sustained. When the State came to view the
universities as bodies of learned men, of special importance to it because adding to
the other glories of the realm that of learning, and the Church discovered in them
their vital importance to it as training schools of its clergy, the attitude of both passed
beyond that sustained to ordinary classes of subjects and justified the crystallization
of class interests in a compact organization in the enjoyment of exceptional rights and
powers. There was never as high a degree of dependence on the universities as on the
municipalities or monastic orders, but the time came when the king found the
universities quite indispensable as his supporters in obtaining a divorce, and when
the pope found them among his strongest adherents against an independent
episcopacy. It is worthy of notice that scholars were separated more distantly from
the other classes of society as they approached the king or pope in the enjoyment of
an exceptional status. They became the ardent supporters of the aggressions of both
on the mass of subjects from whose ranks they had risen.
The rise of the colleges in the universities represented a double movement, that of
disintegration within the universities and that of the reassertion by the Church of its
control over learning. The disintegration began when the units of the domestic life
of the scholars, the bodies of them living in halls, attracted some of the work of
instructing and studying to themselves. At that point the Church both directly and
indirectly through the Friars assumed control of the movement by giving to the
common life of the bodies of scholars such a substantial and independent basis that
the universities were eventually merely federations of colleges under the control of
the Church. When the universities were throwing off the yoke of the Church, they
were doing it as gilds of masters; when the Church reasserted its influence it did it
through subordinate colleges modelled on its own corporations.
The corporations of the popular schools, and most of the grammar schools, as well
as the charitable institutions, may hardly be said to have undergone any organic
development in their relations to the state from the sixteenth to the nineteenth
centuries; they were themselves developed forms of organization and carried forward
the work that had previously been done, for the most part, by the Church and the
gilds. There was no important addition to or subtraction from their bodies of rights
and duties by the crown except such as was implied in remodelling some of the more
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in its character and the state was willing to accept it as such, while it made no serious
effort to either supplement their activity with its own or to absorb it. In the nineteenth
century the state reformed them by giving them a broader basis of membership and
by causing the application of their revenues to purposes more clearly in response to
the demands of present conditions.
The contact of corporations or of corporations and subdivisions of State and
Church with one another and the consequent readjustment of their relations are
always suggestive, especially when the corporations are organizations of social
classes. The universities came into harshest contact with the municipal bodies of the
cities and towns in which they were located. As the learned bodies were closer to the
king and pope than were the bodies of burgesses, the latter had to yield step by step
until (at least in the case of Oxford) they became virtually subject bodies; even in as
large and influential a city as Paris, the university was steadily upheld by both king
and crown in the exercise of privileges derogatory to the strength and dignity of the
municipal corporation. It was not likewise, however, in the cases of colleges, schools
and charitable institutions. Unlike the universities they were rather local than national
in character and acted with reference to a local unit if not in actual organic subjection
to it. Though sanctioned by either State or Church (and sometimes by both) they were
considered to be following the directions of a founder or some local organization,
though in so doing they might confer a general social benefit; the point of view was
shifted and the special protection of the crown was bestowed in a lesser degree. They
were considered as organs of a local unit and generally acted in harmony with it, not
in opposition to it.
The chancellor as representative of the bishop originally granted licenses to teach
to such scholars as had become qualified to do so; as the mass of scholars became
free of the Church, the chancellor became the head of their body as organized in the
university and was elected by it; later, when the university was brought into closer
relations with the state, the chancellor became rather the representative of the
university at court than its active head. The interior government of the university
gradually assumed form in three representative bodies, of which one, representing the
department of arts, had the power of preliminary rejection of measures, the second,
the duty of the ordinary administration, and the third the duty of considering most
important business. Masters had been those scholars who had been formally foundJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 254
competent to instruct; degrees later indicated that the scholar had completed the work
required of him; they became retrospective rather than prospective in significance —
they were evidence of what the scholar had done, not his credentials for what he
should do in future; hence the division of graduates into regents and non-regents,
those who should be actually engaged in teaching and those who should regard their
degrees as evidence of the completion of their studies.
The colleges, in their origin bodies of scholars living in common and aided in the
prosecution of their studies by an endowment, became eventually bodies of graduates
acting as governors and to some extent as instructors of the real scholars, now a
subject class. So close was the organization of the life within and under the colleges
that the instruction given directly by the university was at length displaced by that of
professors, lecturers and tutors in colleges. The scholars under the masters of the
university in its early stages came to be inmates exclusively of colleges and
dependent halls, so that membership in the university was virtually derivative
through the colleges. The university offices, too, came to be occupied by heads or
appointees of colleges in rotation and the work of reducing the university to a
federation of colleges was completed by restricting the membership of its chief
administrative board to the heads of colleges.
In the non-ecclesiastical corporations for educational and other eleemosynary
purposes, the relations that had been the product of the preceding centuries of
university and college development were expressed by separating the corporation
from the scholars or others subject to it, and by identifying them with the endowment
rather than with the work of instruction, as had been the case with the earlier
corporations.VIII. National England.
The one word that most adequately describes the England of Elizabeth is the
adjective “national.” From whatever side it be viewed, the historical development of
the English people since the Norman Conquest had been in the direction of a greater
participation by every Englishman in the common life of all Englishmen.
On the political side, the overlordship of the Norman kings imposed on a feudal
nobility had become the kingship of the Tudors with a national people for its
subjects. A Great Council of feudal barons had been succeeded by a Parliament of
the representatives of the English people. A system of national taxation, though crude
and arbitrary, was year by year teaching every English subject that he and his
fellow-subjects were joint participants in the new national life, while the crown was
learning from it that it had strength and vigor only as it was truly representative of the
common thought and sentiment of its subjects. Feudalism as a system had passed
away and in place of the sovereignty of a king filtered through a hierarchy of feudal
classes was a sovereignty based on the consent of the people. Elizabeth was the first
monarch of national England. She was the first, and the last for two centuries, to
understand that the English kingship was real and a thing of substance only as it
participated in and absorbed the thoughts and sentiments of the English people.
In religion, the national pride had found in the Catholic Church and its popes a
galling foreign power and had replaced them with a “Church of England” and the
English sovereign at its head. And the Reformation had given to the movement of
religious freedom in England such a distinctive character that the English people
could see in the Church of England something peculiarly their own, something that
they would love and defend rather from patriotism than from fanaticism.
The outburst of intellectual and literary energy that glorified the Elizabethan
half-century of peaceful and conciliatory rule served more than all else to bring the
English people to a consciousness of their nationality.  The use of English as a
literary language became a stronger bond of union for the English people. The
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self-consciousness to the English nation. The study of English history and English
life and the growth of the universities produced a broader sympathy of class with
class.
If Elizabethan England was a nation from the standpoints of government, religion,
literature and learning, it was not less a nation from that of economics and industry.
Feudalism as an industrial system was dead and its hierarchy of industrial classes had
decayed. The commutation of feudal dues had swollen the numbers of a free
agricultural class. The class of artisans had grown up outside of and independent of
the feudal system. The feudal nobility had accepted the verdict of industrial history
and the first great period of enclosure had come to an end in 1530; henceforth they
were to be landowners, like their freed tenants, differing from them chiefly in the
mere extent of their holdings and the form of their industry, itself largely dependent
on the size of the parcel of land controlled. The feudal nobility had become great
wool-growers with hired laborers instead of feudal tenants for subjects. The gild
system, as a form of industrial activity, had also sunk into impotence, and its
functions of industrial regulation had passed into the control of institutions of the
central government. Markets and fairs had facilitated intercourse among the people
and had laid a broader basis of economic sympathy. The growth of a foreign market
had introduced the elements of capital and competition into commerce, to a slight
extent, and had broken down the barriers of feudalism and the gilds.
387 The care and
relief of the poor had been taken from the Church and gilds and was now put by the
Elizabethan Poor Laws under the control of local organizations of the national state.
Except in a few industries, particularly the woollen industry, the development of
England down to the middle of the sixteenth century had been internal; the reign of
Elizabeth marks the overflowing of the cup of industrial growth; England was now
to develop externally. The principles of internal control that had been justly inherited
from feudalism and the gilds were now to be consistently applied externally to the
relations of Englishmen with foreign peoples.
The general religious and intellectual activity of the sixteenth century had brought
to the knowledge of the English people the existence of a great world of material
wealth outside the restricted boundaries of their island, and for the Anglo-Saxon to
know of its existence was for him to covet it. The peace and quietude of Elizabeth’s
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people to follow the lead of the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch in the exploitation of
new worlds. The distinctive feature of English corporate life in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was its development in the relations of English subjects to
foreign lands. Internally England had attained forms of industrial life that would
suffer little change until near the end of the eighteenth century; externally English life
was to pass through forms analogous to the earlier forces of internal industry, —
though in a shorter period of time,  — and was then to fall into harmony with the
general internal system.
The development of foreign commerce fleas regarded not entirely as a matter of
interest and benefit solely to the individuals engaged in it, but even more as a matter
of national interest and benefit. The motives that prompted it were three in kind, (a)
industrial, (b) political and (c) philanthropic. (a) The motives were industrial in so
far as the foreign commerce was expected to be a source of gain directly to the
persons engaged in it and indirectly to the people of England whose economic
demands would be more cheaply or fully supplied by it. (b) As there is necessarily
a personal element in governments and institutions and their purposes and aims are
bound up and identified with the personal purposes and aims of those in whom, for
the time, the governmental powers are reposed, and as the individuals themselves
who compose a state are inclined to personify their governments and institutions and
find in the extension of their powers a source of personal gratification, the English
crown directly stimulated and encouraged the growth of foreign commerce with the
ultimate purpose of deriving pecuniary gain or more extended dominion from it; in
so far as these considerations entered into the extension of foreign commerce, it was
prompted by political motives. (c) Again, even the individual or spiritual welfare of
the foreign peoples (in some cases savages) with whom the foreign commerce was
to be engaged in, was a weighing consideration; or in the case of colonists, the
welfare of depressed classes of the English people was aimed at; these motives, being
hardly based on the desire of gain or of more extended dominion, ought to be
distinguished as philanthropic. All three kinds of motives were usually blended
together in such intricacy that no phenomenon can easily be referred to any of them
to the exclusion of any other of them.
Whatever motive or motives might prompt an extension of foreign commerce in
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seventeenth century there was little security on the high seas and the stranger in a
strange land was not always hospitably entertained. International law, now so refined
and reduced to such nicety of distinctions, was crude and quite insufficient for the
protection of merchants. Just as in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it was quite
impossible for the crown to afford adequate protection to travellers and traders on the
highways of England, so in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was quite
impossible for the crown to provide protection for English vessels on the highways
of the ocean. But protection was necessary and had to be provided, if not by the
government of England, then by some other agency. The crown simply delegated its
function of protection until it should be able to perform the function itself; in the
meantime, it recognized the bodies of foreign merchants as performing functions
deserving the encouragement of the state and delegated to them for their exercise
such powers as should be necessary for the purposes of the trades according to the
circumstances of their business and of the peoples with whom they were to deal.
Such were the English corporations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
They may be divided into four classes, according to the ends they were intended to
accomplish and the circumstances under which they were to accomplish them, as
follows (1) Regulated Companies; (2) Regulated (with a tendency to become
Exclusive) Companies; (3) Joint Stock Companies; and (4) Colonial Companies.IX. Regulated Companies.
The Regulated Companies were most nearly connected with the older gilds; in fact,
they were the result of the application to the foreign trade of England of the form of
organization evolved from the experience of England in its domestic trade and
industry. Their control was exercised mainly over trade and industry that had been
carried on with foreign countries during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They
hardly extended into the field of “new trades,” commerce to be “discovered”; when
an effort was made to extend them over that field, they underwent such modification,
as will be seen,
388 that the name “regulated” was not strictly applicable to them. They
were, in general, organizations of the merchants carrying on commerce with
Flanders, the Netherlands, Denmark and the Scandinavian and Baltic countries; the
English merchants in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal appear never to have had an
enduring corporate organization. Down to the fourteenth century, the foreign trade
of England had been substantially engrossed by foreigners, of whom the most
important organization had been the Hanseatic League, with its headquarters at the
Steelyard in London.
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The earliest organization of English merchants that came in direct contact with
foreigners was that of the Staplers or Merchants of the Staple. The staple was the
town or place, whether at home or abroad, to which the English merchants engaged
in foreign trade brought their goods to be exported or sold to foreigners, and the
English merchants that came to them were called the Staplers or Merchants of the
Staple. During the thirteenth century English merchants began to participate in the
foreign trade. It is said that a wool-staple existed in the fifty-first year of Henry III.
(1266–1267),
390 but the first evidence of the organization of the merchants engaged
in foreign commerce dates from the early part of the fourteenth century. In two letters
dated in 1313 and written by Edward II to the Earl of Flanders, Richard Stury de
Salop is described as “major mercatorum de rebus nostro”; together with Sir William
of Dean he appears to have been sent by the king to compose certain differences
between their respective subjects.
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year, the first being in the form of an ordinance requiring that “in consequence of the
losses accruing to the king by merchants, as well natives as foreigners, buying wool
and wool-fells within the realm and exporting the same at their will to Brabant,
Flanders and Diartoys [Artois]” they should all thereafter send them to a certain
staple (and not elsewhere) to be appointed by “the mayor and commonalty of the
merchants.”
392 The second charter was addressed to the “mayor and merchants of the
staple.” The third charter granted that all wool and wool-fells bought in England for
exportation, whether by natives or foreigners, should be carried to only one staple
abroad, to be designated by the mayor and community of the merchants engaged in
the trade, who might also change the location of the staple if they saw fit; merchants
carrying their goods to other places than the appointed staple might be punished by
the mayor and council of the merchants by fines levied on them and on their goods
for the use of the king.
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In 1341 Edward III established the staple of wool and other merchandise at Bruges
in Flanders, appointed the first mayor and constables of the staple and conceded that
their successors should be elected by the merchants themselves, both English and
foreign; the mayor was to maintain a court in which controversies between the
merchants should be settled according to the “law merchant” and infractions of rules
made by the merchants should be punished by the imposition of fines and
forfeitures.
394 During the fourteenth century, however, the staple, though usually at
either Bruges or Antwerp, was frequently changed, often for political reasons, the
concession or withdrawal of the staple being used as a consideration in adjusting
international relations. In the reign of Edward III, the two extremes of having no
foreign staple at all, the merchants being unrestricted in their exportation of goods,
and of establishing the staples in England, the foreigners being compelled to come
to England to make their purchases, were tried for short periods of time. In the reign
of Richard II, near the end of the century, the staple was finally established at Calais,
there to remain until the city should be retaken by the French in 1558. There were not
only foreign staples, but also from five to ten home staples; goods exported had to
be shipped exclusively to the former and from the latter, “where the king had his
beam, his weights and his collectors of customs.”
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In 1353, the management of the home staples was comprehensively dealt with in
Edward’s Statute of the Staple.
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taken to either Newcastle, York, Lincoln, Norwich, Westminster, Canterbury,
Winchester, Exeter or Bristol, where the home staples should be; there the sacks of
wool and quantities of other goods to be exported should be weighed and sealed
under the seal of the mayor of the staple, and the customs on them paid. From York
such goods should be taken for export to Hull, from Lincoln to Boston, from
Norwich to Yarmouth and from Westminster to London, at which places they should
be again weighed by the king’s customers. Goods brought to other staple towns
should be weighed by the mayor of the staple in the presence of the king’s customers
and indentures made between them showing the quantities of all goods brought for
export. The goods should then be exported by foreigners (not by natives), from whom
the mayor of the staple and king’s customers should take oaths not to hold a staple
abroad. If goods had to be carried by water to reach one of the established staples, an
indenture should be made with the bailiffs of the town from which the goods should
be carried. The rent of buildings used by the staple merchants should be determined
by the mayor and constables of the staple with four men of the town duly sworn by
them. That the foreign merchants might not be delayed in the transaction of their
business, speedy justice according to the law merchant was to be administered “from
day to day and hour to hour.” In each staple should be annually elected by the
“commonalty” of the merchants, both native and foreign, a mayor learned in the law
merchant, to govern the staple and dispense justice, and two constables to perform
the duties “pertaining to their office in such manner as was customary in other
staples.” The mayor and constables should have power to preserve the peace, arrest
wrongdoers in the staple and punish them according to the rules of the staple. The
mayor, sheriffs and bailiffs of the towns in which the staples should be or of
adjoining towns were to assist the mayors and constables of the staples in the
execution of their offices.
397 If any one should be aggrieved by a decision or act of the
Mayor or Constables of the Staple, he should be given speedy redress on appeal to
the king’s council. A certain number of “correctors,” both natives and foreigners,
were to make and record bargains between merchants. The mayor and constables
should be sworn by the chancellor to the due performance of their duties, while the
other officers and merchants of the staple were to be sworn by the mayor and
constables, to be judged by them according to law and custom and to maintain the
staple and its customs. Foreign merchants should be protected in the transaction ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 262
their business; in matters of litigation touching them, two of their number should be
chosen by the remainder to sit with the mayor and constables in judgment. A century
later, in the statute of Edward IV, substantially the same provisions for the regulation
of the home staples were enacted, though it was also required that all goods exported
should be taken to the foreign staple at Calais and to no other place.
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When the merchants of the staple passed from the status of a broad class to that of
a somewhat restricted company may not be definitely stated. In the middle of the
fifteenth century the Company of the Staple of England appears to have assumed the
form that it retained until the staple system virtually passed away at the end of the
sixteenth or beginning of the seventeenth century. Definite evidence of the
interrelations of the members of the company is singularly wanting. It is very plain
that the merchants of the staple in the several English cities were separately
organized and that the entire body was also organized, but it cannot be stated with
certainty what organic relations existed between the local and national bodies. Most
of the evidence also shows that not only the English but also the foreign merchants
were comprehended in the staple organization, but it is difficult to believe that the
English merchants were not separately organized for some purposes, especially in the
later stages of the staple trade. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Company
of Merchants of the Staple of England were in charge of the collection of the customs
on exported goods, and made a return to the crown of a definitely stipulated sum in
lieu of what they should collect; they accordingly complained when the crown
granted to the merchants of particular towns the right to export their goods without
taking them to the staple at Calais — a method of procedure that deprived the
company of part of the revenue expected. In such relations to the crown the
foreigners could hardly have participated, and the crown could hardly have held the
whole body of merchants responsible; the company must have been a select body of
the more influential and responsible merchants who had control of the trade.
The merchants of the staple had been engaged chiefly in the exportation of raw
products, such as wool, wool-fells, leather, lead and tin; with the growth of
manufacturing industries and especially of the cloth industry in England in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the transactions of the staplers declined in volume,
they being gradually displaced by the Merchant Adventurers, who had control of the
rapidly developing trade in manufactured goods. After the fall of Calais in 1558, theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 263
staple organization became obsolete, though it survived in some of its features until
the nineteenth century and the Company of Merchants of the Staple of England still
holds periodical meetings for convivial purposes. It can hardly be doubted that the
loss of Calais had a vital influence on the corporation that had originally been based
on the organization of the staplers largely for fiscal purposes. Malynes, writing in
1673 in defence of the rights of the company, claimed that Elizabeth in the third year
of her reign (1560–1561) had granted to the Mayor and Constables of the Staple of
England a charter in confirmation of “all such privileges and liberties as they did,
might or ought to have enjoyed, one year before the loss of Calais, by grant, charter,
law, prescription or custom, notwithstanding any non-user, abuser, etc.”
399 No other
refer once to the charter can be found, but the company’s advocate could hardly have
found occasion to make the statement, if the company’s corporate status had not been
exposed to attack by the loss of the staple town.
Viewed as corporations, the Company of Merchants of the Staple, or the companies
in the several staple towns, were rudimentary. In so far as the organization tended to
maintain the quality of goods through the facilities for inspection provided by it, and
to lend security to dealings not only by affording them a convenient medium but by
enforcing them through special courts, it was of advantage to the merchants
themselves. But the principal motive for establishing the staples was to give the king
control over the transactions with foreigners and especially to make the payment of
customs more certain and convenient. The organization was rather imposed by the
state as a public necessity than conceded by it in response to the demands of the
private interests of the merchants. The view of Gross
400 that the “mayor and
constables of home staples were public functionaries of the king” is hardly
justifiable; the merchants of the staple were not organized as a part of the state, but
were compelled by the state to organize themselves; the difference always exists
between a political administrative body and a corporation. The royal purpose is well
shown in the preamble of the proclamation of Edward III in 1341:
“Whereas, many merchants and others, as well foreign as native,
seeking their own gain at the expense of the state, have both by
stealth and secrecy and by the connivance of royal officers exported
wool and other merchandise from England without paying theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 264
customs due on it, and continue from day to day so to do, to the great
damage of the crown and in contempt of it, we, in order to prevent so
great wrong and to protect our own interests and those of our
subjects, as we ought....”
401
It is plain that the primary consideration was the protection of the royal treasury;
the secondary consideration was the advancement of the private interests of the
merchants. The general view of the foreign trade, as organized in the staples, was
rather restrictive than promotive; the king’s aim appears to have been to place the
native merchant where the foreign merchant might find him, not to enable the former
to seek the latter. Even when the legislation was not so restrictive as that of Edward’s
Statute of the Staple (1353), by which it was provided that goods sold at the staples
should be exported only by foreigners, it generally viewed the trade as in need of
restraint and not of encouragement.
The exportation of manufactured products, especially of cloth, which was to
supersede to a great extent that of raw products, was during the fifteenth century
largely under the control of the merchants who controlled the domestic trade in them.
The Mercers’ Company. one of the twelve great companies of London, was the most
prominent organization in that connection. Many of the merchants engaged in the
export trade in manufactured goods, called Merchant Adventurers, belonged to that
company; indeed, such trade was apparently unorganized, except so far as it was
comprehended in the domestic company mentioned, until the beginning of the
fifteenth century.
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In 1407, Henry IV granted a charter “Pro Mercatoribus Halendiae,” by which,
observing the hardships that had been suffered for want of a better direction and
government of their affairs and were likely to be suffered in future by the English
merchants in Holland, Zeeland, Flanders and other lands oversee unless he should aid
them by permitting them to maintain a government among themselves, he conceded
to them the power of electing governors for the administration of justice and the
adjustment of controversies among them. The governors should also have power to
cause the reparation of all damage caused by or to the merchants and to seek and
receive restitution or compensation for injuries inflicted on the English merchants by
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common assent of the merchants, make and establish statutes, ordinances and
customs for their better government and visit “contrary, rebellious or disobedient”
merchants with reasonable punishments.
403 Nearly a century later the members of the
Mercers’ Company together with other adventures of London, acting under the name
of the Company of Merchants of London, appear to have long exercised a
predominating influence over the Merchant Adventurers; they dictated the elections
of governors, and had even made an ordinance that no merchant should trade in
Flanders, Holland, Zeeland and Brabant, unless he should first pay a fine to them; the
fine, originally imposed by color of a right of the ancient fraternity of St. Thomas of
Canterbury, of which the Mercers’ Company claimed to be the successors, had at first
been only nominal but had been gradually increased to twenty pounds. In 1496, it was
enacted that the trade should henceforth be open and free to all and that no fine,
imposition or tax of more than ten marks should be exacted from them for the liberty
to buy and sell.
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For several years at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century
a contest was kept up between the Merchant Adventurers and Merchants of the Staple
in which the former appear to have been the aggressors. The question of the limits
of their respective powers came before the star chamber in 1504, whereupon it was
decided that all Merchants of the Staple when engaging in the trade of Merchant
Adventurers should be subject to all acts, ordinances and regulations to which
Merchant Adventurers should themselves be subject, as well in Calais (the staple
town) as elsewhere; likewise all Merchant Adventurers should be subject to the
obligations of Merchants of the Staple when engaging in their trade.
405 The next step
was the seizure by the Merchant Adventurers of the cloths of a stapler, not because
he failed to pay a fine for engaging in the cloth trade, but because he engaged in it
without first having secured membership in the Company of Merchant Adventurers
of England; the king on complaint of the Merchants of the Staple addressed a letter
to their opponents in which he interpreted the decree of the star chamber as not
justifying more than the imposition of a fine or license fee.
406 What was the end of
the contest is not known, but it must have been largely influenced by the decreasing
trade of the one and the increasing trade of the other body of contestants. It is of most
importance as indicating the crystallization of the two bodies of traders in distinct
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involved is not unimportant, in view of the later development of companies limited
to exclusive territories; the Merchants of the Staple claimed exclusive jurisdiction in
Calais, and apparently over all kinds of trade in it, while the Merchant Adventurers
had their headquarters in Antwerp and resented what little interference was offered
by their opponents outside of Calais.
Henry VII, in 1505, made the organization of the Merchant Adventurers more
definite by adding to their power to elect a governor or governors that of electing
“twenty-four of the most sad, discreet and honest persons of divers fellowships” of
them to be assistants to the governors. Officers were to be appointed by the governor
and assistants “to take, receive, levy and gather all manner of fines, forfeitures,
penalties and mulcts of every merchant of English subject convicted [of] violating
the statutes” made by the governor and assistants. The officers should have power,
if need be, to seize the persons and goods of offenders, even in England and Calais.
Assistants were removable for incapacity, but otherwise served for life; refusal to
accept their office was punishable by fine, payable half to the king and half to the
company. All merchants were to be admitted to the freedom on payment of ten
marks, and all persons in the trade were to be subject to their government.
407 Whether
the “divers fellowships” referred to were the groups of Merchant Adventurers in the
several commercial cities of England, in the several foreign countries or in the
several branches of foreign trade, cannot be determined with certainty, but they were
probably those named second in order.
The often quoted description by John Wheeler of the Company of Merchant
Adventurers in 1601 is so complete, while it is almost the only historical evidence
of its condition at the time, that it may be quoted again.
“The Company of Merchant Adventurers consisteth of a great number
of wealthy and well experimented merchants, dwelling in divers great
cities, maritime towns, and other parts of the realm, to-wit, London,
York, Norwich, Exeter, Ipswich, Newcastle, Hull [and others.]. These
men of old time linked and bound themselves together in company
for the exercise of merchandise and sea-fare, trading in cloth, kersey,
and all other, as well English as foreign commodities vendible
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much wealth, benefit, and commodity, and for that cause have
obtained many very excellent and singular privileges, rights,
jurisdictions, exemptions, and immunities all which those of the
aforesaid fellowship equally enjoy after a well ordered manner and
form, and according to the ordinances laws, and customs devised and
agreed upon by common consent of all the merchants, free of the said
fellowship, dwelling in the above named towns and places of the
land: the ports and places which they trade unto, are the towns and
ports lying the rivers of Somme in France, and the Scawe [in
Denmark] in the German sea: not into all at once, or at each man’s
pleasure, but into one or two towns at the most within the above-said
bounds, which they commonly call the mart town or towns; for that
there only they stapled the commodities, which they brought out of
England, and put the same to sale, and bought such foreign
commodities as the land wanted, and were brought from far by
merchants of divers nations and countries flocking thither as to a fair,
or market, to buy and sell.... The said company bath a governor, or in
his absence, a deputy, and four and twenty assistants in the mart
towns, who have jurisdiction and full authority as well from her
Majesty as from the princes, states, and rulers of the Low Countries,
and beyond the seas, without appeal, provocation, or declination, to
end and determine all civil cases, questions, and controversies arising
between or among the brethren, members, and supports of the said
company, or between them and others, either English or strangers,
who either may or will prorogate the jurisdiction of the said company
and their court, or are subject to the same by the privileges and
charters “hereunto granted.”
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Malynes’s complaint in 1622 that the Company of Merchant Adventurers was
under the dominance of a coterie of wealthy merchants in London
409 seems to be
borne out by the Parliamentary ordinance of 1643, which provided that none should
trade in the territory of the company except such as were free of it on penalty of theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 268
forfeiture of their goods, that no person should be excluded from the fellowship who
should “desire it by way of redemption, if such person by their custom be capable
thereof, and bath been bred a merchant”; moreover, the merchant “shall pay one
hundred pounds for the same, if he be free and an inhabitant of the city of London,
and trade from that port, or fifty pounds if he be not free and no inhabitant of the city,
and trade not from thence. The ordinance appears to have been largely in
confirmation of existing powers and its passage was probably secured by the
company as a protection against interference with them by the Parliamentary party
in the civil war. The company were given power to levy contributions on members
and their goods for the support and maintenance of their government, and to imprison
them and bind them by oaths to secure their conformity to the corporate
regulations.
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During the sixteenth century the bodies of Merchant Adventurers in several of the
important commercial cities of England assumed a separate organization and
obtained charters of incorporation from the crown, as in Bristol, Chester and
Newcastle. Whether organic relations subsisted between the local companies and the
national Company of Merchant Adventurers seems impossible to ascertain, but their
members must have been subject to its regulations, at least when engaged in
commerce abroad. The form of their government was not peculiar in comparison with
that of the companies of domestic merchants or that of the national company; it was
vested in a master and wardens, or in a governor and from twelve to eighteen
assistants, with minor officers such as clerks, beadles and searchers. In addition to
the tendency towards dissolution into the companies of merchants in the several cities
of England, the foreign trade had expanded beyond its original limits into other
countries on the continent, and the Merchant Adventurers in the new territory sought
separate organization in distinct companies according to the countries in which they
traded. The trade with the original territory of the Company of Merchant Adventurers
gradually became free and open to English merchants regardless of their corporate
rights; by the eighteenth century, all vestiges of corporate control had disappeared;
in the new territories, however, corporate organizations were longer maintained.
Among the rules of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was one forbidding its
freemen to marry women born outside the realm of England.
411 Nor might they (in
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business,
412 except that in one case they might engage in a single retail business. One
of the most notable features of the Merchant Adventurers, as well as of the Staplers,
is the decreased importance assigned to their social-fraternal and religious elements.
While they were not entirely wanting, they were assigned a position of much less
importance than in the classes of corporations previously considered. The trade of
members was minutely regulated, especially with a view to preventing an over-supply
of goods in particular markets; a”stint” (or limit of amount) of goods that might be
taken for sale to any market was frequently imposed and changed to suit changing
conditions.
413 A quite elaborate system of correspondence was the means of
correlating the separate ventures of the numerous Merchant Adventurers, so that they
might not interfere with one another but rather act in harmony.
“By the... governor and assistants are also appointed and chosen a
deputy and certain discreet persons, to be associated to the said
deputy, in all... places convenient, as well within as without the realm
of England, who all hold correspondence with the governor of the
company and chief in the mart town on the other side the seas, and
have subaltern power to exercise merchant law, to rule, and look to
the good ordering of the brethren of the company everywhere, as far
as may be and their charters will bear them out.
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Membership in either the Company of the Staple or Company of Merchant
Adventurers was not incompatible with membership in the other, as was also true of
all the regulated and joint-stock companies. Moreover, while members of the London
companies were restricted to one company, they might be members of any or all of
the companies engaged in foreign commerce.
As compared with the Merchants of the Staple, the Company of Merchant
Adventurers represented a step forward in the organization of the trade of English
with foreign merchants. (a) The staple organization comprehended both native and
foreign merchants, who united in electing the officers and enacting the statutes and
ordinances by which they were governed; but the Company of Merchant Adventurers
was composed of native merchants alone, who might not even marry alien women.
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Merchant Adventurers was in manufactured goods; in domestic industry the former
had been virtually unorganized, except as it had been early organized in the merchant
gilds, while the latter had acquired a structure in the later craft gilds and trade gilds
and in their successors, the companies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The
Merchants of the Staple may be said to have followed the model of the old gild
merchant, while the Merchant Adventurers followed that of the companies evolved
from the trade gilds and craft gilds, though the distinction is not plain in all details.
The staple was an international fair while the market of the Merchant Adventurers
was more nearly like the markets of English towns after the differentiation of their
traders into separate gilds had taken place. (c) The government of the staple was
imposed by the state primarily for public purposes, while the interests of the
merchants were consulted only secondarily; on the contrary, the organization of the
Company of Merchant Adventurers was sought by the merchants primarily in
protection of their own interests, while the benefit of the state was expected to be
only secondary. To secure the payment of customs was the royal purpose in
organizing the staple, the legislation of Parliament in 1543 was
“for the better encouragement and supportation of the fellowship of
Merchant Adventurers of England, which bath been found very
serviceable and profitable unto this state, and for the better
government and regulation of trade, especially that ancient and great
trade of clothing, whereby the same shall be much advanced to the
common good and benefit of the people.”
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The aim in the one case was to control what trade existed; in the other, to foster the
trade and promote its increase. The one organization aimed to place the English
market where the foreign trader might find it; the other, to enable the English trader
to find the foreign market. (d) The governmental organs of the staplers were never
so fully developed as those of the Merchant Adventurers, for the reason, probably,
that the motive of private interest was so much weaker in one than in the other. The
judicial element was more prominent in the first, the legislative element in the
second; consequently the advisory body of assistants hardened in the second into a
permanent part of its constitution, while in the first it remained rudimentary andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 271
unimportant. A comparison of the two organizations is a sufficient preparation for
the complaint of Malynes in 1622 that
“all the trade of the Merchants of the Staple, of the merchant
strangers, and of all other English merchants, concerning the
exportation of all the commodities of wool into those countries where
the same are especially to be vended, is in the power of the Merchants
Adventurers only; and it is come to be managed by forty or fifty
persons of that company, consisting of three or four thousand.”
416
In the sixteenth century, several new regulated companies were organized on the
same general system as the Company of Merchant Adventurers. In 1564 a perpetual
charter was granted to the Hamburgh Company, which appears to have been merely
an organization of such members of the Company of Merchant Adventurers as had
acquired an interest in trade within the Empire beyond their original territory. In 1579
a charter was granted by Elizabeth (and in 1629 confirmed by Charles I) to the
“Fellowship of Eastland Merchants.” They were to have the exclusive right of trading
through the sound to Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Lithuania (except Narva,
which was in the exclusive territory of the Russia Company), Prussia (the province)
and Pomerania (the western limit being the Oder River), the islands of Seeland,
Bornholm, Oeland and Gothland; their principal mart-towns would be Copenhagen,
Elsinore, Dantzig Elbing and Konigsberg. The government of the company was to
be in the familiar form of a governor, deputy, or deputies, and twenty-four assistants,
who should enact laws for the control of the merchants and the trade conducted by
them. Only freemen of the company should participate in the trade, and non-freemen
so doing might be punished by the company through fines and imprisonment. The
purpose of granting the charter is said to have been to give an organization to English
merchants that were opposed by the Hanseatic merchants. After the Revolution of
1688, the company was unwilling or unable to secure from Parliament a confirmation
of its powers based on royal charters and thereby to conform to the new principle that
monopolies of trade should have validity only in Parliamentary statute; they
accordingly lost their control over trade but are said to have kept up their periodical
meetings for social purposes until the nineteenth century. Complaint had been madeJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 272
of them, moreover, that notwithstanding they were a regulated company, their fees
were excessive and consequently restrictive. In 1690 it was enacted that all persons,
whether native or foreign, after the first of May, 1693, might trade freely into
Norway, Sweden and Denmark without regard to any powers claimed by the
company under its charters; and that for the rest of its territory, admission to the
company should be granted to any person on payment of forty shillings.
417 In 1560,
a partial organization of the trade to France appears to have been given by Elizabeth
in a charter to the merchants of Exeter under the name of the “Governor, Consuls and
Society of Merchants Adventurers of Exeter”; they were to enjoy an exclusive trade
to France and secured the confirmation of their privileges by Parliament in the
succeeding reign,
418 but no traces of their activity can be found. A rudimentary
organization of the English merchants in Italy was attempted as early as 1485 by the
appointment of a consul for them; in that year Richard III, at the request of the
English merchants in Italy, appointed Lorenzo Stozzi, a merchant of Florence, to be
their consul for Pisa and adjacent territory, with authority to hear and decide suits and
controversies among them and to do all other things in judicio quam extra which by
law or the custom of other nations should appertain to his office; as compensation for
his services he should receive one fourth of one per cent. of the amount of all
purchases and sales by English merchants at Pisa.
419 Later, however, the trade came
largely under the control of the Levant Company.
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The purely regulated companies developed as fully as the conditions of the
international trade organized within them demanded. The key to an understanding of
their rise and growth is in a due appreciation of the extent to which the political
organization of England had been perfected. The lack of closer political relations
with foreign nations as well as of those between the government of England and its
subjects made it necessary to leave for the exercise of groups of subjects prompted
by the motive of self-interest many powers that were later to be resumed by the state.
When the state became able to extend its functions over the field of activity occupied
by the companies, they became obsolete, though, like most English institutions, they
were maintained in form long after their efficiency as organs of government had
departed. By the middle of the eighteenth century they had all ceased to have an
appreciable influence on English foreign commerce. The fact that the merchants of
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explained by the close relations that had existed between England and France since
the Norman conquest. The English government, in that field of activity, had
maintained the international machinery necessary for the performance of its
functions; the organization of corporations for their exercise was consequently
uncalled for. That the regulated companies, where they flourished, were not more
highly concentrated in power and management was due to the existence of such
partially developed international relations as were possible. Their trade was with
European countries west of Russia and Turkey and had previously to a large extent
been in existence, but under the control of merchants of the foreign countries. What
England accomplished through regulated companies was to substitute English for
Hanseatic, Italian and other foreign merchants in a foreign trade that already existed;
if the trade increased in volume, it was due not so much to the activity of the
companies as to more general causes. It will be seen later
421 that where the trade had
to be “discovered,” as in Russia and Turkey, or created, as in India and America, the
companies incorporated were either originally more compact in form and
concentrated in activity, or if originally regulated companies, were soon so greatly
modified that they were justly contrasted with purely regulated companies as
belonging to a different class.X. Regulated Companies Tending to Exclusiveness.
One class of regulated companies, owing to the peculiar environment with which
they came in contact and to the equipment with which they were provided in
conducting their operations, exhibited a tendency to exclusiveness of membership
and concentration of powers that made them virtually a separate class, midway in
development between the purely regulated companies and the joint-stock companies.
The tendency was not in complete harmony with the form of organization used by the
regulated companies, but, with fidelity to the principle usually followed in the
development of institutions, the effort was made to use an established form in the
expression of a new social force before a form more appropriate for the purpose
should be evolved from experience. Full and unimpeded expression was given to the
elements of exclusiveness and concentration in the joint-stock companies, but in the
class of companies considered in this chapter the form of the regulated company
seemed to be perverted and distorted to the extent that the characteristic elements
manifested themselves.
The best example of the class of companies under consideration is the Levant or
Turkey Company. The English trade with the countries on the eastern Mediterranean,
with Greece and Turkey and with the Asiatic countries to the southeast as far as India
had long been carried on wholly overland, or partly overland and by the
Mediterranean as far westward as Italy or France; as far as England was concerned,
it had participated in the trade only mediately, through the merchants of Venice and
other Italian cities or of France. In the fifteenth century, however, the routes by water
came to be used, and merchants of Portugal served partly as media for the supply of
England with Eastern merchandise. In the same century English merchants began to
meet this branch of foreign trade as it had met that of the Netherlands and Holland.
In 1485 there appears to have been a sufficient body of English merchants in Italy to
justify the appointment by Richard III of a consul for them at Pisa. Soon afterwards,
in the reign of Henry VII, a few efforts were made by English adventurers to establish
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so-called Barbary Company said to have developed into the Levant Company. But
commerce by sea was hampered with many restrictions; it was rendered especially
dangerous and uncertain in the western Mediterranean by the depredations of pirates
and the lack of adequate protection from them. In consequence, no substantial
progress was made in the extension of English commerce in the Mediterranean until
after the middle of the sixteenth century.
In 1581, Elizabeth granted to Sir Edward Osborn, Thomas Smith, Richard Staper
and William Garrett, their executors and administrators, and to such other English
subjects, not exceeding twelve in number, as Osborn and Staper should appoint to be
joined to the four named, together with two others to be appointed by the queen if she
should desire, a charter to trade to Turkey exclusively of all other personas in such
manner as they should see fit, under the name of “The Company of Merchants of the
Levant.” They should have power to enact by-laws (not repugnant to the laws of
England) for their good government, though no business should be transacted without
the consent of the governor, Sir Edward Osborn being named the first governor by
the queen in the charter, and his successors being probably chosen annually by the
company. Any other English subjects trading thither, either by ocean or land, without
the company’s license, should forfeit their ships and goods, half to the company and
half to the crown. The exclusive powers granted were to be valid for a term of seven
years, unless the crown, if they should appear to be “inconvenient,” should see fit to
revoke them on one yearns notice; if, however, they should not “appear to be
unprofitable to the kingdom,” the crown would renew them at their expiration, on
application of the company, for a second term of seven years. The justification of the
grant was found by the crown in the fact that Osborn and Staper “had, at their own
great costs and charges, found out and opened a trade to Turkey, not heretofore, in
the memory of any man now living, known to be commonly used and frequented by
way of merchandise, by any of the merchants, or any subjects of us or of our
progenitors: whereby many good offices may be done for the peace of Christendom,”
such as the relief of Christian slaves, and “good vent for the commodities of the
realm” might be found, “to the advancement of the honor and dignity” of the crown,
“the increase of royal revenue and the general wealth of the realm.” It was
significantly provided by the charter that the company, during the last six of the seven
years of their grant, “shall export so much goods to Turkey as shall annually pay atJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 276
least five hundred pounds custom to the crown,” exclusive of repayments on account
of loss of goods by shipwreck and otherwise.
422
Before the first charter had been granted, William Harbum, Edward Ellis and
Richard Staper (one of the incorporators) had been sent by the queen to Turkey to
negotiate for privileges of trading for English merchants, and had obtained from the
sultan for them the “right to as freely trade and resort to Turkey as the French,
Venetians and others.”
423 Harbum went out as ambassador on the company’s first
voyage in 1582, and on his arrival appointed consuls in the several ports and
established rules and regulations for the government of the trade, especially as it
should come in contact with the sultan’s subjects. Though appointed formally by the
Queen or her representative, the ambassador, consuls and other officers were named
at the request of the company, who also paid their salaries or other compensation and
their expenses. Such further privileges of trade, called “capitulations,” as were
obtained from the sultan appear to have been conceded directly to the company, in
contrast with similar privileges of the Merchant Adventurers and other regulated
companies, which were usually secured through the negotiations of the crown with
the foreign states. The charter must have been renewed on the expiration of the first
term of seven years, though no documentary evidence of it has been found. In 1593,
however, a charter was granted by Elizabeth that indicates a considerable
development in the organization and work of the company. The members named in
the charter now numbered fifty-three, “consisting of knights, aldermen and
merchants,” while the company might admit as new members any who should have
served them as factors or in other capacities; leave was given eighteen others (three
of whom were to be certain aldermen of London named in the charter) to become
members of the company upon the payment by each of them of one hundred and
thirty pounds to the company “towards their past charges in establishing the said
trades”; members who should fail to conform to the rules and regulations of the
company and to make the payments required of them should forfeit their right to
membership, “whereupon the company may elect others in their stead.” The name
was extended to “The Governor and Company of Merchants of the Levant,” — an
indication of the greater prominence in the company of its governing body. An
advisory body appears to have been created, for it was provided that in addition to the
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territory was extended and made more definite; it should include “ (a) the Venetian
territories, (b) the dominions of the Grand Seignior, by land and sea, and (c) trade
through his countries overland to the East Indies, a way lately discovered by John
Newberry and others.” The exclusive right to trade in the described territory, the
power to enact by-laws and the right to demand repayment of customs paid on goods
lost at sea were continued, while duties levied on imported goods should be refunded
if the goods should be exported within thirteen months by English subjects in English
bottoms. “Four good ships, with ordnance and munitions for their defence and with
two hundred English mariners, shall be permitted to go, at all times,” unless the
queen in time of war should notify the company that they could not be spared from
the defence of the realm until the return of the royal navy. The company might have
a common seal and “may place in the tops of their ships the arms of England, with
a red cross in white over the same, as heretofore they have used.” The members
described in the charter and “their sons, apprentices, agents, factors and servants”
should use the powers granted for a term of twelve years, unless they should be
revoked, on eighteen months’ notice, as “not profitable to the Queen or to the
realm”;
424 they might be renewed for a second period of twelve years, on request of
the company, if the “trade shall appear to be advantageous.”
With the liberality to corporations characteristic of the Stuarts, James I, in 1605,
made the incorporation of the Levant Company perpetual, though he aimed to make
it an “open” regulated company by extending admission to its freedom to all sons of
members, all merchants on payment of £25, if under twenty-six years of age, and of
£50, if older, and to all the apprentices of members on payment of twenty shillings.
The machinery of government was more elaborate; all freemen were to elect annually
a governor, deputy governor and eighteen assistants, who should have the entire
management of the company’s affairs; the times of lading vessels and shipping
cargoes were to be determined at “general courts,” as the annual meetings of all
freemen were called.
425 During the civil war, the Levant Company, like that of the
Merchant Adventurers, found it advisable to secure a confirmation of its powers by
Parliament. In addition to a formal continuance of its incorporation, it was conceded
“the free choice and removal of all officers” to be maintained by it either in England
or abroad, whether ambassadors, governors, consuls, deputies or other; it should also
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“to levy money on its members and on strangers, upon all goods
shipped in English bottoms, or in strangers’ bottoms, going to or
coming from Levant, for the supply of its own necessary expense, as
well as for such sums of money as shall be advanced for the use and
benefit of the state, by the approbation of Parliament”
426
thus three distinct steps were gained by the company. The facts that the trade of the
company was approaching the condition of a monopoly and that the company was
suffering from the interference of independent merchants may justly be inferred from
the strict provisions against so-called “interlopers”:
“no person shall bring from or send goods or ships into the limits of
their charter, but such as are free brothers, or otherwise licensed by
the corporation, on pain of forfeiture of the whole, or other lesser
penalty to be imposed by this corporation on their goods or ships;...
They may also impose fines on persons wittingly contemning or
disobeying their orders, but not to exceed twenty pounds for any one
offense, and in default, to distrain the goods of persons so fined; and
if no sufficient distress can be found, to imprison their persons till
they pay their fines, or otherwise give satisfaction.”
Yet the provision for admission was substantially what it had been in the charter
of James:
“None shall be excluded from the freedom... who shall desire it by
way of redemption, if such person be a mere merchant, and otherwise
capable thereof, and shall pay fifty pounds for the same, if above
twenty-seven years of age or twenty-five pounds, if under that age, or
so much less as their fellowship shall think fitting.”
The reason assigned for the grant is interesting, being merely “for the better
government and regulating of trade”; while the purpose of previous grants had been
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the former had in view the activity of merchants, the latter, the form in which their
activity should be exercised.
427 The restrictive tendency in the membership was
recognized and promoted at the Restoration by the provision in the charter granted
by Charles II that it should be confined to persons who were merchants of London
or within twenty miles of it, except noblemen and gentlemen of quality, unless others
should first become free of the city of London. As freedom of the city involved
freedom of the city mercantile companies, the path to membership in the Levant
Company was obstructed by a considerable additional expense.
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The tendency towards the restriction of membership and concentration of power
was no less plain in the relations of the company to the crown and Parliament than
in the interrelations of the members of the company and the other merchants engaged
in the trade. During the seventeenth century after the concession of James’s charter,
the security of the Levant trade was gradually more fully established, communication
between European countries became closer, new sources of trade similar to the
Levant trade were discovered, and new routes of reaching the same trade were
developed, as the water route to India; in consequence the necessity of the corporate
organization of the Levant merchants became less apparent. Interlopers increased in
number and boldness, and in some cases, as in that of the merchants of Southampton,
obtained from the crown an exemption from the requirement of membership in the
Levant Company. Yet the company, designed by James to be open to all merchants,
did not expand to comprehend them. A coterie of influential London merchants, by
manipulating the management of the company, made it a means of excluding
merchants of other cities from the trade. They had sufficient power to secure the
amendment of 1661, which partially sanctioned the control of the company by their
oligarchy. In most of the regulated companies trade had been carried on in private
ships or in ships owned by groups of members; such had been the manner of carrying
on the Levant trade, but the company inaugurated the plan of using ships owned or
controlled by it in its corporate capacity in addition to the private ships of its
members, and made the new system a means of excluding from the trade members
outside of London. It appears that in 1718 the company’s vessels had not been used
for a few years and the company had in consequence lost its control over the trade;
in order to regain control a regulation was made that for the future all trading should
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should set out on their voyages at such times and from such places as the company
should determine. The dates of sailing were arbitrarily postponed for the purpose of
preventing the exportation of goods until prices in the foreign market should rise.
London was designated as the port from which vessels should be laden, a measure
manifestly prejudicial to the interests of merchants outside of London. Appeals to the
ministry were unavailing and a threat of remedy by Parliamentary legislation was
necessary to make the company (or the interior group in control of it) recede from
their position.
The most prosperous period of the company’s career was probably the first three
decades of the eighteenth century but they confessed to a committee of the House of
Commons in 1744 that their trade was at that time greatly decayed by reason, as they
alleged, of the competition of French merchants and the interruption of their supply
of silk by wars in the East; a pending bill to lay the trade open to all English
merchants was defeated, Parliament considering, whether justly or not, that the trade
could be better restored by maintaining than by abolishing the privileges of the
company. But nine years later, in 1753, it was enacted that after the 24th of June,
1754, 
“every subject of Great Britain, desiring admission into the Turkey Company, shall
be admitted within thirty days after... request” upon payment of twenty pounds to the
company;
“all persons free of the company may, separately or jointly, export any
goods... from any place in Great Britain to any place within the limits
of the [company’s] charter at any time and to any persons... free of the
company, or to the sons or apprentices of freemen... so long as they
shall remain under and submit to the protection and direction of the
British ambassador and consuls... ; and may import... commodities
purchased within the limits of the [charter] upon paying the king’s
duties and customs and such impositions as shall be assessed upon all
Merchandise exported or imported, or upon ships laden therewith, for
defraying the necessary expenses of the company.”John P. Davis, Corporations, 281
The governor or deputy governor and company were to make, at a general court,
such rules for the good government of the company as should seem necessary to the
majority of members present, but they should not be valid unless comfirmed at a
subsequent general court, held at least one month later on twenty days’ notice by
publication. If any seven or more of the freemen should think themselves aggrieved
by any rule, they might appeal within one year after its enactment to the
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, who should, after an early hearing of the
appeal, either approve or disapprove the rule in such manner as they saw fit.
429 The
enactment of the law marked a revolution in the affairs of the company. The
exclusive element in it was virtually destroyed. Admission into it and the commerce
of its members were so conditioned that its purely corporate functions were hardly
more than would have been reposed in an administrative branch of the English
government. For many years in the latter part of the century the revenue of the
company was insufficient for the payment of its expenses; Parliament accordingly
granted to it from £5000 to £10,000 per annum to relieve its successive deficits. In
1803, the British government resumed the power of appointing ambassadors, which
had long been reposed in the company. In 1825, in response to a suggestion from
Canning, the company expressed their willingness to execute a deed by which they
should surrender all the powers granted to them by their charters. Parliament, by an
act
430 in the same year, provided that as soon as the deed should be delivered, the
company should be dissolved and all its rights, powers and privileges should
determine; all the company’s property should vest in the crown, and all powers of
government possessed by the company’s consuls or other officers should in future be
exercised by royal officers. The reason assigned for the enactment of the law was
simply that “it would be beneficial to the trade of the United Kingdom, and especially
to the trade carried on in the Levant Seas, that the exclusive rights and privileges of
the governor and company... should cease and determine.”
Very similar to the Levant Company in its organization and course of development
was the Russia or Muskovy Company. Certain nobles and others named having
“already fitted out ships for discoveries northward, north-westward and
northeastward [to lands] not as yet frequented by subjects of any other Christian
monarch” in amity with England, they were in 1554 granted a charter by Philip and
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Discovery of Lands, Territories, Isles and Seigniories unknown, and not by the Seas
and Navigations, before this said late Adventure or Enterprise by Sea or Navigation,
commonly frequented.”
431 Sebastian Cabot, during his life, was to be governor; four
others, of the most “sad, discreet and honest of the fellowship,” should be consuls;
twenty-four other such members should be assistants. They had the usual power to
admit new members, to make laws for the government of their members and trade
and to punish offenders against their privileges by mulcts and forfeitures. As one of
their ships had wintered in Russia and the adventurers had obtained the concession
of important trading privileges from the Czar, they were given by the charter full
permission to trade thither; other parts to which the company might trade should be
only such as were not known to English subjects. They might make conquest of the
lands of infidels discovered by them. As in similar companies, their right to trade in
the territories described was exclusive, and non-members trading in them without
their license were subject to forfeiture of their ships and goods.
432 Among the many
privileges conceded to them by the Czar, their chief factor was to have full power to
govern all the English in Russia and administer justice among them according to such
laws as he, with his assistants, should make and enforce by means of fines and
imprisonment; the Czar’s officers were to assist the English in making and enforcing
their laws even to the extent of affording them the use of prisons and instruments of
torture; in general the Czar assured them justice in their relations with his subjects.
A fen years later (in 1566) he granted the company immunity from tolls and customs
in his dominions. Four years after their charter was granted they began the trade to
Persia by way of Moscow and the Caspian.
In 1566 their charter is said to have been confirmed by Parliament.
433 The chief
additional provisions were intended to restrict the trade of merchants outside the
company and plainly indicate a strong tendency to exclusiveness. The company’s
territory was now defined as any part of the continent lying north, northwest, or
northeast of London and not known or frequented by subjects before the company’s
first voyage, together with the Czar’s dominions, Armenia, Media, Hyrcania, Persia,
and the lands tributary to the Caspian Sea. No English subject should trade to them
without the “order, agreement, consent, or ratification” of the company, on pain of
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“that sundry subjects of the realm, perceiving that divers Russian
wares and merchandise are now imported by the said fellowship, after
all their great charge and travel, some of which be within this realm
of good estimation, minding, for their peculiar gain, utterly to decay
the trade of the said fellowship, have, contrary to [their charter], in
great disorder, traded into the dominions of Russia... to the great
detriment of this commonwealth “
An exception was made, however, of such inhabitants of York, Newcastle, Hull
and Boston as had been merchants for the past ten years, which shows some features
of the company’s management; they were permitted, by December 25, 1567, to
“contribute, join, and put in stock to, with and amongst the company,
such sums of money as any of the said company, which bath
thoroughly continued and contributed to the said new trade from the
year 1552, hath done, and before the said 25th of December, 1567,
shall do, for the furniture of one ordinary, full and entire portion or
share”;
every such merchant who should “in all things behave himself as others of the
society are bound to do, shall, from said date, be accounted free, as one of the said
society and company in all respects.” It is very evident that the activity of the
company was not that of a purely regulated company; such merchants as those of
“fair estimation” described in the preamble of the statute would otherwise hardly
have been trading outside its membership. Even the merchants of the four eastern
ports were not admitted so much because they were merchants as because they were
so situated as to be able to engage in the independent trade most advantageously;
even when they were admitted to share in the privileges of the company, they were
limited in number by the requirement of ten years of mercantile life; moreover, they
were limited in the amount of capital they should invest according to the amount
invested by the original members of the company. Finally, the trading of the company
was plainly carried on not by individual traders separately but by many in
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in successive voyages or adventures.
Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting confirmations from the Czar of
the exclusive privileges of the company and of additional privileges for the company
as distinguished from other English subjects. As early as 1571, the Czar deprived the
company of the exemptions and other privileges granted so readily less than twenty
years before, but soon regranted them. Later in the century the condition of their
rights in Russia was unstable; every year efforts were made to regain lost powers, to
gain new ones or to secure better protection of those nominally possessed. In the
treaty of 1623 made by James I and the Czar, the company considered themselves as
having made a distinct gain in the provision that the subjects of either monarch
trading without his permission in the dominions of the other should be surrendered
for punishment; the company expected that thereby they would secure the exclusion
of English merchants trading in Russia without their license. On the execution of
Charles I in England, however, the power of the company, as far as it was derived
from the Czar, was greatly weakened. The facts that account for the hostile attitude
of the Czar are not fully known. He is said to have claimed that a messenger from
Charles II requested him to abrogate the privileges of the company. He was certainly
disposed to resent the execution of the king by depriving his subjects, especially
merchants closely identified with the rebellious classes, of the exclusive privileges
he had granted to them. A more potent factor was doubtless the rivalry of Dutch
merchants, who sought to improve their commercial relations with the Czar, as
compared with those of the English company, by inflaming his mind against them.
At all events, after 1649, the best status that the Russia company could obtain in
Russia was one of equality with the Dutch merchants. In 1654, the trade from
Archangel into the interior of Russia was not open to the company. They might
remain at that port until they had disposed of their merchandise; unsold goods they
might leave there or take back to England, as they saw fit, but they might take them
no farther inland; in the same year the English are said to have been expelled entirely
from Archangel on the request of an emissary of Charles II. The change in the
attitude of the Czar must have seriously affected the ability of the company to
maintain its monopoly even against other English merchants. When the first charter
was granted, the company had consisted of 207 members; in 1600 there were only
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may be variously interpreted; they can hardly be construed as evidence of a decline
in the trade between 1555 and 1600, while they may be so considered of the trade
between 1600 and 1654; they probably indicate that during the whole time the trade
was being concentrated in a few hands. In 1604, when the Free Trade bill was under
consideration in the House of Commons, it was stated by the committee in its report
on the bill that the directors of the company had limited the amount that might be
adventured by individual members, they made “one purse and common stock,” they
placed all their exported merchandise for sale in Russia in the hands of one agent or
factor at Moscow, they likewise placed all their imported merchandise for sale in
England in the hands of one agent in London; after the business was entirely
transacted it was charged that they rendered to common adventurers such an account
as they pleased.
The Revolution of 1688 had its effect on the organization of the company. It had
become plain that under its management as a monopoly it was of slight public
service. Accordingly, in 1698, it was enacted by Parliament that after Ladyday in the
following year admission to the fellowship should be freely permitted to any subject
upon payment of five pounds.
434 During the eighteenth century the company
remained intact but exercised no control over commerce; in hair and 1750, the trade
with Russia (especially in silk) was still restricted to its free men; in 1854 customs
were still levied by it though “every individual admitted into the company conducted
his business entirely as a private adventurer, or as he would do were the company
abolished.”
435 In 1882 it was said of it that”in truth, for business purposes [it had]
ceased to exist, its only meeting now being an annual social gathering.”
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In this class of corporations ought also to be included the Morocco Company
created by charter of Elizabeth in 1588 to the Earls of Warwick and Leicester and
forty other persons for the development of a trade in Morocco, which proved not to
be important or permanent. In 1604, James I incorporated the “President Assistants
and Fellowship of Merchants of England Trading into Spain and Portugal,”
437 usually
called the Spanish Company, which aspired to have France included in its grant. In
the following year great Parliamentary opposition to its monopoly of the trade
resulted in the Free Trade Act, providing that all the king’s subjects should in future
as freely trade into and from the dominions of Spain, Portugal and France as they had
since the beginning of his reign or before the grant of the company’s charter.
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charter was thereupon revoked by the king. In 1665, Charles II chartered the Canary
Company, to consist of all subjects who had traded to the Canary Islands within
seven years past to the extent of £1000 annually and of all others who should be
admitted to membership by them; they were to enjoy the trade exclusively, and were
to be governed by a governor, deputy governor and twelve assistants. The preamble
of the charter is the most instructive part of it; it is alleged in justification of the grant
of powers
“that the trade to the Canary Isles Noms formerly of greater advantage
to the king’s subjects than at this time, that by reason of the too much
access and trading of subjects thither, ... merchandise was decreased
in its value, and the Canary wines, on the other hand, were increased
to double their former value, so that the king’s subjects were forced
to carry silver and bullion thither to get wines: and that all this was
owing to want of regulation in trade.”
The charter was vigorously assailed in Parliament, as in violation of the Free Trade
Act of 1605, the Canary Islands being part of the dominions of the King of Spain.
The House of Commons passed a resolution “that the patent of the Canary Company
is an illegal patent, a monopoly and a grievance of the subject,”
439 and moved the
king to revoke the charter. In the next year the king yielded to the opposition by
revoking the charter, for which he was thanked by both Houses. When Lord
Clarendon was impeached by the House of Commons one of the charges against him
was that he had “received great sums of money for passing the Canary patent, and
other illegal patents, and granted illegal injunctions to stop proceedings at law against
them and other illegal patents formerly granted.”
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Several other corporations organized for the prosecution of discoveries of new
lands or ocean passages, and for engaging in commerce and in the fisheries would
also have to be included in the class under consideration. Most of them were of little
importance and none of them were permanent. A few may be mentioned as examples.
In 1583, the “Colleagues of the Fellowship for the Discovery of the Northwest
Passage,” consisting of Adrian Gilbert and others, were chartered by Elizabeth for a
term of five years.
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Discovery of the North Passage,” consisting of Penkevell of Cornwall and others,
were chartered by James I for a term of seven years for the “sole discovery of a
passage to China, Cathay, the Moluccos, and other parts of the East Indies by the
north, northwest, or northeast.”
442 The Russia Company and East India Company
formed together a joint stock to engage in the Spitzbergen whale fishery in 1618 and
maintained it for two years.
443 In 1636, Charles I prohibited the importation of whale
fins or whale oil except by the Russia Company, which might form a joint stock for
that purpose.
444 The “Royal Fishery Company of Great Britain and Ireland,” of which
the Duke of York, Lord Clarendon and others were the members, received a charter
from Charles II in 1661. The “Company of the Royal Fishery of England,” which
may have been the successor of the preceding company, consisted of the Duke of
York and others and was chartered by Charles II in 1677. By act of Parliament in
1693
445 Sir William Scawen and forty-one others were incorporated for a term of
fourteen years as the “Company of Merchants of London Trading to Greenland.”
The staple organization had comprehended the foreign trade as it existed, no
change in the relations of native and foreign merchants had been contemplated; the
most that had been sought was the regulation of established relations. The general
purpose of the purely regulated companies was to displace the foreign merchants and
to substitute the native merchants for them, with an incidental enlargement of the
trade. The aim of the former was harmony, even at the expense of perpetuating the
control of the trade by foreigners; on the contrary, the aim of the latter was to satisfy
the ambitions of English merchants in their competition with foreigners. In both
cases the trade was already established, and its further development was to be along
lines already defined. The object of the regulated companies that have been
distinguished as exclusive and concentrated (both terms being inexact) was the
organization of newly “discovered” trade with lands like Turkey and Russia
previously not “frequented” in trade by Englishmen or subjects of other Christian
nations. It was the third stage in the growth of the English foreign trade as far as it
was organized in corporations. In the first stage all the merchants, both English and
foreign, were comprehended in one organization; in the second, all the English
merchants to the exclusion of foreigners alone; in the third, only a part of the English
merchants, to the exclusion not only of all foreigners but also of many English
merchants.John P. Davis, Corporations, 288
The exclusion of the foreign merchants may be easily explained by the different
national purpose that has been suggested as distinguishing the regulated companies
from the earlier staple organizations. The normal purpose of social organization is
to promote harmony between the social elements organized, not to enable one
element to make a conquest of a field occupied by another. It was hardly in the nature
of things that the merchants of the Eastland Company and Hamburgh Company
should be expected to oust the Hanseatic merchants from international trade by being
merged in one organization with them. But the second step in exclusiveness of
corporate membership is not so easily explained. Some considerations bearing on the
question may be profitably presented in detail.
1. The regulated and regulated-exclusive forms may be distinguished, from the
standpoint of their application to the social activity contained in them, as subsequent
and antecedent. The former was a structure that trade had acquired in the course of
its evolution; the latter was applied to trade is its establishment and was intended as
a structure within which its evolution should be at least begun. It is the difference that
is frequently expressed by the terms “spontaneous” or “natural,” as applied to the
former, and “arbitrary” or “compulsory,” as applied to the latter. The importance of
the distinction is that fitness of form for content is usually assured by the test of
experience in the former and subject to be determined by future experience in the
latter, as is well exemplified in the Levant Company and East India Company, of
which one became finally a purely regulated company and the other a joint-stock
company. To express the distinction implied in the somewhat exceptional use of the
terms “subsequent” and “antecedent” in a different and perhaps better way, the
regulated companies were formed after and the regulated-exclusive companies before
the trade was established, The effort involved in the establishment was capitalized,
so to speak, in the form of an exclusive right to enjoy the trade established. The
granting of a charter to the Russia Company had been preceded by a voyage in which
the adventurers had demonstrated on their own initiative, and at their own expense,
the possibility of developing a trade to Russia; likewise the granting of corporate
powers to the Levant Company had rewarded the enterprise of a group of English
adventurers who “had, at their own great costs and charges, found out and opened a
trade to Turkey.” The fishery companies had their origin in the express purpose of
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the “merchants of Holland” and Merchant Adventurers, it had been otherwise. They
had established no new trade; the trade had existed before they were organized,
though it had been carried on by foreign merchants. There was no effort of discovery
or establishment to encourage or reward in their cases.
2. England enjoyed no settled international relations with the nations whose trade
had been “discovered.” The international relations that in the trade of the regulated
companies had been maintained through the political machinery of the state were
formed and maintained by the regulated-exclusive companies themselves in their
commercial territory. Even the formal appointment by the crown of ambassadors and
consuls in Turkey recommended by the Levant Company was soon discontinued, and
the company was expressly allowed by charter to do directly what it had previously
done indirectly, — to appoint the political representatives of the English nation in
Turkey. When Elizabeth sent costly presents to the Czar, they were paid for by the
Russia Company; it was virtually the corporation that was propitiating him, and the
royal name was being used merely as a matter of form. From the side of England,
then, a large part of the political sovereignty of the nation, or more properly, of the
powers through which it was expressed, was reposed in the company — a far larger
part than, in the state of political development in Europe, had been necessary in the
commerce of the regulated companies in Western Europe. Perhaps it is not necessary
to add that from the side of the nations in whose territories the companies traded, a
very similar grant of powers was made. If England presented itself to the foreign
nation in the personality of a trading company, the foreign nation acted reciprocally
through the same medium. If trading privileges were granted, they were granted not
at first through the normal political means of treaties between the sovereigns, but by
“capitulations” directly conceded to the companies. From both sides the companies
derived a considerable body of purely political powers. If the effort of discovering or
establishing a new trade in foreign countries seemed to justify its restriction as a
reward or compensation to the adventurers who had put forth the effort, the success
in securing concessions from the rulers of foreign countries was even more deserving
of reward; the concessions were usually either in derogation of exclusive privileges
granted to traders of other countries or themselves exclusive of such other traders;
in Turkey the English merchants were granted the same rights to trade that had
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Russia they were granted an exclusive trade and suffered a loss when the Dutch were
afterwards admitted to an equality with them. The English and foreign rulers had the
same object in view, the increase of commerce by encouraging merchants through
grants of exceptional powers. If the foreign ruler happened to be passive, and not
desirous of the new trade, a less commendable motive had to be supplied through the
bestowal of gifts or some other less disguised form of payment; in either case, the
result represented an outlay of time, effort and goods, and formed a substantial basis
for grants of powers to the groups of adventurers exclusively of their
fellow-countrymen. Any interloper that tried to engage in a new trade established by
English adventurers must have profited to a greater or less extent by their labors in
founding the trade and in providing the political machinery necessary for its
prosecution; if he were required to pay membership fees in just proportion to the
advantages enjoyed by him as a result of the company’s work, he might not hesitate,
from a selfish point of view, to risk the forfeiture of his ship and cargo in preference
to paying the large fees demanded. The prevalence of interlopers was not always
convincing evidence of their unjust exclusion from the corporations. On the other
hand, the companies, who perhaps regarded their privileges as property, had no
inclination to undervalue them and accordingly demanded exorbitant payments for
their acquisition by others; even further, they certainly placed arbitrary and
unreasonable restrictions on the trade to perpetuate their exclusive enjoyment of it.
What is important is not that they denied to others opportunities to participate in their
trade — that was to be expected — but the conditions that made it possible for them
to do so.
3. Corporations are, in a broad view, institutions of government. The regulated
companies made rules for the government of their members in their individual
activity, and exercised judicial and other functions readily recognized as
governmental. For most purposes their activity may be said to have fallen into two
classes, political and commercial, though the analysis is certainly superficial. The
difference between the regulated and regulated-exclusive companies was, in general,
from this point of view, that in the former the commercial activity predominated,
while in the latter the political activity was greater in volume and more important in
substance. The coercive power behind the political activity was stronger than the
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consequence of their greater ratio of political to commercial powers and of the
normal difference in the effectiveness of the two powers, the regulated-exclusive
companies developed to a higher degree in the direction of government; they did not
stop at the regulation of the individual, but proceeded to absorb him and to merge his
activity in the organic activity of the group to which he belonged; they built
“company” ships and enacted that private ships should not be used in their trade; they
passed beyond the imposition of a “stint” of trading by the individual and enacted
that all trading should be by the group as such, or at least through the companies’
factors; in fine, their governmental machinery was made to do not only the work of
government, but also that of trading.
4. It may be contrary to some accepted theories of the state to suggest that, before
an individual may safely be left to conduct his own business without regulation, he
must be an efficient unit of activity. It is certain, however, that in the trade conducted
by the regulated-exclusive companies the individual merchant was unable to act
separately. It is not too much to say that if he had been permitted to do so, he would
have acted contrary to his ultimate best interests; as it was sometimes expressed, he
would probably have “spoiled” or “decayed” the trade. The companies were
exercising the functions that were later to be exercised by the English nation through
its government in providing the political framework within which the trade had to be
carried on; the individual merchants, acting separately, could undoubtedly not have
exercised them; the trade could only become “open” when the English government
should have assumed the exercise of the companies’ political powers, or should have
separated the political from the commercial powers. The trade to Russia and Turkey
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was based on such an accumulation of
capital as individual merchants had not attained. Trade by sea could not be in smaller
units than single vessels, and the ownership of a whole cargo was undoubtedly
beyond the capacity of the individual merchants of the time. But such was the
insecurity of the sea from pirates and hostile peoples that the unit of trade to Russia
and Turkey could hardly with prudence be less than a small fleet, provided with
marines and armament as well as with sailors. The power of the governing bodies of
the companies to designate the places and times of lading vessels for voyages was not
wholly unwarranted; on the contrary it was quite necessary that it be exercised,
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management was due, for the most part, to the conditions of the commerce of the
time; increased exclusiveness of membership was derived from it through the undue
advantage given by it to the interior body of members in whom the management was
concentrated.
The history of the companies under consideration may be divided into periods and,
though it has not been done before, it may add clearness to suggest such a division
now. (1) They first appeared as groups of adventurers actuated by their personal
interests in seeking new fields of commerce. (2) When the “new trade” had been
discovered and foundations had been laid for its prosecution, the founders, with
others taken into their groups, received grants of powers both from the English crown
and from foreign rulers, by which their numbers were determined, and their relations
to each other, to other subjects and to foreigners were settled. In this stage of
development the terms during which the corporate relations should continue were
limited, and the membership restricted. (3) The first charters were followed by others
by which the powers already granted were supplemented by others wider in scope.
This and the preceding period were the ones in which the characteristic exclusiveness
and concentration of the companies made themselves manifest. This period was
particularly the one in which interference from interlopers and private traders called
for attention. (4) After the influence of private traders acquired sufficient strength,
the trades were opened to all merchants by Parliamentary intervention and the
companies became purely regulated companies. (1) As regulated companies they
eventually became obsolete, exercising only a nominal influence over trade but in
some cases exercising political powers such as would belong to an administrative
department of the government. (6) Finally the nominal control over trade that had
been permitted them was taken away and their political powers assumed by the state
even if their technical corporate existence was not also terminated by a revocation of
their charters. Such at least would be the periods into which the history of the
developed corporations of the class might properly be divided. Such corporations as
the Spanish Company and Canary Company were so manifestly out of harmony with
the conditions under which they were created that they were very properly
short-lived.XI. Joint Stock Companies.
In the purely regulated companies the joint-stock principle was not theoretically
applied, and in such of them as it prevailed was permitted to be introduced only
covertly and in response to the demands of peculiar circumstances; it was at no time
regarded as a legitimate part of their organization. In the joint-stock companies,
however, the principle was fully applied and was the distinctive feature of their
organization and growth. By far the most important of the joint-stock companies
were the old, new and united East India Companies, which may fairly and by writers
usually are regarded as different stages or phases of one great organization — the
East India Company.
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The Levant Company, it will be remembered, was a regulated company, typical of
the class that tended to become exclusive and in which the principle of the joint stock
was introduced to only a limited extent by the coterie of merchants in control of
them. The East India Company appears to have been an offshoot of the Levant
Company or at least to have been closely connected with it at the time of its
formation.
447
On the 31st day of December, 1600, Elizabeth, “greatly tendering the honor of [the
nation], the wealth of [the] people, and the encouragement of [her] subjects in their
good enterprises, for the increase of... navigation, and the advancement of lawful
traffic, to the benefit of [the nation’s] common wealth,” granted to George, Earl of
Sunderland, and two hundred and fifteen others, that they “ from henceforth be one
body corporate and politic... by the name of the ‘Governor and Company of
Merchants of London, trading into the East Indies,’” have corporate succession with
power to admit and expel members, be capable of receiving, holding and granting
property, sue and be sued in the corporate name and use a common seal. “The
direction of the voyages,... the provisions of the shipping and merchandise thereto
belonging,... the sale of all merchandise returned in the voyages,... and the managing
and handling of all other things belonging to the company” were reposed in a
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by the members of the company at a general court but removable by them at any
time; the first governor (Sir Thomas Smith) and committees were named in the
charter. The governor and deputy governor were required to take an oath to well and
truly execute their offices, and the members such an oath as should be prescribed for
them by the company.
448 The courts (or meetings) should be held from time to time
at any place in England or elsewhere. For a term of fifteen years the members of the
company (and such others as should afterwards be admitted to membership) and their
sons (more than twenty-one years old) were exclusively empowered to
“freely traffic and use the trade of merchandise, by seas, in and by
such ways and passages already found out and discovered, or which
hereafter shall be found out and discovered, as they shall esteem and
take to be fittest, into and from the East Indies,... and into and from
all the places of Asia and Africa and America... beyond the Cape of
Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan so always the... trade be not
undertaken or addressed to any... place already in the lawful and
actual possession of any... Christian prince or state in league or amity
with [England] and who cloth not or will not accept of such trade, but
cloth overtly declare and publish [it] to be utterly against his good
will.”
They might
“make such... reasonable laws, constitutions, orders and ordinances
as to them... shall seem necessary and convenient for the good
government of [the company] and of all factors, masters, mariners
and other officers employed in any of their voyages, and for the better
advancement and continuance of [their] trade, “
if only they should be “reasonable and not contrary or repugnant to the laws,
statutes or customs” of England; and in order to enforce them they might “impose
such punishment and penalties by imprisonment of body, or by fines and
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necessary, requisite and convenient for [their] observation,” all fines levied to be for
the use of the company. For the first four voyages, the company should be exempt
from the payment of export duties, and thereafter, if exported goods were lost, the
export duties paid on them should be refunded; import duties should be paid, half in
six months and half in twelve months, and if imported goods should be exported in
English bottoms within thirteen months after importation, no export duties should be
levied on them. They might take out of England each year silver in foreign coin or
in bullion of a value not in excess of £30,000, provided £6000 be first coined at the
royal mint; within six months after the end of any voyage except the first the
company was to bring into England at least as great value of gold or silver in bullion
or foreign coin as had been taken out at the beginning of the voyage. “In any time of
restraint, six good ships and six good pinnaces, well furnished with ordinance and
other munitions for their defence, and five hundred [English] mariners, to guide and
sail in [them] shall be... suffered to depart,” unless they should be needed by the
government for the prosecution of a war. The East Indies and other places described
in the charter should not be “visited, frequented or haunted” by English subjects
during the term of fifteen years except by license of the company,
“upon pain that every such person... that shall trade or traffic into or
from [the described territory] other than [the company] shall incur...
the forfeiture and loss of the goods... which so shall be brought into
[England] as also the... ships, with [their] furniture.... wherein [they]
shall be brought,”
half to the company and half to the crown, should suffer imprisonment during the
royal pleasure “and such other punishment as... for so high a contempt shall seem
meet,” and should not be released until he had executed to the company a bond in the
sum of at least £1000 not in future to trade or traffic in their exclusive territory.
Though the company might grant licenses to non-members to engage in the East
India trade, the crown promised not to grant them without the company’s consent. If
not earlier terminated by the crown on two years’ warning, the grant was to become
void at the expiration of fifteen years, when it might be renewed on application of the
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and not “prejudicial or hurtful” to the realm.
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The first voyage was in 1601 and proved extremely profitable. Eight voyages
undertaken from 1603 to 1613 also terminated, on the whole, successfully, though
the vessels fitted out in 1607 were lost at sea. All of the voyages had been undertaken
by groups of members of the company on joint stocks, and not by the company in its
corporate capacity; in the seventh voyage, in 1610, several classes of “adventurers”
had united and were called joint adventurers, each captain of the four vessels sailing
under separate orders, but all the vessels forming one fleet.
450 The authority exercised
by the corporation over the activity of its members was that of a regulated company.
In 1612 it was resolved that thereafter the trading should be only by the corporation
with a joint stock, but even under the new plan there was not what is now known as
a joint stock. Each member subscribed or “adventured” as much as he desired, or
even declined to subscribe any amount at all, to a common fund to be placed in the
hands of the governor and committees (directors) for management in behalf of such
of the members as had participated in the subscription. After the change of
organization in 1612 a stock of £429,000, known as the “Company’s First Joint
Stock,” was subscribed and devoted by the governor and directors to four separate
voyages or adventures in the years 1613, 1614, 1615 and 1616, the profits being
distributed pro rata among the subscribers according to the amounts of their
subscriptions. In 1617–1618 the “Company’s Second Joint Stock” was raised in the
amount of £1,600,000, the company now having thirty-six vessels and 954
proprietors of stock.
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“But as the accounts of the company have never been remarkable for
clearness, or their historians for precision, we are not informed
whether these ships belonged to the owners of the first joint stock, or
to the owners of the second; or if to both, in what proportion; whether
the 954 proprietors of stock were the subscribers to both funds, or to
the last only; whether any part of the first joint stock had been paid
back to the owners, as the proceeds came in; or whether both funds
were now in the hands of the directors at once, employed for the
respective benefit of the respective lists of subscribers: two trading
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account of different associations. That such was the case, to a certain
extent, may be concluded from this, that of the last of the voyages,
upon the first of the funds, the returns were not yet made. Afterwards,
the directors had in their hands, at one and the same time, the funds
of several bodies of subscribers, which they were bound to employ
separately, for the separate benefit of each;... they, as well as their
agents abroad, experienced great inconvenience in preserving the
accounts and concerns separate and distinct; and... the interests and
pretensions of the several bodies were prone to interfere.”
452
A “Third Joint Stock” followed, when a “Fourth Joint Stock” was projected in 1640
as the condition of the withdrawal by Charles I of the privileges of Courten and his
associates.
453 The confusion of the several joint stocks and the fact that they did not
belong to identical sets of subscribers became most apparent. 
“The proprietors of the third joint stock had made frequent but
unavailing calls upon the directors to close that concern, and bring
home what belonged to it in India;... payment was demanded of the
capital of those separate funds, called the joint stocks of the company.
To encourage subscription to the new joint stock, it was laid down as
a condition, ‘that to prevent inconvenience and confusion, the old
company or adventurers in the third joint stock should have sufficient
time allowed for bringing home their property, and should send no
more stock to India, after the month of May [1640].’ The subscribers
to the new stock were themselves, in a general court, to elect the
directors to who’ll the management of the fund should be committed,
and to renew that election annually.
454 As this was a new court of
directors, entirely belonging to the fourth joint stock, it seems to
follow that the directors in whose hands the third joint stock had been
placed, must still have remained in office, for the winding up of that
concern. And in that case there existed, to all intents and purposes,
two separate bodies of proprietors, and two separate courts of
directors, under one charter.”
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In 1609 the company had obtained from James I a confirmation of their charter
with an amendment making it perpetual, but revocable on three years’ warning. Their
monopoly had been maintained intact during the life of Elizabeth, but James, in 1604,
had granted to Sir Edward Michelborne and his associates a license to discover “the
countries and dominions of Cathaia, China, Japan, Corea and Cambaia and the
islands and countries “hereunto adjoining, and to... trade with the... people inhabiting
[them] not as yet frequented and traded unto by British subjects or people.”
456
Interlopers less prominent interfered continually with the trade, eliciting repeated
protests from the company that they were ruining it. In 1635, Charles I granted to
William Courten and others a license to trade in the territory of the East India
Company, on the ground that the latter had not made settlements and established
trade as promised and expected.
457 In 1637 he confirmed the privileges of Sir William
Courten (son of the earlier man of the same name) and his associates (later known
as the “Assada Merchants”) “as to all places in India where the old company had not
settled any factories or trade before the twelfth of December, 1635"; but without
prejudice to the old company in other respects.
458 When the Council of State was
asked by the company in 1649 to recommend to the House of Commons the passage
of an act favorable to their exclusive privileges, it was suggested to the company that
they enter into a conference with the Assada Merchants for a termination of their long
contest with them.
459 Accordingly the contending parties agreed on a union in
1649–1650, and a joint stock was subscribed by them for future trade. But the union
did not long prove harmonious, and in 1654 a large group of the subscribers to the
joint-stock, including the Assada Merchants, but known collectively as the
“Merchant Adventurers Trading to the Indies” filed two petitions with the Council
of State, in which they prayed 
“that the East India Company should no longer proceed exclusively
on the principle of a joint stock trade, but that the owners of the
separate funds should have authority to employ their own capital,
servants, and shipping, in the way in which they themselves should
deem most to their own advantage.”
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The East India Company and Merchant Adventurers were engaged in fitting outJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 299
separate fleets for voyages. The select committee of the Council of State to whom the
petitions of the Merchant Adventurers and counter petitions of the East India
Company had been referred, could reach no conclusion after holding hearings of
interested parties, and returned them to the Protector and the Council; finally the
Council of State advised Cromwell to continue the exclusive trade and joint stock,
and a new committee of the council was appointed to consider the terms of a
charter.
461 The outcome of Cromwell’s settlement was a nearer approach to the
modern status of a joint-stock company. The interests of all the other adventurers in
previous funds or joint stocks and “dead stock” were bought up by the members of
the East India Company and Merchant Adventurers, and the new joint stock
subscribed was the only one left in charge of the directors.
462
On the accession of Charles II, a new charter was obtained, which increased
substantially the body of powers already possessed by the company. The privileges
granted in earlier charters were recited and confirmed. In addition, it was granted, “
for the preventing of secret and clandestine trading,” that no merchandise of the
growth, production or manufacture of the territory in Asia, Africa and America
exclusively limited to the company should be brought into England without their
consent. All plantations, forts, factories or colonies in the territory should be under
the power and command of the company, who should have power to appoint
governors and all other officers to govern them. The governor and council of the
several places in which the company had factories or places of trade, “may have
power to judge all persons... that shall live under them, in all causes, whether civil
or criminal, according to the laws of [England] and to execute judgment
accordingly.” If a crime should be committed in a place in which there were no
governor and council, the offender might be sent for trial to some other place in India
or to England, as the head authority of the place should deem the more convenient.
The company were permitted to send ships of war, men and munitions into their
factories or other places of trade
“for the security and defence of the same,... and to choose
commanders and officers over them, and to give them power and
authority... to continue or make peace or war with any prince or
people that are not Christians, as shall be most for the advantage andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 300
benefit of the [company] and of their trade, and also to right and
recompense themselves upon the goods, estate or people of those
parts, by whom [they] shall sustain any injury, loss, or damage, or
upon any other people whatsoever, that shall anyways intercept,
wrong or injure them in their trade.... It shall be lawful to erect and
build such castles, fortifications, forts, garrisons, colonies or
plantations... within the bounds of [their trade] as they in their
discretion shall think fit and requisite,”
to send to them
“all kinds of clothing, provision of victuals, ammunition and
implements necessary for such purposes, without paying of any
custom, subsidy or other duty,... to transport such number of men...
and govern them in such legal and reasonable manner as [they] shall
think fit, and to inflict punishment for misdemeanors, or impose fines
upon them for breach of their orders.”
They might “seize upon the persons of all [English subjects that] shall sail... or
inhabit in those parts without [their] leave and license.... or that shall contemn or
disobey their orders, and send them to England.” All employees of the company
should be liable to such punishment for any offenses committed by them as the
company should think fit and the degree of the offences should require. If a person
convicted and sentenced by the president and council in India should appeal, he
should be seized by them and sent a prisoner to England, there to receive from the
governor and company “ such condign punishment as the merits of his case shall
require and the laws of the nation allow of.” “For the better discovery of abuses and
injuries to be done unto the [company] by their servants,” they should have power to
examine them on oath “touching or concerning any matter or thing [concerning]
which by law and usage an oath may be administered, so as the oath and the matter
therein contained be not repugnant to the laws of [the] realm.”
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In 1669, the island and port of Bombay, which had been ceded to Charles by
Portugal in accordance with his marriage contract, was conveyed by him to the East
India Company with power to govern it, to defend it by war and arms, to repel any
hostile force from it, to pass laws for the government of its inhabitants and enforce
them by punishment, fines, imprisonment and “taking away life or member,” to
appoint and dismiss officers and servants bound by oath to perform their duties, to
maintain courts, sessions, forms of judicature and manners of procedure, “like unto
those established and used” in England and presided over by judges appointed by the
company, and even to declare and enforce martial law when occasion demanded. The
laws enacted by the company, however, were to “be reasonable and not repugnant or
contrary, but as near as may be agreeable to the laws, statutes, government and
policy” of England. The powers granted with relation to Bombay were moreover to
extend to territory afterwards acquired by the company elsewhere.
464 The island of
St. Helena was granted to the company, in 1674, with substantially the same powers.
The justification urged for the last grant is instructive:
“For as much as we have found, by much experience, that the... trade
with the East Indies bath been managed by the [East India Company]
to the honor and profit of this our realm, and to that end and out of
our earnest desire that the [company] may, by all good and lawful
means, be encouraged in their difficult and hazardous trade and traffic
in those remote parts of the world.”
465
In a subsequent charter in 1677, amendatory of that of 1669, was granted the power
to coin money in India in such denominations as the company wished, except those
of English money.
466 It had been originally provided that the vessels and cargoes of
unlicensed traders should be forfeited and later that they should not be brought into
England. It was finally granted, in a charter conceded by Charles II in 1683, that the
East India Company might “seize all ships, vessels, goods and wares going to or
coming from the East Indies,” one half to be retained by the company and one half
to be turned over to the crown. A special court was also to be established, to consist
of “one person learned in the civil laws” and two merchants, all appointed by the
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all other mercantile and maritime cases, “all which cases shall be adjudged and
determined... upon due examination and proof, according to the rules of equity and
good conscience, and according to the laws and customs of merchants.”
467
Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of their powers, they not infrequently
exceeded their limits, while sometimes they were unable to use them fully;
indemnifying provisions became common in later charters and appear to have been
readily granted by the crown. In the charter of Charles II granted in 1677, the
exculpatory provision was as follows:
“Whereas divers transactions have happened, wherein the
proceedings of the “company] may be liable to some question how far
they are warranted by the strict letter of [their charters] and the
charters themselves may be in danger to be impeached, as forfeited
for some misuser or non-user of [their] rights, liberties and
franchises... we, for the removal and prevention of all questions and
doubts of that nature, ratify and confirm... all the rights, liberties and
franchises to them formerly granted... notwithstanding any former
misuser, non-user or abuser whatsoever.”
468
Even at the Restoration “the joint stock was not yet a definite and invariable sum,
placed beyond the power of redemption, at the disposal of the company, the shares
only transferable by purchase and sale in the market. The capital was variable and
fluctuating, formed by the sums which, on the occasion of each voyage” or series of
voyages “the individuals who were free of the company chose to pay into the hands
of the Directors, receiving credit for the amount on the company’s books, and
proportional dividends on the profits of the voyage.”
469 The final stage of
development was hardly reached until after the Revolution of 1688. The greater
powers given to the company in the charters of Charles II for the suppression of the
traffic of those who engaged in “a loose and general trade” prepared the ground for
such an organization as was attained under the charters of William  and Mary.
470 For
twenty years after the grant of the first charter of Charles II, in 1661, the company
enjoyed its monopoly of the East Indian trample with comparatively little
interruption.
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especially of the latter), the competition of a few interlopers and the drain of the
“private trade” of its officers and servants had a hurtful influence on dividends, but
such trade as was conducted was under the control of the company and subject to
such limitations as they say, fit to impose. By 1682, however, the opposition to the
company, which had been increasing, manifested itself in a project for a competing
joint-stock company, which for the present was not attained. The opposition is said
to have been prompted largely by the old Levant Company, whose traffic in Indian
goods by way of the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia and the Mediterranean had been
almost superseded by that of the East India Company by sea.
472 Though the
opposition held an “open trade” in no more favor than the existing company, they
were ready to accept the assistance of the interlopers, private traders and “pirates” (as
the company were inclined to class those who traded without their license); in
consequence, the number of interlopers increased rapidly. In 1685, the court (body
of directors) of the company appear to have resolved to prosecute forty-eight of the
principal interlopers in the Court of King’s Bench.
473 What was evidently intended
as a test case had been brought against one Sandys, wherein it had been decided in
January, 1685, “that the Crown had a right to grant exclusive charters, and that such
right had been repeatedly acquiesced in by Parliament”; the defendant had sought
justification of his independent trade in the plea “that his attempt to trade to India
was not contrary to the laws of the realm.”
474 After the Revolution of 1688, the
political theory that monopolies of trade could be granted only by act of Parliament
acquired new force, and the Commons began an active interference in the affairs of
the East India Company. A committee of investigation appointed in 1689, having
extended hearings to both the company and interlopers or traders desirous of forming
rival associations, reported in the following year a resolution
“that the best way to manage the East India trade is to have it in a new
company and a new joint stock and this to be established by act of
Parliament, but the present company to continue the trade, exclusive
of all others, either interlopers or permission ships, till it be
established.”
475
On the failure of legislation by Parliament, the affairs of the company were left toJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 304
the king, by whom their chartered rights were confirmed without diminution in
1693.
476 In the same year, however, a new charter was granted, which recognized to
some extent the rights of traders outside the old company by allowing them to
participate in its business without affording them the opportunity of separate trading,
and made the membership of the company more nearly co-terminous with the
membership of the groups interested in the adventures. The “general joint stock” was
to be increased by.£744,000; subscription books were to be opened to the public; no
subscription was to be in excess of £10,000, and if the aggregate subscriptions were
in excess of.£744,000, the separate subscriptions were to be decreased pro rata.
Each subscriber should have a vote in general court for each £1000 (but no vote for
less) up to £10,000 subscribed.
477 Formerly sons (more than twenty-one years old) of
members and their apprentices, factors and servants might engage in the trade; now
persons formerly eligible to membership were to be admitted gratis to the freedom
of the company, if they should subscribe for stock; other subscribers should pay £5
each for admission; the organic difference between a company whose members had
the privilege of engaging in a particular business and one whose members were
jointly engaged in the business seemed difficult to recognize. The governor and
deputy governor were to be qualified for their offices by ownership of £4000 of
stock; committees (directors), of £1000 of stock. The charter was to be forfeited if
licenses were granted to private traders. All goods imported by the company were to
be sold publicly “by inch of candle” in lots of less than £500 in value, except jewels.
At least £100,000. worth of goods “of the product and manufacture” of England was
to be exported annually. If demanded, the company should sell annually to the
government five hundred tons of saltpetre (for gunpowder). The joint stock was to
be continued for twenty-one years, during the last year of which books “for the
continuance of the joint stock” were to be kept open.
478 In the next year, however, the
House of Commons resolved that “it is the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East
Indies, or any part of the world, unless prohibited by act of Parliament.” It was plain
to the East India Company that they must have their powers sanctioned by Parliament
or eventually lose them; until it could obtain such sanction it must protect itself by
insistence on the validity of its royal charters, by more vigorous prosecution of
interlopers and by profuse and extravagant bribery of public officials and members
of Parliament.John P. Davis, Corporations, 305
The struggle of the company for a Parliamentary confirmation of its powers against
its opponents, whether favoring the right of private trade or the establishment of a
new company, came to a head in 1698. The government being in need of funds to
carry on the European war then in progress, the East India Company offered it a loan
of £700,000 at interest of four per cent. in return for a confirmation of their charter
by Parliament, but their rivals met the offer with one for a loan of £2,000,000 at
interest of eight per cent. for a charter granting a monopoly of the trade but allowing
the traders to determine for themselves whether it should be by joint stock or
otherwise. The result was an act favorable (on its face) to the opponents of the old
company. The subscribers to the loan of £2,000,000 were to be incorporated under
the name of the “General Society Trading to the East Indies,” and each of them was
to trade for himself if he desired; if any number of them should wish to trade on a
joint stock, they should have a charter permitting them to do so; the capital of all
traders was to be equal to their subscriptions to the loan. The great majority were
incorporated under the name of the “English Company Trading to the East Indies,”
with a constitution and powers almost identical with those of the existing company.
The old East India Company, however, was not to be undone. By the terms of the
statute it still had three years (until 1701) of corporate life, and had provided for its
future by subscribing.£315,000 of the loan of £2,000,000. It obtained an act of
Parliament (which could hardly be refused) granting it in 1699 a charter to trade by
a joint stock (like the English Company) on its subscription of £315,000. When they
presented the new charter to King William, he wisely recommended to them a union
with the English Company.
The next (and in many respects the last) step was the union of the old or London
Company and the new or English Company, or more properly, the absorption of the
former by the latter. By an “Indenture Tripartite” between Queen Anne and the two
companies, in 1702,
479 it was agreed that the English Company should transfer to the
London Company at par enough of its stock of £1,662,000 to make the holdings of
the two companies equal, the original stock of £315,000 of the London Company
becoming part of that of the English Company. The “dead stock” (forts, buildings,
etc.) of the old company was transferred to the new company. The two companies
were to maintain separate organizations for seven years, during which period each
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business on its separate account. During the same time the business on the joint
account of the two companies was to be transacted by the English Company under
a board of twenty-four managers, twelve elected by and acting under the orders of the
governing body of each company; each company was to furnish one half the stock for
the new trade. At the end of seven years the London Company was to distribute its
stock among its members, thus making them stockholders in the English Company,
and surrender its charters to the crown. The name of the English Company was then
to be changed to the “United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East
Indies.” By act of Parliament in 1707 it was provided that the subscription to the
government loan should be increased from £2,000,000 at eight per cent to £3,000,000
at five per cent,
480 that £1,500,000 might be borrowed or raised by assessment of
proprietors (shareholders), and that the amount of stock held by private traders
481
might be redeemed by the company on three years’ notice after September, 1711;
finally, the terms of the union of 1702 were confirmed.
482
The constitution of the company during the eighteenth century was fairly simple.
The Court of Proprietors (or stockholders) was composed of all holders of at least
£500 of stock and elected annually at a General Court, a Governor and Deputy
Governor, and a Court of Directors (early called Committees) twenty-four in number
and qualified by the ownership of at least £2000 of stock.
483 The Directors elected
two of their number Chairman and Deputy Chairman, and distributed the bulk of
their business among ten committees. In India the business of the company was
managed under the three presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, each
independent of the other and acting directly under instructions from the Court of
Directors in England. Each presidency was under the supervision of a Governor (or
President) and a Council appointed by the Court of Directors. Under the powers
conferred by their charter and supplementary legislation, a mayor’s court and court
of quarter sessions were established in each presidency, from which the president and
council constituted a court of appeal. The presidents were the commanders-in-chief
of the military forces of the company in their several jurisdictions.
484
The success of the company’s commercial activity was always necessarily
dependent on political conditions. With its body of privileges owing to Royal or
Parliamentary grant and likely at almost any time to be taken away if the king or
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to protect itself as corporations have usually found it necessary. Again, the relations,
whether amicable or hostile, of England to the continental nations of Europe were
certain to have an influence on the company’s commercial activity in India and the
other parts of its territory. Historians of the East India Company have all found it
unavoidable to devote many pages to the foreign relations of England in order to
make plain the course of events in the company’s career in India. The Dutch,
Portuguese and French were all interested in the Indian trade, and shared in it in the
same general way as the English, through the medium of great commercial
corporations. When the relations of England with any of them happened to be
unfriendly, as was too often the case in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the
trade of the East India Company was exposed to all the dangers of war; even when
the European countries were at peace, it was difficult for them to keep their
companies in the East from coming into conflict. In India the commerce of the
company was more completely dependent on the understandings that might be
secured with the native powers. Until near the end of the seventeenth century the
political privileges that the company obtained by treaty or otherwise from native
princes were held subordinate to the commercial aims of the company; if they were
profitable, they were rather indirectly so, because they enabled the company to
prosecute their trade more successfully, than directly as a source of revenue. When
the power of the Mogul went to pieces just before the end of the century, the
company began, largely as a matter of necessity, because the great central power in
India had been destroyed, to build itself up as a political power in India. After the
beginning of the eighteenth century, when the union of the two companies had been
accomplished, it might be assumed that a great increase in Indian trade took place,
but such was not the case. During the whole of the eighteenth century the trade was
much smaller than would be believed.
485 The truth is that the activity of the company
was more largely political, instead of being almost wholly commercial. Alliances
with native potentates or rival claimants to Indian thrones were paid for by grants of
taxes or customs (which the company always called its revenue, as distinguished
from its profits derived from trade) and territorial rights; and these were so closely
connected with the administration of the courts that they also passed under the
control of the company. The field of peaceful acquisition of political powers was left
between 1740 and 1750 for the greater field of war and military conquest.John P. Davis, Corporations, 308
“A new scene is now to open in the history of the East India
Company. Before this period they had maintained the character of
mere traders, and, by humility and submission, endeavored to
preserve a footing in that distant country, under the protection or
oppression of the native powers. We shall now behold them entering
the lists of war, and mixing with eagerness in the contests of the
princes.”
486
The servants of the company engaged in private trade at the expense of their
master; the internal trade of India had been, theoretically, left largely to the natives,
the company concerning itself rather with the import and export trade; the officers
and servants now acquired enormous private fortunes from the internal or inland
trade and were given great advantages over the native traders by exemptions from
customs, duties and taxes obtained by them nominally for the benefit of the company,
but really for their own benefit. From the native rulers and rival claimants they
exacted immense bribes (commonly called presents) for affording them the aid of the
company’s military and commercial power. The treatment of the natives by the
English was oppressive and tyrannical and occasioned loud and frequent complaints
in England. It became constantly clearer that the mission of the East India Company
written between the lines of its commercial charters was to build up in India a
political dependency of England; the time must have come when such relations could
not longer be sustained through the medium of a corporation designed primarily for
the field of commerce.
The Crown and Parliament began to assert more vigorously the doctrine that
political and territorial rights acquired by Englishmen were the property of the state
and not of the company. The double government of Clive did not conceal the fact that
the activity of the company in India was a political and military conquest. The
English nation became conscious that the sovereign functions and powers delegated
by it to the East India Company, if the time was not ripe for their reabsorption into
the English state, ought at least to be regulated and controlled by the English
government — and more truly so because their exercise had been perverted and
prostituted to the enrichment of tyrannical and oppressive subjects. But it was no easy
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assume effective control over the East India Company, so powerful and ubiquitous
was its influence in Parliament and among the controlling classes of English society.
The liquidation of the great expense incurred by the government in assisting the
company in its military enterprises in the middle of the century demanded attention
so urgently that a committee was appointed by the House of Commons in 1767 to
investigate the matter; as the result, the company agreed to pay £400,000 each year
for two years, and two years later renewed the agreement for five years. In 1773,
however, such were the straits to which the company had been reduced both by the
maintenance of its immense political establishment in India and by the peculations
and private trade of its officers and servants, that instead of its making the stipulated
payments, it had to secure from the government a loan of £1,400,000, and submit to
a reduction of dividends to six per cent. until it should be repaid; as an apparently
necessary improvement of its administrative machinery in India, the presidencies of
Madras and Bombay were subordinated to that of Bengal and Warren Hastings
appointed Governor-General, while the mayor’s court at Calcutta was replaced by
one consisting of a chief justice and three associates to be appointed by the crown.
Ten years later, when the company had to apply to the government for another loan
of.£900,000, the ministry of Fox and North proposed the replacement of the Court
of Directors and Court of Proprietors of the company by a body of seven
commissioners; but their proposal failed of acceptance and the ministry fell from
power largely because it was considered, whether justly or not, that the vesting of the
appointment of the commissioners in Parliament (as was proposed) would unduly
exalt the ministry above the crown.
The bill of the Pitt ministry, which became law in 1784, was not so radical in the
reforms for which it provided. While the constitution of the East India Company was
left nominally intact, a Board of Control consisting of six members of the Privy
Council was to be appointed by the crown; the chancellor of the exchequer and one
of the principal secretaries of state were always to be two of the six members, and in
their absence the senior of the others should preside under the title of the President
of the Board of Control. The duty of the Board was “from time to time, to check,
superintend and control, all acts, operations and concerns, which in any wise relate
to the civil or military government, or revenues, of the territories and possessions of
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a Secret Committee of not more than three members to transmit secret orders of the
Board of Control without the knowledge of the other directors. Any act of the Court
of Directors that had been approved by the Board of Control might be in no way
affected by the Court of Proprietors. The servants of the company, on their return
from India, were required to present an inventory of the fortunes that they had
brought with them. A new legal tribunal to sit in England was created “for the
prosecuting and bringing to speedy and condign punishment British subjects guilty
of extortion, and other misdemeanors, while holding offices in the service of the king
or company in India.”
487
The passage of the Pitt bill was the beginning of the end. The history of the East
India Company during the remainder of the period of its existence was a succession
of changes by which the great institution was deprived of the sovereign functions and
powers, one after another, that had formerly been delegated to it. When the charter
rights of the company were confirmed in 1813, it was provided that after April 10,
1814, the trade between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan, except
the tea trade and all trade in China, should be open to all British subjects, though
with many restrictions such as the exclusive use in it of the company’s vessels;
moreover, the exclusive privileges of the company should terminate on three years’
notice after April 10, 1831, and on the payment to it of the amount of government
loan held by it, — though the company might continue to engage in the trade on an
equal basis with other traders.
488 By act of 1823 the trade was made free, except the
trade in tea and the other trade with China.
489 The act of 1833 provided that after
April 22, 1834, the company should close its commercial business and dispose of all
its property that should not be necessary for the government of India; that the British
territories in India should remain under the government of the company until April
30, 1834; that such debts of the company as should not be discharged from the
proceeds of the sale of its property should be assumed by the English government;
that annual dividends of ten and one half per cent. on the capital stock of the
company should be paid by the Eng fish government, with the privilege of
redemption at the rate of £200 for each £100 of stock after April, 1874, on one year’s
notice; that the company should pay to the government £2,000,000 to be made the
basis of a sinking fund for the payment and redemption of the dividends; that
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“to superintend, direct and control all acts, operations and concerns
of the... company; that the superintendence, direction and control of
the whole civil and military government of all the... territories and
revenues in India be vested in a Governor General and Councillors,
to be styled ‘The Governor General of India in Council,’”
the council to consist of three servants of the company appointed by the Court of
Directors and one member (not a servant) appointed by the Court of Directors with
the approval of the king, and all vacancies to be filled by the Court of Directors with
the approval of the king.
490 By the act of 1858 the territories under the government
of the East India Company and all its other property except its capital stock and
future dividends were vested in the crown, together with all the governmental powers
that had previously been exercised by it. The company and the Court of Directors and
Court of Proprietors were to be replaced in the government of India by a Secretary
of State for India assisted by a “Council of India,” the Board of Control being
abolished. The Council of India was to consist of fifteen members, eight appointed
by the croon and seven by the company, who were not to sit in Parliament, were to
serve during good behavior
491 but were removable on address by both Houses of
Parliament; a majority of it were to have served ten years in India and not to have left
India more than ten years previously; vacancies in the seats of the eight crown
members were to be filled by the crown, in the seven other seats, by the Council
itself. “The Council shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State... conduct the
business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the government of India.”
The Secretary of State should preside over it, have authority to appoint and remove
a vice-president for it and should divide it into [ten] committees. He might,
moreover, send secret orders to India, when occasion required, without consulting the
Council. Each year he was required to lay before Parliament an account of receipts
and expenditures, indebtedness and other matters relating to India.
492 When the
English government had finally been substituted for “John Company” in the
administration of India, it retained almost intact the political structure that had been
erected by the company. A proclamation by Queen Victoria announced the
replacement of the company by the English government.
493 The company, however,
was not immediately dissolved, but remained in existence for the purpose ofJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 312
receiving payment of its capital stock and dividends By a later act of Parliament
494
it was provided that dividends should cease from April 30, 1874, and the company
was finally dissolved June 1, 1874. Queen Victoria became Empress of India in 1877
by virtue of an act of Parliament of the preceding year.
495
The most important of the other joint-stock companies, except such as are included
in the class of colonial companies, were the African Company, the Hudson’s Bay
Company and the South Sea Company.
496 Each of them had an extremely interesting
history, but in general they differed only in unimportant particulars from the East
India Company. A brief consideration of some of their features may be of advantage.
Some latitude is used in speaking of the African Company, for there were four
successive companies to which the name was applied, each more distinct from the
other in form and composition than the successive East India Companies from one
another; the several African Companies superseded their predecessors somewhat
arbitrarily; they did not represent a continuous development as did the East India
Companies, though it is nevertheless true that they fairly represented the several
stages in the same course of development. The Portuguese had been the predecessors
of the English in the trade to the west coast of Africa. As early as 1536 a voyage of
discovery and trade was made by Englishmen to south Barbary. In 1588 Elizabeth
granted a charter for ten years to merchants of Exeter and London for an exclusive
trade to the territories tributary to the rivers Senegal and Gambia because “the
adventuring of a new trade cannot be a matter of small charge and hazard to the
adventurers in the beginning.”
497 In 1618 Robert Rich and other merchants of London
were granted a charter by James I to trade to the west coast of Africa on a joint stock,
but the company suffered so much interference from interlopers that it was soon
dissolved. Thirteen years later (in 1631) a similar company, organized by Sir Richard
Young and others, and chartered by James I for thirty-one years to enjoy exclusively
the trade from Cape Blanco to the Cape of Good Hope,
498 laid a more substantial
basis for future commerce by erecting forts, factories (agencies) and warehouses in
the territory. It seems to have accomplished very little else, however, for in 1651 a
new company was chartered, not so much to engage in the trade as to control it by
licensing others to engage in it, charging therefor ten per cent of the cargoes or three
pounds per ton on the ships in which they were carried. A third company (if the
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of York at its head and containing “many others of rank and distinction,” chiefly for
the purpose of transporting negro slaves to the English West Indies, which it was
obligated to do at the rate of three thousand per annum, The fourth and last African
Company, appropriately called the Royal African Company, followed in 1672, and
contained among its subscribers of stock the king himself, his brother, the Duke of
York, and many others of the nobility. The company paid its predecessor for its three
forts and conducted considerable trade until the Revolution of 1688, when the trade
became virtually open by reason of the hostility of Parliament to exclusive trading
privileges; in 1698, however, it was provided by statute
499 that non-corporate traders
should pay to the company a charge of ten per cent of their exports, probably in
return for the use of its forts, factories and warehouses. In the early part of the
eighteenth century it was continually under discussion in Parliament and by the
pamphleteers outside whether the trade of the African Company as well as of the East
India Company and others should not be opened freely to all merchants; in 1713 a
resolution was passed by the House of Commons that the African trade ought to be
free and open on payment by the traders of duties for the support of the forts and
settlements. From 1730 to 1746 the company was reduced to such financial straits
that Parliament granted it annually £10,000 (except in 1744, when the grant was
£20,000) for the support of its forts and factories, while the trade was made free to
all. In 1750 a unique settlement of the trade was made by Parliament. It was to be free
and open to all English subjects. The Royal African Company was to be abolished
as soon as its debts should be paid, and all merchants trading between Cape Blanco
and the Cape of Good Hope were to be incorporated as the “Company of Merchants
Trading to Africa,” and to be made owners of all the forts, factories, settlements,
coasts, islands, rivers and other property then claimed by the existing company. The
new company should have no power to trade in its corporate capacity, to have a joint
or transferable stock or to borrow money. All traders were to be admitted on payment
of forty shillings and were to enjoy the use of all forts and other property for the
storage of goods and protection of persons. The government was to be reposed in a
committee of nine members elected annually, three each by the traders admitted to
membership at London, Bristol and Liverpool; members of the committee and
officers and servants of the company were to be removable for misbehavior by the
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and other expenses and retain the balance of the company’s revenue for their own
compensation, making annual reports to Parliament of all receipts and
expenditures.
500 Two years later the old company was paid for its property and the
new company was empowered to train soldiers at its forts, to visit offenses with
punishments not extending to life or limb, and to maintain courts of judicature for
mercantile and maritime cases.
501 Early in the reign of George III the fort of Senegal,
with its dependencies, was vested in the crown,
502 and later re-vested in the
company.
503 In the latter part of the century annual grants were made to the company
for the support of its forts and other establishments; in 1795, £20,000 was allowed
to it; as late as 1800, £20,000 was granted “for the forts on the coast of Africa.”
Finally, in 1821, it was enacted by Parliament that after the third of July of that year
the company should cease and determine and should be divested of all the forts,
castles, buildings, possessions and rights previously owned or acquired. All the forts
between 20° north latitude and 20° south latitude were made dependent on the colony
of Sierra Leone.
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Of the Hudson’s Bay Companies, the “Governor and Company of Adventurers of
England Trading into Hudson’s Bay,” less is to be said. As Prince Rupert and
seventeen others, “persons of quality and distinction,” had “at their own great cost,
undertaken an expedition for Hudson’s Bay, in order for the discovery of a new
passage into the South Sea and for the finding of some trade for furs [etc.],” Charles
II granted to them in 1670 a charter of incorporation conceding to them the exclusive
commerce of all the bodies and streams of water within Hudson Strait, with all the
land tributary to them and not already possessed by other English subjects or those
of any other Christian prince or state. The company, as formally organized, might fall
into the class of regulated exclusive companies, but it was always virtually a
joint-stock company. A governor and “committee” of seven members (directors)
were to be elected annually by the proprietors (stockholders); a deputy governor was
also to be elected from among the committee. The governor and any three
committeemen
“shall have the direction of the voyages, and the provision of the
merchandise and shipping, and of the sales of the returns, as likewise
of all other business of the company; and they shall take the usualJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 315
oath of fidelity, as shall also all persons admitted to trade as a
freeman of the company.”
They were given power, of course, to make by-laws for the government of their
forts, plantations and for the regulation of their factors and other servants and to
impose fines for their violation; to send out ships of war and erect forts and towns,
to make peace and war with princes or peoples not Christians, to make reprisals on
others who should interrupt them in the pursuit of their trade or otherwise wrong
them, and to seize and send to England for trial all English subjects who should sail
into Hudson’s Bay without their license. It was a somewhat unusual provision that
their land should be reckoned and reputed as one of the plantations or colonies of
England in America and “be called ‘Rupert’s Land.’”
505Prince Rupert was the first
governor of the company. In 1690 it obtained from Parliament a confirmation of its
charter, but for the limited period of eight years. In 1821 it was given, in conjunction
with certain private fur-traders, a license for an exclusive trade during twenty-one
years in what was called the Indian Territory of the British Possessions in North
America; it soon secured an assignment of the interests of the private merchants and
accordingly enjoyed the trade exclusively. The additional grant was renewed for a
second term of twenty-one years in 1839; in 1848 Vancouver’s Island was also added
to the company’s domain, but with the reservation that bodies of English colonists
should be permitted to make settlements in it. In 1857 the affairs of the company
were fully investigated by a Special Committee of the House of Commons, chiefly
at the suggestion of the Canadian government. But it was not until 1868 that an act
was passed by Parliament permitting the crown to accept a surrender of the
company’s grant of privileges on terms to be agreed on
506 By 1870 the negotiations
were completed: the company was still to trade in its corporate capacity, to be paid
£300,000 by the Canadian government for its franchise, to retain the ownership of all
its posts and stations with a block of land at each of them, and to have a twentieth
section of the “fertile belt”; titles to lands previously conveyed by the company were
confirmed.
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The South Sea Company, the “Governor and Company of Merchants of Great
Britain Trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for Encouraging
the Fishery,” was peculiar in several respects. It was the first of the great stockJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 316
companies for foreign trade (except colonial companies) that had not had a previous
development in the form of a regulated or regulated-exclusive company; it was a
complete joint-stock company from the time of its original incorporation in 1711.
Certain debts that had accumulated during the European war, amounting to
£9,471,325, were unpaid; their holders were incorporated as the South Sea Company
by the crown in accordance with an act of Parliament,
508 their debt made to bear
interest at the rate of six per cent. (£568,279. 10s. annually) and made redeemable on
one year’s notice after Christmas, 1716; for the payment of the interest (the surplus
to be applied on the principal) certain duties, originally imposed temporarily, were
made permanent until the debt should be repaid. Its government was vested in a
governor and court of directors, but none of them during their terms of service might
occupy a corresponding office in the Bank of England or East India Company. Their
exclusive territory extended on the eastern side of South America from the Orinoco
River on the north to Terra del Fuego on the south, and on the west side of the
continent from Terra del Fuego to the “northernmost part of America,” including all
the territory within the limits described which should be reputed to belong to the
crown of Spain, or which should be afterwards discovered within the limits or not
more than three hundred leagues distant from the west side of the continent; the
exclusive trade was not to extend to the territories of Holland, or to Brazil or other
territories of Portugal; to the Portuguese territories all English subjects might trade
freely. Trade, moreover, was not to be carried on by the company within the limits
of the East India Company’s grant; even sailing more than three hundred leagues
west of the continent should be punished by forfeiture of goods, one third to the
crown and two thirds to the East India Company. All the company’s trading to the
South Sea (Pacific Ocean) should be by way of the Straits of Magellan or Terra del
Fuego and by no other route. One per cent of their capital stock might be employed
in the fisheries, but not to the exclusion of other subjects. The penalty imposed on
interlopers was unusually severe — forfeiture of ships and merchandise and double
their value, one fourth to the crown, one fourth to the informer and one-half to the
company. As usually, the power was given to establish courts of judicature in their
forts, factories and settlements, to determine mercantile and maritime causes subject
to an appeal to the queen in council and to raise and maintain a military force. In the
following year the commercial privileges of the company were made perpetual andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 317
not subject to termination by the repayment of its public debt.
509 By the treaty of 1713
with Spain, the so-called “assients contract” for the transportation of negro slaves to
the Spanish colonies, at the rate of 4800 annually for thirty years, was granted to
England “or to the company of [English] subjects appointed for the purpose, as well
the subjects of Spain as all others being excluded”; the privilege of sending annually
one ship of five hundred tons burden to the Spanish West Indies, laden with
European goods, was also granted.
510 The contract had until that time been held by
a French company (and even earlier by the Portuguese), but by the Treaty of Ghent
its transfer to English subjects was agreed to. The queen immediately assigned the
contract to the South Sea Company. In the first year of the reign of George I the
company’s capital (the amount of public debt held by it) was increased to
£10,000,000, on which, two years later, the interest was reduced from six to five per
cent; it was later increased to £33,000,000 at five per cent (reduced to four per cent.
after 1727). The effort to incorporate the entire funded national debt into its capital
resulted in the disastrous “South Sea Bubble” of 1720. The foreign commerce of the
company was of minor importance; the assients contract was rather a burden than a
source of profit, and the sending of the annual ship was hedged about with so many
conditions and restrictions that it proved a disappointment; the fishery voyages, to the
slight extent that they were engaged in, brought only losses to the company. In
1750,
511 when, by the Treaty of Madrid, England released to Spain the”assients of
negroes and annual ship,” on consideration of the payment of £100,000, the
commerce of
the company practically ceased; the consideration paid by Spain was passed over
to the company. The trade to no part of its exclusive territory was legally opened to
English subjects, however, until 1807,
512 though an extensive commerce was carried
on clandestinely. In 1815 it was deprived of the remainder of its exclusive privileges,
though it was still permitted to trade on an equality with others; as compensation it
was provided that the proceeds from certain customs and tonnage duties imposed on
the trade from what had previously been the exclusive territory of the company, and
known as “the South Sea duties,” should be put into a guarantee fund until it
amounted to £610,464, and should then be paid over to the company, while in the
meantime the government should guarantee an annual dividend of one half of one per
cent. on the company’s trading stock.
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The most important feature of the development of the East India Company was its
contribution to the extra-national expansion of England. Remarkable as the extreme
powers given to the company may appear, it is difficult to understand how they could
have been less under the circumstances by which its activity was conditioned. The
English state was not sufficiently developed to provide the conditions under which
the trade in India might be carried on; it had in consequence to give the traders
themselves the power to modify their conditions or create new ones. If even in times
of peace among European nations, amicable relations could not be maintained
between their bodies of traders, how could security of property and trade be provided
among peoples with whom the Europeans enjoyed no settled international relations?
The East India Company is the best illustration of the part performed by a corporation
in national expansion, because its development was so evenly graduated. Great
political powers were bestowed on it originally for the purpose of promoting the
economic welfare of the English people and of swelling the revenues of the crown.
It can hardly be said that any other purpose was entertained at the end of the sixteenth
century. The building up of a political power in India by the company was only
indirectly involved at first. The tendency to the increased restriction of corporate
activity to the work of government observed in other kinds of corporations
manifested itself in the history of the Ec st India Company in the gradual
encroachment on the field of the political government in India, while its commerce
either failed to increase or fell into the hands of officers and servants. The
accumulation of political powers, at first a secondary aim, became eventually a
primary aim, while the commerce for the protection of which it had originally been
sought was subordinated to it in importance. So true was it and so clearly did the
English government see the truth that for the last twenty years of the corporation’s
existence its commercial functions had been taken from it and it had been left as the
government of India. The inevitable expansion of nationality enabled the English
state to extend itself over the political field occupied by the corporation, first
indirectly through an intermediate supervisory body and then directly by supplanting
it. From being the commercial territory of the corporation, India became a province
of England. Even the forms of the corporate political machinery were preserved; the
only essential difference was that the national hand replaced the corporate hand at the
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Without entering into a discussion of the theoretical justice of the monopoly
granted to the East India Company, or of the extent to which it was the result of an
artificial element in the cupidity either of the sovereign or the East India traders, it
is significant that it existed and continued to exist even in the face of vigorous and
aggressive opposition. Until the end of the eighteenth century it was hardly a question
whether individual traders might engage in the trade; the real question was whether
the company should be a regulated company under which the activity of individual
and associated traders should be correlated, or a joint-stock company under which
their activity should be unified. It must be remembered that at the beginning the East
India Company was (with some qualifications) “regulated” and that it became a
purely joint-stock company only after a century’s development. The change was so
slow and yet so persistently in the same direction that it cannot be safely ascribed
entirely to arbitrary personal influences. The corporations of the Middle Ages did not
express the idea of combined but of correlated activity, not of association of effort
but of harmony of individual effort. The former in each case is the idea expressed by
the state in action; the latter, the result of the activity of the state on the subject. It
was the growth of the political side of the East India Company that gradually caused
the elimination of the regulated feature and made its restoration impossible until the
English government itself stepped into the place formerly occupied by the company.
The question might possibly be approached from the opposite direction. The
individual trader was confessedly unable to engage in the trade, unless he might
stealthily profit by the system of protection set up at great labor and expense by the
company to whose support he did not contribute. The single vessel could not serve
as the unit of transportation; the trade had to be carried on by fleets of merchant
vessels — vessels larger than had ever before been known in England —
accompanied by the necessary war vessels; moreover, the voyages were long and the
risk great. The larger the unit of activity, whether imposed by physical conditions or
by others, the greater the need of association. It was not correlation of activity that
traders needed; it was association of activity. From both points of view, then, from
that of the corporate group exercising political power and from that of the individual
acting under the limitations of his environment, the evolution of a joint-stock
company with a monopoly of trade from a regulated company open to all who wished
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Company flourished. It might be contended that the monopoly was maintained longer
than accorded with necessity or justice. Corporations, like all forms of social
organization, acquire a momentum; if more force is required to set them in motion,
more force is also required to stop them. In the presence of the traditional
conservatism of English society, it is perhaps more remarkable that the East India
Company was subjected to governmental control so early than that its monopoly was
maintained so long.
Likewise the African Company and Hudson’s Bay Company, though they did not
positively lay a foundation for colonial governments, at least accumulated a body of
political and territorial powers that were afterwards incorporated in colonial
governments independently established. In preventing the subjects of other nations
from gaining a foothold in their territories they performed a service for the mother
country that may, with little exaggeration of its importance, serve as a justification
for the extravagantly generous treatment that they enjoyed. The South Sea Company,
however, performed no such service; substantially the only parts of their commercial
powers that they exercised were those secured to them under the treaties with Spain,
which did not involve the exploitation of new and unsettled territory; the powers that
they did not use, though granted to them, might have resulted in a later extension of
English dominion.
The African, Hudson’s Bay and South Sea Companies were all representative of
what has already been described as a secondary stage in the development of
corporations. The East India Company filled a nearly legitimate field; the
organization seemed to be demanded by the conditions under which the company had
to act. But the three other companies do not appear so clearly to have grown out of
the conditions of their activity; they were rather imposed on their fields of commerce
than evolved from contact with their conditions. The circumstances of the foreign
trade on the west coast of Africa and in the territory tributary to Hudson’s Bay did
not contain so much of the political element as to fully justify the presence of a
concentrated organization like that of the East India Company. The career of the
African Company clearly showed that it was not in harmony with its environment,
and its supervision by a modified regulated company was hardly avoidable. The
South Sea Company was clearly anomalous, from the standpoint of its commercial
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rather with the Bank of England than with the East India Company. It was primarily
a body of holders of the national debt and the grant of its commercial privileges was
in the nature of a premium on the debt held by it. Its character as a trading company
was always insignificant when compared with the other companies or with itself as
a lender of funds to the state. Though none of the great companies used the powers
granted to them to their limit, the South Sea Company fell much farther short of the
limit than any of the others. The corporate organization was hardly called for; the
truth seems to be that the success of other great commercial companies had given a
fictitious value to corporate privileges and had made it possible to “strengthen the
credit” of the state by offering to its creditors the imposing structure of a great
corporation with exclusive control of a trade that had outgrown the stage in which
exclusiveness was either appropriate or possible. The South Sea Company was
peculiar among the corporations of its class in having as a large part of its
commercial territory the dominions of another Christian state; other things equal, that
alone would indicate an abnormal development of structure; companies in such trade,
where indeed they had existed in it at all, had developed but little above the grade of
purely regulated companies.
The lands in which the joint-stock companies traded were not occupied by peoples
recognized by the English or other western Europeans as being on the same level of
civilization with them. The natives of India, and in a greater degree the negroes of
Africa and the savage Indians of North and South America, were viewed by the
Europeans as inferiors, to be subjected to control rather than to be dealt with. In
general, no system of international relations existed between them and England; such
political relations as were required had to be created by the English traders
themselves. The facilities of commerce were wanting in the strange lands; their
peoples had not engaged in international commerce, and even their internal trade had
been rudimentary and unsystematic; such property as wharves and commercial
settlements, which in commerce between European nations were provided by the
state or by subjects of the state in which the commerce was carried on, was wanting
and had to be supplied by the companies. Again the lands were far from England, and
trading voyages to and from them were attended with the greatest risk of attack by
pirates, shipwreck and destruction by savages; larger investments of capital were
necessary, and the danger of losing it was greater. If the establishment of trade inJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 322
Russia and Turkey by adventurers involved effort which, when expressed in property
in the trade, tended to exclude others from it and to concentrate its management in
the hands of a few, how much stronger must the twofold tendency have been in the
trade of India, Africa and North and South America, which had to be absolutely
created; the former trade had been l:nown to exist in other hands or to be accessible;
the latter did not exist and was not known to be possible until the trading companies
demonstrated the truth by creating the commerce.XII. Colonial Companies.
The expansion of England and of other nations of western Europe after the middle
of the sixteenth century was promoted not only by establishing commercial relations
with peoples of settled foreign lands, but also even more effectually by the
colonization of new lands, previously unsettled or peopled only by savages, which
the several nations claimed by virtue of prior discovery. Colonization was merely one
of the agencies through which the general movement sought expression. There was
one important element in colonization, however, that was not present in the
establishment of mere commercial relations with foreign peoples. Wherever an
English colony was planted, there was a body of English subjects to be governed. The
English trade with other nations of western Europe and even with Russia and the
Levant involved most prominently the establishment of international relations,
whether directly through the national governments or indirectly through the medium
of commercial corporations; the trade with India and Africa was to involve rather the
absorption of the governments of the foreign peoples; but the colonial trade involved
an extension of the national government of England over bodies of its own subjects.
The colonial commerce did not consist merely in exchanging English products for
the goods produced by foreigners through their development of the natural resources
of their land, but much more largely in the primary production of goods by direct
development of natural resources; the purpose had to be accomplished by actually
settling the land with English colonists. Moreover, the tracts of land colonized were
manifestly part of the domain of England and not of foreigners. The presence of
bodies of English subjects on English domain as an essential factor in colonization
is suggested at the outset because it had great influence on the social structure
through which the colonies were planted and fostered. The government of England,
largely because of its actual impotence, did not plant the English colonies directly,
at least not those that were afterwards a part of the United States, but made use of the
corporate system for the purpose, — it aimed to secure the development of colonies,
a public purpose, through the stimulation of private interest by grants of political andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 324
commercial privileges.
The necessity of providing governments for bodies of English subjects on
geographical areas of English domain, and concurrently of establishing and
regulating their economic relations with one another and with the merchants of
England, caused a resort to two classes of institutions, as the one purpose or the other
was magnified in importance; the two classes of agencies were accordingly the
colonial proprietary, whose rights and duties were based on those of the older English
nobility, and the colonial corporations, derived from the institutions in which the
powers of regulation over English trade and industry were reposed; in a single
colony, Georgia, the corporation was formed on the model of the English charitable
corporation of the eighteenth century. Neither class of institutions conformed strictly
to their model, and as both were engaged side by side in the same work, each was
affected by the other in form and development.
By a charter of James I in 1606, the territory of “Virginia” between the parallels of
34° and 45° north latitude was divided for purposes of trade and colonization
between two companies, the London Company and the Plymouth Company, the
former to plant a colony at any place between the parallels of 34° and 41°, and the
latter at any place between those of 38° and 45°, neither, however, to make a
plantation within one hundred miles of one already made by the other. The colony of
the London Company was to be called the “First Colony” and that of the Plymouth
Company the “Second Colony.”
514 Each company was to consist of certain “knights,
gentlemen, merchants and other adventurers” named in the charter, together with
such others as they should elect to be joined with them. Each colony should be
governed by a resident council of thirteen members “in all matters and causes which
shall arise, grow, or happen to or within the same... according to such laws,
ordinances and instructions as shall be in that behalf” given by the king. Moreover,
the members of the council should be “ordained, made and removed... according as
shall be directed and comprised in the same instructions.” In addition to the resident
councils there was to be a “Council of Virginia” in England, consisting of thirteen
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members appointed by the king, for “the superior managing and direction,... of and
for all matters that shall or may concern the government, as well of the said several
colonies as of and for any other part or place, within the... precincts of 34° and 45°.”
The king was to grant land to any person recommended by the council of the colonyJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 325
on its petition. Wherever a plantation should be made by either company it should
have all the land extending directly inland one hundred miles from a coast-line fifty
miles on each side of the plantation or settlement, and all the islands within one
hundred miles of the coast and directly opposite the one hundred miles of coast-line.
Each company might fortify its settlements in the discretion of its resident council,
and resist or repel by military power, both on land and by sea, all who without its
license should attempt to live in them or molest them in any way, and to seize all who
should essay to traffic with them without having paid a duty of two and one half per
cent. upon the goods “trafficked, bought or sold,” if English subjects, or of five per
cent if foreigners; for twenty-one years such customs duties should be for the use of
the companies, afterwards, of the king. They had license to take out English subjects
as colonists, and all such persons and their children born in the colonies should “have
all liberties, franchises, and immunities, within any of [the king’s] other dominions,
to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born” in them. They might
also transport goods and munitions from England to their colonies without paying
customs on them for a term of seven years, “for the better relief of the several
colonies and plantations.” The companies and their servants and colonists should not
“rob or spoil” the subjects of other nations. They were permitted “to dig, mine and
search for all manner of mines of gold, silver and copper... and to have and enjoy”
them upon yielding to the king one fifth of the gold and silver and one fifteenth of the
copper. “For the more ease of traffic and bargaining,” they might establish and put
into circulation among the colonists a coin “of such metal, and in such manner and
form,” as their councils should determine.
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By virtue of the powers granted by the first charter, a substantial beginning was
made in the colonization of Virginia. In 1607 Jamestown was founded and governed
by a council as contemplated by the provisions of the charter. But it must soon have
become plain to the adventurers of the London Company that the organization of the
two companies under the Council of Virginia with its members, as well as those of
the resident councils, appointed by the king, was lacking in the concentration of
powers necessary to success. The intention of the king, in settling the terms of the
charter, must have been to separate the political and commercial powers reserving the
former for himself and bestowing the latter on the companies. The royal purpose
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each should have the king’s arms on one side and his image on the other; on one side
of each of them should be the words, “Sigillum Regis Magnae Britanniae, Franciae,
et Hiberniae”; on the other side of that of the “Council of Virginia,” the words, “Pro
Concilio suo Virginiae”; of those of the resident councils the words, “Pro Concilio
primae (secundae) Colonize Virginia.” An amendatory charter was accordingly asked
for and granted.
By the charter of 1609 the request of the London Company was recited
“that such councillors and other officers may be appointed amongst
them, to manage and direct their affairs, as are willing and ready to
adventure with them, as also whose dwellings are not so far remote
from the City of London, but they may, at convenient times, be ready
at hand to give their advice and assistance upon all occasions
requisite.”
The “Council of Virginia” had evidently been intended to represent rather the
interests of the king than those of the company. It was accordingly remodelled to a
council of about fifty members elected by the company annually from their own
number, though the first members were named in the charter. The company should
now be called the “Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of London
for the First Colony of Virginia,” and consist of all who should “adventure any sum
of money in or towards the... plantation of the... colony in Virginia and shall be
admitted by the council and company, as adventurers of the colony [and so] enrolled
in the books or records”; the treasurer and any three of the council should have power
to admit new members; any member might be discharged and disfranchised by a
majority vote of the company in a general assembly. The treasurer should “give order
for the warning of the council and summoning of the company” to their courts or
meetings, and should appoint a deputy treasurer from the members of the council.
The council should appoint all officers, and make all laws for the government of the
colonies and the regulation of the voyages to and from it. The president and council
in the colony, previously appointed by the king, were abolished. The treasurer and
all other officers were to govern according to the laws enacted by the council; in the
colony, in cases of necessity and lack of legislation by the council, the governor andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 327
his officers should exercise their own discretion. In the company’s colonial courts
justice should be administered as well “in cases capital and criminal, as civil, both
marine and other; so always as the... statutes, ordinances and proceedings as near as
conveniently may be, be agreeable to the laws, statutes, government and policy of...
England.” In cases of mutiny or rebellion martial law might be enforced.
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The territory of the company was to be limited to a coast-line two hundred miles
north and an equal distance south of Cape Comfort, to extend “up into the land
throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest,” and to include all the islands in
each ocean within one hundred miles of the coast. Goods were still to be exported to
and imported from the colonies upon the payment of merely nominal duties for seven
years, and to be re-exported from England without additional duties, if within thirteen
months of importation.
A third charter, granted by James I in 1612, conceded chiefly more particular
powers for the government of the company. The treasurer and company might hold
a court once a week or oftener, at their pleasure, “for the better order and government
of the said plantation, and such things as shall concern the same”; any five members
of the council, including the treasurer or his deputy, with fifteen of the”generality”
of the company, should constitute a sufficient court for the disposition of all “casual
and particular occurrences and accidental matters, of less consequence and weight...
concerning the said plantation”; for
“matters and affairs of greater weight and importance, and such as
shall... concern the weal public and general good of the said company
and plantation, as namely, the manner of government... to be used, the
ordering and disposing of the lands and possessions, and the settling
and establishing of a trade there, or such like,”
four “great and general courts” should be held each year. In the quarterly courts
members of the council and officers should be chosen, laws and ordinances should
be passed, new members should be admitted and members who refused to
“adventure” in furtherance of the plantation should be expelled. The territory of the
company was made to include all islands within three hundred leagues of its
coast-line.
518 Incidentally, “for the more effectual advancing of the said plantation,”John P. Davis, Corporations, 328
the company was empowered to “set forth, erect and publish” lotteries.
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In its relations to the crown the company had established its substantial
independence. The importance of its history after its third charter was granted lies in
its political relations to the colonists, but before considering them it will be best to
consider the economic relations that had been developed. By the “Articles,
Instructions and Orders” composed by James I. it was provided that for five years the
companies (the London and Plymouth or”first” and “second” colonies) should
“trade together in one stock, or in two or three stocks at most, and
should bring all the fruits of their labors there, with all their goods
and commodities from England or elsewhere, into several magazines
or storehouses, for that purpose to be erected [and] there should be
annually chosen by the [resident] President and Council of each
colony... one person of their colony, to be Treasurer or
Cape-Merchant of the same, to take charge of, and to manage, all
goods and wares, brought into or delivered out of, the said magazines
“;
two clerks should also be appointed, one to enter all the goods coming into the
magazine and the other to enter all going out of it.
“Every person of each of the colonies should be furnished with
necessaries out of the said magazines for the space of five years, by
the appointment, direction and order of the President and Council of
their respective colonies, or of the Cape-Merchant and two clerks, or
the major part of them.”
Similarly, in England, each company should appoint subordinate bodies of at least
three members each, to remain in London and Plymouth respectively, and to
“take care and charge of the trade, and an account of all the goods,
wares and merchandise that should be sent from England to their
respective colonies and brought from the colonies into England, andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 329
of all other things relating to the affairs and profits of their several
companies “
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After the second charter was granted in 1609, the plan contemplated in 1606 was
modified somewhat. For seven years a joint stock was to be maintained of which
each share should be £12 12s. The investors were of two classes, the adventurers,
who paid their subscriptions in money, and the planters, who went to the colonies and
paid no money. One share was given to each adult and child over ten years of age
who should go to Virginia; “everie extraordinarie man,” such as a knight, gentleman
or physician, should be given additional shares, in the discretion of the company. At
the end of the term of seven years all the profits as well as the land should be
distributed among the shareholders according to their holdings.
521 In 1619 it appeared
that land had been distributed among many of the colonists in severally, and that a
tract had been appropriated by the company in its corporate capacity. A fund
subscribed in England for the founding of a college in Virginia in which “infidels’
children” might be educated was administered by the company; a tract of ten
thousand acres at Henrico was granted in aid of the project and tenants placed on it
by the company to cultivate it “on halves,” the profits to be applied in furtherance of
the college project. Some lands were leased by the company to tenants who should
pay a definite rent in produce. All persons who should settle in Virginia at their own
expense should have a grant of fifty acres and fifty acres in addition for each person
taken with them. Boys and girls were sent out to serve an apprenticeship of seven
years in the colony; at the end of the apprenticeship they were each to have from the
company a year’s provision of grain and other supplies, a cow, forty shillings”for
apparel,” weapons, household utensils and agricultural implements. “Maids” were
sent at the company’s expense to become wives of the planters, who should
reimburse the company for the expense incurred. A body of sixteen committees
(directors), presided over by the deputy governor and known as the court of
committees, was “to perform the orders of courts, for setting out ships and buying
provisions for Virginia,” and to manage the sale of goods brought to England in
return. After the termination of the joint stock subsisting in 1619 the trade was to be
free and open to all British subjects, on payment of the small duties prescribed by the
charters. In future joint stocks for magazines the company should “bear part as anJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 330
adventurer; they shall ratably partake like profit, and undergo like loss, with other
adventurers.”
522 Only two features of the industrial development of the colony of
Virginia under the London Company seem to be worthy of mention, but both of them
serve to differentiate the company from others. (1) The economic as distinguished
from the political affairs of the company passed under the control of a separate
administrative body, the court of committees; that did not happen in any other of the
great corporations (except colonial companies) because their work of government
was not so much more important than their commerce. (2) The membership of the
London Company expanded to include not only the purely investing element in
England, but also the producing element in the colony, apparently for two reasons:
(a) The colonists were British subjects and consequently in closer sympathy with the
English investors, while the producers with whom other companies dealt were
foreigners and many of them on a lower social level, and (b) the company did not
trade with the colonists so much as it shared with them in production; its profits
depended not on buying and selling what the colonists produced, but in enabling
them to produce and then sharing the resulting gains; there was consequently an
identity of interest between the producer and investor that did not exist in the purely
commercial companies. In the nature of things the shareholders in the colonies could
not participate in the deliberations of the company in England, though by the
company’s charter they had the right to do it. The expansion of membership laid a
basis for demanding participation in the deliberations of the governor and council
resident in Virginia.
The economic relations of the company and colonists could have hardly failed to
be reflected in the wider and inclusive political relations, but they are hardly
sufficient to account for the political institutions that were created by the company
in Virginia. It can hardly be doubted that an enlightened desire on the part of the
company to make an application of the political theories cherished by its members
united with the demands of economic conditions prevailing in Virginia to influence
them in the concession of modified popular government. More or less harshness
characterized the contact of the colonists with the company’s governor in Virginia,
perhaps not so much because they were not represented in his government as because
they were actually ill-governed. The appointment of a resident council for him,
however, seemed to afford no relief. Samuel Argall, sent out by the company asJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 331
governor in 1617, was so tyrannical in his government that he had to be recalled on
account of the opposition aroused in the colonists. His successor, George Yeardly,
came in 1619 with “commissions and instructions from the company for the better
establishing of a commonwealth,” by virtue of which it was ordered that an annual
assembly should be held in the colony, to be attended by the governor and his council
and two burgesses elected from each plantation by its inhabitants; in such an
assembly such laws should be made as to the entire body should seem best for the
common good of the colony. The first assembly — the first representative legislature
in America — was held in 1619 in the church at Jamestown, and was attended by
Governor Yeardly and his council, and twenty-two burgesses representing eleven
localities; all took part in the proceedings in the same room.
In 1621 the company at a general court took more for mat action by an “Ordinance
and Constitution” for the government of Virginia.
“The intent is ‘by the divine assistance to settle such a form of
government as may be to the greatest benefit and comfort of the
people, and whereby all injustice, grievances and oppression may be
prevented and kept off as much as possible from the said colony.’ The
governor is to have a council to assist him in the administration. He
and the council, together with the burgesses chosen, two from each
town, hundred and plantation, by the inhabitants, are to constitute a
general assembly, who are to meet yearly, and decide all matters
coming before them by the greatest number of voices; but the
governor is to have a negative voice. No law of the assembly is to be
or continue in force unless it is ratified by a general court, and
returned to them under the company’s seal. But when the government
of the colony is once ‘well framed and settled accordingly... no orders
of court afterwards shall bind the said colony unless they be ratified
in like manner in the general assemblies.’”
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Such grants of free and popular government, conceded by a company under the
control of members of the liberal party in England, could not be suffered by a Stuart;
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proceedings in quo warranto in 1624. He thereupon began the formulation under his
own hand of a new code of laws for Virginia, but died before his world could be
completed. Though Virginia became a royal colony Charles I was in too much
trouble with his subjects in England to interfere with the rights of self-government
formerly conceded to the colonists by the London Company; the only material change
in the government of the colony consisted in the substitution of a royal governor and
council for the earlier governor and council appointed by the company; in
Cromwell’s time, even the right of electing the governor and council was transferred
to the colonists.
The Plymouth Company, which had been included with the London Company in
the charter of 1606, was not so enterprising as its companion company. Its attempt
to plant a colony at the mouth of the Kennebec in 1607–1608 ended in failure, and
it appears to have later confined its interest in the colonization of North Virginia
(called New England after Captain John Smith so named it in 1614) largely to
granting to others licenses to trade, or to plant colonies on tracts of land granted to
them. In 1620,
“for their better encouragement and satisfaction.... and that they may
avoid all confusion, questions and differences between themselves,
and those of the... first colony,” James I. was “pleased to make certain
adventurers, intending to erect and establish fishery, trade and
plantation, within the territories, precincts and limits of the said
second colony... one several, distinct and entire body.”
The territory was now to extend from sea to sea between the parallels of 40° and
48° north latitude so that it would not overlap that of the London Company. But the
Plymouth Company, as reorganized under its new charter, was somewhat different
from the London Company in its constitution.
The name should now be “The Council established at Plymouth, in the County of
Devon, for the planting, ruling, ordering, and governing of New England, in
America” — a name conveniently abbreviated to “The Council for New England” in
common usage. The body was limited in number to forty members, who held their
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members of the first council were named in the charter. A president should be chosen
for a term limited by the council. All the corporate powers, such as the creation of
offices and the appointment of officers, and the making of laws and ordinances, were
reposed in the council. In other respects the company was very similar to the London
Company. Its laws and ordinances were to be enforced by a variety of punishments;
in cases of rebellion, insurrection and meeting, its governor might enforce martial
law. It might mine the precious metals, yielding one fifth of the gold and silver to the
crown. Customs duties should not be levied for seven years and goods might be
re-exported from England without payment of duties within thirteen months of
importation. Land might be conveyed to planters and colonies might be protected by
the use of military power. No other subjects were to engage in trade in the company’s
territory without its permission, and the crown should not grant trading licenses
without its consent. Neither the company nor its officers or colonists should “rob or
spoil” aliens or others. The colonists should have all the rights of British subjects.
Persons who should neglect to go to the colonies after having agreed to go, or having
gone, should be seditious or return to England by stealth, or circulate ill reports of the
company, and be impudent and contumacious when examined by the council as to
their conduct,
524 might be bound with sureties for their good behavior, or sent back
to the colony to be proceeded against and punished by the governor in his discretion
or according to existing ordinances.
525
The purpose of the Plymouth Company was not so much to colonize New England
directly as to permit others to do it through grants of its lands. In the granting of lands
and trading privileges it was more than liberal, often making grants with slight regard
to other grants previously made. In 1621, it made a grant to the Puritans and the
London adventurers who were interested with them in their colony of the Plymouth
settlement; they had previously obtained a license to make a plantation from the
London Company, but by error or deception had been landed outside of the
company’s territory. Likewise, Robert Gorges tried unsuccessfully to utilize a grant
from the company by founding a colony in 1623 on Massachusetts Bay; his
representatives were more fortunate in making settlements in the same year on the
sites of modern Boston, Chelsea and Charlestown. Wallaston made a short-lived
settlement on the site of modern Quincy in 1625. Sanctioned by the company, a
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in England, which was soon, however, removed to Salem, and was later aided in its
development by English Puritans. The most important enterprise was inaugurated by
a grant of land in 1628 to a body of adventurers afterwards incorporated as the
Massachusetts Bay Company. In 1635 the Council for New England surrendered its
charter to the king with the significant stipulation that the land held by it as a
corporation should be distributed among its members.
The London and Plymouth companies appear to have developed in opposite
directions, the former expanding its commercial and the latter its political side. What
constituted the governing body of the former was what was incorporated in the latter.
Even in matters of government the council of the London Company had been unable
to maintain itself and the charter of 1612 had made the council merely a part of the
real governing body, all proceedings being participated in by the “generality,” but in
the Plymouth Company what was virtually the generality was excluded from the
corporation by the charter of 1620. The organic development of each was quite in
harmony with its purposes; the London Company had as its aim the settlement of a
colony and the establishment of commerce with and through it; it accordingly
included in its membership all who should actually”adventure,” and excluded all who
should refuse to do so; on the contrary, the Plymouth Company aimed rather to let
others settle the colonies and establish the commerce by virtue of its grants, while it
should rely on its revenue from the land for its profits and should undertake the
general supervision of the colony, especially on its political side. Much of the
difference must have been due to the difference in character of membership. The
London Company was composed largely of London merchants and men of eastern
England, who infused into the work of the corporation the spirit derived from the
commercial life with which they came in close contact; in political life they were
largely liberals and opposed to the tyrannical methods of the Stuarts; the Plymouth
Company, however, was composed more largely of landowners and gentlemen of the
west of England, and contained much less of the mercantile element; they were more
conservative in their ideas, and viewed the work of the colonization of America in
the light in which a landlord might have been expected to view an agricultural
enterprise, with the owner of the soil governing the body of tenants and deriving from
his ownership a return that he did not primarily aid to produce.
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Council for New England) a grant of the land from sea to sea between a point three
miles north of the Merrimac River and another three miles south of the Charles
River. In the year following the grant was confirmed by Charles I, and Rosewell and
his associates incorporated as the “Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay
in New England.” A governor and deputy governor and eighteen assistants (the first
ones being named in the charter) were to be periodically elected from the freemen of
the company, and were to meet once a month or oftener (at least seven assistants and
the governor or deputy governor attending) in court or assembly “for the better
ordering and directing of their affairs.” Four “great and general courts,” to be
attended by the governor or his deputy, at least six assistants and the freemen, were
to be held each year for the admission of new freemen, the constitution of offices, the
election of officers (by a majority vote of those present) and the enactment of laws
and ordinances not repugnant to the laws of England; the general court at which
officers were chosen was called (though not in the charter) the “Court of Elections.”
The company had most of the powers, exemptions and disabilities characteristic of
colonial companies, — to transport colonists and goods from England, to retain
English citizenship for the colonists, to be free of customs duties for seven years, to
make and enforce laws on its members and colonists, to expel intruders by force of
arms, to refrain from “robbing and spoiling” other subjects and friendly aliens, and
to permit other English subjects to fish in the waters adjacent to their land and use
the land on the shores as much as should be incidentally necessary.
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The economic relations of the company to its colonists were remarkably similar to
those of the London Company to its Virginia colonists after 1609 (the date of the
second charter). The stage of semi-communal industry passed through by Virginia
under the charter of 1606 appears to have been wanting in the experience of
Massachusetts Bay. The distinction between adventurers and planters was maintained
but not reflected in the organization of the company. Mere adventurers (investors)
should be granted two hundred acres of land for each subscription of £50 to the
company’s enterprise; such as settled in the colony should have fifty acres for
themselves and fifty acres for each person that they should take to the colony with
them. If the settlers should be of superior social “quality,” they should receive such
additional allotments of land as should seem to the governor and council to be just.
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or influence exerted. A tract of land was also set aside by the company for cultivation
by it in its corporate capacity through servants and employees. But the system was
not so fully developed in Massachusettts as in Virginia; the company soon transferred
its land to the separate towns of the colony. Likewise the management of the
company’s joint stock and “magazine” was delegated to a subsidiary board of
“undertakers,” but early dwindled to a matter of slight importance, and private trade
supplanted trade by the corporation. In fact, the Massachusetts Bay project was so
predominantly political in character that its economic organization had almost no
influence on its execution. When the election of colonists to the freedom of the
company came to be passed on in Icy, there was no mention of their economic
relations to it as a qualification; the test imposed was the broader one of general
social fitness, though it was narrowed somewhat by reduction to membership in
colonial churches.
The significant development was in the political rotations of the company to its
colonists. From the beginning the company was more closely identified in interest
with its colonists than the London or Plymouth Companies had been. Behind the
movement was the same desire of the Puritans to escape religious oppression in
England that had justified the foundation of the New Plymouth settlement; it was
shared alike by the incorporators and the colonists sent out by them. Moreover, the
purely commercial purposes of the company were less prominent than they had been
in the preceding companies; while the membership of the London Company had been
restricted to “adventurers,” that of the present company contained many statesmen,
clergymen and scholars. Even before the charter had been granted, a body of
colonists had already been sent to join those at Salem who had originally settled at
Gloucester. As soon as the charter had been granted, the company removed its
“domicile” to New England, many of its members themselves becoming residents of
the new colony; whether the removal was technically legal or illegal, it made possible
organic changes within the corporation that in preceding colonial companies had
taken place outside of them. As early as 1630 the freemen had become so numerous
that, divided as they were among several towns, they were unable to make their
influence felt in the government of the company; the election of the governor and
deputy governor and the enactment of laws consequently fell into the hands of the
body of assistants; in the next year it was provided that the assistants should retainJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 337
their offices until deprived of them by vote of the freemen. The concentration of
powers was, up to that point, quite similar to the movement in the English gilds that
developed into the London Livery companies; in fact, the constitution of the
Massachusetts Bay Company needed but little further modification to attain the
model furnished by the London companies. But the activity of the colonial company
came too often in contact with that of its colonists for the establishment of an
oligarchical court of assistants. Accordingly when the freemen of Watertown were
assessed £60 as a contribution to the expense of colonial fortifications at Cambridge,
the assessment encountered the objection that the freemen were being “taxed without
representation.” At a later general court it was provided that the freemen should
participate in the proceedings of the company through representatives, two to be
chosen by each town to sit with the governor and assistants in deliberation on the
affairs of the colony; even the election of the governor and deputy governor was
reposed in the representatives after having been for a time exercised by the freemen
according to the orginal provisions of the charter. In 1644 a question of jurisdiction
in the celebrated “pig case” occasioned a disagreement between the assistants and
representatives that caused them thereafter to hold separate sessions. The government
of the colony had assumed a form that it maintained until the charter of 1691 was
granted.
Within five years after the granting of the corporate charter in 1628 it was a just
ground of complaint in England that a separate and independent state and church
were being established in Massachusetts. An oath of allegiance was exacted of
prospective colonists and a royal commission was sent to New England in 1634 for
the general purpose of re-introducing harmony between the colonists and the home
government, with the power to use the extreme remedy of revoking colonial charters.
In the following year, on writ of quo warrants, the charter of the “Governor and
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England” was annulled, though the home
government was unable to execute the decree.
Until after the Restoration, Massachusetts was allowed to go its own way with little
interference from England. The framework of the corporation had become the
political constitution of a colony. In 1664 four royal commissioners were sent out to
restore the colonists of New England to their allegiance to the English crown, and to
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or under governments originated and fostered by them in the absence of supervision
or regulation by the English government, — an independence that had been greatly
strengthened by confederation of the several colonies. The commissioners, having
accomplished nothing, returned to England. In 1684, another writ of quo warranto
was followed by a decree in the high court of chancery in England annulling the
charter of the company, that had become an English colony. New England was now
to be governed by James II, if possible, through a royal governor and council, whose
jurisdiction was expanded in 1688 to include the colonies as far southward as
Delaware Bay. With the Revolution in England Governor Andros and his council
were driven out of office and the colonial charters restored.
The Massachusetts Bay Company had ceased to exist and its direct work in the
establishment of the colony had been done. The charter of 1691 must be considered
not because it is a part of the history of the company, but because it is evidence of the
enduring effects of corporate activity on the constitution of the political communities
of New England. By the charter of William and Mary the colonies of Massachusetts
Bay and New Plymouth, the province of Maine, the territory of Acadia or Nova
Scotia and between it and Maine were united under the name of the “Province of the
Massachusetts Bay in New England.” A governor, deputy governor and secretary
were to be appointed by the crown, and twenty-eight assistants or councillors to
“advise and assist” the governor were to “keep a council from time to time” with him
when summoned to do so. A general court or assembly was to be held each year,
consisting of the governor and his council and two deputies elected by the inhabitants
of each town to represent them, the number to which each “county, town and place”
should be entitled being left to future regulation by the general court. The governor
was given power to adjourn, prorogue and dissolve the general court. The councillors
were to be chosen each year by the general court, eighteen being allotted to
Massachusetts Bay, four to New Plymouth, three to Maine and one to the territory
between Maine and Nova Scotia,
527 and they should be removable by the general
court. The governor, with the advice and consent of the council, was to appoint all
judges, sheriffs and other officers. Wills were to be probated by the governor and
council. Judicial courts for hearing causes of all kinds were to be established by the
general court, but an appeal to the king in council should be permitted in all
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should make all laws and enforce them by fines, mulcts and imprisonments, and
should have power to levy taxes. The governor should have a veto on all acts of the
general court, and no act should be valid without his approval. All laws enacted
should be referred to the king in council, by whom they might be annulled within
three years. Lands should be granted by the governor and general assembly. The
governor, for the protection of the province, should have power to raise, train and
instruct the provincial militia, undertake military expeditions and enforce martial law
in time of war. The right of English subjects to fish in provincial waters should not
be abridged.
528 The election of a speaker of the house of representatives had not been
provided for in the charter of 1691; it was accordingly granted by George I, in 1726,
that he should be elected by the general court and approved by the governor; if a
vacancy should occur in the office or if a candidate elected by the general court
should be disapproved, the vacancy should be filled by the same procedure. It was
also provided that the general court might adjourn from day to day or for two days,
but not for a longer time without the consent of the governor.
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By the charter of 1691, and the charter of 1726 in amendment of it, the
governmental structure of Massachusetts Bay as a colony, rapidly evolved by it from
the structure conceded to the Massachusetts Bay Company as a corporation, was
merely perpetuated. The governorship was somewhat exalted in the provincial
government, as is likely to happen when the state essays to absorb the results of
independent corporate activity, but the other branches of the government suffered
little modification; the council and house of representatives, by far the more
important parts of the provincial constitution, remained substantially what they were
after the colonial company had adjusted its structure to the colonial environment with
which it came in contact, and had expanded until it was virtually identical with the
colony.
The two charters of Connecticut. and Rhode Island granted by Charles II, the
former in 1662 and the latter in 1663, would in a classification of the charters of
colonies, companies and provinces stand midway between the charter of the
Massachusetts Bay Company and that of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. They
represent with a fair degree of fidelity the colonial constitution of Massachusetts after
it had been transformed from a colonial company into a politically organized colony
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province. The earlier constitutions of both colonies had been such as they had
independently devised for themselves, though of course they had been affected by the
prior experience of their framers in other colonies and by their knowledge of the
constitutions concurrently in force in neighboring communities.
The “Governor and Company of the English Colony of Connecticut in New
England, in America” was to consist of John Winthrop and eighteen others named
in the charter, together with such others as should be “admitted and made free of the
company and society.” A governor (and deputy governor), twelve assistants and a
representative body of two deputies from each “place, town, or city,” elected by their
freemen, should constitute the government and should hold a “general court” twice
a year or oftener. The governor as well as the assistants was to be elected from the
freemen, and might summon them at will “to consult and advise of the business and
affairs” of the company. At the general courts laws should be enacted and freemen
admitted; at one of them the officers should be elected. Colonists might freely be
transported to the colony, should take the oath of supremacy and obedience and (with
their children) should have all the liberties and immunities of natural British subjects.
Goods, merchandise “and other things... useful or necessary for the inhabitants of the
colony” might without restriction be exported thither. Courts of justice might be
established by the general courts for the enforcement of laws by proper penalties and
executions. Military power might be employed for the protection of the colony and
martial law might be exercised when occasion should require. Rights of fishing of
English subjects should be respected. The territory of the company should extend to
the South Sea (Pacific Ocean) on the west.
530 In 1643 the Governor-in-chief and
Commissioners of Plantations had granted to the inhabitants of the towns of
Providence, Portsmouth and Newport,
“a free and absolute charter... to be known by the name of the
Incorporation of Providence Plantations, in the Narragansett Bay, in
New England... with full power and authority to rule themselves by
such a form of civil government, as by voluntary consent of all, or the
greater part of them, they shall find most suitable to their estate and
condition “John P. Davis, Corporations, 341
and to make and execute laws accordingly.
531 When later a charter was granted by
Charles II, in 1663, it differed from that of Connecticut, of the preceding year, only
in details. The name given was the “Governor and Company of the English Colony
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, in New England, in America.” The
assistants were only ten in number. The deputies were not equally apportioned to the
several towns, but Newport should have six; Providence, Portsmouth and Warwick,
each four; and each other town two. The colonists should not make war on the
Indians within the limits of other colonies without the knowledge and consent of the
others, nor should the other colonies molest the Indians within the Rhode Island
colony without the knowledge and consent of its governor and company. In matters
of controversy between the colony and others in New England, it might appeal for
redress directly to the king. The inhabitants of the colony, it seemed necessary to
concede, might 
“without let or molestation, pass and repass with freedom, into and
through the rest of the English colonies, upon their lawful and civil
occasions, and converse, and hold commerce and trade, with such of
the inhabitants of other English colonies as shall be willing to admit
them “hereunto, ‘they behaving themselves peaceably among
them.’”
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The political organization contained in both the Connecticut and Rhode Island
charters was a developed form and underwent no serious modification until the
charters were superseded by state constitution, in Connecticut, in 1818, and in Rhode
Island, in 1842. So clearly was the charter organization recognized as a fit structure
for the government of the commonwealth that when the formation of state
constitutions was recommended by the Colonial Congress in 1776, it was merely
enacted in Connecticut
“that the ancient form of Civil Government, contained in the Charter
from Charles the Second, King of England, and adopted by the People
of this State, shall be and remain the Civil Constitution of this State,
under the sole authority of the People thereof, independent of anyJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 342
King or Prince whatever.”
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All the charters of colonial companies heretofore considered were granted between
1606 and 1663 and followed quite closely the model of the foreign commercial
company. The charter of the “Trustees for establishing the colony of Georgia in
America” was not granted until 1732, and approached most nearly the type of the
prevailing English charitable corporation. The primary motive for granting the charter
appears in the recital
“that many... poor subjects are, through misfortunes and want of
employment, reduced to great necessity, insomuch as by their labor
they are not able to provide a maintenance for themselves and
families; and if they had means to defray their charges of passage, and
other expenses, incident to new settlements, they would be glad to
settle in provinces in America, where by cultivating the lands, at
present waste and desolate, they might not only gain a comfortable
subsistence for themselves and families, but also strengthen [the]
colonies and increase the trade, navigation and wealth of [Great
Britain].”
A subsidiary motive was the protection of the Carolina colonies against the Spanish
and Indians on the exposed southwestern border. The corporation erected to receive,
manage and dispose of contributions made by philanthropic persons was to consist
of Lord Percival, James Oglethorpe and eighteen others, and such others as they
should afterwards elect at annual meetings. The government was vested in a president
and common council of fifteen, later to be increased to twenty-four members, elected
by the corporation at annual meetings and serving during good behavior. The
common council should have a chairman enjoying both an original and casting vote,
and its members were to serve in rotation as chairman and president without salary.
No member of the corporation should have a position of profit under it; all officers
were eligible and removable by the common council, but the governor was to be
approved by the crown. Annual reports of receipts and expenditures should be
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settlements and improvements,” to the auditor of plantations. The corporation had
power to make by-laws for its own government and ordinances for the government
of the colony, not repugnant to the laws of England, and to enforce them by
reasonable pains and penalties; but laws for the control of the colonists revere to the
approval of the king in council. Power was given to take out settlers as colonists and
the necessary military and other supplies; the rights of British subjects were
preserved for the colonists and their children. For twenty-one years the power of
establishing courts “for the hearing and determining all manner of crimes, offenses,
causes and things whatsoever “ should be exercised. The territory granted should
extend from the Savannah to the Altamaha River and westward within the meridians
of their sources to the Pacific Ocean, and should include unsettled islands within
twenty leagues of its Atlantic coastline. Land might be granted to colonists, but not
more than five hundred acres to each one, and none to members of the corporation;
after the expiration of ten years from the date of each grant the crown should receive
annually four shillings for each hundred acres granted. A militia might be formed and
trained and military expeditions engaged in. Georgia should be a separate province
and subject to the laws of no other colony, except that its militia should be subject
to the command and direction of the governor and commander-in-chief of South
Carolina. At the end of a term of twenty-one years “such form of government and
method of making laws... for the better governing and ordering of the said province
of Georgia... shall be established... as [the crown] shall hereafter ordain,” and the
governor and all other officers, civil and military, should be appointed by the
crown.
534 After having met with only moderate success in the establishment of a
colony, the corporation surrendered its charter in rem, and its government was
replaced by that of a royal province.
The purposes of the state in granting to colonial corporations charters conceding
to them for their exercise such extensive powers over persons and property may be
said to have been five in number, though some of them are manifestly comprehended,
partly or wholly, in the others. The purposes were as follows: (1) The colonization
of new lands; (2) The establishment and extension of commerce; (3) The extension
of the dominion of the English crown; (4) The propagation of Christianity and (5) the
relief of distressed classes of British subjects. Such purposes were shared by the
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them was of course not endorsed by the state, (6) the escape from political and
religious oppression in England.
(1) Colonization is for the greater part inspired by purposes comprehended under
succeeding heads, but there is still a broad field within which it may be viewed as an
end distinct in itself. It was an extreme form of the efforts of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries to realize what is vaguely described as the “world idea,” the
knowledge of new worlds and the desire to exploit them. Much of the world’s
colonization has doubtless been promoted not by rational plans to better the social
conditions of colonists but by the mere indefinite desire for change and movement,
— by the stimulated consciousness of individuality and an impulse to nourish it by
contact with new environment, so characteristic of the period of the Reformation.
The first step in the process, the discovery of new lands, was certainly not always
taken with the expectation of eventually deriving an economic, religious or political
advantage from it; it was prompted most by the mere spirit of adventure. The spirit
of colonization was appreciated in England as keenly by the king as by any subject;
it never lacked royal encouragement. But the state as organized was unable to
comprehend the movement; like new movements in other and even narrower fields
of social life, it was conceded a social structure, which, while not truly a part of the
state, yet derived its strength and vigor from it. The general work of colonization,
especially in the presence of a government so lacking in harmony with the political
conditions surrounding it as was that of the Stuarts, was especially appropriate for
corporations.
(2) The strongest particular motive for the formation of colonial companies was
doubtless the economic purpose of establishing and extending English commerce.
The crown found in it a larger source of revenue by reason of the increase of exports
and imports and a larger body of national wealth to be taxed. Besides, from the
exaggerated reports of the deposits of the precious metals, the royal reservation of a
percentage of the gold and silver mined was expected to result in a direct income for
the crown. The reservation in the Massachusetts charter of 1691 of all trees in the
province more than twenty-four inches in diameter for masts for the royal navy, and
the exaction of four shillings per hundred acres on land granted to Georgia colonists
are indicative of the royal view of the colonies as a source of supplying royal
needs.
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encouraged the investors of capital in American voyages to hope for similar success.
In the Virginia charter, the general purpose of colonization appears to have been even
subordinated to the commercial purpose; the settlements were intended to some
extent as establishments for trading with the nations; further than that the
organization of the early colonies on the basis of communal holding of land was
intended to facilitate the absorption by the adventurers of the economic results of the
project. Even when the extension of commerce was not the primary purpose of
establishing a colony, it was permitted to serve incidentally as a basis for securing the
pecuniary assistance indispensable to the success of the colony. In a few cases, as in
those of Connecticut and Rhode Island, the grant of powers appears to have been
regarded not so much as an incentive to future economic activity as a reward for past
exertions. The crown was more than willing to grant such comprehensive powers to
corporations that, by their exercise of them in pursuit of private gain, the royal
exchequer might incidentally be benefited. 
(3) “The enlargement of our own dominions” was one of the agreeable results of
colonization contemplated by the crown. One reason assigned by Charles II for
granting to John Winthrop and his associates the charter of Connecticut was that the
territory “or the greatest part thereof, was purchased and obtained for great and
valuable considerations, and some other part thereof gained by conquest, and with
much difficulty, and at the only endeavors, expense and charge of them [was]
subdued and improved, and thereby became a considerable enlargement and addition
of our dominions and interest there.” National pride, or personal royal pride, or
whatever it may be called, that, without the added hope of economic gain or other
material advantage, has provided a motive for most of the world’s conquests, had its
influence on the development of the American colonies. In order that the new world
might be settled by colonists who should carry with them their allegiance to the
English crown, their settlements were encouraged, not directly, but indirectly through
its delegating to bodies of subjects such powers, political, economic, military and
other, as should be necessary for the success of the enterprises. On the other hand, the
adventurers and colonists, to the extent that they were actuated by the same
sentiment, needed only opportunity to indulge it. Extension of dominion was a public
purpose; it was accomplished to some extent through colonial corporations by
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love of king and country. The purpose of acquiring new dominion was sometimes
thinly veiled in the charters under the ostensibly philanthropic purpose of reducing
the savages in the new land to “civil government” and thereby laying “a sure
foundation of happiness to all America.” The frequent reservation of the appointment
of colonial officers, the supervision of corporate action and the approval of corporate
laws, as well as the requirement of oaths of supremacy and allegiance, and the
guarantee to the colonists and their descendants of the rights of British citizenship,
is evidence that the crown aimed to make the extension of dominion not merely
apparent.
(4) No purpose is more uniformly mentioned in the charters than the conversion of
savages to Christianity. The design in granting the Connecticut charter was to have
the
“people inhabitants there,... so religiously, peaceably and civilly
governed, as their good life and orderly conversation may win and
invite the natives of the country to the knowledge and obedience of
the only true God and Savior of mankind, and the Christian faith;
which in our royal intentions, and the adventurers’ free profession is
the only and principal end of this plantation “
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The Massachusetts charter of 1620 contains evidence that the purely pious purpose
was sometimes confused with others more worldly, and that the attainment of it was
not without serious limitations: 
“For that... within these late years there hath by God’s visitation
reigned a wonderful plague, together with many horrible slaughters
and murders, committed amongst the savages and brutish people
there... in a manner to the utter destruction, devastation and
depopulation of that whole territory, so that there is not left for many
leagues together... any that do claim or challenge any kind of interests
therein nor any other superior lord or sovereign to make claim
thereto, whereby we in our judgment are persuaded and satisfied that
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goodness and bounty towards us and our people, bath thought fit and
determined that those large and goodly territories, deserted as it were
by their natural inhabitants, should be possessed and enjoyed by such
of our subjects and people as... shall by His mercy and favor and by
His powerful arm, be directed and conducted thither. In
contemplation and serious consideration whereof, we have thought it
fit, according to our kingly duty, so much as in us lieth, to second and
follow God’s sacred will, rendering reverend thanks to His Divine
Majesty for His glorious favor in laying open and revealing the same
unto us before any other Christian prince or state, by which means
without offense, and as we trust, to His glory, we may with boldness
go on to the settling of so hopeful a work, which tendeth to the
reducing and conversion of such savages as remain wandering in
desolation and distress, to civil society and Christian religion, to the
enlargement of our own dominions, and the advancement of the
fortunes of such of our good subjects as shall willingly interest
themselves in the said employment to whom we cannot but give
singular commendations for their so worthy intention and enterprise.”
To whatever extent the propagation of Christianity might be furthered it was
legitimately incidental to the work of colonization and afforded a sufficient basis for
grants of corporate powers.
(5) The relief of distressed classes of British subjects was the special purpose of
creating one colonial corporation and must have been implied to some extent in the
general purpose of colonization furthered by the creation of all the others. To
whatever degree colonization may be accounted for on more general grounds, it must
undoubtedly be attributed largely to the desire of the colonists to better their
economic conditions. All colonial corporations, and particularly the Georgia
corporation, would therefore find justification for their existence in the same social
principles on which eleemosynary corporations in general are based. The colonial
company was the medium through which the public purpose of disposing of surplus
population or distressed classes was accomplished by giving vent to private interest,
whether in the form of cupidity or philanthropy.John P. Davis, Corporations, 348
(6) To escape from political and religious oppression by England could hardly be
recognized by the crown as a valid motive in subjects for seeking a body of corporate
privileges. It was accordingly not mentioned in the charters; but it was nevertheless
present in most cases, however carefully it might be concealed. The outcome of
colonial and provincial history in the separation of the American colonies from
England is emphatic evidence of the extent to which the hidden purpose was aided
in its attainment by the granting of corporate powers for other purposes. The social
structure of corporations, like most other legally sanctioned social structures, may
more or less easily be diverted from the purposes for which the state intended it, to
be used for others detrimental to the state or, in extreme cases, actually subversive
of it. 
At first sight the colonial proprietaries appear to have differed very little from the
colonial corporations. The charters by which the powers and duties of both were
defined bear a strong resemblance to each other. The purposes of granting them to
the proprietaries were to enable the grantees to colonize the new land, “to enlarge our
English empire, and promote such useful commodities as may be of benefit to us and
our Dominions, as also to reduce the savage Natives by gentle and just manners to
the love of civil society and Christian religion.’‘
537 Behind the expressed grounds for
seeking the charters, the latent purpose of escaping and assisting others to escape
unjust or distressing conditions in England, whether political, religious or economic,
actuated many of the proprietors. In all cases but one the territory to be owned and
controlled was definitely limited and constituted a separate province; in the
exceptional case of Raleigh, whose charter was the earliest granted,
538 the patentee
was permitted “to discover, search, find out and view such remote, heathen and
barbarous lands, countries and territories, not actually possessed by any Christian
prince, and not inhabited by Christian people, as to him shall seem good,” and “to
have, hold, occupy and enjoy” them with all incidental rights and privileges; but he
was conceded power to expel from the land only such persons as without his license
should inhabit within two hundred leagues of places at which settlements should be
established before the end of six years. In no other charters, save that of the London
and Plymouth Companies, in 1606, was the control of the land dependent on actual
occupancy of it, except in so far as a charter was on general principles forfeitable for
nonuser in cases of absolute failure to plant colonies.John P. Davis, Corporations, 349
In order to enable and encourage the proprietaries to accomplish the purposes for
which their charters were granted, they were empowered, like the corporations, to
take out colonists and goods, to erect fortifications and otherwise use military power
in the defence of their colonies by the expulsion of intruders, the resistance of attacks
and the pursuit of enemies and pirates, and to enforce martial law in cases of
rebellion, sedition and mutiny. The colonists and their children were to retain their
rights as British subjects and not to be absolved from their correlative allegiance to
the English crown. The proprietaries and their heirs and assigns had full power to
“correct, punish, pardon, govern and rule “ the colonists according to such laws as
should seem to them to be necessary, “whether relating to the public state of the
province or the private utility of individuals,” with the uniform condition that they
should be “consonant to reason,” and not repugnant but as nearly agreeable as
possible to the laws and customs of England, — and to enforce them by fines,
imprisonment and other penalties. By the terms of most of the charters, notably of
those of Lord Baltimore and William Penn, the laws should be made “of and with the
advice, assent and approbation of the freemen of the.. . province,... or of their
delegates or deputies.. called together for the framing of laws” by the proprietaries;
in cases of emergencies, not provided for by regularly enacted laws, the proprietaries
or their representatives might use their own discretion, as conceded in the charter of
Charles I to Sir Ferdinando Gorges (1639), but such laws might not extend to
persons’ “lives, members, freeholds, goods or chattels.” Moreover, the colonial laws
were frequently made “subordinate and subject to the power and ‘reglement’” of the
Lords and Commissioners of Plantations, or made approvable or voidable within a
limited time by the king in council, “if inconsistent with [his] sovereignty or lawful
prerogative... or contrary to the faith and allegiance due [him]” or otherwise
objectionable.
Incidentally “cities, boroughs and towns” might be incorporated, “markets, marts
and fairs “ be established, ports designated and the provinces divided into “towns,
hundreds, counties” and manors by the proprietaries. Likewise churches and chapels
might be founded and all ecclesiastical control exercised over them, and over the
colonists in reference to them, except in so far as special privileges should be
conceded to them by the charters. The proprietaries had power “to confer marks of
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them with titles and dignities (but so that they be not such as are now used in
England).” Offices might be created and all officers appointed. Courts might be
erected for the hearing of all manner of causes, civil, criminal, ecclesiastical and
marine — even courts feet and courts baron, — and view of frankpledge might be
held; but appeals were usually permitted to the proprietary, or to his governor or
other representative, or even in cases of importance to the king in council. Licenses
to trade were issuable by the proprietary, but a percentage of the gold and silver
mined and of the profits of the pearl fishery were reserved by the crown, and other
British subjects should not be excluded from the fisheries. Ordinarily the power of
taxation was not reserved by the king; in the Maryland and Pennsylvania charters it
was expressly waived, unless (in the latter) “with the consent of the proprietary or
chief governor and assembly, or by act of Parliament in England.” The proprietaries
might convey lands to settlers and lay customs and duties for their own use. “Spoiling
and robbing” other subjects and friendly aliens were prohibited on pain of outlawry
if speedy compensation should not be made for the damage caused. 
Thus the proprietaries were quite identical with the colonial corporations in the
purposes for which unusual powers were conferred on them by the English crown,
and very similar in the variety and scope of powers conferred, as far as they affected
their external relations, either to the crown or to the colonists. But there was one
important difference between them. The corporations had forms of organic social
structure conceded to them by their charters that the proprietaries, even when more
than one in number, did not possess. The relations of the members of the
corporations to each other were definitely ascertained and enforced through the
medium of a form of government within them; it was possible for political
constitutions of colonies to be developed from them without destroying the continuity
of the infra-corporate relations. The proprietaries were merely individuals. When
there was only one proprietary, any development of political institutions in his colony
had to come from actual delegation of his powers. Even when a plural number of
proprietaries were united, as under the Carolina charter, no organization of
membership was provided that could form the basis of colonial institutions; they
were merely joint proprietaries, limited in number. Again, in the corporations even
when their constitutions could not be converted into constitutions for their colonies,
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structure of the corporation might serve as a model for the constitution of the colony.
In the proprietaries, however, if political institutions had to be provided for the
colonists, there was present no constitution to serve as a model, a model would have
to be sought elsewhere.
The proprietary colony was based on the English lordship or county palatine; the
colonial company on the English foreign trading company. The former seemed to
derive most of their powers and duties from the ownership of the soil; the latter, from
the terms of its charter. The inference is unavoidable that it was the presence of the
land settled by a body of English subjects that caused the growth of the double
system. The great foreign trading companies owned a commerce and controlled only
their members and servants; the feudal English lordship would have been an
unsuitable structure for them; they assumed the form derived through the London
companies from the older gilds. When the newly discovered land in America was to
be settled as English domain, with English subjects, largely through the use of
commercial gain as an incentive, it is not surprising that confusion in the social form
of the colonizing agents resulted, with the English lordship and the English
commercial company side by side, each, however, having some characteristics
borrowed from the other. The difference in type of the proprietary is accountable for
many minor variations in the bodies of powers granted in the charters. Though the
corporations were to be the lords and proprietors of the soil, their provinces were not
called seigniories, as was Penn’s province of Pennsylvania. The power to incorporate
cities, boroughs and towns, to establish manors and manorial courts, to bestow titles
and dignities and to hold view of frankpledge were not given to the corporations,
though they were given to proprietaries; such powers, in their historical development,
seemed to be quite inseparable from the older feudal conception of government based
on the ownership of the soil, and accordingly incompatible with the activity of
corporations.
The political or governmental powers bestowed on the corporations and
proprietaries, it need hardly be added, were incidental and subsidiary to the other
powers to be exercised by them. Such of them as related to the internal organization
of the corporations themselves were of course involved in their very nature as
organizations of corporate groups of persons; some of them, if not expressed, would
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Connecticut charter of tam, and in charters of other colonies, that laws should be
enacted and executed “according to the course of other corporations within...
England.” The powers to be used for the control of other English subjects (not
colonists) may be viewed in the same light, though they were largely negative, and
not positive in operation, rather preventing others from acting than compelling them
to act or imposing conditions under which they should act. The restriction of the field
of colonial activity to the grantees of charters was intended not so much to afford a
reward for their doing or aiding the work of colonization as to supply a necessary
condition under which it might be done; they were doing work of which the major
part was the legitimate work of the state and subject to all of the limitations to which
the activity of the state is subject; their several fields of activity had to be exclusive.
The body of powers to be used for the government of the colonists owed their
delegation to the inability of the state to exercise them. Political organization of
population was necessary in the American colonies, — perhaps more necessary there
than elsewhere, — and if not exercised by the state, had to be exercised by some
subordinate agency.
“Forasmuch as upon the finding out, discovering or inhabiting of such
remote lands, countries and territories... it shall be necessary for the
safety of all men, that shall adventure themselves in those journeys or
voyages, to live together in Christian peace, and civil quietness each
with the other, whereby every one may with more pleasure and profit
enjoy that whereunto they shall attain with great pain and peril.”
was the reason assigned by Elizabeth for granting to Raleigh the absolute power of
governing the members of his prospective colony in Virginia. The grounds for the
original bestowal of liberal powers were equally strong for a liberal legal
interpretation of them; “these our letters patent,” was the universal promise, 
“shall be firm, good and effectual in the law, to all intents,
constructions and purposes whatsoever, according to our true intent
and meaning herein before declared, as shall be construed, reputed,
and adjudged most favorable on the behalf, and for the best benefitJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 353
and behoof of the... . governor and company.”
By far the most important feature of the development of the colonial companies
was their influence on the political institutions of the colonies. The opposition caused
by the tyrannical government of Argall in Virginia had for its first result the
appointment by the company of a council for him. When that seemed to be
insufficient and nothing short of participation by the colonists in the government of
their affairs promised permanent relief, the liberal members in control of the
company conceded to the colonists under Governor Yeardly the power of forming
through their deputies and together with the governor and his council a colonial
legislature. The political organization of the colony became thereby a reproduction
of that of the company itself, except as to two features: (a) the independence of the
governor and council as related to the burgesses and electorate was due to their
representing the interests of the company rather than those of the colonists; (b) the
principle of representation applied in the election of burgesses was an improvement
on the direct participation by members of the company in the consideration of its
affairs. The Plymouth Company suffered a reverse development, not only conceding
no political institutions to the colonists of New England, but itself shrinking into a
mere organization of its own governing body and leaving contact with colonists to
persons not included in its membership. Even such members of the Council for New
England as engaged in colonizing projects did so not in the capacity of members or
representatives of the company, but in that of its grantees. The development of
political institutions in New England must consequently be sought, not in the
relations of the Plymouth Company or Council for New England to the colonists, but
in those of their grantees to them. The Massachusetts Bay Company, incorporated
after it had received a grant from the Council for New England, represented an
advance beyond the position of the London Company in that it did not delegate a
political organization to its colony but became actually identical with it through the
admission of colonists to its membership as freemen. The constitution of the
company became the constitution of the colony, with its governor, elected by the
freemen and advised by the assistants, responsible for the execution of the laws, and
the deputies and assistants or councillors, likewise elected, responsible for
legislation. The third step was taken when by the Connecticut and Rhode IslandJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 354
charters the colonies were given colonial constitutions under the guise of
semi-commercial corporations, with governments similar to that of Massachusetts
Bay; but the two charters were less in creation of new constitutions than in
confirmation of older ones which had developed in imitation of those of
Massachusetts Bay and New Plymouth. The Georgia Company was somewhat
anomalous in the colonization of America. Its centre of force was not so much in its
colonists in America as in the philanthropists in England that supplied it with
resources; its content was not so much colonization as the administration of charity
funds; it was quite independent, as far as its corporate life was concerned, of the
social activity of the colonists; consequently it neither generated a colonial
constitution nor permitted its own constitution to become one. The colonial
constitutions developed in Virginia and Massachusetts on the form of the commercial
corporations contained the following elements: (a) The executive was a governor,
either appointed by the company or elected by the colony, who was advised and
assisted by a council, likewise either appointed or elected; (b) the supreme judiciary
of the colony consisted of the governor and council; (c) the legislature consisted of
the council and a representative body of deputies elected by the local divisions of the
colony, at first deliberating in joint session but later separately, the governor having
either a veto, or a casting vote in the sessions of the council.
The colonial constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts Bay served as models for
the other colonies. When settlements were made in New Hampshire, Rhode Island
or Connecticut, in the north, or in Maryland or the Carolinas in the south, to a large
extent by emigrants from the two older colonies, the demands for local representative
institutions were met by the concession or assumption of forms of government
similar to the two models. By the time when the middle colonies passed under
English control, the southern colonies (except Georgia) had all conformed to the
model of Virginia, and the New England colonies to that of Massachusetts. When
William Penn gave form to the representation of the colonists of Pennsylvania and
Delaware, as provided in his charter, the system developed in Virginia and Maryland
was substantially reproduced. Even the Duke of York authorized the governor to call
an assembly in New York in 1682 for the enactment of laws, which in the following
year provided for a government like that of the New England colonies in response to
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was divided into East Jersey and West Jersey, prevailed in the separate parts and was
finally perpetuated when the parts were reunited in bloc. The only material
modification of the system in its developed form was found in Pennsylvania and
Delaware, where the legislative body consisted of the popular representatives alone
to the exclusion of the council. The prevalence of the system based on the earlier
colonial corporations of Virginia and Massachusetts is perhaps the more remarkable
when it is considered that all the other colonies south of New England, excepting
Georgia, were proprietary colonies. The failure of Locke’s “Fundamental
Constitutions” in the Carolinas and of Gorges’ earlier but similar scheme in Maine
showed that it was impossible to successfully follow the feudal type of organization
farther than it had been followed in the creation of the proprietaries.
It has been suggested that corporations have usually, in history, served as temporary
social structures until the activity organized within them might be absorbed by the
state or co-ordinated with other activity exercised under the state. The process of
absorption in the case of colonial corporations and proprietaries is represented,
though imperfectly, in their replacement by provincial governments. When the
process began, it was soon found that the forms of government established in the
colonies under the liberal powers of the royal charters had acquired so great fixity
and stability and were so nearly in harmony with the conditions of colonial society
that they could not be changed. All that the crown could do in most of the colonies
was to assume the appointment of the governor and council, leaving the body of
popular representatives intact. Speaking broadly, the colonies had become states
whose sovereignty and independence were limited only by the appointment of some
of their constitutional bodies by a superior state. In Connecticut and Rhode Island,
even the governor and council were elected by the colonists. In Massachusetts, the
governor alone was appointed by the crown. In Pennsylvania, Delaware and
Maryland the governor and council continued to be appointed by the proprietary. In
the remaining colonies, both the governor and council were appointed by the crown.
England, as politically organized, could do no more; later efforts to make its
sovereignty over the American colonies real and effective resulted in their revolt and
eventual independence not only of England but also of such proprietaries as still
retained their powers. “The colonies formed by the Europeans in America are under
a kind of dependence, of which there is scarcely an instance in all the colonies of theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 356
ancients, whether we consider them as holding of the state itself, or of some trading
company established in the state.”
539 The feature of corporate autonomy had been
allowed such free development in the American colonies that England was unable to
reduce them to complete organic dependence. When the colonies became
independent States they reproduced in their State constitutions the features of
government with which they had become familiar in their colonial experience.
Finally, when the Federal constitution was framed, much of the material to which
they resorted had been accumulated during the growth of the States from colonies.
The constitution of the colonial trading company was therefore perpetuated to a large
extent in the State and Federal constitutions of the United States.
It would be beyond the province of this study to present in detail the features of the
State and Federal constitutions that were derived from the original colonial
companies; it must be said in general, however, that the constitutions of the Virginia
Company and Massachusetts Bay Company served as foundations for the future
constitutions of the colonies and of the States and Federal state that succeeded them.
The chief modifications came from three sources: (1) colonial experience; (2)
imitation of the British constitution; and (3) the application of abstract political
philosophy. The concrete changes consisted in the introduction of the following
elements: (1) The governorship was exalted in many colonies by its separation from
the electorate due to its representing the interests of the king, a proprietary or a
colonial corporation; even when reduced to election by the people, the governor was
an officer of far greater power and independence than the governor of a colonial
company had been; in none of the commercial companies of the class to which the
colonial companies belonged had the governor enjoyed a veto; in most of them he
was a mere executive officer; in some of them he degenerated into a mere figurehead.
(2) The bi-cameral legislature had not existed in the older corporations; its existence
in the colonies was possibly due in some measure to imitation of the English
Parliament, but more probably to the representation by the council and house of
representatives of opposing interests and to their exercise of different grades of
power. (3) The representation of local communities did not exist in the commercial
companies; its introduction into the colonies was a matter of necessity; it was a
refinement of representation by proxy, which actually existed in Maryland as a stage
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towns and other local units. (4) The restriction of the franchise was not a feature
unknown in corporate organization; it had been applied in the East India Company
and others, but not in the London Company, except to the extent that non-adventurers
might not vote; in the colonies the system was extended somewhat. (5) The
separation of judicial from executive and legislative functions that characterized the
State and Federal constitutions was never more than rudimentary in commercial
companies, largely because they judged only infractions of their own laws, while in
the colonies a body of English common law was enforced that seemed to be
independent of the influence of the colonial legislative authorities; the theory of the
existence of a body of customary law and of “natural rights” antecedent to the
enactment of positive law by the colonial legislature probably gave rise to the
independent judiciary. (6) The general system of “separation of powers” and “checks
and balances” was quite foreign to the organization of the typical trading company;
it was infused into the colonial governments just as into the English government by
the representation of conflicting social interests in separate parts of the government.
The growth of politically organized colonies from commercial corporations was
quite in harmony with the course of development in other classes of corporations.
The political powers of the companies were the ones that survived, while the others
perished. If the London Company had enjoyed a longer corporate life, it might have
been expected to shrink into an organization of its governing body, just as happened
in the case of the Plymouth Company when it became the Council for New England;
as it was, its commercial importance decreased and it became more largely a body of
liberal-minded English citizens whose aim was rather to put in force in the
company’s colony a system of government in accordance with the political theories
that they cherished. The Massachusetts Bay Company, though ostensibly organized
as a trading company, readily divested itself of its commercial attributes and
expanded the political side of its organization into a complete colonial constitution.
In the Connecticut and Rhode Island corporations, the economic basis of the
organization w as hardly more than a pretext; their charters virtually conceded to the
colonists political constitutions for their government. In fact, though technically
corporations, they deserved the name little more than Canada would deserve it now.
Self-government or political autonomy alone does not constitute a corporation,
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not merely by a smaller group within it. Connecticut and Rhode Island were
autonomous provinces, not corporations.
540 The Georgia corporation experienced no
development at all, either directly within itself or indirectly through the body of
colonists subject to it. It had from its beginning a form already virtually established.
No change could more easily have taken place in it than in the average charitable
corporation on which it was modelled. In its essence it represented the governing
body of the philanthropists whose contributions it administered. The colonists were
a class dependent upon them, and therefore normally subject to their government.
Not only were American governmental institutions largely derived from corporations,
but American conceptions of political liberty were colored by conceptions of
corporate activity. If they were not so colored, it may at least be said that they were
given greater vigor and effectiveness through forms of organization derived from
corporations. The growth of political liberty in England was hampered by the
presence of feudal institutions; it has had to be developed even to the present day
under restrictions imposed on it by the necessity of expressing itself through forms
not fitted for it or of expressing itself in actual opposition to them. In America,
however, the field was almost clear; feudal institutions took no firm root in the new
soil. In England, corporations had been the framework within which society had
made most of its progress out of the feudal organization; in America, then, where
there were few remnants of feudalism, it might have been expected that corporate
organization would afford the means of rapid social progress. It was the presence of
the feudal element in England and its absence in America that, more than any other
difference, widened the breach between the mother land and the colonies until it
could not be closed again. The theory of voluntary association, with the subsequent
obligation of maintaining the relations assumed until the purpose of the association
is attained — the theory on which the corporation is based — is identical, when
applied to the state, with the theory of the “social contract.” The relations assumed
by the American colonists seemed to be voluntarily assumed, but the consequences
of assuming them could not be avoided; the existence of a power higher than that of
the colonies, from which the latter derived its validity, obscured the element of
necessity in colonial institutions, and substituted the less substantial idea of their
corporate origin. A corporation is created by the state, by a higher power, before
which it is strong because it may rely on it for the protection of its exceptional rightsJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 359
and weak because it depends on the higher power for its existence. Its strength and
its weakness both demand a strict definition of its rights and duties; it must therefore
have a charter. The perpetual recourse to charters taught the American colonists to
value a written constitution. Corporations and colonies modelled on them did not rely
for stability and certainty of rights and duties on a body of customs; when the
colonies became States and later the States became part of a Federal state, the habit
of relying on charters manifested itself in the formation of written constitutions.
541
The principle of the “strict construction” of constitutions, so familiar to students of
American public law, is merely an application to the state of the principles applied
in ascertaining the rights and duties of corporations; the theory of “implied powers,”
which has been partially expressed in the Federal constitution, extends no further in
American public law than in the law of corporations; if a corporation be granted
existence for certain purposes and the right to exercise certain powers, it is granted
by implication the powers incidental to its corporate existence, powers clearly in
harmony with the purposes for which it is created and the powers incidentally
necessary for the exercise of its expressed powers. In truth, as far as concerns the
system of public law developed in the United States, the people have simply created
corporations of themselves and construe their rights and duties accordingly. Quite in
harmony with their attitude towards themselves is the organization of the state behind
the constitution — the state that has created corporations of itself — with a supreme
court to stand between the state as state and as corporation, and to protect it in either
capacity against itself in the other capacity.
542 When the colonies became independent
States, they simply substituted the American people for the king of England as the
source of political power and left themselves as politically organized where they had
been before, midway between themselves as sovereign and themselves as subjects.XIII. The Legal Conception of Corporations.
The conception of an institution found in a prevailing system of law is not always
identical with a sociological conception of it; it would be nearer the truth to say that
such identity never exists. The system of law lingers behind society in its progress
and delays to translate newly formed social relations into enforceable rights and
obligations until (in many cases) long after they have been fully formed. Not only
does the law negatively fail to interpret promptly and fully new social relations, but
it positively preserves decadent social relations in form long after they have (in many
respects) ceased to be effective in substance. Even when the point is reached at which
new social relations can be no longer left without legal expression, they are expressed
in terms of the existing system of law with the least possible disturbance of the
principles of which it is composed; if necessary to reduce the new relations to
harmony with the old in the system of law, resort will even be had to fictions —
intentional assumptions of things as facts that are in truth not facts. In a perfect
system of law there would be no fictions; the use of them is a confession of
weakness, of the inability of the system to faithfully reflect and support social
relations. The failure of a system of law to adequately express new social relations
is very apparent in the United States at the present time, where the principles of
equality before the law, freedom of contract and the preservation of private property
seem to be seriously out of harmony with the actual social inequality of individual
members of society, the limitation of the power to contract by the organization of
trusts and trades unions, and the extended modification of the private control of
physical things (private property) by the increasing complexity of social relations. As
an example of the conservation of old institutions in the law after they have actually
decayed in society, one has only to refer to the preservation of monarchy in European
governments, in public law, or the persistent adherence to the feudal system of land
tenure until a very recent day, in private law. No better example exists of the use of
a fiction to bring new social relations into harmony with established law than the
legal view of a corporation as an artificial person, a persona ficta. far as the modernJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 361
law of corporations is subject to criticism, it is due to the three features suggested,
(a) its positive conservation of obsolete social relations; (b) its negative failure to
recognize new social relations; and (c) its employment of a vicious fiction to provide
an apparent harmony between an old system of law and new elements of society.
The conception of corporations at the foundation of the modern law of them
matured in England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and found its chief
expounder in Sir Edward Coke. When Sir William Blackstone wrote his
Commentaries on the Law of England, published in 1765, he did little more than to
bring together the principles scattered through Coke’s Institutes and Reports, and to
present them in a more compact and serviceable form. The conception remained
substantially intact until after the beginning of the nineteenth century and is still the
basis of the present law of corporations, though seriously modified by legislation and
judicial decisions since 1850. The state of the law as interpreted by Coke and
Blackstone may therefore be taken as the starting-point for a study of corporations
on their technical legal side, as it was at once the culmination of previous
development and the foundation of future changes; the earlier changes had been
constructive, while the modifications of the nineteenth century have been destructive
in their tendencies. The elements of the law, as somewhat unsystematically
expounded in Coke’s Institutes and Coke’s Reports (especially the report of the
leading case of Sutton’s Hospital),
543 and in Blackstone’s chapter on Corporations in
his Commentaries,
544 may perhaps best be distributed, for the sake of clearness and
succinctness, under the three heads of (a) relations to the state, (b) internal relations,
and (c) relations to society. 
(a) Relations to the State. — Corporations, called also bodies politic or bodies
corporate (corpora corporata), were erected, with the consent of the state, by
common law, prescription or expressly by royal charter or act of Parliament. Their
erection was not dependent on the use of express words of incorporation but might
be implied in the nature of the powers granted, as the incorporation of a municipality
was implied in the grant of gilds mercatoria. Even this erection in future might be
anticipated and legalized in advance on the fulfillment of conditions presently
imposed. They might be created by the state either directly or mediately through
agents to whom such creative power should be delegated. They might be dissolved
by act of Parliament, by the death of all their members (in the case of corporationsJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 362
aggregate), by surrender of their franchises to the king or by forfeiture of them
through neglect or abuse of them. The general purpose of creating them was to
subserve “the advantage of the public” as in “the advancement of religion, of
learning, and of commerce”;
545 the particular purposes of the creation of each
corporation appeared in the body of rights and obligations confirmed to it by
common law or prescription, or expressly by act of Parliament, royal charter or
founder’s charter. As a negative corollary, it might not be erected for illicit purposes.
The chief legal quality conferred on a corporation as a means to the accomplishment
of its purposes was the capacity to “take in succession.” “It is impossible to take in
succession for ever without a capacity; and a capacity to take in succession cannot
be without incorporation; and the incorporation cannot be created without the
king.”
546 The accomplishment of the corporate purposes was ensured by the visitation
of civil corporations by the king through the court of king’s bench, of ecclesiastical
corporations by the ordinary and of eleemosynary corporations by founders, their
heirs or persons designated by them. On the dissolution of a corporation its lands and
tenements reverted to the person, or his heirs, who had granted them to it,
“for the law cloth annex a condition to every such grant, that if the
corporation be dissolved, the grantor shall have the lands again,
because the cause of the grant faileth. The grant is indeed only during
the life of the corporation; which may endure for ever: but, when that
life is determined by the dissolution of the body politic, the grantor
takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every other grant for life.”
(b) Internal Relations. — Corporations were sole, consisting of one person, as the
king, a bishop or parson; or aggregate, consisting of more than one person, as the
mayor and commonalty of a city, the head and fellows of a college or the dean and
chapter of a cathedral church.
547 They enjoyed “perpetual succession,” the former
through a succession of single persons and the latter through the maintenance of the
body of members by the admission of new members to fill vacancies. Corporations
aggregate might enact by-laws or private statutes for their better government, but
only such as should not be contrary to the laws of the land or the statutes provided
by founders. Membership in them was forfeited by infraction of the corporate statutesJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 363
or of the law of the land, or might be voluntarily resigned. The corporate will was
determined by vote of a majority of members. The corporation could act only
thorough its organization; consequently, if an integral part of it should be wanting,
the activity of the corporation was suspended until the wanting part should be
supplied; thus during the vacancy of the headship, if  one were a part of the corporate
constitution, the corporation could perform no act until it had first elected a head. Nor
might the head, in most matters, act without the body.
“A sole body politic that hath the absolute right in them, as an abbot,
bishop, and the like, may make a discontinuance; but a corporation
aggregate of many, as dean and chapter, warden and chaplains, master
and fellows, mayor and commonalty, etc., cannot make any
discontinuance; for if they join, the grant is good; and if the dean,
warden, master, or mayor makes it alone, where the body is aggregate
of many, it is void and worketh a disseisin....”
(c) Relations to Society. — In their relations to society, corporations were “artificial
persons,” “persons incorporate or politique created by the policy of man (and
therefore... called bodies politique)” as distinguished from “persons natural created
by God.” As such juristic persons they were separate and distinct from the natural
persons of whom they were composed. They accordingly had to have corporate
names, in which they might “sue or be sued, plead or be impleaded, grant or receive,”
purchase and hold lands, goods and chattels
548 “and do all other acts as natural
persons may.” It was the opinion of Coke that a corporation must also have “a place,
for without a place no incorporation can be made.” “A corporation aggregate is
invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law.” As
it could not “manifest its intentions by any personal act or oral discourse,” it had to
“act and speak “ by a common seal and appear by attorney. Because it could not
appear in person, it could not do fealty or homage, for they had to be done in person,
— yet it could receive homage a corporation sole might do homage, however, and it
had been likewise possible for an abbot, because his convent had been “dead in law.”
Having no physical body, a corporation aggregate could not be an imbecile, commit
a crime, be guilty of treason or suffer an assault or battery; nor could it be imprisonedJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 364
or suffer attainder, forfeiture or corruption of blood; it could not be outlawed but had
to be coerced through its lands and goods. Having likewise no soul, it could not be
bound by oath (and consequently might not act as executor or administrator), could
not be excommunicated or summoned into ecclesiastical courts (which could act only
pro salute animi and punish only by spiritual censure). As the ideal personality of the
corporation and the natural personality of its members were entirely distinct, “the
debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished by its dissolution;
so that the members thereof cannot recover, or be charged with them in their natural
capacities,” as indeed they could not while the corporation was in existence. The
chief distinction between the natural persons that composed corporations and the
natural persons with whom they came in contact lay in the capacity of the former to
“take by succession.” Those who took lands, goods or chattels by succession,
whether individual persons or groups of persons, were conceived to form, together
with their predecessors and successors, the ideal, immortal person of the corporation.
“As all personal rights die with the person, and as the necessary forms
of investing a series of individuals, one after another, with the same
identical rights, would be very inconvenient, if not impracticable, it
has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public
to have any particular rights kept on foot and continued, to constitute
artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and
enjoy a kind of legal immortality.... As the heir doth inherit to the
ancestor, so the successor doth succeed to the predecessor, and the
executor to the testator.”
“Continuance of blood” in ancestors and heirs was replaced by “privily of
succession” in corporations.
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The core of the developed legal conception of corporations is easily discerned in
the view of them as artificial persons — natural persons expanded in some directions
and limited in others. When, however, an effort is made to discover the technical
legal sources of the conception so fully elaborated by Coke and Blackstone, it
encounters difficulties that open up a wide field of speculation. The germ of the
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both the Roman law and the canon law. The greatest difficulty lies in the
impossibility of attributing particular changes in the English law to forces within it
or to the external influences of the other two systems of law; in many cases all three
systems are found to have exerted concurrent influences, which it is quite impossible
to separate or compare in strength. Certain periods of English history or certain
branches of English law may be designated in which it may be asserted with safety
that the legal interpretation of English institutions was working itself out through the
common law and supplementary statutes without external influence, or in which
either the civil law or canon law was to a greater or less extent being infused into the
English law; but when a particular definite change is found to have taken place in the
English law, such as the recognition of the corporate nature of municipalities, it is
unsafe to say that the change was due wholly to the natural evolution of English law,
or to estimate the extent to which the Roman law or canon law directly or indirectly
contributed to it. Outside of the field of technical law, in which legal principles may
be considered as derived from existing systems of law, is the wider field of social
development, largely independent of the system of law, yet also either promoted or
restrained by it; eventually, however, the system of law must inevitably be reduced
to harmony with permanent changes in society itself. The prominent features of the
evolution of the English law of corporations may be grouped under the heads of (1)
English law, (2) Roman law, (3) Canon law and (4) Social development.
1. English Law. — In the beginning the germ of the future conception of a
corporation made its way into the English law through the recognition of
the”communities” of cities and towns, and of the body of rights and duties
appertaining to residence in them. That cities and towns and bodies of population
grouped about castles performed functions of exceptional importance, involving
exceptional rights and duties, had been recognized before the Conquest, as appears
from the records of Domesday. William the Conqueror, however, made the
recognition sharper and more distinct. The grant of a charter to the city of London
implied the sanction, to a limited extent, of the peculiar privileges that its citizens
enjoyed. More generally he proclaimed in his laws that “castles, boroughs and cities
were founded and erected for the protection of the people of the land and for the
defence of the realm, and that therefore they ought to be preserved in all their
freedom and integrity.”
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claim for a year and a day in our cities, or in our boroughs surrounded with a wall,
or in our castles, from that day he shall be made a freeman, and he shall be for ever
free from the yoke of servitude.”
551 The law crystallized at first about the term “liber
burgus,” but it denoted rather a medium through which the law viewed the burgess
himself than a legal entity. During the first two centuries after the Conquest, the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the conception was hardly more fully developed. The
next step, covering the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, is fairly indicated by the
use of the term “community” somewhat more technically, and finally, towards the
end of the period, by the employment of derivatives of the term “corpus.” The use of
the term “corporation” at the end of the series became common in the sixteenth
century. In the general use of the first term, “community,”
552 it comprehended
counties, hundreds, townships, gilds, universities and monastic orders;
553 in Magna
Charta it was applied even to the English nation — “tout la commune Dengleterre.”
When the city of London was described as a commune in 1191, it is still a matter of
controversy whether the word was used generally or technically. But in 1304, in an
action brought by the Abbot of St. Edmund’s against some of the townsmen for
usurpation of political powers, he charged “quod non habent guildam mercatoriam,
nec cognitiones Placitorum ad guildam mercatoriam pertinentes, nec communitatem,
nec sigillum commune, nec majorem...”;
554 the “point” of the case was whether the
townsmen had a technical “community.” In a charter granted by Edward III in 1345
to the tenants of the manor of Cheylesmere in Coventry is the following concession:
“dictis hominibus de Coventre tenentibus dicti Manerii quod ipsi et eorum heredes
et successores Communitatem inter se decetero habeant, et Majorem et Ballivos
idoneos de seipsis eligere et creare possint anneatim...”
555 As terms midway between
“community” and “corporation” are found such as “communitas perpetua,”
“communitas perpetua et corporate,” “corpus corporatum et politicum” and the like.
By the charter of Henry VI to Kingston-upon-Hull in 1440, in which Merewether and
Stephens somewhat arbitrarily find the first grant of a complete incorporation, the
“burgesses, their heirs and successors” were made”one perpetual corporate
commonalty”
556 The Conqueror had most prominently in mind, apparently, the
physical town, with its castles and walls and inhabitants to defend them; in the “liber
burgus” the law saw most clearly a body of tenants enjoying special privileges of land
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community, when the term was used generally, the group of people was seen, though
dimly, to be the subject, as a group, of legal rights and duties; when the term was
used technically or replaced by some derivative of corpus, the organized group was
clearly separated as a legal personality from the aggregate of persons of which it was
composed. Concurrently with the emergence as a distinct legal personality was the
gradual substitution of “successors” for”heirs” as the persons upon whom the
corporate rights and duties should devolve. In many early grants, the powers
conceded, being largely dependent on the tenure of land, were made simply to groups
of tenants, on the assumption, doubtless, that they would descend to their heirs
without express provision.
557 In William’s charter to London privileges were granted
to the citizens and their heirs. Likewise John confirmed the grant of the sheriffwick
of London and Middlesex to the “citizens of London and their heirs” to be enjoyed
by them “hereditarily.”
558 In later charters to other cities and boroughs heirs and
successors were mentioned together, as in the charter of Richard II to the men of
Basingstoke, in which it was conceded “hominibus ville predicte quod ipsi, heredes
et successores sui unam Communitatem perpetuam de seipsis et unum Commune
Sigillum habeant imperpetuum...”
559 When the conception of the corporation was
complete, the successors alone should theoretically enjoy corporate rights and
perform corporate duties. The transformation was apparently never fully
accomplished. In both towns and gilds heirs of townsmen and gildsmen were
accorded special consideration, in the former even until the nineteenth century, in the
latter, as long as they existed. Even in the early centuries, when the heirs of
townsmen appeared formally to be the only persons to enjoy their rights after them,
it had been almost universally possible for the status of burgess-ship to be acquired
by outsiders, as in the familiar case of villeins that had escaped from feudal manors.
The coming into distinctness of the conception of the community as a legal entity
separate from its individual members was accompanied by the more formal
concession of the element of perpetuity. In few cases had corporate privileges been
bestowed on groups of tenants or burgesses for limited periods. The group had been
reasonably considered perpetual and its enjoyment of a privilege presumptively
unlimited in time. When the body of privileges came to be viewed as inhering in a
technical “community,” a medium through which burgesses enjoyed the privileges
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rather than to be one, then the element of perpetuity seemed an attribute of the
artificial community to be expressly attached to it rather than an inherent quality of
its nature. The “limited liability” so much considered in modern corporations had an
origin similar to that of the element of perpetuity — in the legal separation of the
community or aggregate of members from the members themselves. In a rough way,
the members of medieval gilds and municipalities were held jointly responsible for
the debts of members, whether incurred in personal transactions, or in transactions
relating to matters of common concern; it was only when the process of separating
the members from the community in thought and action and legal rules was
complete, in the fifteenth century, that the well-known principle of the civil law, “Si
quid universitati debetur, singulis non debetur, nec quad debet universitas, singuli
debent,”
560 became applicable in England. A common seal appears to have been used
by groups of population, such as counties, that never attained the status of
corporations; on the contrary it seems not to have been used by many bodies that
might properly be considered corporations; in some cases the private seal of an
officer was attached to corporate documents; in fact, hardly a statement can be made
of the use of seals before the fourteenth century that would not have to be guarded
with many exceptions. It is sufficient for the present purpose to say that during the
fourteenth century the grant to a community of the privilege of using a common seal
became one of the usual features of corporate charters. It was undoubtedly one of the
manifestations of the evolution of the community as a distinct legal personality, and
afforded Blackstone, in the eighteenth century, a technical justification for the
statement that a corporation must “act and speak” only by its common seal.
The classes of corporations (in the general sense of the term), other than
municipalities, affected by the development of the law of corporations before the
sixteenth century were the ecclesiastical corporations (with the allied educational and
eleemosynary corporations) and the gilds. The former came into contact with the
English system of law largely through their landholding capacity; for the most part
the conception of them was derived from the canon law, the law of the Church; as far
as the temporal law sought to interpret them, it must have sought to appreciate and
reflect a conception of them that had already matured within the organization of the
Church. As far as the gilds were concerned, they were easily fitted into the
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accentuated the personality of the towns in which they flourished and thereby aided
the legal conception of corporations to an earlier and more vivid realization, but by
the time the conception was approaching fullness, the gilds were in decay. It was to
only a limited extent that the gilds, as such, appeared as parties in litigation. On the
whole they were subordinate to the towns, especially during the fifteenth century,
when the legal conception of a corporation was crystallizing. The gilds of London
appear to have been exceptional, for London was so large and had such varied
separate interests that it never attained the distinct personality characteristic of many
smaller cities and towns; the gilds were consequently nearer to the conception of a
corporation than the city itself and continued in existence long after gilds in the rest
of England had virtually disappeared.
2. Roman Law. — In attempting to estimate the influence exerted on the conception
of a corporation in the English law by the conception of it in the Roman law, one
comes almost at the outset upon a remarkable similarity in the bodies of corporation
law in the two systems. The similarity, close as it must be conceded to be, is far too
easily accounted for by the assumption that “the [English] conception of a
corporation] has been taken full-grown from the law of Rome,”
561 though it has been
made by many writers.
562 Two serious obstacles are encountered by the assumption:
(a) The most prominent feature of the conception in the English law is wanting to
that in the Roman law, and (b) the occasion or medium of the absorption by the
English law of the particular branch of Roman law cannot be shown from the
historical facts.
(a) In the Corpus Juris Civilis, the developed body of Roman law with which the
English system came in contact, corporations were not regarded as “artificial
persons.”
563 Contrasted with singulares personae were societates, collegia,
universitates and corpora. The societas corresponded closely in general to the
modern  society, neither encouraged nor forbidden by the state, except as its purposes
should be positively unlawful; but the term was also applied to associations formed
for farming the taxes or other public revenues, or for working gold, silver and salt
mines,
564 the latter being apparently intended as an indirect source of public revenue.
Social-religious organizations quite similar to the social-religious gilds of mediaeval
England were usually formed on the basis of some community of interest, as tenancy
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strictly social or religious in character, such organizations were always the cause of
more or less anxiety and apprehension to the government. Corresponding to the
English craft gilds were the Roman collegia of fellow artisans or fellow-workmen,
such as bakers, smiths, fishermen and mariners.
565 Later monastic convents, cathedral
chapters and chapters of collegiate churches were anticipated in the collegia of priests
attached to temples. Even some departments of the government, as the treasury,
fiscus, were viewed as being subjects of rights and duties, and approached the status
of later English “corporations sole.” But the most fruitful sources of corporation law
in Rome, as later in England, were the subordinate political communities, civitates,
municipia, coloniae, vici, comprehended under universitates, the body contemplated
by the law appears to have been sometimes the whole community, sometimes only
the governing body. The term corpus was the technical legal term implying the
recognition and sanction of the collegium or universitas by the state, but universitas
was frequently used synonymously with it, and collegian was also used with the
presumption that it was a legal corpus. As in English law so in the Roman law the
relation of the state to the formation of corporations ranged from no restriction at all,
except for purposes declared to be illegal,
566 to absolute prohibition, except with the
express license of the state.
567 Collegia illicita were dissolved and their common
property divided among their members.
568 Serfs might not be admitted to membership
in some colleges without the consent of their masters.
569 A person might be a member
of only one collegium at one time; if he should belong to more, he was required to
choose the one to which he should adhere and leave the others.
570 At least three
members were necessary to constitute a collegium or universitas,
571 though it should
not cease to exist by its reduction to a membership of one.
572 Corporate action was
determined by vote of a majority,
573 though it appears that (at least in municipalities)
two thirds of the corporation or governing body had to be present.
574 The universitas
could act in litigation and dealings with the world only through its agent, its syndicus
(permanent representative) or its actor (agent for a particular purpose or occasion).
Debts due to a corporation or owing by it were payable neither to nor by its
individual members.
575 Things (res) were of five kinds: (1) communes (as the air); (2)
divinae ( res nullius, things belonging to “nobody”), including (a) res sacrae
(temples), (b) religiosae (burial-places) and (c) sanctae (city walls);
576 (3) publicae
(rivers, ports, streets, public edifices); (4) res universitatis (corporate things, theatres,John P. Davis, Corporations, 371
race-courses, public slaves);
577 and (5) singulae (private things). In contemplation of
law the member of the corporation appeared to sustain the same relation to the
corporate property that the citizen sustained to the property of the state.
578
As the municipalities emerged in Roman history, and forced themselves in between
the citizen and the state, the political powers that were detracted by them from the
state lost their standing in the jus publicum and became subjects of jus privatum. The
evolution was not at all dissimilar to that experienced by English cities and boroughs.
Moreover, the point was reached at which the property of the corporation could be
viewed as not the property of the members, and not even to be used by them in
common.
579 But the Roman law never reached the point in development at which the
corporations were included in the category of “persons.”
580 The only expression from
which it may be inferred that the conception of “personality” was entertained is found
in the provision relating to succession by inheritance: “Mortuo reo promittendi et
ante aditam hereditatem fidejussor accipi potest, quia hereditas personae vice
fungitur, sicuti municipium, et decuria, et societas.”
581 There, apparently for the
purpose of illustration and comparison, the body of rights and duties eventually to be
attached to some person by virtue of the possession of the goods comprised in the
inheritance are likened to the body of rights and duties attached to a corporation and
not exercised by its particular members. When commentators write of “juristic
persons” in the Roman law, they use their own expression to describe what the
Romans themselves did not recognize as persons.
(b) What was the occasion or medium of the absorption of the Roman law of
corporations into the English law? It is quite universally conceded that from the time
of the conquest of Britain by the Anglo-Saxons in the fifth century until the discovery
of the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis at Amalfi in 1130 and the revival of the study
of Roman law at Bologna, a period of about seven hundred years, the Roman law
exercised no influence on the English law. The influence so extensively felt on the
continent did not penetrate to England. After the Norman Conquest and even before
Vacarius lectured on the civil law about the middle of the twelfth century, some
indirect influence may have been exercised through the large number of ecclesiastics
that came to England with the Norman kings, but it is said that even they applied
themselves to the study of the common law. The use of Norman French in the courts
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movement, except as some principles of Norman law were imported, its effects must
have been slight, for no evidence of them is to be found. In the reign of Stephen,
however, when Theobald was made Archbishop of Canterbury, he brought to
England with him Vacarius, an Italian priest, who began to lecture (at Oxford, it is
said) on the civil law in 1149. The revival of the study of the civil law was one
feature of the “twelfth century Renaissance” and the inauguration of the lectures of
Vacarius may be taken as the beginning of its influence on English law. Stephen at
first prohibited by proclamation the study of the civil law in England, but his
opposition was either soon withdrawn or disregarded. Under his successor “those
[civil] laws were, with more safety, cherished here, and held, at least by some, in
much greater esteem than before.”
582 From the middle of the twelfth century to the
beginning of the reign of Edward III, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the
civil law enjoyed its greatest influence on the law of England. The judges, court
officers and lawyers were ecclesiastics,
583 all learned in the Roman law. The kings,
favoring the Imperial principle of the Roman law, “quod principi placuit legis
vigorem habet,” may be assumed not to have been averse to its use in England,
though they may have opposed its teaching and interpretation by the Roman Catholic
Church.
584 The common law itself was not a settled system
585 and lacked the strength
of a body of written law in an age when a written text was accorded the presumptive
weight of tradition.
586 During the period a state of hostility between the laity and
clergy is said to have resulted from their rivalry in the support, respectively, of the
Common law and Civil law. The establishment of the court of common pleas
permanently at Westminster in accordance with the terms of Magna Charta, and the
founding of the Inns of Court — the “University of the Common Law” — are
represented as preserving the common law from being overwhelmed by the Civil law.
Henry III, in 1235, certainly issued an order to the mayor and sheriffs of London “ne
aliquis scholas regens de legibus in ea civitate de caetero ibidem leges docent,”
which, whether it referred to the Civil law alone
587 or to both the Civil law and
Common law,
588 must have given greater importance to the work of the Inns of Court.
In the following year, when all the influence of the Church was exerted to secure the
incorporation in the English law of the civil law rule (enforced in the ecclesiastical
courts) for the legitimization of bastard children by future marriage of the parents,
“all the barons and earls with one voice answered, that they would not change theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 373
laws of England, which have hitherto been used and approved.”
589 In 1164 Pope
Alexander III had forbidden monks to teach either medicine or the Civil law outside
of their monasteries; later Innocent IV forbade the clergy to read the Common law,
“because its decisions were not founded on the Imperial constitutions, but merely on
the customs of the laity.”
590 It might reasonably be inferred that many features of the
Roman law would be found in the English law as the result of the contact, but of
Glanvil’s compendium of the law, written in the reign of Henry I, it is said by a
competent authority that
“though it bears traces of his acquaintance with the Roman law, and
adopts in some few cases its terminology, [it] is otherwise entirely
free from Roman influence and shows the almost complete purity of
the English law at the end of the twelfth century from Roman
elements.”
591
The common law, though an undigested mass of court-sanctioned customs, had
remarkable vitality because it was in so great harmony with the actual conditions of
the English people; its lack of systematic arrangement was perhaps an indication of
its greatest virtue; it was unsystematic because society was not systematically
organized.
The attainment of a perfectly formed system of law may be an indication of social
decadence, for social progress is always uneven and is reflected in incoherence in
laws and branches of law; it is true at least that the Roman law did not attain
symmetry and formal perfection until Roman society was in decay; likewise the
feudal system of law was attaining the virtue of a system only when feudalism was
beyond the first stages of disintegration. Moreover, the principles of the public law
of Rome, favoring imperialism and monarchy, must have been odious to the English
baronage and common people (as far as the latter participated in political life) and
even to the Church at a time when it was asserting its superiority over emperors and
kings; and the odium of the public law was perhaps imparted to the private law as
part of the same system.
Bracton’s De Legibuset Consuetudinibus Angliae, written in the reign of Henry III
after the middle of the following century, contains much that was taken directly fromJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 374
the Corpus Juris Civilis (or the Summa of Azo), but it is very questionable how far
the portions relating to corporations were applicable to existing English corporations.
The jurisdictional privileges of cities and boroughs and of citizens and burgesses
were recognized;
592 and of royal charters, some were said to be private, others
common and others for a corporation (universitatis);
593 thus far, evidently, no resort
was had to Roman sources.
“Things belong to corporate bodies (universitates) and not to
individuals, which are in cities, such as theatres, stadia, and such like,
and if there are any things in cities which are common... these things
are said to belong to corporate bodies as regards both the dominion
and the use. But the use of things is said to belong to corporate
bodies, not as regards their [actual] use, but as regards their dominion
and products, such as land and serfs, which are said to belong to
cities, because they so belong to all the citizens as not to belong to
any one person by himself”;
594 “a thing cannot be the subject of
donation, which cannot be the subject of possession, as a thing which
is sacred or dedicated to religion, or is, as it were, so, as a thing which
belongs to the public treasury, or things which are, as it were, sacred,
such as the walls and gates of a city;... of sacred things some are not
holy but sacred, such as the walls and gates of a city, and they are
sacred on that account that they have been sanctioned by kings or by
citizens abiding in them; for capital punishment is appointed for
those, who with rash audacity overleap the walls or gates of a city;
likewise of tenements, some are neither sacred nor holy, but public,
of some body, to wit, a corporation, or of a commune (universitatis,
communionis) or of all and not of any one private man or a single
person, such as are theatres and stadia or public places, whether they
are in cities or outside of them.”
595
The portions quoted are plainly taken bodily from the Roman law, and they are as
plainly inapplicable to contemporary cities and towns in England. There were no
theatres and stadia in English towns; gates and walls were not regarded as sacred; noJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 375
theory of public municipal property had been worked out; corporations owned no
serfs. If the portions of Bracton’s work taken from the Roman law and clearly
inapplicable to existing conditions be disregarded,
596 it contains no evidence of the
absorption by the English law of the Roman law of corporations. The same may be
said of the abridgments of Bracton’s work in the reign of Edward I, that of Thornton,
the Fleta, the Mirror of Justices and the work bearing the name of “Britton.”
The beginning of the reign of Edward III (1327) may be taken as the date when the
direct influence of the Roman law on the law of England ended. Earlier the Year
Books contain records of the use of the Roman law as accepted authority, either to
support a principle of English law or to supply it when wanting;
“where an express rule was wanting in [the English] law, recourse
might then be had to the rule of the Civil law, as far as grounded on
reason, and when both laws were conformable to each other,... then
the matter in debate was in some measure confirmed or explained by
the words of the Imperial law.”
597
But after that time the Year Books were void of citations of Roman law as
authority, English lawyers boasted of their ignorance of it and judges were inaccurate
in their interpretations of it.
598 Judges and lawyers were no longer chosen from
ecclesiastics. For the future its influence was to be due to its value as a systematized
body of law, evolved from the experience of centuries of Roman history. It was
studied by the judges, lawyers, statesmen and churchmen. The universities taught it.
It was a prominent part of a liberal education. It remains to-day the greatest
monument of analytical legal reasoning. Its influence was therefore subtle and
impossible to estimate, but it must nevertheless have been considerable. If it failed
to manifest itself in its recognition as authority in the adjudication of cases, it was felt
perhaps hardly less in moulding the thoughts of judges and lawyers and giving them
form and system. It was the source of a body of maxims, recognized as having weight
because founded on reason.
599 It contributed likewise a mass of legal terms. But no
more in the particular field of the law of corporations than in the general field of
English law can the extent of the influence be estimated. Remarkably enough, the
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which the “communities” of English municipalities begin to emerge in technical
distinctness from their individual members. If it may be said that during the period
of the greatest influence of the Roman law none of its principles of corporation law
were absorbed by the English law, so it may be said that during the period in which
the English law of corporations was attaining technical perfection the Roman law had
the least appreciable influence on it. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and
the first half of the sixteenth century, the principle of artificial personality, with all
its material deductions and corollaries, was completely evolved; yet at no step in the
evolution may the law of Rome be shown or reasonably assumed to have been used
as a model.
600
The use of the principles and procedure of the Civil law, or of the Canon law
modified by it, in the ecclesiastical courts and in those of the universities may be
readily traced to the influence of the Church and its predilection for the Civil law.
The king’s chancellor, from whom emanated the body of adjudications to correct and
supplement the Common law, was an ecclesiastic. Masters and scholars were clerics
and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Church; when the courts of the
chancellors of the universities took their place, the Civil law remained the basis of
their procedure and adjudications. The use of the Civil law in the Marine or
Admiralty courts and in the Court of Chivalry was probably due to the fact that the
rights of foreigners often came before them, and seemed to demand the application
of the Civil law for the same general reason for which it has contributed so largely
to the body of International law.
601 But for the matter under consideration, it must be
said that it would be very difficult to show any positive influence on the law of
corporations from the use of the Civil law in those courts.
The truth is that the Roman law and English law passed through parallel courses
of development, corresponding to parallel courses of development in the states whose
social relations they registered and interpreted. The English law reached the point of
development indicated in the Corpus Juris Civilis towards the end of the fifteenth
century and passed beyond it in the following century to a point that the Roman law
had not attained. The development of the English law no doubt proceeded in a more
orderly and systematic course, and unfolded its successive conceptions in greater
distinctness through the influence of the Roman law, as an elaborated system, on the
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systems in the department of corporation law remains as a basis for the inference that
the intangible influence of the Roman law was exerted in somewhat greater strength
on that than on other branches of English law, but it is far from conclusive evidence
of a direct “borrowing” or “taking” of the one by the other.
One other avenue through which the Roman law reached the English law and
undoubtedly modified it in both form and substance may be anticipated. The Canon
law, the system of law built up by the Roman Catholic Church, was in most respects
based on the Civil law of Rome and derived its methods and maxims from it. Each
was permitted, on principle, to supplement the other in its application.
602 The
inclination of the canonist was to apply the Civil law, rather than the Common law,
in the field of temporal rights and obligations, if the Canon law could not be
extended to comprehend it. As far, therefore, as the Canon law influenced the law of
England, to such extent it must be conceded that the Roman law exercised an indirect
influenced.
603
“It is obvious that the republication of the Canon law could not but
operate as a fresh recognition of the lasting validity within its own
limits, of the Roman Civil law, while the language and forms of the
new Canon law codes tended to reproduce and preserve the ancient
legal phraseology and logical forms of thought.”
604
After the reign of Stephen the Civil and Canon law were so “inseparably
interwoven with each other”
605 that their effects could not be separated.
3. Canon Law. — The Canon law exercised a peculiar influence on English law,
quite in harmony with the general influence of the Church on the social organization
of the Middle Ages. Broadly speaking, the Roman Catholic Church performed for
Europe the inestimable service of preserving the organic framework of decaying
Roman institutions during the shock of the barbarian conquests until it might again
serve as the framework of society after its reorganization. As a part of the service the
Church built up within itself a form of government and a body of law modelled on
those of Rome. The Canon law was the law of Rome modified and tempered by the
teachings of the fathers of the Church and the religious doctrines of Christianity. As
a vague presumption of universality attached to the government and laws of Rome,John P. Davis, Corporations, 378
the presumption that inspired the dream of the mediaeval empire, so the claim of the
Church to be universal afforded a basis for the claim that its laws were universally
applicable in spiritual matters, which gave to the Corpus Juris Canonici all the
strength that it enjoyed.
606
The earliest corporations were those of the Church, the monasteries and cathedral
chapters. Their internal relations as well as their external relations to the Church were
the product of Canon law and subject to its regulations. If at first the bodies of
medieval masters and scholars assumed the form of gilds after their separation from
the direct control of the Church, they were later re-organized in educational colleges
that abjectly followed the ecclesiastical type, while their members remained cleric).
The hierarchical feature of the organization of the Catholic Church and Catholic
Christianity was reproduced in the corporations, both ecclesiastical and educational;
as a matter of legal interpretation, accordingly, the monks were “dead in law “ and
their personality was absorbed in that of their abbot. The English lawyer might liken
dean and chapter to husband and wife, and say that the chapter was covert of the
dean, but the temporal law, for the most part, merely accepted the interpretation of
ecclesiastical institutions adopted by the Church, and enforced it with the least
modification necessary to ensure harmony with the Common law.
607 If the Church
corporation owned land, it was vested in the bishop or abbot, not because it was
demanded by the principles of the Common law, but because the view held by the
Church in its law was accepted by the state when the corporation came in contact
with the temporal side of society. The doctrine of the absorption of corporate powers
by the head of the corporation, favored by the Church on account of its veneration of
authority and the hierarchical form of its government, was partly accountable for the
exaggeration in temporal corporations of the importance of the headship of the mayor
or alderman. The conception of the submergence of the personality of the individual
in that of the group was especially favored by the Church; it is frequently found
expressed in the Scriptures,
608 the patristic writings and the literature of monasticism;
the bond of religious unity was so close that the conception was often reflected in the
life of the early social-religious gilds.
Yet, after all, what the Canon law borrowed from the Civil law was largely its form
and structure, its system, terminology and procedure; though its substance was also
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law were derived to a great extent from the thought and literature of the Church.
There was nothing in the corporation law of Rome that favored the doctrine of the
legal absorption of the group in its headship; that was a doctrine evolved from
Christianity as an interpretation of the social relations of men; when the English law
enforced it, as it did to a great extent, it was not borrowing from the Civil law of
Rome, but from the Canon law, the ecclesiastical system of interpreting and
enforcing social rights and duties.
When the relations of corporations to their members and to society came to be
subjected to the test of philosophy, it was the scholastic philosophy, the philosophy
of the monastic and cathedral schools, that was first applied. It was the speculative
canonist and the scholastic philosopher that invented the mystical “personal”
elements in the conception of the corporation; it was they that described it as a
persona ficta long before it was adopted by the English lawyers as the basis of a
system of corporation law. Innocent IV earned the title of “the father of the modern
learning of corporations” by giving formal sanction to the results of their quibbling
analyses. If the source of the conception of a corporation as an artificial person is to
be found, it must be sought among the speculations of the canonists and scholastics
of the thirteenth century,
609 not among the interpretations of Roman or English jurists.
The conception, moreover, was most promoted in its development by ideas and
thoughts drawn from the literature of the Church.
4. Development of Society. — Whatever may have been the capacity of the English
law to expand, or to absorb elements of the Roman and Canon law, so far as to
eventually evolve a complete system of corporation law, the evolution was greatly
influenced by this fundamental characteristic of the Common law: It was based on
the individual as the unit of society. It cannot be said with entire truth that it
expanded so as to comprehend corporations; the body of principles apparently
necessary for the regulation of their relations have been attached to the main body of
English law by means of fictions, assumptions of things as true that are not true. For
that reason it has always been necessary for the historian or jurist, in writing of the
states of western Europe and the United States, or of their systems of laws, to
supplement the main body of his work at intervals with additional chapters on
corporations. If the purpose was to analyze the organization of the state, corporations
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was to study the grouping of citizens, bodies of individuals enjoying exceptional
rights that had crystallized in corporations were found outside the scheme and had
to be accounted for in supplementary chapters or apologetic footnotes. It has always
been a question whether they were public or private in nature, or whether they were
divisions of the state or associations of citizens — a matter of importance in technical
analysis; and whichever view was taken, it had to be expressed with more or less
qualification.
610 Chapters on “Corporations” always give the impression that they
have been”tacked on.”
Both the later Roman law and the Canon law were like the English law in holding
the individual in legal contemptation as the social unit, but in both of them the full
elaboration of individual relations was impeded by the unpropitious nature of the
media through which they had to be interpreted and enforced — imperialism in the
state and hierarchy in the Church. Both the Roman and English law had early been
based on an aggregate social unit, the family or clan; the rights and duties that they
had enforced were those that inhered in men by virtue of their participation in the
social life of a composite unit. It was due in both of them to the inability to perfect
the transition from the composite unit to the individual unit that left a large number
of semi-public, semi-private corporations between the state and the private citizen;
other bodies and even individuals were brought within the comprehension of the
term, but hardly for any reason than that they resembled corporations in some
important particulars. The defect of Roman civilization was apparently that it had not
a content of individual life capable of further development. Imperialism in form is
not necessarily subversive of individual liberty; it is imperialism in substance that is
fatal to it; just as formal democracy may be only a mask for tyranny. When a society
is progressing from the condition of a federation of composite units to that of a nation
of individual citizens, the system of law must be developed on the side of rights
rather than on the side of duties. When the transition has been completed, the system
of law normally seeks an adjustment of rights and duties that leaves neither
exaggerated in comparison with the other. But a system of law, however highly
developed on the side of rights, can hardly be promotive of liberty unless the subjects
to whom it is applied are capable of development. The decay of personal life caused
the downfall of Rome; what the invasions of the Germanic tribes contributed to the
society of Europe was assertive individuality — or “personal independence,” asJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 381
Guizot described it. But the first effect of the sudden injection into the
semi-Romanized life of western Europe of the unassimilated life and customs of the
Germanic races was the feudal system — a negative product — not so much an end
as a beginning — a state to which society retrograded until it might resume progress.
The problem of civilization thereafter, on its legal side, especially in England where
the subfoundation of Roman institutions was wanting, was to evolve a system of
principles, rules and procedure through which the element of assertive individuality
might be permitted orderly and harmonious development.
The social unit under feudalism was the manorial village. The relations of villeins
of one manor to villeins of another, if they may be conceived to have enjoyed such
relations, had to be sustained through the lord of the manor; even within the manorial
group many of the relations of fellow-villains had to be sustained through the feudal
lord, though enough of them found a medium in the communal organization of the
villeins themselves to afford a sound basis for their self-government after the loss of
control by the feudal lord. The departure from the feudal system, it is hardly
necessary to suggest, was accomplished largely through a chaotic mass of exemptions
of subjects from feudal obligations. The unevenness of the development of
exemptions, combined with the inability of the state to absorb the political powers
lost by the feudal nobility — in other words, its inability to substitute, until after
centuries of development, a national state for an aggregate of feudal manors — left
here and there bunches of political powers vested in communities that were
afterwards viewed as technical corporations. The work of the English law, during the
twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as far as the promotion of liberty was
concerned, was largely to construe and enforce the mass of exemptions. The jurist
comprehended the nature of individual rights and obligations by comparing or
contrasting them with normal rights under the decaying feudalism; from that point
of view, all (or nearly all) individual rights and obligations were in a sense
exceptional. But the exception became the rule when with the passing away of
feudalism the system of law reached the level of the individual and interpreted his
rights and obligations directly, rather than by contrasting them with a prior status,
even though it continued to use in describing them the obsolescent terminology of
feudalism. The communities to which clusters of powers had been transferred were
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but with the normal English subject. While formerly members of communities, in
legal view, had been merely members of a larger society, enjoying exemptions, like
their fellows, they now occupied, by virtue of their communities, an exceptional
status in the society, unlike their fellows. The law recognized no technical
corporations until it had reached the basis of the individual as a social unit. Only
when the background of individual rights and obligations became plain to the eye of
the English law was it able to see corporate rights standing out in relief against it.
There was no place in the system of law for the bodies of citizens (as units) enjoying
corporate powers, especially when the powers were translated into common property
in lands or goods or the exclusive right to perform political functions. The extreme
individualistic tendency of the law prompted it to insist on finding a person, natural
or other, to stand for the scattered powers, unabsorbed by the state, that were left over
from the feudal period. The Roman law was able to view property as belonging to the
State, Church or corporations, or when contrasted with the property of individuals,
as that “of no one” (sullies); but in the English law such property must belong to the
king, a lord, bishop, abbot or some other person, though in Bracton’s day the
churchmen might be said to hold property “in right of” the Church. The result was
the fiction of corporate personality. The maturity of the conception was in the
fifteenth century, the century of transition between the older feudal order and the new
national order.
If the history of English law were to be divided into periods, they might be as
follows: (I.) The feudal period, ending in the middle of the twelfth century. (II.) The
post-feudal period, until the end of the fifteenth century, during which the English
system was slowly evolving itself from the feudal system through a mass of
exemptions from its principles. (III.) The first individualistic period, the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, during which the elaboration of the system on the basis of the
individual was impeded by the absolutism of the Tudors and Stuarts. (IV.) The
modern system of law, dating from the last quarter of the seventeenth century, based
on the individual and afforded nearly complete development through democratic
government. During the first and second periods the personality of corporations was
not recognized by the law, except imperfectly at the end of the second period. In the
third period, the soil of absolutism in the state proving very fertile for the legal
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the beginning of the nineteenth century, the conception has undergone no change,
having apparently become firmly established as a part of the law.
The maturity of the conception of corporations in the English law was undoubtedly
facilitated by the development of the corporations themselves. It was not entirely
fortuitous that the conception of corporations as artificial persons was nearly
coincidental with the completion of the process of “shrinkage” of corporations from
entire communities to smaller select bodies within them. The close bodies in gilds
and municipalities were crystallizing during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
It was when they ceased to derive their life from the communities themselves and
appeared to enjoy an existence independent of them, not in harmony with them but
rather in opposition and contrast to them, that their distinct “personality” emerged.
Moreover, the development facilitated the substitution of the private for the public
view that might be expected to be taken of the communities. The close bodies, as
well as the rest of the community, regarded the powers reposed in them largely as
sources of private advantage; the state was accordingly much more readily inclined
to assign them to the department of private law than to that of public law. The nearer
they approached the plane of private persons in their activity, the easier it was for the
jurist’s imagination to impute personality to them.
The Canon law, under the influence of the hierarchical organization of the Church,
was able to partially avoid the difficulty experienced by the Common law, through
the principle of “the absorption of the corporate group in the headship,” if the
expression may be used. One is at first surprised in examining the bulky Corpus Juris
Canonici to find no mention of ecclesiastical corporations, though he finds much of
ecclesiastical persons and of the requirement that bishops and abbots be elected by
chapters and convents and act in many respects only with their consent. For a time
the English law would accept the view and enforce laws in accordance with it, but
it was fundamentally out of harmony with its system and soon or late dean and
chapter and abbot (or prior) and convent had to be included in the category of
artificial persons with other corporations. The monasteries were swept away by the
Reformation before the view that monks were “dead in law” and their legal
personality absorbed in that of abbot or prior could be reconciled to the principles of
English law; they remained long enough, however, to trouble Coke in his analysis of
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The peculiar manner in which a system of law is erected is accountable for much
of the confusion that has entered into the conception of a corporation and the
heterogeneous mass of principles and rules collected about it. The judge and lawyer,
in classifying institutions, have regard rather for the social effects of their analysis
than for the generic qualities of the institutions. Certain social effects are desired, or
already settled in accordance with a standard approved by custom or public opinion.
The purpose of analysis and classification is to obtain the desired practical effects,
and institutions and men are grouped accordingly. If the regulation of the relations
of dean and chapter is desired, and the merging of the personality of the latter in that
of the former seems expedient to accomplish it, it would not be surprising to find
deans called artificial husbands and chapters artificial wives. If it is in substantial
harmony with ideas of justice that sleeping car companies be held liable for the
security of goods taken into sleeping-cars by their occupants, they may be found
classified with either common-carriers or inn-keepers. In the system of English law
true corporations have found themselves in strange company; their name has been
extended to comprehend other bodies and persons to the manifest confusion and
inconsistency of the law, as one feature or another has been exaggerated and made
the basis of classification. Corporations are associations; therefore the State, the
Church, the county, the township and the family are corporations, and the tendency
of the present century is to view partnerships as closely akin to them. Corporations
are created by the state; therefore legalized societies and private clubs as well as
bodies of public officers, like boards of regents of universities, are corporations.
Corporations may endure forever and take property in succession for public purposes;
therefore bishops, abbots and rectors are corporations sole, because their corporate
property is inseparable from their offices, which may be perpetual. In each case the
person or group brought within the definition is wanting in some essential attribute
of corporations other than the one used as a test.
A great change that is still not without its effect on the law of corporations took
place, or more properly, culminated in the sixteenth century. The standpoint from
which all institutions were viewed was shifted from society as a whole to the
individual. Social forces were conceived as moving from below and not from above.
The destruction of tradition and the elevation of reason was one phase of the change.
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century, but the Reformation was a practical application of it. Private contrast largely
superseded status in the determination of social relations. Corporations were viewed
not so much as divisions of society as associations of individuals.
611 They were now
enlarged individuals, not reduced societies. The legal theory of artificial personality
was in such complete harmony with the view of society and the individual from the
shifted standpoint that it acquired great permanence in the course of the sixteenth
century. XIV. Modern Corporations.
When the field of modern corporations is entered, the feature of it that first attracts
the attention of the investigator is the absence of the older corporations, or their
presence in such a modified form or under such exceptional conditions that he may
leave them out of account without doing serious injustice to the subject. Most of the
corporations considered in earlier chapters have gone out of existence; some of them
have been so remodelled by the state that they have virtually lost their corporate
identity by becoming administrative organs of the state; only a few of them remain
as obsolete survivals of a past state of society. Modern corporations seem to be
substantially new bodies, modern not only in time but also in the nature of their
activity. So great is the change from the old to the new that a superficial view of the
subject almost justifies a doubt whether a study of old corporations is profitable as
a preparation for the study of modern corporations. A second thought, however, is
convincing that the corporate element in the organization of society is substantially
the same. Society has changed, both in structure and activity, but, the service
performed by corporations as a part of the structure within which some of its activity
takes place is unchanged. Social progress may demand that new definitions be found
for the terms “public” and “private,” but, when a group of associated individuals is
confirmed in its character as a group for the accomplishment of a public purpose
through the pursuit by the group of private interest, the group is as much a
corporation under the new definitions as it would have been under older ones.
Of the corporations included in Class I. and described as Local-Internal
Corporations, those of the Church that survived the Reformation in England have
become hardly more than administrative units of the national Church (or State); their
activity is conditioned and regulated by ecclesiastical commissions and similar
bodies of a supervisory nature to so great a degree that they would hardly be
recognized as corporations at all if it were not for the demands of an obsolete system
of land tenure. In the United States, in general, no such bodies have existed in the
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uniformity in the several States, on the basis of societies regarded by the law as
purely civil in nature, and hardly more justly to be regarded as corporations than the
residents of an English parish; the only bodies in them that resemble corporations are
the boards of trustees in whom are vested the title and management of the property
of the church, but they are merely elected representatives of the church society, no
more corporate in character than the legislature of a state. Even the organization of
the Roman Catholic Church, with its greater regard for tradition, has been so
expanded and amplified that the religious orders have become substantially
component parts of it, rather ranks inside of it than autonomous groups outside of it.
The English municipalities, with the glaring exception of metropolitan London, were
reformed during the early part of the nineteenth century until they became
self-governing divisions of the state; if the term “corporations” is still applied to
them, as to cities and towns in the United States, it is in disregard of the nature of the
changes that have taken place. The mediaeval gilds have passed away entirely, except
in so far as they are perpetuated in the clearly anomalous London companies; modern
trades unions are not the successors of the older gilds, much as they resemble them
in many respects. Educational and eleemosynary corporations, identified with
universities, colleges, schools, hospitals, almshouses and the like, have been greatly
modified by the state through its administrative, legislative and judicial organs; for
the most part, especially in the United States, the plain tendency has been in the
direction of replacing them by institutions maintained by the state itself; in England
many have been merged in public institutions, others have been reduced to a similar
condition through the regulation of the appointment of members, and all are so
closely supervised by governmental departments and commissions that they lack
genuine corporate autonomy. Even the venerable Universities of Oxford and
Cambridge, the most conservative of corporations, have been subjected to the
influence of the prevailing tendency, while their colleges have been reduced nearly
to the status of departments in them; the later institutions, such as the University of
London, bear plainly the stamp of state initiation and control. In the United States,
state universities, colleges and schools, and those under the control of religious
denominations, administered by representatives of large social groups, have very
generally taken the place of the semi-monastic foundations familiar in English
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Of the corporations included in Class II and described as National-External
Corporations, even fewer remain as a part of the organization of the society of the
twentieth century. The Regulated Companies passed away with the expansion of the
international political organization of modern states; the functions of their officers,
as far as they have not been entirely dispensed with, are now performed by officers
of the state; their control and protection of individual merchants in their foreign trade,
to such extent as they are still enforced, find expression through the medium of
administrative departments of the state. The Regulated-Exclusive Companies shared
the fate of the Regulated Companies, differing from them only in the element of
exclusiveness that has been perpetuated in modern commercial companies. The great
Joint-Stock Companies of the type of the East India Company have passed away,
except as they are used to a limited extent in Africa and a few other places in which
England is still seeking to “expand”; the enduring product of the East India Company
is found in the political machinery through which England governs her Indian
possessions; history may reasonably be expected to repeat itself in Africa. Even the
United States has had an Alaska Commercial Company in the present century to
which it has virtually delegated the duty of regulating the seal fishery of the Pribiloff
Islands. But the monopolistic joint-stock company, wielding political powers, is an
institution of the past and confessedly exceptional in present society; the Hudson’s
Bay Company, denuded of its monopolistic trading privileges, is easily classified
with modern commercial companies. The Colonial Companies, short-lived as they
were, existed long enough to contribute through transformation or imitation a large
part of the political foundations of American Colonies and States and of the United
States; they have not been used as models for subsequent corporations.
The great fact of the history of the old corporations is that the state has wholly or
partially absorbed their powers. To such extent as the social activity of the surviving
corporations has been supplemented in response to greater public demands, it has
been done almost entirely through the medium of new institutions, created,
maintained and administered by the state, and not through new corporations. The
absorption of the powers of a corporation by the state does not imply merely the
resumption of powers previously granted by it; some of the powers may have been
inoperative, when granted, from lack of subject-matter on which to have effect; on
the other hand, it does not follow from the absorption of corporate powers by theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 389
state that the state continues to exercise them as the corporation has previously done;
they may be allowed by the state to lie dormant under the influence of political
theories repugnant to their exercise. The Local-Internal Corporations were not so
much the means through which the State and Church accomplished the transition
from an agglomeration of local units to a national or even (in the Church) to a world
unit, as the measure of their inability to readily complete the transition. Likewise,
though in a different field, the National-External Corporations did not so much
provide the means through which the states of modern Europe expanded, as they
represented their inability to readily accomplish the great movement. In both cases,
as nationality was gradually perfected (the parallel movement in the Roman Catholic
Church was not so successful) the raison d’être of the corporations ceased. Modern
corporations, though they exercise their activity in a field somewhat different from
that of their predecessors, are evidence of the same lack of ability on the part of the
state (society politically organized) to fully comprehend and correlate the social life
of its citizens. The plane of corporate life has been depressed, in a sense, to a lower
level. The purpose of the modern corporation is less plainly to contribute to national
development and is apparently confined, to a large extent, to the amplification of the
individual. The view of the subject is obscured by the fact that society is now
working from a different standpoint, from that of the individual instead of from that
of the state. The result can hardly fail to be the same — an eventual disintegration of
corporations, an absorption of their political elements by the state and the relegation
of the remaining elements to the individual. As contrasted with earlier corporations,
modern corporations are national, not local, in the scope of their activity, and aim at
the perfection of the infra-national relations of men. They resemble each class of their
predecessors in one respect and differ from each of them in another respect. There
is a sense, to be sure, in which some modern corporations are local in the extreme,
but it is in respect of the subject-matter of the activity and not of the individuals
organized; on the other hand, many modern corporations are international in
character, but not so much in respect of the subject-matter as of the component
individuals; thus they are contrasted with earlier corporations in their exceptional
phases, for the Local-Internal-Corporations, as far as they were more than local, were
so on the side of their activity rather than on that of their member ship, and
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on the side of their activity rather than on that of their membership.
A classification of modern corporations is quite sufficient in itself to indicate the
wide difference in nature, but in activity rather than in form, by which they are
separated as a class from the two classes of older corporations. The most serviceable
basis of classification is doubtless the “public” element in them; they will be arranged
in order, therefore, according to the degree of distinctness in which their activity is
recognized as public in the opinion of society. An exception will be made of the
division of Economic Corporations, however, and they will not be classified on the
basis selected; but their subdivisions will be so arranged. For the purpose of making
the divisions and subdivisions more distinct, corporations excluded from them will
be contrasted with such as are included in them.
612 Incidentally such comments will
be added as limited treatment will permit.
III. Modern Corporations are so called because they are an integral part of modern
society, of the society that originated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
distinguished by individualism in general, but more particularly by democracy in the
state, and by the destruction of tradition and the elevation of reason in religion and
science. They might be described, in contrast with earlier corporations, as
National-Internal Corporations, because generally restricted in scope to national
limits and tending to perfect the relations of individuals within it rather than to
extend their political or economic influence without it. From another point of view
they might well be described as Individualistic Corporations, because more distinctly
regarded as groups of individuals than were earlier corporations; by the use of such
a term, however, they would not be clearly distinguished from the National-External
Corporations, though not improperly contrasted with the Local-Internal Corporations,
which might well be called Socialistic Corporations, as approaching the ideal of
totally organized social groups. Modern Corporations may be divided as follows:
1. Political Corporations, such as the numerous Societies for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, and to Animals, including only such as actually exercise political
powers through their agents by arresting law-breakers, assuming custody of children
by force, seizing unlicensed private property (especially dogs) and destroying it.
Some Civic Associations would be included, because they assume some of the
functions of city government (though only permissively on the part of the state) such
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private property. At least one penitentiary in the United States is maintained and
conducted by a “private” corporation, but as the motive is private gain, derived from
fees from the State and its counties and cities and from the United States, the
corporation would probably have to be included in “Economic” Corporations. Many
similar organizations, such as Law and Order Leagues, wield no political powers
directly, but frequently seek to procure the enforcement of laws for the regulation of
the traffic in intoxicants and for the suppression of vice by gathering evidence and
“arousing public opinion”; such corporations could hardly be classed as political, but
would have to be placed under the head of Scientific Corporations, as aiming to
promote the formation and enforcement of more correct public opinion. For reasons
that have appeared in preceding pages — but which will probably appear inadequate
to those who have adopted the conception and classification of corporations found
in most legal treatises — counties, cities, towns, school-districts and the like are not
included in political or other corporations. At the risk of unnecessary repetition it is
again insisted that they are departments of the state, and bear the name of
corporations only by virtue of traditional usage.
2. Eleemosynary Corporations, such as maintain and conduct hospitals, asylums,
infirmaries, public libraries and like institutions, and administer the funds for their
support. The field of such corporations is characterized by the extent to which the
state and its subdivisions have encroached on it through their own institutions from
one direction, and the extent to which, from another direction, such corporations have
ceased to be autonomous and have become merely representative bodies of large
divisions of society based on religious, racial or other bases. Such of them as still
possess sufficient autonomy to be called corporations date as a class from the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the period of the destruction of gilds and
monasteries, the chief organized agencies of charity in the Middle Ages. It need
hardly be added that in the category of such corporations would not be included the
governing bodies of state institutions, appointed or elected officers serving merely
in a representative capacity; some hesitancy would be justified in including even
similar bodies appointed or elected by religious denominations.
3. Educational Corporations, such as the “close” bodies maintaining or conducting
universities, colleges, training schools, technical schools, seminaries and “institutes”
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to such corporations. Their field of activity has been even further encroached upon
by the state (especially in the United States), religious denominations and other large
and more or less indeterminate groups of citizens. If the English universities and
colleges of the ecclesiastical type be omitted, the class may be said to date from the
sixteenth century. Boards of regents and other governing bodies of state universities
would not be included.
4. Scientific Corporations, such as the Royal Society, the American Musical
Association, and many of the numerous other associations for the advancement of
literature, politics, science and the arts, and, more generally, for the promotion of
culture and morality in society. Not all such associations could be properly
considered corporations, even if legally “incorporated” for the purpose of holding
property or some similar purpose. The grounds on which many of them would be
excluded are most frequently the want of responsibility attaching to membership,
indefiniteness of membership, incapacity to enforce “group will” either on members
or non-members and want of continuity of organization. A few such associations
antedate the nineteenth century; the great majority of them have originated in very
recent years.
5. Religious Corporations, such as the boards of trustees of some churches, or more
properly the bodies of communicants themselves, of which the boards of trustees
serve as governmental organs. The chief difficulty in classifying such bodies arises
from the fact that they are usually only subdivisions of a large class in society, to be
viewed in the same light as a social order. For many purposes, however, they are
considered to be separate and distinct, especially in contemplation of the law, which
regards them as merely civil societies. Some recent organizations subsidiary to the
churches have sustained relations to them very similar to those sustained by
corporations to the state, with some similar unfortunate consequences. Some such
societies as the Young People’s Societies of Christian Endeavor, encouraged in their
religious zeal by the churches, have formed national organizations largely
independent of the churches, and have thereby excited apprehensions that they would
get beyond their control.
6. Social-Fraternal Societies, such as the Knights of Pythias, Odd Fellows, Redmen,
Foresters and many similar bodies. They would have to be regarded in almost the
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composed of many smaller groups in many respects distinct and independent,
especially in legal contemplation. In their present state of development, bar
associations, medical associations, trades unions, boards of trade and even stock
exchanges would have to be included in the class. The meaning of the term
“fraternity” is not unduly extended if it be used to comprehend the element of mutual
fair dealing infused into the mercantile life of stock-brokers by their organization in
exchanges.
7. Economic Corporations,
613 of which there are many kinds, but all distinguished
from other corporations by being a part of the machinery of society for producing,
exchanging and distributing wealth. They may be subdivided, in the order in which
their functions are most distinctly recognized as “public,” as follows:
(a) Improvement Companies, such as are organized for the reclamation and
improvement of large tracts of unoccupied land, establishing town-sites, building
towns, (e.g., Pullman, Illinois), “booming” new settlements and incidentally
developing mines, ranches and other economic projects.
(b) Transportation Companies, for the transmission of persons, goods and
intelligence, including railway, stage, toll-road, canal, ferry, express, messenger,
telegraph, telephone, gas, electric light, water, irrigation and drainage companies.
Associations of pilots would probably have to be included in the class. Hardly a
single kind of the companies mentioned existed before the beginning of the
nineteenth century, many of them not until after 1830; many of them have originated
during the past twenty years; they are essentially the product of conditions peculiar
to the nineteenth century.
(c) Banking Companies, ranging from the great bank which serves as the financial
agent of the state, such as the Bank of England and the historical Bank of the United
States, through the present national and State banks of the United States, to the
so-called “private banks.” If the great”state banks” be left out of account, banking
corporations may be said to be peculiar to the nineteenth century. The Bank of
England stands in classification near the line that separates the great national-external
companies from the infra-national economic corporations. The East India Company
and South Sea Company were both holders of government loans; in the latter,
commercial activity was merely incidental to the loaning function, but it was
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that the commercial privileges, attached as a kind of bonus to its holding of
government debt, had to do with the infra-national economic relations of citizens, and
promoted rather internal national development than external national expansion.
(d) Insurance Companies, including fire, life, marine, accident, cyclone and other
insurance companies, as well as the several kinds of guaranty companies, and ranging
in form from the compact “old line” companies to the individualistic Lloyd’s
companies. Some of the mutual companies would have to be included under the head
of social-fraternal corporations; that they would be properly so included seems to be
confirmed by the recent growth of “insurance departments” as adjuncts of the
Masonic and other fraternities. As a class, insurance companies date their origin from
the end of the seventeenth century, though they have had their greatest growth in the
nineteenth century.
(e) Trust and Investment Companies, representing a differentiation of the capitalist
and investor’s agent from the banker. Most savings banks would have to be included
in the class. Many insurance companies, moreover, apparently make the business of
insurance hardly more than collateral or incidental to that of an investment company.
(f) Commercial Companies, if the term “commercial” may be used broadly enough
to include corporations for mining, agricultural, manufacturing and trading
enterprises, and narrowly enough to exclude corporations previously described. The
term “private corporations” is commonly used to describe them. The varieties are
almost innumerable; some of them are difficult to distinguish in form from the kinds
of modified partnerships known as “limited companies.” It is in this class, moreover,
that the corporate form of social structure has been abnormally developed and
subjected to most abuse in application. A few of them are found in the history of the
eighteenth century, but they were almost universally monopolistic in character,
formed by individuals and sanctioned by the state for the purpose of protecting or
promoting the use of improved processes or inventions, or to encourage the
development of the natural resources of localities. With a few such exceptions, all of
the class belong to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and have multiplied most
rapidly since 1850.
With the exception of several educational and eleemosynary corporations, a few
scientific associations, banking corporations, insurance companies and monopolistic
“patent” companies, the class of corporations described as essentially modern areJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 395
products of the nineteenth century. In the United States only a few corporations of
any kind are found before the beginning of the century; they were of slight
importance to society, though the historical facts relating to them are full of interest.
The charters of some of the old American universities indicate that they were
intended to some extent for the conversion of the heathen (Indians) to Christianity
and for the dispensation of charity; the bodies of some of them were modelled closely
on the prevailing ecclesiastical type of the English university college. In South
Carolina a corporation very similar to the English “incorporated wild” was created,
with the power, among others, of maintaining a school; remarkably enough, the
corporation is still in existence. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century,
however, the multiplication of corporations has proceeded with great rapidity. In the
absence of trustworthy statistical or other data it is impossible to state with a
reasonable degree of exactness how many have been created or are now in existence,
or to otherwise estimate the extent to which they have entered into the social life of
the century, but it cannot be denied that the growth of corporations in western Europe
and the United States signifies nothing less than a social revolution. Though the great
change cannot be fully accounted for at the present time, as well because it is still in
progress and has not yet accomplished itself, as because the requisite data are not at
hand for the purpose, a few general considerations may be offered as at least a partial
explanation of it, under the heads of (1) economic conditions, (2) political conditions
and (3) the reaction of economic development on society.
1. Economic Conditions. — The growth of modern corporations has been most
largely on the economic side of society. As far as their growth has taken place on the
other sides of society, it has been due almost entirely to the reaction of economic on
political and religious conditions. The nineteenth century was the century of
economic development as former centuries have been distinguished by their
development in politics, religion or some other department of life. The last half of the
seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century were remarkable for the small
addition of corporate structure to that already in existence. The only legitimate field
for corporations was apparently the exploitation of new foreign lands. Even when
several corporations were designed by the Stuarts for the field of foreign commerce,
they proved abortive, because they were given control of trade already established
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extra-national expansion. In the internal economic relations of England and America,
there was no growth of corporations during the period for the general reason that
there was no growth on the economic side of internal national life. One is almost
surprised to find in the literature of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries so
much evidence that England was considered to be over-populated and that the
colonization of America was regarded as necessary to relieve it of its surplus people.
Such expansion of economic life as took place was extensive rather than intensive;
the aim was to utilize the forces of nature by reaching them at more points, not by
exploiting them more vigorously at given points. The existing structure of society
was sufficient for the economic activity organized within it; no new structure was
needed and new corporations were consequently not brought into use. Even the
creation of the Bank of England at the end of the seventeenth century was hardly
exceptional; its privileges, or such of them as concerned the relations between
citizens, were hardly more than a premium on the public services performed by it as
a lender of money to the state. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however,
what Arnold Toynbee described as an industrial revolution took place. The great
inventions of the period increased the control of men over the forces of nature and
presented to them the possibility of a greater economic development than they were
able to organize in existing social forms. The first effect of the movement on the
creation of corporations was very similar to the effect so manifest in the early history
of the great companies for foreign trade. As the body of “adventurers” that
discovered and developed a “new trade” in foreign lands were considered entitled to
the exclusive enjoyment of it because they had discovered and developed it, so now
in domestic trade the discoverers of inventions and the promoters of new industries
(whether based on inventions or not) seemed to be entitled to the exclusive
enjoyment of their fruits. As such advantages had in earlier centuries been under the
control of gilds, now, since their decay, they were subject to a large extent to the
control of close municipal bodies, the “corporations” of whose restrictions Adam
Smith complained. Such advantages might be enjoyed, in some degree, in the new
municipalities, free from the restrictions of the older ones, but in general
incorporation was necessary. They depended negatively on exemptions from the
control of existing social organs, and needed positively powers of control over
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incorporation of such bodies, the state could not undeceive itself that it was
incorporating the entire groups of persons engaged in the industries, capitalists,
masters, workmen and all, though it reserved the effective powers of control for the
exercise of limited interior groups which deserve to be considered the real
corporations. Such corporations as the London companies seem to have served as
models. When the enterprise in view was a unit in itself, as a bank, insurance office,
canal or railway, instead of an industry requiring a body of artisans, or when the
factory system became firmly established, concentration easily took place, resulting
in the incorporation of the owners alone. The movement by which regulated
companies developed into joint-stock companies in the foreign commerce of England
was paralleled in domestic trade by the incorporation of the unit of industry instead
of the whole industry.
The purpose of the state in so granting corporate powers was, of course, to give to
society the benefit of the possibilities opened to it by developing industry; in order
to do so, it was necessary to confer upon groups of citizens the powers of
organization incidental to the control of the new activity, especially in the presence
of the restrictive social organization with which they came in contact. In the light of
the development of earlier corporations, it can hardly be said that the movement was
at all extraordinary. In an unusual development of any side of society the existing
organization of the State (or Church), unable to accommodate it, if it is not actually
restrictive of it, concedes it an organization in the form of corporations. Three
factors, therefore, only the last of which has since become inoperative, appear to have
entered into the growth of corporations at the end of the eighteenth century: (a) The
possibility of an absolute growth of industry itself, (b) the desire of the state to
promote it by affording it necessary and appropriate organization and (c) the presence
of restrictive social organizations, whether governmental or corporate, with which
new industries came in contact. It is often assumed at the present day that all modern
industrial corporations have owed their existence to the necessity of “massing
capital”; that would account, to a slight extent, for the feature of association in them
before the beginning of the nineteenth century, but would be wholly inadequate to
account for the corporate form of organization or the semi-political powers with
which they were endowed. The massing of large amounts of capital in industries was
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through the development of improved facilities of transportation. Modern
corporations in their early stages were merely organizations that enabled men to gain
a reward for giving to society the benefit of inventions and new industries, with slight
reference to the amount of capital employed.
2. Political Conditions. — If it is true that corporations are in general social
organizations midway between the state and the individual, owing their existence to
the latter’s need of organization and the former’s inability to supply it, their
prevalence must be largely dependent on political conditions, the nature of the state
and the degree of perfection and stability attained by it. The attitude of society to its
political institutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was essentially
destructive. The attainment of nationality in the sixteenth century had been expressed
in an exaggerated monarchy; no sooner was nationality accomplished than the infra-
national relations of individuals demanded increased attention. Under existing
conditions the effort to establish individual liberty was necessarily destructive in its
effects on political institutions. It seemed to be necessary first to deprive them of
their strength, to reduce the monarchy to an institution of comparative insignificance,
to materially modify the aristocratic element in the organization of the state. The
constructive process, the formation of political institutions that would be harmonious
with theories of individual liberty, was only slowly working itself out and was to wait
for its completion until the nineteenth century, though it was long anticipated in
America. While the work of disintegration was in progress, the state, viewed as
identical with the parts of society that actually wielded political powers, was more
or less justifiably considered as something apart from the mass of citizens, something
to be opposed, at best little more than an unavoidable evil. Individual liberty was
reflected on its legal side by an exaggeration of rights. While the monarchy based
itself on divine right, the people went to the opposite extreme in maintaining that
government was based on the consent of the governed. Philosophy eventually
systematized the prevailing thought and explained not only the political organization
of society, but finally its entire organization by the assumption of contracts between
individuals. It seemed inevitable that in thought society should suffer disintegration
before it could again be harmoniously organized. 
The importance of the fact in a study of corporations lies in the denial of expansion
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industry from control by the political organization of society. The standpoint was not
yet wholly changed. The development of the nation was still consciously the goal, but
it was not identified with the development of the individual; the individual was to be
regulated in his activity so as to contribute by it directly to the development of the
nation; even more narrowly, in practice, the political interests of the state as
organized had to be subserved; if a new trade was to be discovered or established or
new lands colonized, it had to be so done as to extend the dominion of the English
crown and swell its revenues. It is significant that the mercantile system was applied
most fully in matters relating to foreign commerce; it could not have been extensively
applied in domestic trade, as became plain from the opposition aroused by the
“monopolies.” When the time came for the industrial revival at the end of the
eighteenth century, the theory was that the “wealth of nations” was best increased by
giving to the individual the greatest possible freedom to increase his own wealth. All
local and national restrictions might best be removed; the first form in which such
restrictions were removed was in bodies of exemptions contained in charters of
incorporation. Moreover, if a social function was of recognized public importance,
it was safer for society that the state delegate to groups of individuals the power to
perform it than for it either to perform it itself or to closely supervise its performance.
That was the difference (not always easy to discover) between the general liberation
of the industry of individuals from political restrictions and the creation of
corporations; when the individual was liberated, it was considered that his interest
was identical with that of society and that he would subserve the latter by pursuing
the former, if merely permitted to do it; when the corporation was created, its work
was recognized as of public importance but it was considered that it would not
perform it without encouragement by the removal of restrictions or oftener by the
positive delegation of public powers. In further contrast with the liberation of the
individual, corporations were given a social form, an organization, that in earlier
history had been found capable of serving as constitutions for semi-autonomous
colonies, and that, even in industry, might expand so far as to menace the social
integrity of the individual. Distrust of the state as organized caused the accumulation
of political powers in the hands of minor states, corporations, which excited no
apprehensions because they were democratically organized and did not seriously
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based substantially on individual contract and was not “freedom of association” one
element of liberty? If the entire state had been formed and organized like the
corporation, would not philosophers and political theorists have had to confess that
it was an ideal state?
After the experience of a century the distrust of the state has not ceased to be a
potent factor in the organization of industry. The constitutions of the United States
and of the several States were constructed on the principle that government is hardly
more than a necessary evil, the less of which is had, the better for the citizen. The less
responsibility imposed on congresses, legislatures and councils and on national, State
and municipal administrations, the more their ability to discharge their functions has
decreased, just as the physical member withers from lack of use. If railways, lines of
telegraph and other public enterprises were to be maintained, the state should
delegate its power of eminent domain, its public lands, its highways and streets, and
renounce its power of taxation to corporations, so that the individual might be
protected against the state in the contest of “man vs. the state.” But there is much
evidence that the true nature of corporations is gradually becoming plainer, though
least in the system of law. When the workman finds his wages determined by the
corporation that controls the business employing his labor, and seeks refuge in a trade
union that deprives him of his individuality, when the farmer finds his connection
with a market dependent on the regulations of a railway company, when the
business-man finds the volume of credit and currency subject to the curtailment or
expansion of banking, trust and investment companies, when the small investor finds
his only avenue of investment in savings banks and trust and investment companies,
when the citizen finds his social intercourse conditioned on membership in church
organizations and social clubs, when the scientist or professional man finds that he
cannot bring his efforts to bear on society except through the medium of associations,
— they all begin to realize that they are governed more by corporations than by the
state, that they are the major part of the mechanism of government under which they
live. But the distrust of the state still exists in a large measure; corporations, it is said,
must be controlled by the state through commissions — the state must not absorb
them and cannot be trusted to control them directly.
The principal source of the increase of corporations, which might be included under
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economic development of western European nations and the United States (especially
the latter) in the presence of political institutions and political theories by which the
activity of the state has been strictly limited. The demand for canals, railways, banks,
telegraph and telephone lines, water-works, electric light and gas plants and the many
other factors of modern economic progress, has at times approached the condition of
a “craze.” It has appeared in the minds of men to justify prodigality in the concession
of public powers to corporations. The past century has witnessed greater economic
expansion than any previous century in the world’s history. Nations, states, cities and
geographical sections have competed with one another in the extension of
encouragement to corporations for the development of their natural resources. Early
in the century it was not considered justifiable to create corporations for any purpose
not clearly public in nature; each application was considered by itself, and if
favorably was followed by a legislative act of incorporation. Not only was it always
difficult to distinguish between public and private, but the view that individuals
should have the freest possible opportunities to create wealth encouraged the
presumption that every business was of public importance in the respect that it might
increase the aggregate wealth of society. Not only was the work of legislatures
simplified by the passage of “general incorporation” laws for special classes of
corporations, but justice between individuals in different occupations seemed to
demand that the laws should comprehend successive classes of enterprises lower in
the scale between public and private; the climax was reached in some states when
general acts were passed permitting the incorporation of associates “for any lawful
purpose.” Thus the innumerable “private corporations” came into existence. The
period of expansion has been followed by one of organization. The vine has been
stimulated to attain its full growth; now it is found in need of training and pruning.
In periods of expansion society develops irregularly and unevenly; when they are at
an end, the incongruous new social structure in which the expansion has taken place
is reduced to a greater or less degree of conformity with the rest of the structure
(political and other) of society, usually with accompanying modifications in the latter.
The second process is always disquieting in its effects, involving always the
readjustment of the relations of individuals, and not infrequently the disturbance of
“vested interests.”
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reactionary effect of industrial development on society is what might be called a form
of materialism, with some limitations on the common use of the term. Under the
domestic system the tool was an adjunct of the man. The workman’s skill was part
of him. The element of skill has been largely transferred to the machine. The
workman has become an adjunct of the machine, which he controls by wheels and
levers. Since the sixteenth century, when capital in the modern sense became a factor
in industry, the relation of the capitalist to industry had been of the same nature as
that of the workman under machine industry. Capital is merely the accumulated
products of past labor devoted to the production of new wealth. The capitalist does
not produce directly; he merely controls the production of others through the
ownership of capital. Under the gild system masters (from whom capitalists
afterwards developed) were little different from journeymen or workmen; both
engaged directly in production side by side. In both classes the general relation to
industry has changed from the actual performance of the work to the control of its
performance by machinery. The evolution in the broad field of industry has been
parallel with that in the evolution of corporations themselves. Corporations are
instruments of control, of social organization, just as machines are instruments of
men’s control over the forces of nature; corporations are social machines to which
the individual has become almost as completely an adjunct in his relations to men as
he has become a mere adjunct of the machine in his relations to nature. Nor is it at
all remarkable that the highest developed form of corporation has become the social
structure of capital. For is not social control the essential feature of the capitalist
class? Does property in physical things confer any benefit on their owner (beyond the
advantages of consumption) except as they be made the basis of controlling others
in the production of new things? The historical growth of corporations has been in
complete harmony with such a conception of capital. The mediaeval gilds, originally
the organizations of classes of persons engaged in industry or trade, became quite
generally restricted, by the sixteenth century (the date of the appearance of a distinct
class of capitalists), to the class of employers within them. The great foreign
companies of the succeeding centuries carried the development forward from the
point it had reached in the gilds, purified of all but capitalistic elements; they were
purposely and consciously restricted to the social class to which the gilds had become
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machine industry and in the relations of men to each other under the system of
capitalistic production, the corporation appears from its historical development to be
a fit and appropriate social organization.
Through the extension of the use of machinery and the development of
transportation the individual has been removed to a greater distance in both time and
space from the forces of nature on which he depends. His contact with nature is more
effective, but it is less direct. He has become far more dependent on the artificial
physical element (machines, factories, railways) and the human element (organized
society) than on nature itself. The category of public industries is accordingly
extending itself so as to cover industries formerly viewed as private in character. The
early stage-coach was hardly more than a private industry; the modern railway is one
of the most familiar examples of a public industry. As an industry becomes more
public in character, it is elevated in popular estimation above the owners of it and in
a sense separated from them, — it is idealized or personified. It appears to have rights
and duties in itself, distinct from those of its owners. Is not that the same movement
that resulted (in a somewhat different field) in the development of the legal
conception of the “ideal personality” of municipalities? The law regards the capital
invested in it as “clothed with a public trust,” by virtue of which its owners have only
a limited control of it; its patrons are regarded as entitled by law to the benefit of its
services in return for a reasonable compensation. It is the increased dependence of
men on physical things, grouped in great units such as systems of railway, telegraph
and water works, that has contributed in a large measure to the growth of
corporations.
A very conspicuous result of the industrial development of the nineteenth century
has been the enlargement of the physical unit of greatest industrial efficiency beyond
the capacity of the individual. Under the gild system the unit was the tools of the man
with his strength applied to them; human capacity, capital and market were all
limited. Under the domestic system the unit was increased to the co-operating family
of the master with the few workmen added to it and made virtually a part of the
household; human capacity and capital were increased, while the market remained
substantially unchanged. Under machine industry the machine with its operator was
the unit, increased to a factory full of machines and operators when the market was
so widened through improved transportation as to permit localization of industries.John P. Davis, Corporations, 404
In transportation the unit has grown from the single vessel or stage-coach to the fleet
of vessels and system of railways covering thousands of miles. The individual
capitalist was undoubtedly incapable of engaging alone in industries organized in
such large units; association of capitalists was the necessary result. As far as
association enabled capitalists to attain the unit of greatest efficiency the movement
was undoubtedly beneficial to society. But the movement has divided in two
directions with generally unfortunate results. The individual has been increasing in
capacity so rapidly during the past few decades that most corporations find
themselves in the control of small interior bodies of stockholders with large holdings
of stock, the remaining stockholders being relegated to the status of mere creditors
of the corporations, with no effective voice in the management of their affairs; in
some railway companies stock is issued with the reservation of the recipient’s proxy,
his voting capacity. The other direction in which the movement of association has
been diverted from the line of greatest benefit to society is in that of exceeding the
unit of greatest efficiency. A factory of a certain size or a railway of a certain length
is proportionally more efficient than one either larger or smaller than the former or
longer or shorter than the latter. Where association exceeds such a unit, it is arbitrary
and results in what are now generally known as “trusts.” Association is not peculiar
to corporations, however, but differs from association in other forms because of the
peculiar conditions under which it takes place and is maintained. Corporate
association has reference rather to the corporate property or industry than to the
persons associated. The physical element is exaggerated, the human element is
depressed. The purchaser of stock considers that he is acquiring an interest in an
enterprise, not so much that he is assuming common relations with the numerous
other stockholders; for the most part, he does not know them and does not take the
pains to learn who they are; if he “knows the property” and by what directors it is
administered, he is satisfied. It is the social separation of men, the disintegration of
society in its personal phases, and the consequent participation of men in society
through the medium of institutions, clubs, societies and the like, that raises corporate
association into something extra-personal, unsympathetic, apparently the product of
necessity; it is the same characteristic that is found in the association of citizenship
in which the personal relations are depressed in the presence of a state embodying
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state than a fellow-citizen of his neighbor; so the stockholder looks upon himself
rather as a participant in the corporate enterprise than as an associate of his fellow
stockholders.
After a so confessedly imperfect review of the causes of the unprecedented growth
of corporations in the nineteenth century, a brief consideration of the most prominent
present tendencies in their development may not be out of place. The most
remarkable change in public sentiment is in relation to the functions of the state. It
cannot be denied that a strong reaction against the destructive, “dispersive”
philosophy of the eighteenth century is in progress. The effects of the change are
more marked in England than in the United States because its political organization
is more fully adapted to reflect and respond to such a change in public sentiment. The
“scattering” of sovereignty, the limitation of governmental powers, was too fully
translated into political institutions in America to permit a rapid expansion of the
activity of the state. In the United States the end of the Civil War (1865) may fairly
be taken as the date of the beginning of the reaction. To what extent the extraordinary
activity of the state demanded by the exigencies of the war, certainly extended in
many cases beyond the limits imposed by constitutions, may have laid a basis for the
enforcement of the change in public sentiment may well be questioned. Undoubtedly
the people became accustomed during the four years of war to a greater latitude of
state action than had ever before been sanctioned by public opinion! but the extension
of it to comprehend the field occupied by corporations was due to other causes not
so closely connected with the Civil War. The internal development of the country had
been greatly restrained by the unsettled political relations of the opposing sections.
When the restraint was removed by the termination of the war, the course of
development was resumed with extraordinary vigor, and chiefly through the
instrumentality of corporations. During the decade succeeding the war and even
before the war was ended, the United States and the several States, as well as
counties, cities and towns, were scandalously prodigal of concessions to corporations.
Unfortunately the development has recently come to a somewhat abrupt end with the
virtual exhaustion of its geographical area, and the field of corporate enterprise has
been transferred from unsettled or growing communities to places in which the stage
of settlement and growth has been passed; the society in. which corporations now
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consisting more in the regulation of old relations than the establishment of new ones;
public thought, for example, is concerned more with the government of established
cities than with the foundation of new ones. The change in the character of social
progress has suddenly revealed to the people the immense volume of public powers
that have been reposed in corporations, and the dangerous extent to which corporate
structure has shown itself capable of expansion beyond the activity legitimately
organized within it. Trusts and industrial combinations are more or less justly
identified with corporations, because the same social structure has in experience
proved so readily adaptable to their purposes. Under such conditions the extension
of governmental powers, to which the people became accustomed during the war and
the period of corruption that followed it, presents a ready remedy for the evils of
government by corporations and finds the people taught by experience not to fear its
use. State ownership of railways, telegraphs and other industries confessedly public
in nature is openly advocated now, though even a decade ago such advocacy would
have met with only modified approval. The masses of the people have heretofore
opposed the extension of the activity of the state because it might encroach on their
own; confusing corporations with themselves as individuals, grants of public powers
to them have seemed to accord with their opposition to encroachment by the state on
the liberty of the individual. But now the same classes are clamoring for the
extension of the activity of the state to protect the individual against the corporation.
It is beginning to be recognized that more government is necessary under the
developed conditions now attained by society than under the comparatively simple
conditions prevalent a century ago, — and that such increased government has
actually been provided, not by the state but by corporations. The plain tendency in
corporate life at present, in its relations to the state, is in the direction of subjection
and submission to close supervision. In history the state has never been satisfied with
the mere supervision of corporations by commissions or otherwise; it would be
against the teachings of history to expect that now the state will stop short of the
complete absorption of the governmental features of corporations. The work of
absorption has already progressed far in the fields of political, eleemosynary and
educational corporations; the economic corporations have been disturbed but little.
The scientific and social-fraternal associations have hardly passed beyond the
“permissive” stage, in which they are merely recognized as of public importance andJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 407
permitted to own property and otherwise act as organized groups; there are some
slight indications that a few of them are entering the stage in which they are
encouraged by the state to exist, and in which the state eventually depends upon them
for the supplementing of its organization of its citizens.
In their relations to each other corporations exhibit the tendency to combination
that in earlier centuries resulted in the domination of the medieval Church by the
monastic orders, that gave the class of burgesses a predominant influence in the
English House of Commons, that makes metropolitan London even to-day hardly
more (politically) that a federation of livery companies, as other English cities and
towns have only recently ceased to be. If corporations have been afforded free
development, they have never failed to evolve a higher organization, which they have
sometimes succeeded in substituting for the organs of the state themselves. In the
light of the history of corporations there is nothing astonishing in the growth of
Charity Organization Societies, associations of college presidents,
614 the National
Society of Christian Endeavor, Amalgamated Trades Unions, the grand lodges of
fraternal organizations, joint traffic associations, pools, trusts, clearing houses and
trike, — they are the parliaments and congresses of corporations, phenomena
perfectly familiar to the student of the history of corporations. Such consolidation has
never proved to be permanently independent; it has either served as a medium of
absorption by the state, or has had to be destroyed with such exhausting efforts of the
superior organization of society as was involved in the dissolution of the Society of
Jesus.
Within the corporations the process described in earlier chapters as “corporate
shrinkage” is found to be accomplishing itself. In the political, eleemosynary,
educational and religious corporations, the process is almost complete; what is
regarded as the corporation, both in law and in popular estimation, is the governing
body, the council, board of trustees or board of managers. Even in scientific
associations, an interior body called in some of them the council or senate, and in a
greater or less degree independent of common members, is the repository of the
actual powers of the associations; the membership is largely indeterminate, many of
the members being such only for the purpose of securing publications or bulletins of
information issued by the associations. In the social-fraternal organizations
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nature membership has come, during the past few years, to confer rather a license to
follow a trade than a right to participate in the social life of the group. The somewhat
independent status of “walking delegates “ is one of the evidences of the change. It
is beyond denial that trades unions have shown a tendency to become closer bodies
controlling some of the conditions of branches of industry instead of organized
associations of the men engaged in the industries; in that respect they have more
nearly approached the status of true corporations. In economic corporations attention
need hardly be called to the virtual exclusion of the small stockholder from
participation in the corporate activity; one could not consider him responsible for
corporate misdoings. The frequent resort to the issuance of bonds has had the same
effect, to relegate the mass of persons (both bondholders and stockholders) interested
in corporate enterprises to the status of creditors of the smaller and closer bodies that
are the real corporations. The retention of proxies by rings has also had a restrictive
influence. The result of all the influences has been the virtual shrinkage of most
economic corporations to small interior bodies, in some cases members of a single
family or of a group of allied families. In one sense the movement is in the direction
of an exaggerated individualism; under the “new feudalism” the baronage will consist
of the small bodies to which corporations have shrunk, exercising as “private rights”
the public powers of corporations that have so shrunk.
All that may be said of the relations of corporations to individual members of
society is implied in what has already been said of them. The present tendency is for
them to become less organizations for the self-government of industries than
organizations for the imposition of the conditions under which industries shall be
prosecuted — essentially governmental bodies. The tendency of corporations to
expand into monopolies, if not originally created such, elevates them above the level
of the individual, whose normal industrial condition is one of competition with his
fellows; though their interests were identical a few years ago, they are at variance
now. Yet the corporate or semi-corporate organizations of society are so numerous
and so pervasive of all kinds of social activity that the individual citizen, trying to
attain the ideal of personal independence venerated in the theory of the political
institutions of his country, finds every avenue under the control of some kind of an
association in which he must acquire membership or to whose regulations he must
submit. If he is suspected of failure to support his children a Society for theJohn P. Davis, Corporations, 409
Prevention of Cruelty to Children takes them from him and places them in an
“institution” in contempt of his right to be heard in his own defence and to be held
innocent until he is proved guilty. If he fails to pay for a license to keep a dog, a
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, entitled to receive the license-fee,
takes away his animal summarily and deprives him of the benefit and protection of
the courts that he is taxed to support. He is not permitted to dispense charity
indiscriminately and according to his own judgment; even if he embodies his charity
in an institution, its management must be submitted to the supervision of a Charity
Organization Society, or suffer the penalty of adverse criticism. His self-education
is almost out of the question; as far as his education is not regulated by the state, it
is regulated, in quantity and quality, by the religious denominations and corporations
in control of the universities and colleges. As a scientist he cannot make himself an
efficient factor in society except through the medium of associations. As an artist, his
work must receive the commendation or approval of some academy or similar body.
As a lawyer or physician he is subject to the rules of bar associations or medical
societies. In social intercourse with his fellows he finds societies, clubs, circles,
lodges and churches indispensable. The conditions of the town in which he lives are
possibly the effects of the policy pursued by the improvement company that is
“booming” it, regulating the architecture of the dwellings in it and imposing upon the
inhabitants many other restrictions. The success of his business may be absolutely
dependent on the treatment accorded him by transportation companies. He may be
wealthy and honest and yet fall into bankruptcy through the refusal of banks to supply
him with “credit.” His loss by fire and the loss suffered by his family by his death
entitle him and them to nothing but sympathy from others; relief should have been
provided for through insurance companies. His range of investments outside of those
reached through trust and investment companies is comparatively small. If he aspires
to a public office, he finds a successful opponent in a fellow-citizen having more
extended membership in fraternal organizations, trades unions and church societies.
He discovers, in fine, that citizenship in his country has been largely metamorphosed
into membership in corporations and patriotism into fidelity to them.John P. Davis, Corporations, 4101. “When Alexander Hamilton wrote his celebrated report on the establishment of the First United
States Bank in 1790, there existed only three banking corporations in the United States.” — Richard
T. Ely, “The Growth of Corporations,” Harper’s Magazine, vol. lxxv, p. 71 (June, 1885).
2. “The rapid growth of private corporations is one of the striking features of the present industrial
development. More prominent perhaps in the United States than elsewhere, it is nevertheless to be
observed in all countries which have felt the spur of recent industrial progress.” — “Statistics of
Private Corporations,” by Roland P. Falkner, in Publications of American Statistical Association
(June, 1890), p. 50.
3. “Before 1850, [in Michigan] we had about forty-five mining corporations, seven or more railroad
corporations, a few banking corporations several plank-road corporations, and a few of a
miscellaneous character all, of course, under special charters [with the exception of religious
corporations].
“General laws to the number of one hundred and fifty-six have been passed from time to time since
1850 for incorporating almost every kind of lawful business and association, and the result has been
that we now have [in Michigan] about eight thousand corporations which are organized under those
general laws, divided as follows: manufacturing and mercantile, twenty-five hundred; mining, thirteen
hundred and twenty-eight; railroad, seventy-nine; street railway, one hundred and thirty-two;
transportation, one hundred and twenty-three; state banking, one hundred and fifty-nine; charitable,
two hundred and forty-eight; improvement, seventy-seven; miscellaneous, twenty-eight hundred and
eighty-two.
“To this great number of domestic corporations must be added one hundred national banking
corporations, and a large and not ascertainable number of foreign corporations,... which do business
in this state by its express permission.” — Address of President (Alfred Russell) at Jackson, Michigan,
March, 1894, on “Corporations in Michigan,” Publications of Michigan Political Science Association,
No. 2, p. 97.
4. “It is within the bounds of moderation to estimate the wealth of corporations as one-fourth of the
total value of all property in the United States. The most significant fact, however, is the rapidly
increasing proportion of all the resources of the country which belongs to corporations.” Richard T.
Ely, op. cit., p. 73,
“Not far from one-quarter of the wealth of the United States is held by trading corporations. It is not
improbable that half the permanent business investment of the country is owned in this way.” —
Arthur T. Hadley in Railroad Transportation (1885), pp. 42, 43.
5. “The facility with which corporations can now be formed has also increased [the Supreme Court’s]
business far beyond what it was in the early part of the century. Nearly all enterprises requiring for
their successful prosecution large investments of capital are conducted by corporations. They, in fact,
embrace every branch of industry and the wealth that they hold in the United States equals in value
four-fifths of the entire property of the country. They carry on business with the citizens of every state
as well as with foreign nations, and the litigation arising out of their transactions is enormous, giving
Notes.rise to every possible question to which the jurisdiction of the federal courts extends.” — Address of
Justice Field at the Centennial Celebration of the Organization of the Federal Judiciary, at New York,
February 4, 1890, 134, U. S. R., 742.
6. The Law and Jurisprudence of England and America (pp. 376–377), John F. Dillon.
7. “There can be no question that corporate organization has been of great advantage to the country
— to the poor as well as the rich. By greater economy in production, rendered possible by
concentration of capital, the poor have profited in the reduced price of most of the necessaries and
comforts of life... The comfort and convenience of all dwellers in this country have been greatly
promoted by corporate contrail of business. Take for instance our facilities for traveling. Again, the
regularity and cheapness of communication by mail, telegraph, and telephone have only been made
possible by the cooperation of hundreds of corporations all working together in intelligent harmony.
Again, what could we do without banks, and without insurance companies? We owe it to the
corporation that we can protect our property against loss by fire and our families from want in the
case of the death of their breadwinner; and to the savings-banks that eve can safely keep our surplus
earnings, and receive them back again, safe and intact with reasonable interest. And so we may sum
it all up in one word and say that the conditions of modern life would be impossible there it not fm
the corporations, Whether sleeping or evoking, engaged in business or pleasure, eating, drinking,
dressing, or traveling, or whatever we may be about, we must thank them to a great extent for the
means and opportunity of doing so.” — William Jay, “The Corporation in Commerce,” chapter viii.
in One Hundred Years of American Commerce, vol. ii., pp. 47. 48.
8. “Organized wealth and power have not yet grown wise enough to scent danger before it is upon
them, The Eastern section of our country is already in danger, and I have an impression that it does
not see this. In its concentration of the wealth of the country and in its ostentatious display of its
wealth, in the gradual cultivation of caste, in the tendency to hug its vast riches and in finding means
to keep its millions at home, let it behold a danger it will do well to consider in the light of both
ancient and modern history.
“If it has any real statesmen, they cannot put their genius and resources to better uses than to
formulate some policy which will bring the conflicting elements [of the eastern and western United
States] together.
“In 1800 we were a few millions of people and we loved liberty. In 1900 we are nearly a hundred
millions of people and we love money Moreover, individually and collectively, we have a great deal
of money. Most of this money is invested in what are called corporations. From a handful of
individuals we have become a nation of institutions. The individual counts for less and less,
organizations for more and more. It is the idiosyncrasy of the age we live in.” — Interview of Henry
Watterson, in New York Journal, November 29, 1896.
9. “How great have been the advantages to our commerce and our country’s development from
corporate organization no one can say. Have these advantages been to some extent counterbalanced
by certain evils? The concentration of wealth in the hands of corporations has had the effect of driving
the individual producer out of business. In the early days of our country’s existence many industries
were carried on in the towns and villages by skilled workmen who were their own masters, and who
were in business for themselves. Tailors, shoemakers, weavers, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, saddlers, and
many other manufacturers on a small scale carried on their business for their own account, and were
a useful, self-reliant, and manly element in our population. These industries are now to a great extent
monopolized by large corporations, and the men who were formerly independent in their business are
now represented by salaried workmen. The gradual extinction of this class of men of moderate means
who carried on their business for their own account seems to be a distinct loss to the community.” —
William Jay, “The Corporation in Commerce,” chapter viii. in One Hundred Years of AmericanCommerce, vol. ii., p. 48.
“[As one of the evil effects of corporate organization] we shall have, in place of the independent
business men of to-day, each gaining his livelihood by his success in a wide range of thought and
action, a body of clerk-like functionaries, each of whom will do a certain limited kind of work at the
command of his superiors.” — Charles Francis Adams, “The Place of Corporate Action in Our
Civilization,” chapter iv. of Shaler’s The United States of America, vol. ii., p. 197.
10. Cf. Arthur T. Hadley, Railroad Transportation, p 43.
11. No little confusion is caused by the failure to separate the “corporation question” from questions
allied to it; it must be borne in mind that it is primarily a question of social form and only secondarily
one of social function. Mankind or human energy is the content, the corporation is one of the forms
through or within which the human energy becomes human activity. E. g., the corporation question
is often carelessly confused with that of the consolidated control of capital or “trusts,” — but the latter
comes within the scope of the former only through an enquiry to what extent the corporation by virtue
of providing a fit or usual form for the activity of trusts, affects such activity by restricting, expanding
or otherwise influencing it.
12. Dr. Roland P. Falkner, of the University of Pennsylvania, deserves much credit for his efforts to
collect and tabulate some of the statistics of modern private corporations. Some of the results of his
work are found in a very instructive paper on the “Statistics of Private Corporations” in the
Publications of the American Statistical Association, June, 1890, p. 50.
13. “American lawyers have written more voluminously, not to say more diffusely, on corporation
law than those of any other country; but they have usually elected to treat the subject from a strictly
legal standpoint. Their works have been planned merely to serve busy attorneys.” — A. G. Warner,
Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. ii., p. 551 (January, 1892), Review
of W W. Cook’s The Corporation Problem.
14. When sleeping-cars first came into extensive use, the first efforts of the courts were to construe
the liabilities of the companies operating them as those of either common carriers or inn-keepers, but
it was found later that the legal rules relating to those two classes of persons were inapplicable to
sleeping-car companies; now “according to the weight of authority, the liability of the sleeping-car
company is neither that of a common carrier nor of an inn-keeper.” — American and English
Encyclopedia of Law, sub verbo “Sleeping-cars.”
It is believed that the chief difficulty in legislative and judicial control of corporations at present is
due to the effort to apply to them legal principles elaborated in a system of law founded on individual
social units instead of modifying the existing system so as to make its principles applicable to
aggregate social units; the theory of “artificial personality,” though harmless when applied with due
limitations, has been the source of much confusion in legislation and legal decisions on questions
relating to corporations.
15. “The demand for the use of corporate powers in combining the capital and energy required to
conduct,.. large operations, is so imperative, that by the tendency of the courts to meet the
requirements of public necessities, the law of corporations has been so modified, liberalized, and
enlarged, as to constitute a branch of jurisprudence, with a code of its own, due mainly to very recent
times. To attempt, therefore, to define a corporation or limit its powers by the rules which prevailed
when they were rarely created for any other than municipal purposes, and generally by royal charter,
is impossible in this country and at this time.” — Justice Miller, in Liverpool & London Life and Fire
Insurance Company vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 10 Wallace, 566.
16. Morawetz on Private Corporations, §1 (2d edition), Taylor on Private Corporations, §22. W. NV.
Cook, in his work on Stock and Stockholders (§1), seems to adhere to the conception with
modifications, as does also J. L. Lowell in his work on Transfers of Stock. See article on “The LegalIdea of a Corporation,” in American Law Review, vol. xix, pp. 114-116.
17. “Up to the present century, the fiction [of an artificial person] was adequate for the regulation of
corporate affairs.” — Taylor, Law of Private Corporations, §22. See preceding note.
18. Even Stubbs, in his monumental Constitutional History of England, views the English
municipalities at the end of the Middle Ages almost solely as a part of the central administration
machinery of the state. Mrs. J. R. Green, in Town Life in the Fifteenth Century, has given an adequate
treatment of one phase of corporate life. Gross’s Gild Merchant is the only complete study of any one
class of corporations.
19. This particular characteristic has been appreciated by Franklin H. Giddings in his Principles of
Sociology, in which he has very appropriately assigned a discussion of corporations to the chapter on
“The Social Constitution” (Book II., chapter iv.).
20. The use of corporations for associated social activity has been more generally recognized than any
other feature of them; unfortunately most writers have not succeeded in discovering, or at least have
failed to consider, any other feature. E.g., Professor Giddings, in his Principles of Sociology (p. 187),
recognizes corporations as forms of association, but discusses no other quality of them.
21. “The idea of a corporation sole has been claimed as peculiar to English law, but the novelty
consists only in the name; and it has been justly remarked that, ‘as so little of the lay, of corporations
in general applies to corporations sole, it might have been better to have given them some other
denomination.’” — Dr. Wooddeson, Vinerian Lectures, vol. i., pp. 471, 472.
“ There are very few points of corporation law applicable to a corporation sole.” — Kent,
Commentaries, vol. ii., p. 273.
22. “The number of corporations sole in the United States must be very small indeed. It is possible
that the statutes of some states vesting the property of the Roman Catholic church in the bishop and
his successors may have the effect to make him a corporation sole; and some public of beers have
corporate powers for the purposes of holding property and of suing and being sued.” — Blackstone,
Commentaries, Book I., p. 468, note of editor (Cooley).
23. This idea is elaborated fully in Pollock and Maitland’s History of English Law, vol. i., pp.
469–495.
24. “The law has wisely ordained that the parson, quaternes parson, shall never die, any more than
the King; by making him and his successors a corporation By this means all the original rights of the
parsonage are preserved entire to the successor; for the present incumbent, and his predecessor who
lived seven centuries ago, are in law one and the same person; and what was given to the one was
given to the other also.” — Blackstone, Commentaries, Book I., cap. 18. This is verbal jugglery,
“It is true the Common Lawyers of England have been used to speak of Parsons, Vicars and even
Wardens of Parish Churches. as Corporate-bodies. Sir Thomas Littleton speaketh after that manner.
But I do apprehend, that the reason thereof is, because Parsons, Vicars, or Church-wardens, have a
Perpetual succession, like as Politick bodies have; and therefore,
that this way of speaking of them as of corporate-bodies is founded rather upon Resemblance than
Reality.” — Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 47. See also reference to the case of Overseers vs. Sears.
“One genera. figurative notion of incorporeity bath produced many fictions.” — paradox, as quoted
by Gross, Gild Merchant, vol. i., p. 104, note. The reference there given is “Addit. MS., 
Brit. Mus., 4531, fol. 122.
25. Of course, whether given legal relations are regular or exceptional depends on the nature of the
system of law under which the relations are recognized or created and enforced; some systems, such
as that of early Rome, have been based on a composite unit, as the family or some other group; others,
such as the Imperial Roman law and the (English and American) law since the destruction offeudalism, have been based on the simple unit, the individual The members of a corporation act not
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superfluity of labor; a widening market and consequently a greater importance of capital, now that
master artisans began to buy their own materials, and manufacture for the anticipated demand of the
general public; an influx of labor from the country districts, following upon the gradual relaxation of
the bonds of villenage; or, finally, the sheer selfishness of the masters in limiting their own members.”
— English Economic History, vol. i., part ii., p. 102.
259. See Statute of 1536, 25 Henry VIII, c. 5; Statutes, III, 654. Oxford had enacted ordinances for
the same purpose in 1531.
260. That the interests of masters and journeymen were at variance and that the latter appreciated their
identity of interests as a class appear plain from an ordinance of the Shearmen of London in 1350:
“Whereas heretofore, if there was any dispute between a master in the said trade and his man, such
man has been Wont to go to all the men within the city of the same trade; and then, by covin and
conspiracy between them made, they would order that no one among them should work, or serve his
own master until the said master and his servant, or man, had come to an agreement; by reason
whereof the masters in the said trade have been in great trouble, and the people left unserved; — it
is ordained that from henceforth, if there be any dispute moved between any master and his man in
the said trade, such dispute shall be settled by the wardens of the trade. And if the man who shall have
offended, or shall have badly behaved himself towards his master, will not submit to be tried before
the said wardens, then such man shall be arrested by a sergeant of the Chamber, at the suit of the said
wardens, and brought before the Mayor and Aldermen; and before them let him be punished, at their
discretion.” — Memorials of London, pp. 247, 248. The same preamble and ordinance appear in the
“Regulations of the Trade of the Alien Weavers in London” (1362), ibid., p. 307 Almost a
half-century earlier, in 1303, the Cordwainers had found it advisable to forbid by ordinance that their
journeymen should meet to make provisions to the prejudice of the craft or the damage of the
common people, on pain of imprisonment. — Liber Custumarum, p. 84. For an account of the
disputes between the Saddlers and their “Yomen,” see Memorials of London, pp. 542–544; for similar
disputes in the London Gild of Taylors, see Clode’s Merchant Taylors’ Company, pp. 609–612. The
increasing number of rules for the regulation of the classes in their intercourse is evidence of the want
of harmony between them. Graduated fees for the several classes were at once the cause and effect
of the crystallization of differences between them.
261. In English Economic History, vol. i., part ii, pp.106–124.
262. Clode, Early History of the Merchant Taylors’ Company, chapter on ‘’Bachelor or Yeomen
Company of Taylors,” vol. i., pp. 60–74.
263. Ashley.
264. Memorials of London, p. 570. Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce.
265. Growth of English Industry and Commerce, vol. i, p. 339.
266. E.g., The Gild of Fullers and Gild of Tylers, of Lincoln; the Carpenters’ Gild, the Saddlers’ and
Spurriers’ Gild, the Brotherhood of Barbers, the Gild of Peltyers, and the Tailors’ Gild, of Norwich;the Shipmen’s Gild of Lynn, and the Gild of Smiths of Chesterfield. “No tyler nor ‘poyntowr’ shall
stay in the city [of Lincoln], unless he enters the gild,” while the Gild of Fullers was founded by “all
the brethren and sisteren of the fullers in Lincoln.”
267. The Gild of Tylers mentioned in the preceding note ordained that “ if any brother does anything
underhanded am with ill-will, by which another will be wronged in working his craft, he shall pay to
the gild a pound of wax, without any room for grace,” an ordinance on the border-line between
religious fraternity and industrial organization. Among the many ordinances of the Gild of Fullers,
also mentioned in the preceding note, were a few of an industrial nature: “None of the craft shall work
on the trough [i.e., full cloth by treading it with the feet] and none shall work at the wooden bar with
a woman, unless with the wife of a master or her handmaid”; working on Saturdays after noon or on
feast-days of the Church was forbidden; strangers were admitted to work among the brethren and
sisters and enrolled on the payment of a penny to the wax; “if any one wishes to learn the craft, no
one shall teach it to him until he has given two pence to the wax.” — Smith, English Gilds.
268. “In honor of God, of Our Lady, and of all Saints, and for the nurture of tranquillity and peace
among the good folks the Megucers, called ‘Whittawyers’ [they have] ordained the points:... That
they will find a wax candle, to burn before Our Lady in the Church of All Hallows.... That each
person of the said trade shall put in the box such sum as he shall think fit, in aid of maintaining the
said candle,... If by chance any one of the said trade shall fall into poverty, whether through old age,
or because he cannot labor or work, and have nothing with which to help himself; he shall have every
week from the said box seven pence for his support, if he be a man of good repute; and after his
decease, if he have a wife, a woman of good repute, she shall have weekly for her support seven
pence from the said box, as long as she shall behave herself well and keep single. If any one of the
said trade shall have work in his house that he cannot complete, or if for want of assistance such work
shall be in danger of being lost, those of the said trade shall aid him, that so the said work be not
lost.... And if any of the said trade shall depart this life, and have not wherewithal to be buried, he
shall be buried at the expense of their common-box; and when any one of the said trade shall die, all
those of the said trade shall go to the vigil, and make offering on the morrow that no one of the said
trade shall behave himself the more thoughtlessly, in the way of speaking or acting amiss,... and if any
one shall do to the contrary thereof, he shall not follows the said trade until he shall have reasonably
made amends” — Memorials of London, pp. 232–234.
269. See English Economic History, vol. i., part i., pp. 91, 92.
270. Thus, analogously, the Gild Merchant of Coventry, founded in 1340, made a return in response
to the demands of Richard II. in 1389, but though it introduced its return with a statement that the gild
had been formed by merchants of the city, “troubled about their merchandise, through being far from
the sea,” no ordinances of an economic nature were reported, the return being confined to
social-religious ordinances, such as the king had demanded. — Smith, English Gilds, p 226.
271. Ashley, English Economic History, vol. ii., pp. 134–158.
272. Madox, History of the Exchequer, vol. i., pp. 337–341, with notes referring to Pipe Rolls.
273. “Sciatis me concessisse Telariis Londoniarum Gildam suam, in Londoniis habendam, cum
omnibus libertalibus et consuetudinibus quas habuerunt tempore Regis Henrici, avi mei; et ita quod
nullus nisi per illas se intromittat infra civitatum de eo ministerio, et nisi sit in eorum Gilda, neque
in Sudwerke, neque in aliis locis Londoniis pertinentibus, aliter quam solebat fieri tempore Regis
Henrici, avi mei.... Ita quod singulis annio inde reddant mihi duas marcas auri.... Et prohibeo nequis
eis super hoc aliquam injuriam vel contumeliam faciat, supra decem libras foris facturae....” — Liber
custumarum, p. 33.
274. Madox, History of the Exchequer, vol. i., pp. 562, 563.275. Liber Custumarum, p. 48.
276. Madox, History of the Exchequer, vol. i., p. 414.
277. In the reign of Edward I, when, in compassion for their poverty, he reduced the ferm of the
weavers of Oxford from a mark of gold to forty-two shillings yearly, it was to be rendered “per manus
majorum et Ballivorum suarum Oxoniae qui pro tempore fuerint,” instead of directly to the officers
of the exchequer. See the order from the King to the barons of the exchequer, in Madox’s History of
the Exchequer, vol. i, pp. 33q. 340, note (z).
278. As an example, the language used in the ordinances of the Tapicers may be quoted: “These are
the Ordinances of the Trade of Tapicers, made by the good folks of the said trade: the which
Ordinances were approved and accepted before John de Pulteneye, Mayor, the Aldermen and the
Commonalty, in the Court of Common Pleas holden [in 1331].” — Memorials of London, p. 178.
279. “Saving always unto the Mayor and Aldermen, for the time being, power to amend and change,
to curtail and adjust, the articles aforesaid at any time that unto them it may seem requisite, for the
common profit, for them so to do; and also, to make due and rightful correction in behalf of those who
shall complain that under color of any of the said Articles they have been wrongfully aggrieved.” —
Ordinances of the Cutlers, Memorials of London, p. 441.
So, too, in Bristol, in affirming, ratifying and confirming ordinances proposed by the fullers, the
mayor, sheriff and burgesses say: “That if any ordinance, point, or addition, touching the said craft,
may be profitable, as well to the town as to the craft, then, by the advice of us and the masters of said
craft, amendment thereof shall be made, these ordinances not-withstanding.” — Smith, English Gilds,
pp. 283–285.
The ordinances of the butchers, as an exception to the general rule, appear to have been enacted by
the mayor and aldermen, and then consented to by the craft. — Memorials of London, pp. 179, 180.
The regulations of the armourers are said to have been made with their assent, in the presence of the
mayor, aldermen and sheriffs. — Ibid., pp. 145, 146.
280. See New Articles of the Pouchmakers, 43 Edward III. (137l): “To the honorable the Mayor and
Aldermen of the City of London, pray the good folks, Pouchmakers of the same city, that whereas
they have some Articles of that trade which are very profitable, to the common profit of the people,
and not as yet enrolled; it will please you to accept these Articles to be enrolled, for the common
profit of the people;... ” — Riley, Memorials of London, p. 360.
281. “But through frequent removal of the Sheriffs and Bailiffs, Land] through too great sufferance
on the part of some of the bailiffs, the... articles [of the mistery] are not duly observed and are abused;
by reason whereof it is proper to apply a remedy thereto....” — Statutes of Fishmongers, Liber Albus,
pp. 323–334.
In Bristol the Fullers prayed: “Whereas the said craft has, of old time, had divers ordinances
enrolled... of record in the Gihald of Bristol wherefore may it please... to grant to the said applicants
that all their good ordinances of old time entered of record, and not repealed, be firmly held and kept
and duly put in execution... and to grant to the said suppliants... new additions and points [proposed].”
— Smith, English Gilds, pp. 283–286.
282. Memorials of London, pp. 400–402.
283. See Memorials of London, pp. 107, 108, 116, 117, 135, 171, 172, 212, 214, 215, 249, 250, 529,
530, 596, 597, and in many other places.
284. The powers of the Masters of the Founders were quite exceptional in this regard. “All work in
the said trade that can be found falsely wrought, and made of false metals, shall be broken by the
masters of the said trade.”  — Ordinances of the Founders, Memorials of London, p. 515.285. “If any one of the... Trade [of Cordwainers] shall be found offending, touching the trade, or
rebellious against the wardens thereof, such person shall not make any complaint to any one of
another trade by reason of the discord or dissension that may have arisen between them; but he shall
be ruled by the good folks of his own trade. And if he differ from them, as acting against right, then
let the offense be adjudged upon before the Mayor and Aldermen; and if he be found rebellious let
him pay a fine to the chamber.” — Articles of the Cordwainers or Tawyers, Memorials of London,
pp. 391, 392.
286. “As to all those of the... trade who do not wish to be judged by the wardens of the trade for the
time being, upon matters touching the trade, the names of such shall be presented to the Mayor and
to the Aldermen, and by them they shall be judged as to the wrong or falsity which they have
committed.” — Articles of the Cutlers, Memorials of London, pp. 217–219.
287. Liber Custumarum, p. 123. See also Statutes of Fishmongers, Liber Albus, pp. 323–334.
288. Memorials of London, p. 21.
289. Ibid., pp. 344, 345.
290. Herbert, History of the Twelve Great Livery Companies of London, vol. i., pp. 56, 57.
291. See the ordinances of the fullers and weavers at (a) Beverly and (b) Oxford and of the weavers
at (c) Winchester and (d) Marlborough. (a) (c) In Beverly and Winchester the craftsmen could not
follow their craft outside the city: if they wished to leave their mistery, they had to appeal to the
municipal corporation to be received into the franchise and dispose of their tools. (b) In Oxford, the
consent of the “good men” of the city was necessary to the following of the crafts; the widow of a
craftsman had to leave the craft on her marriage to a second husband not of the craft. (d) In
Marlborough the craftsmen could work only for the good men of the city; if they lavished to acquire
the franchise, two probationary years had to be passed and in the third the craft had to be forsworn;
they might not engage in trade without disposing of their tools. In all four places the craftsmen were
wanting in capacity to accuse or bear witness against freemen. — Liber Custumarum, pp. 130, 131.
292. The double relation appears in an article of the Cordwainers or Tawyers (1375) “that no one of
said trade shall keep house within the franchise, if he be not free of the said city, and one knowing
his trade: and that no one shall be admitted to the freedom without the presence of the wardens of the
said trade, bearing witness to his standing.” Memorials of London, p. 391. See an ordinance of the
Barbers, of the same year, of the same import, ibid., pp. 393, 394. Likewise it was provided that no
one should “ keep shop of the... craft [of Scriveners] in the city [of London] or in the suburbs thereof
if he be not free of the city, made free in the same craft and that, by men of the craft.” — Ibid., p. 372.
More formally  it was required by an ordinance of the Braelers (Brace-makers) of London that a
foreigner should be brought by the wardens before the mayor and aldermen and in their presence
examined by the former “ as to whether he is proper and skilled in such trade, for the common profit;
and whether he is of good standing for dwelling in the said city.“ — Ibid, pp. 277–279. The
ordinances of the Glovers plainly contemplated the use of the craft without admission to its freedom.
“No foreigner in this trade shall keep shop, or shall follow this trade, or sell or buy, if he be not a
freeman of the city, without the assent of the wardens of the same trade, or the greater part thereof.”
— Ibid, pp. 245–247. By the articles of the Spurriers, “no alien of another country or foreigner of this
country, shall follow or use the said trade, unless he is enfranchised before the Mayor, Aldermen and
Chamberlain and that, by witness and surety of the good folks of the said trade, who will undertake
for trim as to his loyalty and his good behavior.” — Ibid pp. 226–247. The ordinances of the Lorimers
required strangers to enter into frankpledge — Liber Custumarum, p. 79. Even as late as the
seventeenth century there was a custom in Chester “that no man can uses  or exercise any trade unles
— besides his freedome of the Cittie — he be alsoe admitted, sworne, and made free of the same
Company whereof he desires to trade.” — Gross, The Gild Merchant, vol. i, p. 118, note (2), quotingfrom Harley MS. 2054, fol. 71.
293. According to its charter of 1602, the Council of Durham was to consist of a mayor, twelve
aldermen (serving for life) and the “twenty-four,” the latter consisting of two members of each of
twelve crafts, elected annually by the mayor and board of aldermen. — Gross, The Gild Merchant,
vol. i, p, iii, note (2).
294. The chapter on “National England,” in vol. ii.
295. Two early examples of the widening of the area of gild activity are evidenced by the two charters
granted by Edward I in 1327 to the Girdlers and the Pellipers (or Skinners) of London. By the first
the material and workmanship of girdles were prescribed and extended to all the cities and boroughs
of England, in each of which the regulations were to be enforced by the men of the local craft and by
the local mayors or other head officers, the searchers of the London gild, however, were given power
to search for false goods in other places. — Memorials of London, p p. 154–156. Certain ordinances
made by the Pellipers were accepted and approved by the King and provisions made by them for the
regulation of prices were to be in force not only in London but at fairs in all parts of the Kingdom,
— Ibid., pp. 153, 154.
296. See Statutes, vol. ii., p. 90; 19 Henry VII, c. 7 (1503), “For Making of Statutes by Bodies
Incorporate”: “No masters, wardens and fellowships of crafts or mysteries, nor any of them, nor any
rulers of gilds or fraternities [shall] take upon them to make any acts or ordinances or to execute any
acts or ordinances by them heretofore made, in disheritance or diminution of the prerogative of the
King, nor of other, nor against the common profit of the people, but that the same acts or ordinances
be examined and approved by the Chancellor, Treasurer of England, or Chief Justices of either
Benches, or three of them, or before both the justices of assize in their circuit or progress in the shire
where such acts or ordinances be made;..  none of the same bodies corporate [shall] take upon them
to make any acts or ordinances to restrain any person or persons to sue to the King’s highness, or to
any of his courts, for due remedy to be had in their causes, or put or execute any penalty or
punishment upon any of them for any such suit to be made.” The statute was in confirmation of an
earlier one of 15 Henry VI., requiring that ordinances be submitted to justices of the peace or the chief
governors of cities and be entered by them of record.
297. “It is ordained [in the first year of Edward III] that all the mysteries of the City of London shall
be lawfully regulated and governed, each according to its nature in due manner, that so no knavery,
Wise workmanship or deceit, shall be found in any manner in the said mysteries, for the honor of the
good folks of the said mysteries, and for the common profit of the people. And in each mystery there
shall be chosen and sworn four or six, or more or less, according as the mystery shall need; which
persons so chosen and sworn, shall have full power from the mayor well and lawfully to do and to
perform the same, And if any person of the said mysteries shall be rebellious, contradictory, or
fractious, that so such persons may not duly perform their duties, and shall thereof be attainted, he
shall be imprisoned and fined].” — Liber Albus, pp. 424, 425.
298. “No foreigner [shall] sell his wares... by retail, any more than other foreigners do in other trades
in the city... Butchers must dwell within the city, and hold the franchise equally with the other
citizens, or else wholly do the same as foreigners do.” — Ordinances of the Butchers (1331),
Memorials at London, pp. 179, 180.
299. Thus, in the 28th year of Edward I the burillers of London made complaint that the weavers had
substituted new statutes for old ones. Thereupon a body of new ordinances was drawn up by four
aldermen, six burillers and seven weavers, to be enforced by four wardens, and to regulate not only
the relations of weavers and hurillers to each other but also those to the outside world. — Liber
Custumarum, pp. 122–124. Two years earlier two successive royal writs had been issued for the
investigation of the practice of sending cloth outside of London to be fulled. On the confession of thepractice by the fullers of London, the “textores, burellarie, tinctures et
cissores” were called together “ad ordinandum et providendum dictum officium fullorum, qualiter
in posterum se debent habere et gerene, ad emendationem dicti officii fullorum,” and a code of rules
composed for the control of all the allied crafts. — Ibid., pp. 127–129. There was a similar
disagreement between the joiners and saddlers of London and the same method of adjusting it was
resorted to. — Ibid., p. 80.
The two hallmotes held each year by the fishmongers were attended by “all the fishmongers who
belong to the hallmote of the one fishmongery and the other” — the dealers in salt-fish and stock-fish
as well as those in fresh fish — but their statutes were enforced by fifteen wardens of the whole trade.
— Statutes of Fishmongers, Liber Albus, pp. 323–334.
300. The curriers and pelterers united in a statute or ordinance regulating fees, prices, etc., but they
were to be enforced by one of the former and three of the latter. — Liber Custumarum, p. 94.
301. Some of the peculiarities of the relations of trades under the “gild system” come into view in the
dispute of the cordwainers and cobblers in London in 1395. Complaint had been made to Richard II
by the alien “cobelers” dwelling in London “that they could not gain their living as they had gained
it theretofore, by reason of their disturbance by the wardens of the trade of ‘cordwainers.’” Thereupon
the mayor, upon the order of the King that “the cobelers should gain their living as they had done
from of old, and according as the custom” of London demanded, held an inquisition by twenty-four
sworn men, twelve of each trade, and charged them “loyally to present and declare that which was
due, and would belong in right and reason to either side.” The outcome of the inquisition was an
agreement by the two trades: “No person who meddles with old shoes, shall meddle with new shoes
to sell; and... every manner of work that may be made of new leather belongs to the new workers
[cordwainers] without their meddling with any old work to sell. And in the same manner, the old
workers [cobblers] shall not work upon anything but old leather for sale, on pain of forfeiting such
work; except in mending old boots and shoes, that is to say, in ‘quereling’ before and behind, clouting
and pecyng, ryvetting and lyning; in doing the which, they may take new leather, or old, whichever
shall be best for the common profit. And also, — that all persons following the said trade, in new
work and in old, as well masters as serving men, shall be under the rule and governance of the
wardens of the said trade of ‘cordwainers’ in overseeing and searching whether they keep the
ordinances and do their work, on both sides, well and lawfully, for the common profit.” — See
indenture of agreement between the cordwainers and the cobblers, Memorials of London, pp.
339–349. For additional rules see pp. 571–574.
302. Sometimes a degree of separation was due to other than purely economic causes. In 1370, the
Flemish weavers and the weavers of Brabant there ordered to hold distinct meetings in separate
churchyards, on account of the fights, brawls and tumults that had been incidental to common
meetings; later it was held that the degree of separation was not such as to prevent the serving men
of the trade from serving indifferently the masters of either one or the other of the two bodies. —
Memorials of London, pp. 345, 346.
303. Ordinances of the Braziers (1406), Memorials of London, pp. 624–627. A step in advance of the
relations of the classes in the craft of braziers is exhibited in the relations of the lawyers and pelterers.
“These are the Ordinances provided and made [in 1365] by the serving-men called ‘Tawyers’ in the
city [of London], as to how they shall serve the Pelterers, and how much they shall take for their
labor”; that they should work for no one but pelterers, freemen of London; that their work should be
judged “by award and discretion of the rules of the trade of Pelterers”; that they should not make old
“budge” into new leather (by stripping off the fur); that they should not act as brokers between dealer
and dealer, etc. — Memorials of London, pp. 330, 331. In the latter case one gild was plainly subject
to another.304. See Table of Charters in Herbert’s History of the Twelve Great Livery Companies of London, vol.
i., p. 224.
305. The following were the new companies incorporated by James I: Curriers, plumbers, founders.
fruiterers, scriveners, brown-bakers, woolmongers, turners, apothecaries, silk-throwers, felt-makers,
ship-rights, bowyers and tobacco-pipe-makers.
306. When Sir John Frederick was elected mayor in 1661, he had to qualify himself for the office by
securing admission to the court of the Grocers’ Company; he had formerly been a member of the
Barber Chirurgeons Company.
307. At the end of the reign of Edward III thirteen of the companies seem to have been predominant
over the others. — Herbert, History of the Twelve Great Livery Companies of London, vol. i, pp.
33–35.
308. The chief privileges of the great livery companies were the following: (1) The wardens of them
alone might attend the lord mayor as chief butler at coronations; (2) they alone (except the armorers)
might enroll the sovereign as a member and entertain foreign princes and ambassadors; (3) they were
accorded precedence in civic pageants; (4) they alone contributed to repair the city walls; (5) they
were most heavily assessed in all levies for the state or city; (6) freedom of them was a necessary
qualification for the office of president of the Irish Society. — Herbert, History of the Twelve Great
Livery Companies of London, p. 37.
309. The process of selection or differentiation into great and lesser companies had begun before the
end of the fourteenth century. The great livery companies, in their order of precedence, were the
following: mercers, grocers, drapers, fishmongers, goldsmiths, skinners, merchant taylors,
haberdashers, salters, ironmongers, vintners and clothworkers.
310. The amounts were resolved into rent charges payable to the crown and then redeemed at twenty
years’ purchase.
311. Perhaps a survival of the earlier more democratic constitution appeared in the announcement,
at the annual “election dinner” of the livery, of the choice of officers already made by the court of
assistants at a “private election” or “secret election.”
312. In some of the lesser companies the livery numbered no more than ten members.
313. The Ironmongers’ Company and Joiners’ Company were exceptional in the respect that their
liveries and courts of assistants were identical; in other words, the whole livery was the governing
body.
314. Nine of the twelve great livery companies obtained new charters from James.
315. It is impossible to ascertain definitely whether the freedom might be acquired by marriage to a
“free brother” or “free sister” as in the early gilds, but the fact seems to be that it could not be so
acquired.
316. Quoted in Report of London Livery Companies Commission, p. 21.
317. “The freemen of the Vintners’ Company who have become such by patrimony or apprenticeship,
and the widows of such freemen, enjoy by custom the right of selling foreign wines without a license
throughout England,” — London Livery Companies Commission, Report, (1884), p. 19.
318. 40 and 41 Victoria, c. 42.
319. Statutes 5 and 6 William IV, c. 63, and 41 and 42 Victoria, c. 49.
320. 31 and 32 Victoria, c. 113.
321.  London Livery Companies Commission, Report, pp. 19, 20. “The Vintners’ and Dyers’
Companies are by ancient custom associated with the crown as joint protectors of the swans of the
Thames.” — Ibid.322. The Stationers’ Company appears to be an exception to the general rule. This company “consists
exclusively of craftsmen land] carriers on in its corporate capacity the trade of a publisher, its
principal publications being Almanacs.” — London Livery Companies Commission, Report (1884),
pp. 19, 20.
323. London Livery Companies Commission, Report, p. 15.
324. London Livery Companies Commission. Report, part iii., p. 1.
325. Statutes 15 and 16 Henry VIII, c. 11.
326. Herbert, vol. ii., p. 289 (Charters of the Goldsmiths Company).
327. According to Herbert, op. cit., the “touch” and the “trial of the pyx” had been conferred on the
Goldsmiths’ Company before the twenty-eighth year of the reign of Edward I.
328. London Livery Companies Commission, Report. pp. 19, 20.
329. Probably the best exemplification of the use of a gild or the company developed from it for the
exercise of national functions is found in the history of the “Master, Wardens and Assistants of the
Gild, Fraternity or Brotherhood of the most glorious and undivided Trinity, and of St. Clement in the
Parish of Deptford Strand in the County of Kent.” The company is assumed to have been a medieval
gild of pilots, mariners and seamen, but first appears positively from historical evidence in the early
part of the sixteenth century, when it was incorporated by Henry VIII. At that time it was governed
by a master, four wardens and eight assistants, and provided pilots for vessels, attended to the burial
of deceased brethren and sisters, gave charitable aid to seamen and mariners in distress, relieved the
widows and orphans of brethren and cared for the wives and children of such as were sick or in
captivity. When Admiralty and Navy Boards were estate fished by Henry VIII in 1520, the company
was placed in charge of the shipbuilding yard at Deptford. By act of Parliament in the eighth year of
the reign of Elizabeth, they were given authority to erect new sea-marks and preserve old ones, and
to grant licenses to mariners to row in the Thames; a fine of £100 might be imposed by them for the
destruction of a sea-mark, one half for their own use and one half for the use of the crown later in the
same reign they acquired the entire rights of ballastage, beaconage and buoyage. In 1620 their duties
are said to have been to lay buoys and erect beacons, to have charge of the naval stores and oversight
of shipbuilding at Deptford, to present designs for ships and examine foreign ships offered for sale,
to inspect provisions, cordage, ordnance and ammunition as well for private as for royal vessels, to
give certificates to pilots and to masters recommended for royal vessels, and even to impress masters
and seamen for the royal navy, to appoint some foreign consuls, as at Leghorn and Genoa, to serve
as hydrographers of the navy, to participate in the adjudication of causes in the admiralty court in the
capacity of assessors, to survey the number, armament and equipment of fleets, to grant licenses for
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